We will read only extracts from the Politics. If you have access to a complete copy have it handy because I will sometimes refer to passages not in the Readings (such references will be in [square brackets]); but the extracts in Readings are enough for the course.
We imagine that in the Academy Plato gave lectures or talks or seminars or held conversations, but we have no record of what he said. He did not write it down. In fact, as he explains in Letter VII 341c, he did not think that philosophy could be learned from writings, but only in conversation: "after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another". Aristotle in some of his writings reports and criticises theories and arguments he ascribes to Plato that are not found in Plato's dialogues, and it is assumed that these were things Aristotle heard Plato say while he was a member of the Academy. In one place Aristotle uses the word "we" to refer to himself and the other members of Plato's school, though even there he is rejecting Plato's key doctrine: "Further, of the ways in which we prove that the Forms exist, none is convincing..." (Metaphysics, I.9).
We suppose that in the Lyceum Aristotle gave lectures, and the surviving works of Aristotle seem to be based in some way on such lectures. They do not seem to be works addressed to the general public: they are very concise, often cryptic. Presumably Aristotle elaborated on them in some way when they were used in his school. Perhaps he agreed with Plato that philosophy had to be learnt in live conversation, and perhaps these writings were used as a basis for discussion in the school. (Here is a new word: "aporetic", meaning making it seem that there is no way out of a problem -- as a prelude of course to showing a way out.) Many passages in Aristotle's works are "aporetic" or "dialectical", i.e. an exploration of a question by examining plausible arguments on both sides without trying to settle the question definitively; such passages perform the same function as Plato's Socratic dialogues, though they are not dialogues in form. But like Plato, Aristotle also wrote dialogues, addressed to the general public. In ancient times literary people like Cicero praised Aristotle's dialogues highly, but curiously they were allowed to perish; they survive only in fragments quoted by other authors. So while Plato wrote only dialogues, Aristotle wrote both dialogues and works for use in his school, and only the latter have survived intact.
However, Aristotle's school writings show signs of having been edited by someone other than Aristotle himself. It seems that after his death, or even in his lifetime, some of his colleagues in the school gathered together many shorter writings, some of them fragmentary, only drafts, and cobbled them together into long treatises. Aristotle himself might have begun to do this, but the activity of some other editor is suggested by the fact that fairly often the one work contains two or more different treatments of the same topic: presumably Aristotle would have thrown one of them away or amalgamated them if he had edited his own work, whereas someone else might have been reluctant to throw away or rewrite something Aristotle had written.
So Aristotle's books are not easy to read. At first they seem highly organised and comprehensive treatises, but when you read them you often find that the plan announced at the beginning is not actually carried out, that there are overlaps and gaps, and so on. The book we will look at, the Politics, is in eight books. Some scholars (see W.D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 235) suggest that the work would have been better organised if books VII and VIII came before book IV and book VI before book V. Books I and II are a unit. Book III seems like a new beginning of a complete treatise on politics; so do Books IV and VII. The beginnings of these books are not included in the Readings, but if you have access to a complete copy of the Politics read book III chapter 1, book IV chapter 1, and book VII chapter I, and you will see what I mean: each makes no reference to any earlier part of the book, each reads like the beginning of a complete investigation (see for example [1290 a13-29], which gives the program of the investigation). It would be a good idea to look at the beginning and the last paragraph of each of the eight books. Even within the more or less coherent parts of the work there are signs that it has been put together so to speak with scissors and sticky tape. I don't say this to discourage you from reading it. In fact a less polished work is often more thought provoking than one in which the author has tied up all the loose ends.
Each of Aristotle's books is divided into "books" and chapters. References are sometimes given by book and chapter. For example, "Politics, I.1" means book I, chapter 1 of the Politics.
The translation I have used is from The Works of Aristotle translated into English, by W.D. Ross and others (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921).
