Aristotle's Ethics

Copyright © 1996 R.J. Kilcullen


Contents


Quotations from the Nicomachean Ethics (abbreviate E.N.) are from W.D. Ross's translation in The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, Oxford 1928 (reprinted 'World's Classics'). References of the form '1234 b3' are Bekker numbers, printed in the margins of most editions.

To make its citizens morally good is these days not generally regarded as the business of the state; politicians are not expected to be especially good themselves, or to have moral purposes; as political slogans 'the good life' or 'the quality of life' refer to the physical conditions of life. For Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand, politics and ethics were closely connected. 'He who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life' (Politics 1323 a15). 'Virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called' (Politics 1280 b7; see the whole of this chapter, III.9; cf. E.N., X.9). For Plato's judgment of the attempt to practise politics as an art separate from ethics see his Gorgias.

I Virtue

According to Plato (Republic 352-4) a 'virtue' enables a thing to perform its work well; its 'work' (or 'function') is what only it can do, or what nothing else can do so well. For example, since only the eye can see, to see is the work of an eye; the work of a pruning knife is pruning, since although other tools can be used for that purpose nothing else can do it so well. The virtue of an eye or a pruning knife is a physical state -- being sharp and well-tempered etc.; virtue is not a specifically ethical word. Aristotle follows Plato's usage: a virtue (e.g. sharpness) makes the thing to be a good thing of that sort (e.g. a good knife) and makes it do its work well (e.g. to cut effectively). 'The virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well' (1106 a15-25). Many virtues are needed to enable a human being to function well. Some are physical states (not dealt with in the Nicomachean Ethics), others are moral virtues (E.N., III.7-V), others are intellectual virtues (science, practical wisdom etc.: E.N., VI). Particular kinds of persons have special functions to which special virtues correspond; e.g. flute-players, sculptors, painters (1098 b25), doctors, statesmen, women, slaves, etc. (Politics I.13). The Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with the virtues of a human being as such (or of the virtues of 'a man' as such -- Aristotle is generally not thinking of women.)

1. Moral virtue

In E.N. VI.13 Aristotle distinguishes 'natural' virtue (what we might call temperament) from moral virtue 'in the strict sense'. A person may be born with a calm or brave temperament; 'but we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way'; 'if a man once acquires reason... his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense' (1144 b5-). Moral virtue in the strict sense is the submission of one's feelings and outward acts to reason. A person who is by temperament quiet or spirited may be so even when it does not fit the situation; a person who has the corresponding virtues is quiet or spirited as reason judges one or the other to be appropriate (cf. Plato, Statesman. 360a-). The emotional part of the soul is rational in the sense that feeling can be modified by thought -- it 'listens to', 'obeys', 'is persuaded by' reason (1102 b30-35). The moral virtues make good the elements of human nature which are 'persuadable' by reason, by making them readily persuadable.

Moral virtue is not innate temperament, then. It is developed in the course of a person's life by habituation. This is not true of all virtues; the sharpness of a knife is not a habit, intellectual virtues are not habits; but the virtues of the part of the soul which is able to be influenced by thought are habits. 'The stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times... Neither by nature... nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit' (II.1). Human nature and the personal temperament superadded to nature leave the relationship between feeling and thought somewhat indeterminate, so that there is room for the development of a habit of 'feeling reasonably'. 'It is not by often seeing that we got the sense of sight', 'but the virtues we get by first exercising them'; 'we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts' (ibid.). Each time we manage to restrain a feeling by thinking about whether it is appropriate to the situation we make it easier to do the same thing next time; every time we indulge a feeling thoughtlessly we make it harder to restrain such feelings in future (II.1-4).

A feeling (confidence, fear, friendliness etc.) can be stronger, or weaker, than is appropriate to the situation. Similarly outward action can be overdone, or not carried through. Moral virtue makes it easier to do well in these respects, to feel or act neither too much nor too little, but just as much as reason judges appropriate. 'There is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly' (1138 b20-5), like an archer tensing his bow more or less, as the arrow seems likely to fall short or over-shoot the mark. This is the first sense of the doctrine that moral virtue is concerned with a 'mean' (middle, intermediate point). Virtue is excellence, not mediocrity. The archer's virtue enables him to get an excellent score, although to do this he must each time neither fall short nor overshoot but hit the point between. Similarly, although virtue is concerned with avoiding both excess and defect in feeling and action, so that 'in respect of the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean', nevertheless 'with regard to what is best and right it is an extreme' (1107 a8). A virtuous person excels at stopping at just the right point.

