John Kilcullen
Copyright (c) 1996, R.J. Kilcullen.
Weber's most famous book is The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5). It is generally taken as a counter to the Marxist thesis of the primacy of base over superstructure: Weber is supposed to have argued in this book that capitalism in fact developed historically as a result of a religious movement, protestantism, specifically Calvinism. The argument is that Calvinism, with its doctrine of predestination - i.e. the doctrine that God eternally decreed the salvation of some and the damnation of others, not in view of the good or evil deeds they would do, but simply 'because he willed it' - that this doctrine made Calvinists anxious about their salvation; that this led them to seek reassurance in attempting to succeed in their economic (and other) undertakings, in the belief that God signifies his favour by giving prosperity to the undertakings of the elect; at the same time the Calvinist did not spend his money on self-indulgence, so had nothing else to do with it but plough it back into the business. And his employees, being Calvinists also, had a sense of their jobs as 'callings' to be done well out of religious duty even for small earthly reward. Hence the 'Protestant ethic' - the famous 'work ethic' -, the drive for economic success, the will to work hard, the habit of not spending on frivolous self-indulgence - all this, originating in theology, provided a 'spirit' for capitalism, the set of motivations and attitudes that led to 'rational investment' of profits continually ploughed back, and to the modern world.
I suspect that this is a travesty of Weber's book. It is certainly a travesty of Calvinism. Any properly catechized Calvinist would have known that it was wrong to seek a sign that he had been saved, and nonsense to find it in economic success. If 17th century Calvinists were thinking along those lines, then perhaps Calvinism had been corrupted by the influence of early capitalism; and in that case the economic base might have been the 'independent variable' or initiator of change. As Parkin says (Max Weber, p.57): 'The question then arises as to why the doctrine [Calvinism] evolved in the particular manner it did... Weber does not address this problem of what might be called "the transition from Calvinism to Puritanism"'. As Parkin points out, Weber generally supposes that a religion will be held in differing senses by different social strata; if Calvinism underwent some change between John Calvin and the early Calvinist capitalists that Weber studied in his book, then that change should have something to do with the way Calvin's doctrine was received in different social strata. 'What seemed to be required was a complementary study designed to demonstrate the effects of the stratification system on the peculiar evolution of early protestantism. Had Weber managed to get round to conducting such a study, he would have had to clarify and expand upon his own brand of materialism and to show how it differed from the Marxist version.... there are enough hints in his work to suggest that his own final position would not have differed very much from a sophisticated Marxist one' (ibid.).
At any rate, as long as the 'Calvinism' that is supposed to have provided the initiating force for capitalism is not the Calvinism of John Calvin, but something already undergoing change caused by unexplained factors, it has not been established that capitalism originated in the realm of ideas, if that is what Weber was trying to prove.
Parkin suggests that Weber has two thesis which he never clearly distinguishes, what Parkin calls the 'strong' and the 'weak' thesis. The 'strong' thesis is that Calvinism caused capitalism, the weak thesis is that Calvinism did not (like other religions) obstruct the development of capitalism. The strong thesis is that when a certain change occurred in the realm of religious thought, that brought into being the capitalist economic system. The weak thesis is that there were already causes at work which did in the end produce capitalism, but that they were obstructed by certain religious ideas, until the change in religious thinking removed the obstacle.
There is another possible interpretation of his thesis: that while capitalism was not brought into being by religious ideas but by other causes that were present already, Calvinism did provide a legitimation for this development (see Parkin, p.59). On this interpretation Calvinism was not just religion getting out of the way, but religion helping a development it had not originated, by 'legitimating' the work of the other causes. Admittedly, 'legitimation' is the removal of an obstacle, namely of objections that the thing is not legitimate; but it can go beyond that, to call for an attitude of positive approval and assistance.
