Copyright © 1996 R.J. Kilcullen
Quotations are from the translation by G.B. Phelan and I.T. Eschmann. Extracts in Readings.
But 'where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what pertains to the commonweal'. There must therefore exist something which 'impels towards the common good of the many'. Rule ordered to this common good is just, rule for the sake of the ruler's private good is unjust and perverted. Thomas then repeats the sixfold classification of Aristotle, Pol., III.7.
If a just government is in the hands of one man alone, he is properly called a king. Wherefore the Lord says by the mouth of Ezechiel: 'My servant, David, shall be king over them and all of them shall have one shepherd' [Ez. 27:24]. From this it is clearly shown that the idea of king implies that he be one man who is chief and that he be a shepherd seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own. (pp. 8-9)Following Aristotle, Thomas distinguishes by degrees of sufficiency between household, street and city. 'Still more self-sufficiency is found in a province' - in medieval Europe the city-state was no longer the highest unit. 'A king is one who rules the people of one city or province, and rules them for the common good. Wherefore Solomon says: 'The king ruleth over all the land subject to him' [Eccles., 5:8].'
Against rule by one: Just as the government of a king is best, so is government by a tyrant the worst. A force for evil does more evil when it is unified. 'There is a greater departure from the common good in an oligarchy, in which the advantage of a few is sought, than in a democracy, in which the advantage of many is sought; and there is a still greater departure from the common good in a tyranny, in which the advantage of only one man is sought'; pp. 14-5. If government by many becomes evil it is weaker and the many hinder one another; p. 15. Thomas then gives an account of the tyrant's repressive methods, based on Aristotle, Pol., V.11, 1313 a34-1314 a30, supplemented by bible texts: 'The sound of dread is always in his ears, and when there is peace... he always suspects treason'; Job 15:21. 'As a roaring lion and a hungry bear, so is a wicked prince over the poor people'; Prov. 28:15.
It often happens 'that men living under a king strive more sluggishly for the common good, inasmuch as they consider that what they devote to the common good, they do not confer upon themselves but upon another, under whose power they see the common goods to be... Experience thus teaches that one city administered by rulers changing annually is sometimes able to do more than some kings having, perchance, two or three cities. (pp. 19-20.)
Despite these drawbacks Thomas recommends kingship. He argues that the risk of a king becoming a tyrant is the lesser danger (p. 21-). Government by many leads to dissension, which does more harm to peace than is likely to be done by a tyrant, unless he is extreme (cf. Aristotle, Pol., V.11, 1314 a30-1315 b12). Rule by many is more likely than kingship to give rise to tyranny.
Therefore, since the rule of one man, which is the best, is to be preferred, and since it may happen that it be changed into a tyranny, which is the worst..., a scheme should be carefully worked out which would prevent the multitude ruled by a king from falling into the hands of a tyrant. (p. 23).Thomas does not here say much about such a scheme, but in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 105, a. 1, he advocates mixed government, a combination of kingship, aristocracy and democracy. The right sort of man should be chosen as king, the government should be arranged so as to remove opportunity to tyrannize, and the king's power should be 'tempered'. There should also be means of removing a king who becomes a tyrant.
If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands. (p. 27)Chapters 7-11 outline the heavenly rewards for a king and the punishments that lie in store for a tyrant. Worldly glory should not be set up as the ruler's reward, although desire for glory is more like a virtuous motive than desire for money or pleasure [cf. Augustine, City of God, V.19]. But the best motive is desire for the happiness of heaven. Tyrants have no friends, are in continual danger and will be punished with eternal damnation.
Such men rarely repent... When will they ever restore all those things which they have received beyond their just due?... When will they make amends to those whom they have oppressed...? The malice of their impenitence is increased by the fact that they consider everything licit [i.e., permitted] which they can do unresisted and with impunity. (p. 50.)Let us hope that the King of Cyprus took all this to heart.
Read II.3 (= I.14 in the Readings Book).
The argument here is in terms of the subordination of ends. Rule belongs to whoever is the expert concerned with the highest end. If the highest end were bodily health, then rule would belong to the physician. The highest end of political life is that the citizens live well, and this end is the concern of the king, who rules the city. But citizens have a higher end - happiness in the afterlife. Priests, whose concern this end is, therefore have authority over kings, and the chief priest has the highest authority.
There are frequent references to Aristotle in the editors' footnotes. Thomas Aquinas did much to disseminate Aristotle's ideas.
The last few chapters of the book are about the king's role in the foundation of new cities.
Notice: