ROBERTO MICHELS: OLIGARCHY

John Kilcullen

Copyright (c) 1996, R.J. Kilcullen.

Michels, Schumpeter and C. Wright Mills are writers much influenced by Weber (Mills helped translate Weber into English) who have taken Weber's ideas further, and also made their own original contribution to political and social thought.

Michels started from the radical wing of the German Marxist party, the SPD, and ended in Italy as one of Mussolini's professors of Fascist political science. What unifies his intellectual biography is a Weberian concern with bureaucracy.

He was born in 1876 in Cologne, died in Italy in 1936. He studied in England, France and Italy, as well as Germany. His family background was French, Italian and German, and at various times he wrote for journals in each of those languages.

As a young man he was a member of the German Social Democratic Party. At this stage he was a radical critic of the SPD leadership, from a 'syndicalist' viewpoint. The 'syndicalists' (from the French word for a trade union) argued that participation in Parliamentary politics will not achieve socialism. Winning elections requires too much compromise. The best way is militant trade union action, culminating in a General Strike, which would transfer control of the factories not to the state but to the workers themselves. At this stage of his life Michels criticised the SPD as being too much concerned with winning seats in the Reichstag, too anxious to remain within the law, not militant enough in its opposition to the military dictatorship represented by the Kaiser.

From articles written at that time (quoted in David Beetham, 'From Socialism to Fascism: the Relation between Theory and Practice in the Work of Robert Michels', Political Studies 25 (1977), pp.3-24, 161-81): 'All the resolutions of German socialism are dominated by the fear of its organization's being dissolved by the state, which might take offense at any action too direct, too imprudent, or too energetic. It is this fear which has condemned anti-militarism and the general strike to perpetual oblivion, for how long no one knows. Organization for its own sake... this is the fetish to which German Social Democracy appears so often ready to sacrifice everything, including socialism itself.'

'In a country where initiative does not count, and people have a remarkable talent for being disciplined, where large numbers are enrolled into vast organizations characterized by a mechanical inflexibility, and where everything is militarized and bureaucratic, the workers have followed the same route and taken the same pattern of organization as the other classes. There is only one thing to equal the socialist and trade union bureaucracy in the perfection of its complex functioning and that is the bureaucracy of the state itself... One can understand how our workers' organization has become an end in itself, a machine which is perfected for its own sake and not for the tasks which it could have performed.'

At this time Michels may have thought that this bureaucratization was the result of German cultural patterns, something that could be reversed by effort. But soon he came to think that it was an inevitable result of organization, and that organization was an inevitable result of the attempt to be effective - in other words, that any group of people who try seriously to achieve any social purpose will end up serving a complex organization become an end in itself. (Cf. Weber.) This is true even if (as was the case with the SPD) their original or ostensible purpose was to establish democracy: their own organization will become an oligarchy ('rule by the few') - bureaucracy being a kind of oligarchy.

This train of thought took him out of the SPD, and shortly after he left he published Political Parties (1911). The book is based mainly on his experience of the SPD, but it puts forward general conclusions supposed to hold of all political parties, indeed of all organizations. The argument for generalizing is that if even an organization dedicated to the establishment of democracy cannot help becoming itself an oligarchy, a fortiori other organizations will go the same way. The (questionable) assumption is that an organization dedicated to establishing democracy is less likely than organizations with other purposes to be undemocratic: if it can be shown in this most unlikely case that oligarchy is inevitable then it is safe to generalize and say that every organization must be an oligarchy.

In the book Michels shows in detail how oligarchy develops out of a desire to be effective. For good reasons (the division of labour) the members look for leaders and organizers, these people specialize at various tasks, and their specialized knowledge and skill makes them indispensable - they can threaten resignation if the organization seems to be on the point of making a wrong decision. The 'rank and file' (significant phrase) leave it to the officials: they do not attend meetings - in fact supporters often do not bother to join the organization, being confident that it is good hands. Members and supporters develop attitudes of gratitude and loyalty to the leaders, especially those who have suffered for the cause. Among the leaders megalomania develops, and this even reinforces their power: 'This overwhelming self-esteem on the part of the leaders diffuses a powerful suggestive influence, whereby the masses are confirmed in their admiration for their leaders, and it thus proves a source of enhanced power.' Once the organization becomes large enough to have income and accumulated funds, it appoints full-time officials and establishes newspapers, training schools and so on. This means that the party leaders have patronage - power to appoint people to paid jobs. The appointees are their heirs apparent. And they are a conservative element: they are not in favour of risky experiments, or of anything that might lead to a clash with public opinion or with powerful interests, because this might lead to the destruction of the party's power to pay their salaries. The possibility of a career within the party attracts the interest of a less idealistic kind of person. And so on.