It is not possible to define the right point in abstract terms. If the extremes were definite and the right point were half-way between them, it might be arrived at by simple arithmetic. But the extremes are not definite: excessive anger (for example) can be more or less excessive. 'It is possible to fail in many ways, for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured' (1106 b30). An archer could not locate the mark by finding a point half way between 'falling short' and 'overshooting', because these are not definite points. Also, the moral mean may be more like one of the extremes than the other: 'e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage' (1109a1). Further, the right amount varies from one person to another -- it is 'relative to us'. 'By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men;... but the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so' (1106 a28-) -- it is not equidistant, and what may be too much for one person may be too little for another.

For these reasons the mean cannot be defined in the abstract; one person cannot tell another in general terms how much is enough. Moral standards are learnt by apprenticeship, by associating with someone who is a good judge and seeing how that person decides in a range of particular cases. A good judge is someone with practical wisdom -- moral virtue makes a person good at feeling and acting in accordance with judgment, and judging is the work of reason, which is made good at judging by practical wisdom. So 'virtue is concerned with... a mean relative to us, this being determined by... that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it' (1107a1-5). (Now read II.6).

Habitually to fall short of the mark is one vice, habitually to overshoot it is another; each virtue is thus flanked by two vices, opposed to one another and to the virtue. This is the second sense of the doctrine that virtue is a mean: in a table of virtues and vices, the virtue column would be in the middle, between two columns of vices. The exception to this is justice. Justice is a mean in the first way (the just person excels at giving or taking not too much nor too little but just the right amount), but it is opposed not by two vices but only one, injustice -- whenever too much is given to one person, too little is given to another, so there is no difference between habitually falling short and habitually overshooting (1133 b30-1134 a15). For an outline of the moral virtues and vices, read II.7. The 'table' referred to at 1107a35 is reconstructed in W.D. Ross Aristotle, p.303.

Aristotle perhaps overemphasises the fact that moral virtue is concerned with achieving just the right amount of feeling or action. It has other important aspects, which he mentions more briefly. 'To feel them (fear and confidence) at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best' (1106 b20; cf. 1109 a25, 1110 b30-). It is not clear that in all of these aspects virtue can be represented as a mean; or perhaps some of them pertain to practical wisdom rather than to moral virtue. Elsewhere (1105 a30-5) he says that an act does not come from moral virtue unless it is chosen for its own sake (i.e. not for some ulterior purpose, e.g., to avoid punishment). This is an important point, apparently not covered by the conception of virtue as a mean.

2. Continence, endurance and virtue

The emotional and active elements in the personality of virtuous persons are ready to be 'persuaded' by their reason; they feel and act as they should without any great struggle. In fact they take pleasure in acting rightly; just as sense pleasure completes the activity of a healthy sense organ in relation to a suitable object (1175b20f), so a virtuous person takes pleasure in doing the right thing (see II.3, and 1099a5;-20). Similarly a vicious person takes pleasure in doing what comes naturally to such persons. The virtuous do the right thing without struggle or regret and with pleasure; the vicious do the wrong thing without hesitation and without remorse.

Obviously most of us are neither virtuous nor vicious; to do what is right is often a struggle, and when we fail we suffer remorse. Post-Aristotelian philosophers came to think that perfect virtue was in practice unattainable, that we are all at best 'in progress' toward virtue. The region between untroubled virtue and remorseless vice is occupied in Aristotle's scheme by continence/incontinence, endurance/softness; a continent person struggles successfully against the allurements of pleasure, the person of endurance puts up with pains which may be incident to right action. Continence and endurance are virtue not yet perfect, when habituation to right feeling and action is not yet complete. These intermediate states are the subject of E.N. VII. In this context Aristotle discusses Socrates' paradox that no one does wrong knowingly -- i.e. that we cannot be deflected by pleasure or pain from doing what we know is right. Aristotle distinguishes (obscurely) between various senses of 'know', and various things a person needs to know to act rightly, and concludes that Socrates is in a way right and in a way wrong; see VI.3. Aristotle's treatment of Socrates' problem has given rise to an ever-growing modern literature on akrasia (incontinence, or weakness of will).

