William of Ockham, Eight Questions, Dialogue: Reading Guide

(The Readings book contains extracts.)

In Eight Questions Ockham states and compares various answers to a set of questions someone active in politics had sent to him and to others (one other set of answers survives). It is one of Ockham's 'recitative' works, in which he does not indicate which of the various opinions is his.

Read iii.1 (i.e. question 3, ch. 1)

This states several theories which imply an affirmative answer to the question.

Theory (a), 'fullness of power': This is the theory criticised in Short Discourse, book ii.

Theory (b): There ought to be one world ruler (though without 'fullness of power' in the objectionable sense), who should be the pope. The argument for this theory ('It is also proved by reason...') is constructed from materials taken from Marsilius of Padua (p. 80, in Readings), but (b) is not Marsilius' theory: he does not hold that the pope should be the supreme ruler. Perhaps Ockham thought that Christians would have to hold that any ruler as strong as the one Marsilius advocated would have to be the head of the Church.

Read iii.2

This states theories which imply a negative answer. Theory (c) is Marsilius', (e) is Ockham's. Theory (c) corresponds to the fourth of the opinions presented in Short Discourse, ii.20 (Readings, pp. 171-2); theory (d) corresponds to the first, and theory (e) to the last. In (e) note 'regularly or occasionally'; cf. Short Discourse, iv.4, Readings, p. 177.

Read iii.3

Arguments {c}, {d}, {e}, corresponding to the three theories of chapter 2: the answers in this chapter to the arguments of chapter 1 are given from the standpoint of these three theories. Theory {c} is that of Marsilius of Padua, who says that a community must have one head (cf. Readings, p. 160). According to Ockham, theory {e}, a community need not have a single head, and indeed is not well governed if it has one head who is never subject to correction or deposition.

Read iii.4, 8

Coercive power is what distinguishes a ruler from a teacher; cf. Marsilius, Readings, pp. 161-2.

Read iii.9

This and the next two chapters clarify theory {e} (see last two paragraphs of iii.3).

'But for jurisdiction... especially from a superior...': Ockham is thinking of a bishop answerable to an outside authority. The jurisdiction of the bishop of Paris, for example, depends from a superior (the pope) who is not the king of France, and not a subject of the king of France.

Read iii.10

During the middle ages the clergy were normally exempt from the jurisdiction of secular courts, even when they committed ordinary crimes. Perhaps Ockham is thinking especially of the pope, who was on Ockham's view properly exempt from the coercive jurisdiction of the Emperor, except occasionally: under some circumstances an emperor might coerce a pope, but not regularly.

'Primarily the business of another, or others': e.g. a pope is to be corrected when necessary by the cardinals, or by a Church council; but if they fail the emperor or some other secular ruler may intervene. (In Contra Benedictum vii Ockham argues that the secular rulers should intervene to depose a pope who falls into heresy, or will not desist from injustice.)

Read iii.12

'At least in some case': at least occasionally, casualiter, when the regular machinery for correction fails.

'Whole world': See note 78 to Short Discourse, Readings. Ockham supposes that the Emperor might occasionally intervene in France or England, though normally those kingdoms would regularly be exempt from his jurisdiction.

'Christ's reasonable ordinance': In Ockham's view the exclusion of the clergy from secular affairs is a matter of divine positive law, not something required by the nature of religion or politics. 'Outside the case of necessity': regularly the clergy should not intervene in secular matters, but occasionally they should.

'Regularly' - 'occasionally': Ockham does not think that laws and institutions can be designed so that it will never be necessary or right to do something illegal or unconstitutional. Corruption of the head will always be possible, and it may be necessary for someone normally a subject, or someone outside the system and not normally entitled to intervene, to correct or depose the head. (Cf. Bayley, 'Pivotal Concepts in the Political Philosophy of William of Ockham', Journal of the History of Ideas, 10 (1949), pp. 199-218. [B1.J75].)

Dialogus

Ockham's Dialogue between Teacher and Student is a discussion of many of the issues in controversy between Pope John XXII and the dissident Franciscans. It is Ockham's largest and most important 'political' work (equivalent to about 1500 pages in a modern edition). The few pages printed in the Readings are on monarchy and on the power of the Emperor. Bear in mind that the work is a dialogue and that it is one of Ockham's 'recitative' writings; it surveys the range of opinion about the various questions discussed without asserting any opinion. So it is risky to attribute to Ockham himself as his own opinion any of the arguments presented. However, the extracts in the Readings express views that in my opinion Ockham probably held.

On Monarchy

Monarchy is rule by one person. Some monarchies are hereditary, some elective, and of elective monarchies some are appointments for life, others for a limited period of years, others subject to some condition. Thus the papacy was and is a monarchy (rule by one), elective (the pope is elected by the college of cardinals), for life. The medieval Roman Emperor was elected by seven (or so) Princes Electors, for life. The medieval King of Poland was elected for life. In modern constitutions the U.S. President is a monarch, elected by an electoral college (which is in turn elected by citizens of voting age), holding office for a fixed renewable term of four years (with a rule against more than two successive terms). A Prime Minister is a monarch in the relevant sense, appointed by a 'monarch' (so called - the Queen does not rule) or by the monarch's representative, holding office while he or she enjoys the confidence of Parliament. Sociologists sometimes call a bureaucracy in which each department is controlled by a single head 'monarchical' (or 'monocratic', which means the same thing).

Note also that 'rule' can have degrees. The power of a monarch may be limited to some extent, as long as it still makes sense to say that that person rules. Ockham does not attribute absolute and unfettered power to any ruler. He thinks that at least 'occasionally' any ruler may need to be corrected or deposed.

So in reading Ockham's arguments for 'rule by one', do not interpret them as arguments for hereditary absolute monarchy. Note that one of his arguments is that a single ruler is more easily removed if he rules badly. His argument for rule by one is simply that it is more efficient to have one person, rather than a committee, to make most ordinary decisions.

Read Dialogue, part III, tract I, book 2, chapters 18 and 19; and tract II, book 1, chapters 13 and 15.

Although Ockham thinks that monarchy is usually the best form of government, he does not think that it is the best form in every time and place.

Read Dialogue, part III, tract II, book 1, chapter 6, and tract I, book 2, chapters 20,22,25,28.

Notice that Ockham holds that it may be right on occasion to make an exception to an explicit divine command.

On the powers of the emperor

Just as the pope's powers are limited, so the powers of the Emperor are limited.

Read chapters XXVI-XXVIII

Note the legal maxim, 'What has pleased the prince has the force of law' - i.e. that the law is whatever the king or emperor wishes it to be, and Ockham's gloss: 'What pleases the prince reasonably and justly for the sake of the common good has the force of law' (chapter XXVI, argument (2), and chapter XXVIII, answer to second argument). Here again Ockham anticipates John Locke and other modern exponents of liberalism.

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