Tape 9: William of Ockham

Ockham was another opponent of the papal claims to fullness of power, but not as extreme an opponent as Marsilius. Whereas Marsilius wanted to subordinate the Church to the secular ruler in a Christian state, Ockham reasserted the older 'Gelasian' theory of the relationship between Church and State, namely, that each is independent of the other. He argues that Christ did not take away any of the legitimate rights enjoyed by non-Christians, and, in particular, did not subordinate the Roman Empire and other kingdoms to the pope.

William of Ockham

William of Ockham was born about 1285, entered the Franciscan order, studied and taught philosophy and theology in the schools of his order and in the University of Oxford.

Ockham's university work was interrupted in about 1324 by a summons to the court of Pope John XXII at Avignon to answer complaints against the orthodoxy of his Oxford theology lectures. A committee of theologians was appointed to review the text, and worked slowly; it produced two reports, but after four years no final decision had been made. Meanwhile Ockham had become convinced that the pope himself had fallen into heresy -- not over anything to do with Ockham's Oxford teaching, but over questions which had arisen in controversies about poverty which had been going on within the Franciscan order, and between the mendicant orders and the secular clergy, since the mid-thirteenth century; see Lambert, Franciscan Poverty (BX3604.L3), or (for a short account) Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility (BX1806.T54).

Poverty and property

Pope John had issued several bulls which amounted to a rejection of Franciscan views on poverty. The Franciscans (so they claimed) owned nothing at all, not even 'in common', i.e., as a community: that is, not only did individual members of the order have no property, but the order as a community had none. They held that Christ and the apostles had also owned absolutely nothing, either individually or in common. The Franciscans had (they claimed) mere 'use of fact' of things needed to live and work: i.e., they made merely de facto use, without any legally-enforcable right, of buildings, books, clothes, food, etc., which remained the property of the donors or became the property of the pope. Against this, Pope John ruled that Christ and the apostles had had common property, that no one can rightly use things consumed by use (such as food and drink) without having property in them -- that even in the state of innocence Adam had had individual property in such things; and that in future property given for the Franciscans' use would not become nominally the pope's property but would be the common property of the Franciscan order.

The Franciscan leaders regarded these rulings as the destruction of the order's way of life, and as heresy (being incompatible, they held, with the bible and with the previous teaching of the Church). While in Avignon Ockham met the head of the order, Michael of Cesena, and became convinced that Pope John was a heretic. In 1328, with Michael and several others, Ockham left Avignon and went to Italy to join Ludwig of Bavaria. When Ludwig returned to Germany they went with him. Ockham spent the next twenty years until his death in 1349 in Munich, writing a series of books and pamphlets to show that John XXII and his successor Benedict XII were heretics and therefore not true popes. (It was generally held at the time that a pope who became a heretic automatically ceased to be pope; see Tierney, Foundations of Conciliar Theory (BX821.T5), pp. 57-67.)

Property a human institution

Ockham's first controversial writing was Opus nonaginta dierum (OND, the Work of Ninety Days, so-called because it was written in 90 days). It was concerned mainly with poverty and property. In it Ockham upholds against John XXII the doctrine, held until then by most theologians, that property did not exist in the state of innocence but was instituted by human enactment (law, custom, law of nations, civil law) to reduce the disorder and neglect which resulted from Adam's sin. Without 'appropriation' (i.e., the designation of some things as one person's and others as others') sinful man would take what others need, and would take no care for the provision of things needed. John, on the other hand, held that by divine law individual property exists even in the state of innocence, since anyone who consumes food or drink must have property in it. This is like the theory later held by John Locke in the 17th century. Ockham's theory is like that of David Hume and the Utilitarians of the 18th and 19th centuries.