3. Desert

For many modern moral philosophers, ethics is coextensive with the sphere of voluntary action deserving praise or blame. For Aristotle it was something wider; the study of desert is only a part. 'Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue' (III.1). Read III.1-5; for the most part this can be left to speak for itself. Some comments:
  1. Compulsion makes an act involuntary. Notice that Aristotle takes compulsion to mean physical compulsion: a person is not physically compelled by threats, dangers, anger, the allurements of pleasure; these do not make action involuntary. Voluntary actions done under threat may be pardoned if the threat is one 'which overstrains human nature, and which no one could withstand. But some acts perhaps we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather face death after the most fearful sufferings' (1110 a25).
  2. Other acts are done as a price paid for some good; these are voluntary. 'For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or painful in return for great and noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person' (1110 a20). 'It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be chosen at what cost, and what should be endured for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decision' (1110 a30).
  3. Ignorance or mistake does not always excuse. It does not if it is due to carelessness (1113 b35). Also, mistaken moral perceptions, mistakes about ends and principles, are blameworthy and wicked; Aristotle seems to assume that these are due to bad habits voluntarily contracted (1110 b27-35, 1114 a35-b25). The acts or omissions which cause such mistakes deserve blame, and so do the acts afterwards done in error.
Deliberation, choice, and wish are the topics of III.2-4. Aristotle says that deliberation and choice are about means to an end we wish to attain through action. But elsewhere he says that some actions, viz. virtuous acts in which human happiness consists, are themselves ends, done for their own sakes and not as a means to some further end. Perhaps Aristotle thinks that virtuous actions are not deliberately chosen but impulsive (cf. 1111 b7-9); but this is unlikely, since to identify the mean in virtuous actions (how much action and feeling is the right amount) may require careful reflection. It seems better to say that Aristotle's analysis of deliberation and choice is incomplete. It is an analysis of only one kind of decision, concerning those inferior actions which are valued only as means to something else.

4. The intellectual virtues

The moral virtues perfect that part of the soul which is rational in the sense that it can be controlled or influenced by reason (see part 1 above). The intellectual virtues perfect the part of the soul which itself reasons and thinks. The intellectual virtues are either theoretical (intuitive reason, science, wisdom) or practical (art, practical wisdom). The intellectual virtues are not 'moral' in the modern sense; to be a good mathematician does not make a person morally good. However, to practice skilfully as a mathematician is a possible part of the good life, which is Aristotle's subject.

Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue which is also a moral virtue (in the modern sense of 'moral'); it is the main subject of Book VI. It seems to me that E.N. contains two different and perhaps inconsistent views of the relation between moral virtue and practical wisdom. The first theory is assumed in Book II, the second in Book VI:

  1. The first is the one outlined above in discussing 'the mean relatively to us': practical wisdom is excellence in judging how much action or feeling is enough in a particular situation, moral virtue is the readiness of emotions and active powers to obey the judgment of reason.
  2. The second is connected with the analysis of deliberation given just above: practical wisdom is excellence in choosing means appropriate to ends to which we are directed by moral virtue.
In Book VI practical wisdom is said to be the virtue which enables a person to deliberate well, to choose means which are truly expedient for right ends, the ends being set by moral virtue.

On either theory (it seems) practical wisdom requires insight. Notice the references to intuition or perception (1142 a25-30, 1143a 30-b15; cf. 1109 b15-25). These passages are not easy to interpret, but they seem to suggest that practical wisdom involves 'seeing' with an 'eye' which virtue and practical wisdom provides -- some sort of practical intuition. (Intueri in Latin means to see.) This practical intuition is not to be confused with the intuition which is a speculative virtue, VI.6. In many places Aristotle says that things seem or appear differently to persons of different character; they are as they seem to the person of good character (1113 a15-b1, 1114 a30-b25, 1099 a5-25, 1176 a3-30, 1176 b25 ). Only a person with a properly formed character can benefit from the abstract study of ethics, because only such a person can apply universal considerations correctly to particular cases; to do this intuition is required. See 1095 a1-5, 1095 b1-10, 1103 b25-10, 1141 b14-20.

II The Good Life

5. The good for man

An activity can be specified by reference to the faculty or skill or virtue by which it is done, or done well; e.g., 'intellectual activity' means the range of things which can be done by intellect, 'mathematical operations' are the things a mathematician is skilled at. Sometimes it is difficult to find any concise characterisation except by reference to faculty or skill. According to Aristotle 'the good for man' [and woman?], i.e. the goal of human existence, is to be active in accordance with the human virtues; i.e. to do, and do well, the range of things which reference to these virtues specifies. The detailed account in III.7-VI of the various human virtues gives this formula its content (which is why I postponed discussion of the good life until after the discussion of virtue). The goal of human existence is to do well the sorts of things that courage, justice and the other moral virtues, and wisdom, science and the other intellectual virtues, make a person able to do well.