Because of his involvement with the SPD Michels was out of the running for an academic job in Germany (the government controlled academic appointments, and discriminated against Jews, Catholics, Socialists). He was a protegee of Max Weber (Michels on oligarchy resembles Weber on bureaucracy); Weber was a liberal, not a socialist, and a professor, but could not get Michels a job in Germany. However he got him a job in Italy, at Turin, where he met Gaetano Mosca, whose ideas were similar to those Michels had presented in Political Parties. These two, together with Vilifredo Pareto, are known as 'elite' theorists. According to Mosca, for example, the traditional (Greek) classification of constitutions into monarchy, oligarchy/aristocracy, democracy is unrealistic: there is in fact no alternative to oligarchy, though there are kinds of oligarchy. The best kind is one in which there is not just one elite but several, which 'circulate' (i.e. compete and take turns in occupying positions of power), and which are 'open', continually (but not suddenly) renewing themselves by coopting new members.

Although he had come to believe that democracy is not possible, Michels still believed that opposition to oligarchical tendencies is worthwhile. In his later period he seems to have thought that the kind of constitution we call democratic, though it cannot really be such, is a good way of providing for the circulation and renewal of elites.

From Mussolini's government Michels accepted in 1928 a chair of politics specifically established to promote Fascism. In his later writings he sometimes underlines the advantages of such a regime: 'By its nature, the rule of the elite will be frank, clear, concrete, direct. The elite does not exercise its function by means of tortuous intrigues and of "connections" dear to majoritarian and democratic regimes. Nor is it inevitably prey to lack of clarity, to vacillation, indecision, and to foolish and insipid compromises.' (First Lectures in Political Sociology p.121 (HM/33/.M5))

These are the terms in which Fascists criticised democracy. On the other hand there are passages that express reservations about one-party regimes: 'In democracy... various elites... struggle for power. From this derives... lack of stability... an expenditure of time, a slowing down of necessary training for those who intend to acquire governmental competence. But on the other hand the democratic system offers a certain guarantee to the members of the various elites of the repetition... of their turn at the helm of the state. But, be it said parenthetically, these manifold minor elites inevitably become bitter enemies of every government conquered and held by a single strong elite of anti-democratic tendencies. For the latter has an almost permanent character and is based on a principle which prolongs the usual expectation sine die, actually excluding the majority of the elites from political power. And without the least intention of harming anybody we will say, Hinc illae lacrimae ["Hence these tears"].' (ibid., p.119).

His analysis of the career of the 'charismatic' leader is to some extent a warning. For example: 'It is useless... to hope that dictatorships, having happily initiated their political work, will abdicate at the height of their power, since abdication is an act of weakness. It implies that the dictator will feel that he has nothing more to say and nothing else to do; or it implies that such an act might be voluntary on the part of him who, finding himself pressed continually by misfortune or bold and confident adversaries, judges it impossible to continue on the given path, and supinely prefers an inglorious disappearance to a glorious fall. The charismatic leader does not abdicate, not even when water reaches to his throat. Precisely in his readiness to die lies one element of his force and triumph.' (ibid., p.130)

I conjecture that Michels thought that Fascism might be the appropriate solution for Italy at the time, but still thought that 'democratic' forms were preferable when they could be got to work: not as a step toward genuine democracy, which is permanently unattainable, but as a way of reducing the inevitable evils of bureaucracy and oligarchy.

To return for a moment to his most influential work, Political Parties. The argument, as I mentioned above, is a generalization from one case, that of the German Social Democratic Party, to the conclusion that no organization of any size and complexity can be genuinely democratic - the leaders will always establish themselves as an entrenched oligarchy. To generalize from one instance is of course risky. What may justify it in this case is, first, that the Social Democratic Party was notable for its commitment to democracy: if even it could not manage to remain democratic, then it is unlikely that any other organization could. And second, Michels does not merely document his claim that the party is oligarchical, he also explains the development of its oligarchical character by reference to factors at work in any complex organization - the effects those factors have in this case they will also have in other cases. But of course it cannot be proved a priori that in this case the generalization must succeed: we must test it as best we can against other organizations. And it seems that most people with experience of complex organizations find that the account Michels gives of the SPD fits their own experience.

However this has not been enough to convince everyone that democracy cannot exist. They say that even if it is true that every separate political organization in the country is an oligarchy such as Michels describes, it may still be possible for the polity as a whole system to be democratic, if these oligarchies have to compete for voter support. (Compare Mosca.) As we will see in the next lecture, this is Schumpeter's theory of democracy. (There is of course a question whether these writers are simply redefining a word: their justification would be that what they call democracy serves the same values as democracy in the traditional sense.) A theory like this is often called 'pluralism': provided there is a plurality of competing centres of power there may be democracy even though every party is internally an oligarchy. This idea derives from Weber, who suggested that in a bureaucratized world freedom might have its best chance if there was not a monolithic bureaucracy, but a plurality of bureaucracies rivaling one another. (The leading critic of pluralism has been C. Wright Mills, who argued that in the United States in the 1950s competition among participants in congressional politics did not amount to democracy, because there was at a higher level a 'power elite', a coherent and more or less unified network of powerful people, not a class, nor a status group (though wealthy and high prestige people dominated it) but precisely a 'power' phenomenon - a network that exercised political power.)