Church and state

Ockham also wrote on the relation of Church and state. The dissident Franciscans needed allies, and turned to Ludwig of Bavaria. Ludwig and other secular rulers were threatened by the claims John and some of his predecessors made to superior authority. Ockham came to see the whole policy of John XXII and Benedict XII as the application of an extreme doctrine of fullness of power: exaggerating their powers as God's vicars, the popes were claiming (as Ockham saw it) power to make and remake the Christian faith, to make and unmake governments, to create and abolish rights of all sorts. Against this he argued that the powers of the pope as Christ's vicar were much less than Christ's own powers, and that Christ himself had not abolished or lessened the rights or liberties previously had by unbelievers; Christian laymen still had those rights and liberties, and not by grant from the pope, and the pope was obliged to respect them. (And Christians generally would be obliged to respect the rights of non-Christians: a point of importance when Christians began to invade south America.)

All of this was no doubt welcome to Ludwig of Bavaria: it meant that the Roman Emperor in the fourteenth century had the same rights as the Roman emperors of ancient times and was not the pope's vassal. However Ockham also stresses the rights and liberties of lower princes and other subjects against the emperor and other rulers. The emperor does not have 'fullness of power' in secular matters, any more than the pope does

Recitative and assertive writings

Ockham's controversial writings fall into two classes, 'recitative' and 'assertive'. The former merely recite or report and compare arguments and objections, without saying what conclusion Ockham himself holds, the latter state and argue for his own opinions. The recitative writings include Opus nonaginta dierum (abbreviated OND, The Work of Ninety Days), Octo quaestiones (abbreviated OQ, Eight Questions), and the Dialogus (Dialogue between Master and Student). The assertive writings include the Breviloquium (Short discourse concerning the tyrannical rule over divine and human things, and especially over the Empire and its subjects, usurped by certain persons called supreme pontiffs), and a number of other works.

SHORT DISCOURSE

Book 1 of the Short Discourse (Breviloquium) argues that there is nothing wrong in discussing the nature and limits of papal power. In the remaining books he argues that the pope has no power in secular matters.

Read ii.1 (i.e. book 2, chapter 1).

This is the theory to be refuted in book 2.

Read ii.2.

The references, 'd. 19, Si Romanorum' and the like, are to sections of the canon or civil law. Various of the law texts are denoted by 'd.', 'q.', 'X.', 'ff.', 'C.' etc. Each of the latin phrases, Si Romanorum, etc., identifies a section by its opening words. The law books were accompanied by a standard commentary in the margin, called the 'ordinary gloss', in the form of glosses or notes keyed to words and phrases in the text. In footnote 7 dicendo identifies the relevant part of this commentary by the word it glosses. Ockham makes many quotations from the law texts, the bible, the fathers of the Church and many other authorities because he is arguing against the apparent authority of the reigning pope.

Read ii.3.

Note Ockham's conception of a 'right': A right is something of which a person cannot justly be deprived against his will, unless he has committed some fault or there is some good reason in terms of the common good, which the courts will restore to him if he is improperly deprived.

Schisms: splits.

Read ii.4.

Ockham, like other Christians before him, did not reject slavery on principle.

Chapters 5 and 6 give other arguments to show that Christ did not give the pope such fullness of power.

Read ii.7.

Elsewhere (OQ, i.4, pp. 22-3) Ockham argues that there is nothing in the nature of secular power and religious authority which prevents their being held by the same person; their separation is a matter of divine positive law. His main authority for this positive law is 2 Tim. 2:4, 'No one on God's service involves himself in secular business'.

Chapters 8-12 continue the argument that the pope does not have fullness of power in temporal matters. Chapter 13 challenges the pope's supporters to say what power they think he has.

Read ii.14.

The doctrine of fullness of power did not mean that the pope could do anything, but that he could do directly whatever any authority in the Church could do. But the argument Ockham is criticising, if it is sound, does not prove merely this. He is criticising it by pointing out that it has implications that would be unacceptable to those who use it.

Read ii.16.

The rights which unbelievers had before Christ, and the corresponding rights of believers, are not subjected to the pope's power.