Notice that the goal is not to develop or possess these virtues, but to do the things which they make one able to do well. To be able to do them well it is necessary to develop the virtues, but the point is to do them, not merely to be able to (1095 b30-1096 b1, 1098 b30-1099 a5, 1176 a33-1176 b1). This distinguishes Aristotle's theory from the 'self-realisation' theories of ethics which were popular in the 19th century, according to which the goal of ethical conduct is to perfect oneself, to develop one's potentialities to the full, to become an admirable human being; the goal according to Aristotle is not to become or to be, but to do.

6. Happiness

He often calls the good 'happiness' (eudaimonia), which might suggest that the goal is the state of mind which follows upon good action. But this is not what he means. Eudaimonia on his account is not a state of mind; it consists in action, not in something else resulting from action. The good is 'an active life of the element that has a rational principle... life in the sense of activity' (1098 a5). 'We identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul, and not among external goods... We have practically defined [it] as a sort of good life or good action' (1098 b18-22). It is 'an activity... [one of those] desirable in themselves, not... for the sake of something else, ... from which nothing is sought beyond the activity' (1076 b1-8).

A 'happy' life is not one lived in a happy state of mind, but one which is objectively happy, one which an impartial judge would regard as fortunate (cf. 'a happy thought' -- not one which results from or produces a happy state of mind). 'Fortunate', however, suggests something that depends on luck, whereas eudaimonia depends largely on good management (I.9). Perhaps 'eligible' (worthy of being chosen) is the best word; a good life is one which an impartial judge would regard as worth choosing if there were a choice. Imagine that we are invited to choose our lot, to choose among an array of possible life-histories (cf. Plato Republic 618-); a 'happy' life is one which a sensible person making a careful choice might select. Happiness as a state of mind (pleasure) is a consequence of such a life, but not one of its constituent elements (1099 a5-). To live a good life, to live well, is to engage in certain activities; pleasure will result, but is not the goal. Read X 4, 5, 6. (Compare Joseph Butler in D.D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists, Vol. I, paragraphs 415, 417).

The goal of human existence, then, is to perform well certain activities which are desirable for their own sakes and not merely on account of their results, viz. those which the various moral and intellectual virtues make one able to do well. Of these activities some are internal (thinking) others are external (acts of courage, justice etc.). A good external action involves (a) correct intention, and (b) carrying out the intention; for (a) virtue suffices, but for (b) a person may need tools, equipment, money, friends. People who judged correctly what should be done and whose judgment controlled their feelings and executive powers would be morally good (in the modern sense of 'moral'), but if they lacked the outward means of carrying out their intentions they could not be said to be 'happy' -- their life would not be one that a sensible person given the choice would select. Happiness 'needs external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment' (1099 a30).

Happiness is virtuous activity; 'of the remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments' (1099 b27). In Politics 1295 a35 Aristotle defines the good life as a life according to virtue lived without 'impediment'; i.e. a life in which good intentions are not frustrated by ill-health, poverty, etc. 'The best life... is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions' (Politics 1324 al). 'May our state... be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness... are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose' (Politics 1322 a30); chance brings external goods, 'but no one is just or temperate by chance' (Politics 1323 b28). See E.N., I, 10.

Aristotle seems unsure how much power over happiness should be attributed to fortune. After Aristotle the Stoics emphasised that the good must be 'self sufficient' (following, perhaps, Aristotle's remarks that it is 'that which when isolated' -- i.e. just by itself -- 'makes life desirable and lacking in nothing' (1097 b15)), and is 'something proper to a man and not easily taken from him' (1095 b25)). The Stoics held that a person can be unhappy only by doing 'the acts that are hateful and mean' (1100 b35). The goods which fortune controls are not parts or preconditions of the good for man. In modern times Kant said something similar: 'Considered in itself it [the good will] is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about... If by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this value' (Immanuel Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. H.J. Paton, New York, 1964, p.62). Aristotle might have replied that, all the same, no one who had the choice would select a life in which the good will is frustrated. To make such a choice would in fact show that there was not really a good will, but at best 'a mere wish'. Such a life therefore cannot be called 'a good life', or 'the good for man'. To mean well is perhaps sufficient for what we would call a morally good life, but it is not sufficient for a life such as well-meaning people would choose if they had the choice -- it is not in Aristotle's sense 'happy'. (On this controversy see Cicero, De finibus, IV.viii.19-; Loeb edn. p. 321 ff.)