There is also another distinction to be made: between a 'one-phase' causal relationship, and feedback. (These are not technical terms - I'm inventing them now!) By a 'one-phase' relationship I mean that A causes B, or B causes A, and that is it. Sometimes it is said that 'each reciprocally causes the other', but this is what I call feedback: A > B > A' > B' >A" > B". In the second phase B reacts on A to transform it into something rather different, A', which in the third phase transforms B into B', and so on. Perhaps this is the interaction of capitalism and religion: it may be difficult to know on which side the process began, but each progressively transformed the other: perhaps the transformation was the reinforcement or strengthening of capitalism and the corruption or weakening of Protestantism. Indeed by the 19th century Protestantism in Germany had become a convenient support for other social institutions, not a critic or a threat, a shadow of its former self.
If the relationship was one of mutual or reciprocal influence, or feedback, then neither the 'superstructure' nor the 'base' was the originator of social change. We have rather the sort of thing Mill envisages, 'consensus', but apparently without any 'central chain'.
After the Protestant Ethic Weber undertook a series of comparative studies of various cultures and religions. These are discussed in Parkin's chapter, p.63 ff. The point of the 'comparative method' is to apply Mill's methods of 'agreement' and 'difference'. (See J.S. Mill, Logic, Book 3 ch.8.) Agreement: if these two cases in both of which the phenomenon being investigated is found agree in the following circumstances: [a list], then among those circumstances will be found the cause of the phenomenon.
Difference: case A, case B; similar in all circumstances except that in case A there is circumstance X, not found in B; then if the phenomenon occurs in A and not in B, X is its cause. This is the well-known 'control group' method.
In Weber's studies the phenomenon under investigation is the emergence of capitalism, which he thinks took place only in Western Europe in early modern times, being exported to other countries (e.g. China, Japan) by invasion from Europe. He examines all the cultural circumstances, looking for cases in other places which were in almost all circumstances similar to early modern Europe, hoping to find what made the difference. The other similar cultures are the 'control'. His argument by the method of difference is that if such and such a culture was like early modern Europe in every respect but one, then that one will be what made the difference, it will be the cause of the emergence of capitalism. What made the difference is religion: the parts of early modern Europe in which capitalism originated had a religion more favourable to rational calculation etc. than other 'control' cultures, otherwise pretty similar, in which capitalism did not originate.
But Mill would have been horrified at such a crude application of his method of difference. It overlooks his warning that 'consensus' means, in social inquiry, that major institutions in one social context cannot really be compared directly with, and pronounced to be similar to, the 'corresponding' institutions embedded in another social context. This is drawing lessons from history in just the way Mill warns against (e.g. Logic, Book 6, ch.10, para.4). And as Parkin points out, on closer examination all the institutions in Weber's 'control' cultures turn out to be importantly different from the 'corresponding' European institutions. 'Virtually every institution that falls under Weber's scrutiny - is shown to have an entirely different form and function in the east compared with the west', Parkin, p.67. 'If, on Weber's own reckoning, the urban structure, property relations, the legal and administrative system, the political functions of the state, and very much else besides, were completely different as between east and west, it is obviously not possible to test for the separate effect of the religious variable', Parkin, p.68.
You will remember that Mill held that social science must explain in terms of psychological laws of the type, 'Someone with such a disposition will in such circumstances act like this', 'Someone with such a disposition will in such circumstances acquire this new disposition' - propositions about individuals, testable over many instances (since there are many individuals, whereas there are few 'cultures' or 'societies') - the circumstances, however, including the social situation. Mill's psychological propositions are the remote descendants of the 'maxims' used by the sophist-trained speechmakers in Thucydides. Now compared with Mill's approach Weber's method of 'ideal types' is not sufficiently analytic. Instead of getting down to many separate psychological generalizations about individuals, Weber, in constructing types, often constructs a complex in which are juxtaposed elements that do not have any tight logical or psychological (or other causal) connection. For example, his model of bureaucracy embodies the notion of division of labour, and also the notion of authoritarian subordination: but it is quite possible for a division of labour to be organized by a set of people acting as a 'collective', relating as equals. So in studying the phenomena associated with bureaucratization Weber is not well placed to distinguish what is due to division of labour and what to authoritarianism, since he has lumped these two things together under the one concept, bureaucracy. For example, take his worry that bureaucracy is inimical to freedom, and yet inevitable and inescapable, because bureaucracies are so effective that they displace all non- bureaucratic rivals. If their effectiveness is due to the division of labour, and the threat to freedom is due to authoritarianism, then it might be worthwhile to ask whether you can in practice have one without the other. Is it even possible that a non-authoritarian bureaucracy might be even more effective? Perhaps, after all, division of labour requires authoritarianism, but this is something that needs to be thought about. Weber's 'ideal type' is just an abstraction of the Prussian bureaucracy that was in fact authoritarian, and the 'ideal type' does not help, but is rather an obstacle, to thinking about the question whether a division of administrative labour has to be organized in an authoritarian way. ('Authoritarianism', by the way, is also an 'ideal type', a complex: it is possible to have authority that is non-authoritarian. But I will not pursue this question.)