'According as in other words': anyone who says that a supposed right is not really a right because it conflicts with the gospel law must show that Christ and the apostles somewhere said so specifically -- 'Whatever you bind' cannot be taken as a general abrogation of existing rights.

This is a difficult paragraph, so let us read it again. "Without rash assertion..." etc. "from the regular and ordinary power": i.e., "normally". In a few pages time we will come to the idea that the pope has extra rights of intervention in unusual cases. But he wants to say that normally the pope cannot interfere with the rights rulers and other people had before the establishment of the Christian church. But of course some of the rights of governments recognised then might not have been genuine rights -- e.g. the ancient Roman empire claimed the right to suppress the Christian religion, to execute people in cruel ways, and so on. So he says, "the legitimate rights", "which do not conflict with good morals" etc. So there is room to argue that some of the anciently-recognised rights should not have been recognised. But what about the "etc." -- "which do not conflict with good morals, God's honour and the observance of the gospel law" -- doesn't this open up the possibility that the pope may after all abolish lots of anciently-recognised rights on the ground that they have been abolished by the gospel law? So Ockham restricts this opening: "according as in words other than 'whatever you bind'" etc. That is, if you want to argue that the gospel law has abolished some of the ancient rights, you have to find some bible text that abolishes some particular right in explicit terms; you can't claim, Ockham says, that this text "Whatever you bind" is a wholesale abolition of all the preexistent rights. You must find a text where Christ, the evangelists (i.e. gospel writers) or apostles have "fully taught and more clearly explained" that this or that ancient right has been abolished. So the rights rulers and other people had "before the explicit establishment of the gospel law", i.e. before the time of Christ, are still the rights of rulers and laypeople and unbelievers, unless you can argue (a) that some particular so-called right was really against morality, or (b) that in some bible text specifically relating to the right in question Christ or the Apostles explicitly abolished that right. There is a presumption that the same rights exist now as did before Christ came. This puts an onus of proof on anyone claiming the abolition of an ancient right -- they must produce an argument either in terms of morality or in terms of a specifically relevant bible text.

Read ii.17.

The previous chapter was about rights, this is about liberties.

'Supererogatory': beyond the call of duty.

In ii.18 Ockham argues that in matters which do come under his jurisdiction the pope should not impose any heavy burden unnecessarily.

Read ii.19, 20.

The second last opinion is Marsilius', the last is approximately Ockham's own. Read the footnotes. Notice in footnote 96 that Ockham does not reject the papacy and acknowledges that in a certain sense the pope has fullness of power -- but not in the sense stated in ii.1. The pope can on occasion (casualiter) intervene in secular matters, which are not regularly his concern, either by virtue of the general power everyone has to do anything that is necessary to the common good if those whose proper business it is fail to do it, or else by virtue of a power Christ gave specifically to the pope to do whatever is necessary to the safety of the Church, the salvation of souls and the government of the faithful. In temporal matters he cannot do even what is necessary unless the laity will not do it.

So Ockham does not think that the pope should never intervene in secular matters. 'Occasionally' he should, when some emergency threatens the Christian community (e.g., an invasion by the Saracens) and the lay rulers do not respond effectively. But on these occasions the pope is supplying the deficiencies of those whose proper business the matter is; he is not intervening as if he had an over-riding authority in temporal matters. For a modern example, we might imagine that in some emergency the Red Cross might take over governmental functions if no one else would perform them.

Book ii has argued that the pope does not have 'fullness of power' in a certain sense. The remaining books argue that the Roman Empire is not subject to the pope.

Read iii.1

'Major premise': that divine law is what is found in the scriptures. 'Minor premise': that it is in the scriptures that before there were kings some things were appropriated.