A life extends through time. The goal of human existence is to be active in certain ways over a reasonable stretch of time. Premature death does not lessen a person's moral goodness in the modern sense of 'moral' and it does not affect the value of what they have done: still a life cut short prematurely is not one that a sensible person would select. Happiness is therefore 'activity of the soul in accordance with virtue... in a complete life' (1098 a18).

A person is happy, then, 'who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life... and is destined to live thus and die as befits his life' (1101 a15f).

7. Production and action

It is not possible to spend all one's time in activities desirable for their own sakes. Since the good life extends through time and requires external goods, health etc., some time must be devoted now to securing the conditions of intrinsically valuable activity in the future. This 'necessary' activity (1176 b3) includes, or is co-extensive with, 'production'. 'Action' (or 'doing') and 'production' (or 'making') are basic categories of Aristotle's practical philosophy. Production has as its end something which is a means to something further -- either to another stage of production or to action; 'instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action' (Politics I.4). Production is for the sake of instruments of further production or of possessions which are a means of intrinsically worthwhile action. These concepts should perhaps be given an extended sense, so that anything for which there is an art is a form of production, whether or not a transportable artefact results. (On Art see VI.4. An art is a virtue, but not a 'moral' virtue in our sense (1105 a23-1105 b5, 1140 b23-5). For example, household management produces a state of affairs which facilitates further domestic production and also activity desirable for itself; in this case the 'instrument' or 'possession' produced is a suitable disposition of objects in space and time. Similarly medicine is an art the 'product' of which is a body capable of continued production or action; and so on. Happiness -- activity desirable for itself -- consists in action not production. 'But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities' (1094 a5). 'That which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only ... the end of a particular operation) -- only that which is done is that' (1139 b3). 'For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot [have]; for good action itself is its end' (1140 b7). 'Life is action not production' (Politics 1254 a8). Activities which are merely preparatory to living should be kept in their place.

8. Action and contemplation

Read X.7,8. In these chapters Aristotle argues that the good life consists primarily in intellectual activity, 'contemplating truth' either by oneself or better still with fellow workers (1177 b1). (This is not exactly what we do here at Macquarie University; insofar as our activity has some ulterior purpose it is part of production, not happiness). This is leisure (1177 b4), not to be confused with relaxation (1176 b34) -- relaxation is for the sake of further work, work is for the sake of leisure (1177 b5). Leisure is the activity in which happiness primarily consists, and it requires exertion (1177 a1). To perform this activity well we need the speculative intellectual virtues, viz. intuitive reason, science and philosophical wisdom.

The life in accordance with the other kind of virtue (moral virtue, with which is linked practical wisdom) is the good life 'secondarily' (1178 a8). What does this mean? There are at least two possible interpretations, neither of which can be said to be clearly what Aristotle meant. One is that actions facilitated by moral virtue are to be valued as a means to the intellectual life. 'And this activity alone (the intellectual life) would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action' (1177 b1-5). Practical action, e.g. politics, aims at 'a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being different' (1177 b1-5); practical action would seem to aim at establishing conditions under which intellectual activity flourishes. But this would make 'the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue' a kind of production, or at any rate not a kind of happiness, since happiness is activity valued for itself. It would also conflict with the doctrine that a person of moral virtue chooses what is right for its own sake (1105 a30-50).

Another possibility is to take 'secondarily' as a reference to the hierarchy among the parts of the soul (see 1103 a1-10 and above). The part which engages in philosophical activity is rational in the strict sense and in itself, and the part perfected by moral virtue is rational in the sense that it is persuadable by reason. Happiness is 'an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this one part has such a principle in the [secondary] sense of being obedient to one, the other in the [primary] sense of possessing one and exercising thought' (1098 a3-5). So happiness in the primary sense would be the activity of reason in the strict sense, happiness in the secondary sense would be activity of the part which is rational in the other sense. The latter is not merely a means to the former, but still the former is best -- there are degrees of value among things valued for themselves.

Aristotle says that the life of practical virtue is 'typically human' (1178 a14); the intellectual life is perhaps 'too high for man' (1177 b26), being more appropriate to the gods. He concludes, nevertheless, that the intellectual life is the best life a human being can live (cf. Metaphysics 982 b27-983 a11). This conclusion conflicts with a premiss of the argument of I.7, viz. that the good for human beings consists in performing their 'work' or 'function', the thing that only a human being can do, or what nothing else can do so well; that argument proceeds by excluding activities common to human beings and other beings (1097 b33-1098 a5; 'we are seeking what is peculiar to man') and concludes that human good consists in rational activity. It appears now that one kind of rational activity is common to man and gods; surely this should also be excluded, leaving as the good for man the life of practical reason, which is 'typically human'. If the function of something is what nothing else can do as well the function of a human being cannot be something that the gods do better. The argument from function is apparently overidden, however, by another principle, that the good for a being is the activity of its 'best' element, by which it is most akin to higher beings; see 1098 a17 (which may be an afterthought); 1177 a13, 1177 b35, 1178 b23, 26, 1179 a26.

The 'function' argument has deep roots in Aristotle's philosophy. According to Aristotle every kind of thing has its characteristic and peculiar end in a cosmic order. Tendency to its end or good is the chief principle in the thing's essential nature (Physics II.8); its nature is most fully realised in the activity by which it attains its end; it is good of its kind when it is performing this activity well, i.e. in accordance with the virtue characteristic of this kind of being; so a good thing of its kind is one which has the appropriate virtue and acts well in view of the end which is 'the good' for such things (E.N., I.7). The universe, the totality of beings of every kind, is an ordered whole, with a good toward which the whole tends, viz. god (Metaphysics 1075 a12-25). This does not imply that each thing seeks god directly; because beings form an hierarchical order, it may be that lower things seek the good of the whole indirectly, by seeking their appropriate lower goods, each 'minding its own business' (cf. Plato Republic 433-4).

But the 'best part' argument has roots also. Aristotle thought that the order of kinds formed a continuum with some overlap between lower and higher kinds; hence the possibility of a lower kind's having a best part by which it is akin to a higher kind, and of some direct tendency to higher ends. (On continuity of kinds in Aristotle see A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, New York, 1936, p.55-9). But the hierarchical order would be destroyed if the appropriate lower end was neglected altogether. Usually a thing does and should pursue its 'proper' (i.e. peculiar) end, but it may engage a higher activity intermittently ('God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are' Metaphysics 1072 b23; cf. 1072 b15).

To sum up: contemplation is higher and better, and is happiness 'primarily'; activities in accordance with practical virtue are happiness 'secondarily' because they are 'rational' in a secondary sense, and are lower in the cosmic scale of values. But this lower activity is not a mere means to the higher, and should not be neglected entirely since it is appropriate to man's place in the cosmic order. The good life will thus be a mixture of the two kinds of activity. How much of each kind is the right amount relatively to the individual is presumably to be judged, intuitively, by practical reason and cannot be defined in the abstract. Whether this summarises what Aristotle had in mind must remain uncertain.

9. Teleology

Aristotle's ethics is often described as 'teleological', a description justified by his constant references to the end, the mark, the good, etc. However, in modern ethical theory "teleological" usually means "consequentialist", and Aristotle's ethics is not consequentialist. Consequentialism is the doctrine that the goodness or badness of an action always derives entirely from the goodness or badness of its consequences, so that no action is good or bad intrinsically. The best-known species of consequentialism is Utilitarianism, which holds, roughly, 'that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness' (J.S. Mill Utilitarianism (B1602.A2 vol. 10), p. 210). Similarly Aristotle says that happiness is something 'we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else... but we choose [other things] for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be made happy' (1097 b1-5); happiness is the 'end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake, everything else being desired for the sake of this' (1094 a18). This sounds like Utilitarianism. But there is a vital difference. Mill continues in the passage just quoted, 'By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain' (p. 210), whereas Aristotle says, 'We must class happiness as an activity... and if some activities are... desirable for the sake of something else ['production'], while others are so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for the sake of something else... And of this nature virtuous actions are thought to be' (1176 b1-8). So when Aristotle says that some activities are desired as means to happiness, he means as means to other activities; the goodness of the consequences or products of such actions derives from the intrinsic goodness of the activities which they facilitate: in his view only actions can be good intrinsically, which is the opposite of consequentialism.

See B. H. Baumrin, Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionism', The New Scholasticism, 42 (1968), pp.1-17. (B1.N4)

III Friendship

Friendship is an important part of the good life, and it gets more attention in the Nicomachean Ethics than any other single topic (Books VIII and IX). It also links ethics and politics into one subject, 'political science' (I.2). 'Friendship is a virtue, or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary for living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods. It stimulates to noble actions -- "two going together" -- for with friends men are more able both to think and act... Friendship seems to hold states together... When men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality' (VIII.1). The friendship Aristotle has in mind is friendship between men; even on this topic women are not mentioned.