If the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature... Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal [1252 b30-1253 a3]A "political animal" means an animal whose nature is to live in a polis or city, not isolated or in small groups. "Civilization" (from Latin civitas, a city) is the natural state for the human animal. It is the natural state not in the sense that it is the original state, but in the sense that the natural goal of human development is life in cities. This is a rejection of the idea common at the time, and since, that civilization is artificial, conventional, unnatural. Aristotle would have agreed with the 18th century writer who said (I can't remember who it was!) that "it is natural to man to be artificial". (On the contrast between convention (law, nomos) and nature (physis) see Thucydides V.105, Readings, p. 40, and compare I.76, Readings, p. 11).
In Aristotle's philosophy, "nature" (in Greek physis, from which we get "physics") -- nature is the principle of growth or development: a thing's nature is what makes it develop in a certain way, and development is for the sake of its goal. Aristotle's physics is said to be teleological, from the Greek word "telos", a goal or end: according to Aristotle every nature exists for some purpose. (However, he did not think that nature was designed by a mind; Aristotle did believe, for philosophical reasons, in a supreme being or god, but he believed that the world had existed eternally, that it was not created by God, that God was not the designer of things. Natural purposes are, so to speak, blind and unconscious, except in human beings.)
Read the extracts from chapter 2, 1253a 7-39 (Readings, p. 101)
A comment:
In chapter 3, when he talks about the slave as part of the household, Aristotle raises a question: Some say "that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by convention only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust" [1253 b20-3]. In chapter 3 he does not pursue the question of the justice of slavery, but he takes it up again in chapter 5, our next extract.
READ I.6
Some comments:
A husband and father... rules over wife and children, both free [i.e. neither is a slave], but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature [i.e. occasionally a wife may be wiser than her husband], the male is by nature fitter for command than the female... But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect... The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent.This passage seems to say that the relation of husband to wife is like the relationship of ruler to ruled in a constitutional government, in which citizens take turns to rule because "the natures of the citizens are equal and do not differ at all", though it is customary to pay the rulers special respect; but in marriage there is a permanent inequality. He seems to want to say that men and women are by nature equal, like citizens in a constitutional regime, but permanently unequal. This seems contradictory.
In the next chapter, [chapter 13 of book I] there is a discussion of the question whether slaves and freemen, women and men, have the same virtues. If we say that slaves can have the same virtues as freemen, then why are they slaves? On the other hand, since they are human beings and have reason, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. Similarly with women. We can generalise the problem, and ask in general about natural ruler and natural subject: "if a noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule and the other always be ruled?"
Aristotle answers in terms of his theory of the parts of the soul. You will remember that Plato distinguished three parts of the human soul, the reason, the spirited part and the desires. Aristotle also makes a distinction within the reason. One part of the soul is reasonable in the sense that it deliberates, reasons, and draws conclusions -- he sometimes calls this the deliberative faculty; another part of the soul is reasonable in the sense that it is persuadable by reasoning. The emotions are persuadable. It is possible to reason someone into a different state of feeling; it is sometimes possible to reason yourself into a different state of feeling -- to reduce fear, for example, by reflecting on the real facts about the apparent dangers or by reflecting on the importance and value of what it is one has to do in the face of real dangers. Corresponding to the two reasonable parts of the soul there are two sets of virtues: there are intellectual virtues, virtues of the reasoning or deliberative faculty, and there are moral virtues, virtues of the persuadable part, the part of the soul that is capable of being influenced by reasoning. Courage, for example, is a moral virtue that consists in the responsiveness of one's fears to reasoning. (Aristotle relates the kinds of virtues to the parts of the soul in another work, the Nicomachean Ethics; see the extract in Readings, p.98, RH.)