In reply to this theory, Ockham quotes many texts from the bible and from fathers of the Church which imply that unbelievers had property in things, and political jurisdiction: e.g., 'Give to Caesar the things which are Caesar's' (Mt. 22:21), 'But Paul said, 'I stand at Caesar's judgment seat, where I ought to be judged'' (Acts 25:10). Then he states his own position:

Read iii.6.

Compare the last sentence with the definition of right, above, note to ii.3.

Read iii.7.

The question in this chapter is whether property exists by natural law, divine positive law, or human law. Ockham's answer is that it does not exist by natural law, that divine positive law gives mankind the power to make human laws under which individuals or groups can appropriate things; individuals then acquire property by doing whatever human law says establishes property in a thing. For example, if I acquire property in an animal taken in the hunt, that is by virtue of a human law which says that capture of a wild animal makes it property (Roman law called this occupatio); that human law was able to be made because divine positive law gave mankind the right to make laws permitting appropriation.

'Without power to appropriate... except by use': Perhaps this envisages a sort of temporary property, such as you have while using a book in a library -- another reader normally cannot take the book until you are finished.

'Useful and expedient': Cf. Aristotle, Politics II.5; Thomas Aquinas, S.T., 2-2, q. 66, a. 2. (See Readings).

'Brought in by divine law': Divine positive law, revealed in the bible.

Read iii.8.

The point of this chapter is to reject the doctrine of Giles of Rome (see Readings, vol. 1, p. 177 ff) and others that by right only Christian believers should have property or political power.

'Falls under precept': Given the disorders caused by sin, property and government are normally necessary and ought to be established. There is thus a precept (i.e. a command or imperative) to establish these institutions. 'Purely a matter of morality': as distinct from the precepts about ritual etc. found in the bible, which are matters of divine positive law. Morality is natural law. Its requirements are not known only by those who have read the bible, but also by unbelievers.

"Situation of necessity": It was held that someone judicially deprived of a right, as punishment, could nevertheless use it in case of necessity, i.e. to save his life. Ockham says that unbelievers can appropriate and establish government not only in case of necessity, since they have not been deprived of these rights.

In the next three chapters Ockham concedes that God did in a few cases directly confer property or jurisdiction; but in general these things exist by human law made under divine law conferring law-making power.

Read iii.12.

In Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae for each question there are first objections, then the author's answer to the question, then his replies to the objections. Several of the 'books' of the Breviloquium have a similar structure. In the remaining chapters of book iii Ockham answers the arguments put forward in chapter 1 in favour of the theory Ockham rejects.

Read iv.3.

Book iii argued that the Roman empire is not 'from' the pope -- i.e., that the Emperor is not the pope's vassal. So who is it from? Ockham's answer will be: The Emperor's power comes from God ('All power is of God...', Rom. 13:1), but through the people; but once the people has conferred power on the Emperor he is answerable normally to God alone, though on occasion an emperor may be corrected or deposed by the people.

Read iv.4.

'Deprived of his right': Someone may be deprived of his right without having committed any fault if the common good urgently requires it; e.g., the ruler may requisition a boat or a horse or other private property in a military or civil emergency.

Read iv.5.

Ockham holds that the Empire is from God alone in the third way.

Read iv.6.

In iv.7 Ockham argues that the Roman empire is not from God in the first or second ways. If it were from God in either of those ways, that could be known only through the bible, and it is not to be found there.

Read iv.8.

In the omitted sections Ockham quotes at length from Gregory, Chrysostom, Ambrose and other Church fathers to the effect that Christ did not take away or reduce the rights of the Roman empire, or of other governments.

'According to his passible and mortal humanity': According to Christians Christ was God as well as man. Ockham is saying that as man Christ was not superior to any king, though as God he is supreme. ( 'Passible': capable of suffering.)

The argument of this chapter is that the emperors who were not Christians were not subject to the Jewish religious authorities before Christ, nor to Christ, nor to Peter, nor to Peter's successors (the popes); and that when the emperors became Christians they did not then become subject to the popes in temporal matters. On Ockham's theory the medieval 'Roman Empire' is the ancient Roman empire continuing.