10. What friendship is

Friendship often begins from an impulse of admiration and good-will. 'Good-will may arise of a sudden, as it does toward competitors in a contest' (1166 b35). 'No one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved' (1167 a4). But a person's goodwill, admiration, delight, are not love until 'he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence' (1167 a6), and until general well-wishing results in practical deliberation and action. 'Those who feel good-will are not for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not do anything with them nor take trouble for them' (1167 a8).

Presence and activity are thus necessary. But they are not sufficient; it is not friendship unless the attitude is reciprocated, and mutually acknowledged: 'But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add "when it is recognised"?... How could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings?' (1155 b33f).

Friendship, then, is reciprocal and explicit goodwill expressed in activity carried on in one another's presence, i.e. in a sharing of life. 'Those who approve of each other but do not live together seem to be well disposed rather than actual friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends as living together' (1157 b18-20). 'Friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends... each class spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together' (1171 b33f).

Real friendship is uncommon and requires time and familiarity for 'each to be found lovable and [to have] been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the signs of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not' (1156 b125f).

11. Kinds of friendship

Since different classes of people value different things in life, shared lives are of different kinds. Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship, based respectively on utility, pleasure and goodness. ('Useful' means valued as a means, 'good' means valuable intrinsically). Good people are also useful and pleasant to one another, so the third kind of friendship includes the other two (1156 b13-, 35-). But it also transcends them in various ways. In the third kind, each loves the other for the other's sake, but in the other two each loves for his own sake. Consequently the inferior kinds are friendships only incidentally, 'for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure' to the other. 'Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the other party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him' (1156 a15f). Friends who are good wish well to one another 'qua good, and they are good in themselves'; thus the friendship is not 'incidental', and their friendship 'lasts as long as they are good -- and goodness is an enduring thing' (1156 b5f).

It seems to me that Aristotle is trying to say something important but not getting it quite right. It may be that virtue is more deeply and permanently embedded in a person's nature than other useful and pleasant qualities, but still it is not identical with the person's self; to love others for their virtues is to love them 'incidentally', not for themselves. Conversely, it is possible to love others for themselves even though they lack good qualities. Suppose a good person becomes bad; Aristotle thinks it would be natural to break off the friendship, 'for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend' (1165 b22). Or suppose one friend remains the same, but the other makes more progress in virtue; 'Should the latter treat the former as a friend? Surely he cannot' (1165 b24). In such cases one should keep a remembrance of former intimacy and make some allowance for former friendship 'when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness' (1165 b35), but the friendship is ended. Now it may be true that reciprocal friendship cannot be maintained unless both parties are more or less equally good, but it seems a fact that one-sided love can remain -- that one may love or continue to love another for himself or herself although this person has lost or has never had good qualities. If the person has never even seemed admirable, love may never have begun (though it may, e.g. for a child); but once it exists, it may survive the loss of good qualities. Disinterested love is of the person for that person's sake, not for his or her qualities, as Aristotle supposes.

The fundamental distinction is between self-interested, merely apparent, friendship, and real, disinterested friendship. Love of wine is not only not reciprocated, it is not disinterested, and it is especially for this reason that 'of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the word friendship' (1155 b29, 1157 b30). Self-interested love is not real friendship even if it is reciprocated; friendships based on utility or pleasure in which 'those who love... love for the sake of what is good for themselves' (1156 a13) are not friendships at all. However, utility and pleasure can be the basis of real friendship. It is possible for each to aim at being useful to the other for the other's sake; people who at first associate because they need one another may, and often do, develop disinterested good will, and may come to help one another without calculating or caring about who gets most (at least, this may become an element in their relationship; they may not calculate or care much about who gets most). Thus it may be true even of friendship based on utility or pleasure that 'the friend who excels in the services he renders will not complain' (1162 b12), since 'it is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment' (1162 b35). (But there should be no unwillingness to accept service; otherwise the other's good-will be frustrated and his happiness lessened.)

When 'friendship' based on utility is self-interested, complaints and disputes are likely to arise. Aristotle examines such complaints in some detail (VII.13-IX.3). It transpires that these are not real friendships. Complaints are especially likely when one party thought that the relationship was disinterested and it turns out that the other was calculating. 'If we can we should return the equivalent of what we have received, for we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognise that we were mistaken at first and took a benefit from a person we should not have taken it from -- since it was not from a friend, nor from one who did it just for the sake of acting so' (1163 a1-). Why is it that giving strengthens love more than receiving (IX.7)? Most people think that it is because the recipient is then like a debtor from whom one can expect a return. But creditors 'have no friendly feeling to their debtors, but only wish that they may be kept safe with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have done a service to others feel friendship and love for those they have served even if these are not of any use to them and never will be' (1167 b30-). These passages clearly imply that self-interested friendship is not really friendship.