To return to Weber on Capitalism. Parkin points out that in constructing the complex 'ideal types' or models he uses in his comparative study of eastern and western cultures, Weber's inclusions and exclusions are pretty arbitrary, slanted toward the conclusion he expects to come to: 'In his characterization of the world religions, Weber sets up a series of ideal-types. Only the most salient features of any belief system are incorporated into the general construct. This necessarily entails the accentuation of some features and the exclusion or devaluation of others. In the case of Calvinism, it is noticeable that Weber heavily underscores those teachings that could be said to be broadly compatible with the capitalist ethos, while discounting those elements that appear to jar with it. When it comes to the other major religions, the opposite procedure is adopted. Elements in Hinduism, Confucianism, Judaism, and the rest, that seem to square quite well with economic rationality are accorded only a peripheral place in the model, while those elements that are at variance with such an outlook are given a central place. As a number of other authorities on these religions have noted, it is perfectly possible to construct ideal-types in which Weber's priorities are reversed', Parkin, pp.63-4. This is a general problem with the method of constructing ideal-types, in contrast with the method of analyzing into the causally independent elements as Mill recommends. Any complex consisting of diverse elements not tied together by logical or causal relations is only accidentally unified, and could be reconstructed in another way. Investigation carried on by means of such ideal types has had some of its conclusions built in, when the complex was put together.
Among the social preconditions of the original development of capitalism are a predictable legal system, and behind that a state bureaucracy; and (to establish wide markets) a habit of treating all people as having rights and as possible partners in law-regulated commercial dealings. In some societies a strong distinction is made between insiders and outsiders: one does not drive commercial bargains with insiders, and one does not much respect the rights of outsiders. 'Universalistic' religions such as Christianity break down such distinctions. Behind the legal order is the notion of universal citizenship - that residents are mostly citizens with rights, not subjects at the ruler's discretion; universalistic religion favours that. The legal order also requires a bureaucratic state to enforce the law - professional administrators and jurists. The bureaucratic state arose partly by natural selection, because such states can supply larger armies with better weapons. (Weber notes the analogy between capitalism, in which workers do not own the means of production, bureaucracies in which bureaucrats do not own their offices or means of administration, and armies using centrally supplied and team-operated weapons). The bureaucratic state presupposes literacy (which religion may foster), and various other factors. So the chain (or rather web) of causation is traced backward to many factors. Calvinist predestination is not mentioned; protestantism figures as another surge of christian universalism, and as abolishing the monasteries. The abolition of monasteries is important as removing an obstacle, namely the preoccupation of people with the strongest religious motivation with other-worldly ends.
According to Collins 'Weber's constant theme is that the pattern of relations among the various factors is crucial in determining their effect upon economic rationalization'. If one factor is by itself, or very much stronger than the others, capitalism will not develop; for example, if the state is too strong by itself it tends to stifle capitalism.