In iv.9 Ockham presents arguments which seem to show that the Roman empire 'must be regarded not as a true [legitimate] empire, but only as a tyrannical empire usurped over equals'.

Read iv.10.

Ockham regards Christ's statements about the Roman empire as proving that at least in his time it was a legitimate regime.

In iv.11 Ockham answers in detail the arguments of iv.9 to prove that the Roman empire was a usurped tyranny. In iv.12 he asks whether, if the Roman empire could be established by the mere will and consent of those who subjected themselves, could it not be dis-established later by their mere will and dissent?

Read iv.13

Ockham favours world government.

There are two more books, in which Ockham answers arguments to prove that secular rulers must be subject to the pope based on texts in the bible (see the arguments of Unam sanctam, in Readings), and on texts of canon law. The only surviving manuscript of the Breviloquium breaks off in mid-sentence.

Summary

In the Breviloquium William of Ockham discusses the nature and limits of papal power. He argues that the pope regularly has no power in secular affairs and may intervene ('occasionally') only where a natural emergency or ineffective lay rulers endangers the Christian community.

According to Ockham property would not have existed in the state of innocence. It was established after sin as a remedy for greed and negligence. Property exists, with God's permission, by positive human legislation.

Ockham argues against the papal confirmation of the Roman emperor on the grounds that the Roman empire is not 'from' the pope, hence the emperor cannot be a papal vassal. Ockham maintains that the medieval Roman empire is a continuation of the ancient Roman empire.

Further Study

See William of Ockham, Eight Questions, Dialogus, Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, John of Paris, Ibn Khaldun and Franciscus de Victoria, De Indis. There are extracts in the Readings book and reading guides in Volume 3, Supplementary Readings. Ockham's Eight Questions includes a critique of Marsilius's idea of sovereignty. The extracts from Dialogus include a discussion of what reasons there might be for thinking that monarchy is the best form of government, and a discussion of the emperor's powers, which Ockham subjects to the same restrictions as he imposes on the powers of the pope -- while supporting a world monarchy in politics and papacy in the Church, Ockham opposed absolute government in both Church and State.

For translations from Ockham's Dialogue and other works see William of Ockham, Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. McGrade and Kilcullen (Cambridge University Press, 1995); also E. Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (JA82.L5), pp. 80 ff, 117 ff, 300 ff, 398 ff, 495 ff, 606 ff.

A.S. McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (JC121.034.M33). For Chapter 2 see Volume 3, Supplementary Readings, p. 139 ff.

Bayley, 'Pivotal Concepts in the Political Philosophy of William of Ockham', Journal of the History of Ideas, 10 (1949), pp. 199-218, (B1.J75)

For an account of the educational system of the time and of Ockham's theories and influence see Courtenay Schools and Scholars in 14th Century England. For a summary account of his philosophy see Copleston, A History of Philosophy (B72.C6), vol. 3; for a full account and analysis of his philosophy and theology see Adams, William of Ockham (B765.034.A72) On Ockham's 'razor' see Maurer in The Monist, 61 (1978), pp. 426-43 (B1.M7), and in Medieval Studies, 46 (1984), pp.463-75 (D111.M44).

On later discussion of the question whether unbelievers have any right to their property, see Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-1550 (KBG500.M8); Pennington, in Church History, 39 (1970), pp.149-61 (BR140.A45).)

Tutorial Questions

1. What power does Ockham think that pope has, and does not have?

2. What does he mean by "right"? by "liberty"? What rights and liberties does he think unbelievers have? the laity?

3. What does he mean by property? By what law does he think property exists? Compare his views on this topic with those of Thomas Aquinas.

4. Does Ockham endorse the claim that the emperor's power is from God alone?

5. To what extent was Ockham a liberal? (Read McGrade in volume 3.)

6. Compare the views of Ockham and Marsilius.

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