Weber again: on Political Parties

(For earlier pages on Weber, see Weber on Bureaucracy, Weber on Capitalism, Reading Guide to Weber.)
See 'Politics as a Vocation', in GM (i.e., Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and ed.), From Max Weber), p.100ff; and 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany', in ES (i.e., Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York, 1968) (HM/57/.W342)), vol. 3 p. 1381 ff.

Some of Weber's remarks on political parties are comparable with those offered by Michels. Weber sketches a history of the development of political parties. In the old days the leading people of a locality ('notables', 'magnates') would organise to choose and support some candidate; sometimes just one important person would make the choice. There were parties in parliament, in the sense that members formed factions, but they did not seek support as parties in the country. Parties had no paid officials.

When the franchise was extended 'professional' organizers arose outside parliament who raised money and ran election campaigns. They were either political entrepreneurs (the American bosses) or paid officials. 'Naturally power actually rests in the hands of those who, within the organization handle the work continuously... [and] of those on whom the organization... depends financially'; GM p.103. 'Politics is always made by a small number of persons', ES, p.1421. Weber offers a Michels-like account of the role of officials and financial backers; ES, p.1443-48, and cf. GM p.125.

According to Weber, some Social Democrats think that their party has succumbed to 'bureaucratization' (he may have Michels in mind); but officials submit relatively easily to a vote-getting leader - their party is plebiscitary. Bourgeois parties may be dominated by 'party notables' (not local notables, but notable MP's and others), and the 'guild spirit' prevails. These notables submit to the party leader less readily: they make their way of life out of chairmanships, resent the novus homo [newcomer], care about old party traditions, etc. See GM pp.103-4. On 'notable' vs. 'plebiscitary' parties see ES, pp.1399-1400, 1458-9. For 'notables' Weber sometimes writes honoratiores ("the more honourable", a Roman law term for socially superior people).

[Note on the word "plebiscitary": In Roman History a plebiscite was a vote of the plebs, the common people. In modern European history the word often (not always) is used with unfavourable connotations because of the way plebiscites were used by Napoleon, Napoleon III and others who gained power by coups to give a appearance of democratic legitimacy to their dictatorships--once the leader was safely in power and had set up a system of government, the people were asked in a plebiscite to say "yes" or "no" to the regime, but in fact they had no alternative. Weber uses the word pejoratively: the leader of a plebiscitary party claims to act with the authority of the members, but in fact takes no notice of their opinions and wishes.]

Plebiscitarian leadership entails the 'soullessness' of the following, their intellectual proletarianization - they obey blindly. 'This is simply the price paid for the guidance of leaders'. The alternative is 'leaderless democracy, namely the rule of professional politicians without a calling, without the inner charismatic qualities that make a leader'; GM p.113. In England the party 'functions only as a following for the leader or the few leaders who form the government, and it blindly follows them as long as they are successful. This is the way it should be. Political action is always determined by the "principle of small numbers"'...; ES, p.1414. This sounds like an anticipation of the elitist views that Michels embraced in his fascist phase. Since oligarchy is inevitable, what matters is to get good leadership.

But Weber was critical of the Caesarist regime of the Kaiser. (Note that German "Kaiser", like Russian "Czar", is a transliteration of Latin "Caesar", the title used by the Roman emperors.) In Germany under the Kaiser, according to Weber,parliament was impotent. No one with leadership qualities went into parliament. Politicians 'have had no power, no responsibility'; the country has been ruled by the state bureaucrats under cover of the Kaiser; see ES, pp.1405-7, 1413-15, 1424-5, etc. For Germany after the war Weber advocated universal franchise and parliamentary government. After criticizing the American practice of direct popular election of the president, along with the referendum and recall (ES, p.1454-6), he came to favour the plebiscitary election of the head of government as a check to the power of the upper house to undermine the function of the lower house in selecting leaders, and because proportional representation 'facilitates the horse-trading of the notables for placement on the ticket,... [and] will give organized interest groups the possibility of compelling parties to include their officials in the list of candidates, thus creating an unpolitical Parliament in which genuine leadership finds no place'; GM p.114, and compare ES, 1448. See Beetham pp. 232-7. What he says here about proportional representation has been verified of our upper house: the parties' control of the lists has given the party machines power to put party bureaucrats in as Senators. So, just as I suggested earlier that while Michels favoured fascism for Italy he may have thought that in other circumstances democratic forms would reduce the evils of oligarchy, similarly Weber seems to have favoured a combination of British and American institutions to secure good political leadership for Germany. Notice that the point is not to secure genuine democracy (whatever that is), but to get good leadership. Weber and his school of thought, regarding as inevitable the progress of bureaucracy, and, regarding that as inimical to genuine political as well as personal freedom, want to salvage what they can by giving scope to charismatic leadership.

ROBERTO MICHELS: OLIGARCHY

Weber again: on Political Parties

Further Reading on Michels