How does this distinction between parts of the soul and kinds of virtue resolve the questions whether slaves and women can have virtues and if so why should they always be subordinate, though in different ways, to free men? Aristotle's answer seems to be that slaves can have only the virtues belonging to the part of the soul that is influenced by reasoning, while women can also have the intellectual virtues, but in a subordinate way. "For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority" [1260 a12]. This of course prompts the question why is a woman's deliberative faculty without authority? Aristotle does not ask or answer this question. He concludes that all human beings including slaves have moral virtue, that free men and women have intellectual virtue also, but that in women the moral and intellectual virtues are marked by subordination: "Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them [i.e. to women, slaves and free men]; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying" [1260a 20-23]. (The reference to Socrates is to Socrates' theory that the virutes are just different names for one and the same thing, namely knowledge, knowledge of the relative goodness and evil of the things among which we have to choose, available at the moment of choice: if all the virtues are really this one thing, then there can't be different virtues for different people.)
It is interesting that despite his acquaintance with Plato's thinking on this subject, Aristotle accepts the customary subordination of women to men without being able to justify it.
Well, this completes our sampling of Book I. The main topic has been the family or household as the element from which states are formed, and the aspects we have looked at are slavery and the place of women -- topics Aristotle does not handle well (it's a pity these topics come early in the book, because readers may be discouraged from reading the rest of the book); another topic of Book I that we haven't looked at is the family's property.
Book II is a discussion of the views of various other thinkers on the best state, including Plato's sketch of such a state in The Republic. We will read Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's views on private property and the family.
Against this Aristotle says:
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect something which he expects another to fulfil; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike [1261 b34-1262 a2].
Read Aristotle, book II, ch. 5 (Readings, p. 103) to 1264 a4.
Notice these arguments carefully. In one form or other they have often been used in favour of the institution of private property. Notice what Aristotle says near the bottom LH of p. 103, 1263 a21ff; his preference is for a society in which individuals are in charge of particular things but freely allow others to use them.
This is all we will read of Book II. Criticism of Plato's Republic occupies II.1-5, criticism of his book The Laws occupies II.6. Chapters 7 and 8 criticise other utopias. The rest of book II criticises Sparta, Crete and Carthage, often regarded (especially by conservatives) as models to which other states should conform. Aristotle's writings often include a survey of what other thinkers have said about the question he is writing about. After the survey of opinions about the best state you would expect him to present his own view of what kind of state is best, but in fact we don't come to that until book VII.
Book III makes a new beginning. "He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of government must first of all determine 'What is a state?'" After a preliminary discussion of who counts as a citizen [III.1-5], he raises the question How many kinds of state are there? How many kinds of constitutions are there? Are some constitutions good or true forms and others bad? This is the part of Book III we will look at.
The true end or purpose of the state, he says, is to help its members live, and to live a good life. Re-read the opening paragraph of the Politics, Readings, p. 101. Constitutions which aim at the good life for the citizens are true constitutions, those which aim at the good of the rulers only are perversions [1279 a17-21]. There are echoes here of Plato; remember in The Republic Socrates' argument with Thrasymachus, in which Socrates argued that government is an art the purpose of which is to further the good of the governed.
Read III.7, Readings, p. 104.
| Good | Bad | |
|---|---|---|
| One | Kingship | Tyranny |
| Few | Aristocracy | Oligarchy |
| Many | Polity | Democracy |
In that passage Plato mentions a seventh form (ibid., 302c), which Aristotle also mentions in a number of passages not included in the Readings: "If, however, there be some one person, or more than one... whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the virtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs", then he or they should be supreme and not bound by laws [1284 a3-17]; that is, under those circumstances the city should be governed by a king or an aristocracy unfettered by rules and laws. Aristotle often alludes to this ideal constitution [1284 b25-35, 1288 a7-30, 1289 a30-2, 1293 b25-8, 1332 b17-25]. But whereas Plato calls the seventh the true constitution and the others imitations, Aristotle calls three of the others "true", and mentions the seventh only incidentally: in the Politics attention is focussed mostly not on the ideal form of government but on the "second best", or best practicable. (Cf. [IV.1], and Plato, Laws, 739a-c).
Read III.8. (Readings p. 104).
A similar point is made in IV.4, [1290 a30-b20]. The criticism Aristotle is making here is that Plato's classification obscures the really significant dividing line, which is not between the few and the many but between the rich and the poor. This is the first of many criticisms Aristotle will suggest of Plato's classification, which he seemed in III.7 to endorse.