Weber's theory as Collins describes it does not exemplify Mill's project of finding some central chain in the filiation of one stage from another, around which everything else can be organises - a project of which Marx's theory is an example. Rather it sounds like Mill's emphasis on consensus: 'Any one factor occurring by itself tends to have opposite effects, overall, to those which it has in combination with the other factors'; Collins, p.934. As Collins remarks, 'Weber's position might well be characterized as ... seeing history as a concatenation of unique events and unrepeatable complexities', ibid., p.935. Collins writes: 'The discipline of historical scholarship reached its maturity around the end of the nineteenth century. Not only had political and military history reached a high degree of comprehensiveness and accuracy, but so had the history of law, religion, and economic institutions not only for Europe and the ancient Mediterranean but for the Orient as will...Weber was perhaps the first great master of the major institutional facts of world history', ibid., p.937. This exaggerates Weber's standing as an historian. Still, it is worth noting that the progress of historical scholarship does not seem favourable to the idea that there is a central chain of causation running through history. (Of course this may be due simply to a reaction on the part of bourgeois scholars against the prevailing materialist versions of this idea - the lessons of historical scholarship are never clear enough to rule out class, religious and other prejudices).
So far we have been considering Weber's view of the origin of capitalism. A few remarks on his view of its future. Once capitalism has come into being and is well established the factors which led to its existence need not be the ones that keep it in existence, and there may be others that tend to destroy it. It may be that there is no incompatibility between Weber's account of the origin of capitalism and Marx's account of its future: though Weber's story weakens the materialist theory of history in its crudest form (Weber's late theory attributes an important role to religious and other ideas, though not as in The Protestant Ethic), Marx's prognosis for capitalism is not based on the crude form of the materialist theory of history. In fact it does not seem to be based on any form of the materialist theory of history: Marx's analysis is of what is specific to capitalism, and, if it were valid, could stand apart from any more general theory of history, as far as I can see.
As capitalism goes on some of the factors that brought it into being, such as christianity, are eroded by capitalism itself; with - in this case - perhaps some weakening of the structure. 'The closing words of the book speak of the threat of working class revolution which appears once capitalism matures and work discipline loses its religious legitimation'; Collins, p. 936. 'In the advanced societies, the skeleton of the economic structure might even be taken over by socialism', ibid., p.935. This sounds like a possible anticipation of Schumpeter.
Weber uses the notion of expropriation in analysing not only economic institutions but also others. See SEO pp.329-341, GM pp.196-244. Government requires certain material goods. In some states these goods are the property of the staff, in others the staff is separated from the means of administration or coercion. 'This distinction holds in the same sense in which today we say that the salaried employee and the proletarian in the capitalistic enterprise are "separated" from the material means of production'; GM p.81. In the second kind of state the staff are 'non-owners... who do not use the material means of administration in their own right but are directed by the lord', ibid.. Feudal states exemplify the first type. The development of the modern state was the expropriation of the feudal lords by the prince. 'The whole process is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of the independent producers'; GM p.82. Cf. GM pp.221-4, SEO p. 331, ES, p.1394. 'The bureaucratization of ... the universities is a function of the increasing demand for material means of management. ... Through the concentration of such means in the hands of the privileged head of the institute, the mass of researchers and docents are separated from their "means of production" in the same way as capitalist enterprise has separated the workers from theirs'; GM pp. 223-4.
Weber's Protestant Ethic hypothesis, and Marx's 'materialist' hypothesis, have stimulated a good deal of historical research, especially in economic history. What often happens in the study of history is that some imaginative and exciting hypothesis is put forward, with too much assurance, and then several generations of academic historians test it against the facts and gradually decide that the exciting hypothesis was too imaginative. The moral to draw from such experience is, however, not that imagination should be restrained. If it were not for the imaginers the factual researchers would simply drown in fact. But it does seem to me that the project of explaining what caused capitalism by examining its origins in certain places in Europe is a bit like trying to explain what causes thunderstorms by investigating why this one started in a certain part of the country. Perhaps there were in many places conditions that could easily have led to the development of capitalism, if conditions had been only slightly different - and perhaps the difference needed was one thing in one place, another thing in another. If what is needed in such situations is just a slight difference, perhaps historians will never be able to discover what slight difference it was that precipitated the development.
See:
Weber on political
parties
Roberto Michels: Oligarchy
Schumpeter: Capitalism,
Socialism, Democracy
Return to Teaching
Materials on Political Thought
Return to Home Page