This brings us to the question whether the poor or the rich should rule. "If the poor,... because they are more in number, divide among themselves the property of the rich, -- is not this unjust?" [1281 a13-15]. "Again, when in the first division all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin the state?" [1281 a18]. These passages will remind you of Macaulay's objections against democracy (Readings, vol. 2, p. 362). On the other hand, Aristotle sees some force in arguments in favour of democracy.
Read III.11
This is an answer to some of Plato's arguments against democracy.
Read III.15 (Readings, p. 106 RH).
The argument of 1286 a38 ("Or..." ) is that for a given standard of virtue, many rulers are better than one.
Read III.16
This is also against Plato. Aristotle advocates what is called "the rule of law" or "the rule of laws, not men". See also his Rhetoric, I.1, 1354 a30-b15 (Readings, p. 117, near the bottom LH).
Aristotle does not deny Plato's point that laws framed in general terms cannot provide for unusual cases. It must be possible for magistrates to make exceptions:
When the law speaks universally, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right... to say what the legislator himself would have... put into his law if he had known... And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality"; Nichomachean Ethics, V.10.
The outcome of Aristotle's discussion of kingship is that normally it is not a good constitution. Where men are alike and equal, the rule of a king is inappropriate [III.17, 1288 a1-5]. If there is someone whose virtue exceeds that of all the others put together, he should be king [1288 a15-19, 35-8]; cf. [1284 a3-7], but obviously, this is not likely to happen often.
Now if some men excelled others in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general... so that the superiority of the governors was undisputed and patent to their subjects, it would clearly be better that once for all the one class should rule and the others serve. But since this is unattainable, and kings have no marked superiority over their subjects... it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed [1332 b17-27].The term Aristotle uses for the regime in which citizens take their turn to govern is "Constitutional" or "political" government, or "polity". Normally, then, political government is preferable to kingship.
After discussing the several different kinds of democracy and oligarchy, in chapters 8 and 9 Aristotle discusses the kind of polity that he calls "polity". He generally defines this as the form of government in which all the citizens take turns to rule, but now he defines it in terms of the idea just introduced, that rule is a complex of activities that can be allocated to different social categories. Polity is the form of government in which different organs of government are controlled by different sections of the population, in such a way that both rich and poor have a share of power. Perhaps it is because power is shared by all categories that it can be said that all take turns to rule.
Polity is "a fusion of oligarchy and democracy" [1293 b34], in an attempt to "unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich" [1294 a17]. The fusion or mixture is made by including in the constitution some features generally associated with democracy, such as an assembly open to all citizens, with other features generally associated with oligarchy, such as election to high office (wealth is an advantage in electoral contests).
The mixture can be more democratic or more oligarchical; polities with more oligarchical features are sometimes called "aristocracies", because they favour wealth, and good family and education tend to go with wealth [1293 b36, 1294 a19-25].
Read IV.9.
Note that election is an oligarchical practice; democracies choose office bearers by lot, on the assumption that all are competent enough.
Read IV.11, IV.12
So a "polity", a fusion of democracy and oligarchy, requires a balance of social classes, of rich and poor; a strong middle class holds the balance. (For the influence of these ideas on J.S. Mill and other liberal writers of the 19th century, see “Liberal Democracy”, “Influence of Aristotle’s Polity”.)
Read the extracts from book V (chapters 5, 6, 8, 9, 11).
In [1316 a1-] Aristotle criticises Plato's account of revolutions (Republic, [544-]).
Read VI.2
There follows a discussion of kinds of democracy (cf. IV.6). It is best when the high offices are elected, and the democratic assembly can call the office holders to account. "The principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due" [1319 a1-5]. Compare J.S. Mill on the idea of a rational democracy, Readings, vol. 2, p. 366.
Compare this with V.9, Readings, p. 112. His idea is that a regime will last better if it includes features of the opposite kind of constitution and conciliates people who might otherwise hanker after the opposite kind of constitution. This is one of the strengths of "polity": it combines democracy and oligarchy.
Read VI.7
This is about the preservation of oligarchies. It shows Aristotle's appreciation of the role of force in politics. "It is an impossible thing that those who are able to use or to resist force should be willing to remain always in subjection... those who carry arms can always determine the fate of the constitution" [1329 a8-12]. [Compare 1268 a18-26, 1279 b1-3, 1297 b1, 1304 a20-40, 1306 a20-30]. A stable constitution gives power to those who would otherwise take it. In Aristotle's preferred constitution, polity, the citizens are those who possess arms. Compare Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 33, and Thucydides VIII.97.
In Aristotle's view the significant dividing line in politics is between rich and poor. The best practicable constitution will be one in which the interests of these two groups are balanced in a fusion of democracy and oligarchy; it is best because it is just and stable. How the balance is best achieved depends on circumstances. The balanced constitution may be called aristocracy or, if it is more democratic, "polity".
The notion of polity, or the constition consisting in a combination of oligarchical and democratic elements, is one of Aristotle's most influential contributions to political thought. It is a likely source of Mill's idea of representative government, which is substantially what we have and call democracy. "There is a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the same state may be termed either a democracy or an oligarchy" (1294 b15).
Aristotle was not the only advocate in ancient times of a mixed or balanced constition. See Plato, Laws, 691c-701e, and Thucydides VIII.97. Another was Polybios; see K. von Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. Polybios wrote in Greek a history of Rome, in which he argued that the virtue of the Roman republican constitution was that it combined monarchy (the consuls), aristocracy (the Senate) and democracy (in plebiscites and certain other functions). Aristotle's mixed constitution does not include monarchy, and he is interested in mixing democratic and oligarchic institutions because he wants to distribute power between rich and poor, which was not in Polybios' mind. Polybios' version of the mixed constitution came down through Cicero and other ancient writers to medieval and modern times (Montesquieu; Blackstone). Its most notable monument is the American constitution, where the relations between President, Senate and Congress fit the Polybian scheme. Mill's idea of balancing classes in a representative government is close to Aristotle, not Polybios.
In inquiry about the best form of state it is necessary to decide first which is the most eligible (choice-worthy, preferable) life for individuals. Aristotle summarises parts of his "discussions outside the school" (dialogues, presumably, now lost) "concerning the best life". A happy man must have external goods, goods of the body (e.g. health), and goods of the soul (virtue). "Some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation and the like" [1323 a35-40] -- i.e. of external goods. But experience shows that "happiness... is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities" [1323 b1-5]. "Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action" [1323 b22-3]. "The best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions" [1323 b40-]. (Compare N.E., book I, chs. 5, 7 and 8 (some extracts in Readings, pp 97-8); cf. Politics [VII.13]).
"Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily" [1324 a23-5]. It is irrational to design a city for military power, to rule tyrannically over its neighbours [1324 b1-; cf. 1333 a35-1334 a10]. (Compare Plato, Laws, 625-.) "Warlike pursuits... are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them" [1325 a5-10]. The happy life is one of virtuous activity.
"Activity" is not to be construed too narrowly: thinking is activity. "Not that a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves", i.e. philosophy and science -- see E.N., book X, chs. 7 and 8. "Virtuous activity, and therefore a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is most truly said to act" [1325 b17-23].
The good state will therefore be one which makes it possible for its citizens to engage in intelligent and virtuous activity, including scientific and philosophical thinking. For some of this activity leisure is needed; see VII.15. Aristotle probably assumes that citizens will be active in the dramatic performances, gymnasia, games and religious functions customary in Athens. Compare Plato, Laws, 803-4.)
Chapters 13-15 look like another version of the first chapters of the book. They are followed by a discussion of marriage, upbringing of children and education, which continues to the end of book VIII, the end of The Politics.
Aristotle often disagrees with and criticises Plato -- e.g. on the family, on property. At the end of The Politics he sketches out his own "ideal state". Although it is unlike Plato's in many ways, it is like it in being designed to achieve ethical values.
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