So it seems that Aristotle's account of friendship should be corrected to allow for the fact that relationships based on the useful and the pleasant may be disinterested and are not real friendships unless they are. The third kind of friendship includes service and pleasure but extends to a sharing in activities good in themselves, those which constitute the good life; Aristotle calls this 'perfect' friendship (1156 b6-), friendship 'firstly and in the proper sense' (1157 a31). Perhaps this friendship is 'perfect' in the sense that it is the goal, what any real friendship tends to become if circumstances permit; pleasant and useful exchanges gradually deepen into a sharing in the activities which give life its value. For the perfection of real friendship both parties must be virtuous, as Aristotle says, because the good life requires virtue. But most of us are only 'in progress' to virtue (see above), and the third kind of friendship can perhaps exist inchoately between people not yet perfectly virtuous. 'The friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for each takes from the other the mould of the characteristics they approve' (1172 a12-). To live in the eye of a friend who values the good life is a support in living well; such friends 'neither ask nor give base services, but (one may say) even prevent them' (1159 b5).

12. The friend as another self

Book IX, chapters 4 and 7-9 give a deeper insight into the nature of disinterested friendship by exploring its connexion with self-love. The two might seem to be opposed, since self-interested friendship is not real friendship. However, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of self-love, only one of which is selfish (cf. Joseph Butler in D.D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists, sections 384-5, 418-23). 'Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honour and bodily pleasures... [which] become objects of competition... Most men are of this nature (which is why the term has come to be used as it is -- it takes its meaning from the prevailing type of self-love, which is a bad one)... If a man were always anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other of the virtues... no one will call such a man a lover of self or blame him. But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self... He gratifies the most authoritative element in himself [reason]... [with which] he is most properly identified... He is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which is a matter of reproach' (1168 b15-). The goods which the true self-lover seeks are not fixed in quantity, so that if one had more another would have less; there is no competition or conflict. 'He does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility... But he may even give up actions to his friends; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself' (1169 a18-).

On the last point, about action, compare 1168 a5-10. It brings us to the connections between Aristotle's theory of friendship and the basic principles of his ethics. The connexion is made through the idea that a friend is another self (1166 a31, 1170 b7); this is not literally true, it is a graphic way of saying again that disinterested love is possible, that we can 'identify' with another and make that person's good one of our own goals, sought for its own sake. 'As a man is to himself, so is he to his friend' (1171 b34). Now a person's happiness lies in living and being active in certain ways; more exactly (a refinement Aristotle introduces for the first time here), it lies in conscious activity; and a person's happiness is 'to contemplate worthy actions and actions which are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend are both' (1170 a3). A good person takes pleasure in perceiving his own activity; 'as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self)'; therefore he takes pleasure in perceiving his friends' activity. 'He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realised by their living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place' (1170 a15-b15). 'Discussion and thought' is happiness primarily; friends will also share the secondary happiness of the life of practical virtue (see above).

13. The need for friends

Friends are needed as being useful in securing the means of living the good life. But they are also needed to share in it, to intensify the intrinsically worthwhile activity of one's self or 'other self'.

However, the need for friends has limits. These are vaguely defined -- not a certain number, but something within a range (1170 b35). Those with whom one shares life must be friends to one another, and this condition is not easy to fulfil if the number is large (1171 a1-5). Erotic love is, ideally, friendship in the highest degree, and experience shows it can be felt toward one person only, Aristotle believes; similarly other high degrees of friendship are possible with a few people only (1171 a10, 1158 a12).

Useful friends are needed especially in adversity, disinterested friendship is needed in adversity and prosperity alike. In adversity we are comforted by the sight of a friend and by his words ('if he is tactful, since he knows our character and the things that please or pain us'); but it is painful to see his pain at our misfortune (1171 b1-), and therefore we should hesitate to call on him, unless he can render great service at small inconvenience to himself (1171 b18). [Is this right? We tell our friends not to hesitate to ask for help, and not to consider the inconvenience; and if we find that a friend needed help and did not ask we are sorry.] In prosperity we need friends to share in the worthwhile activity which prosperity makes possible. 'It is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those in adversity (for it is characteristic of a friend to render services, and especially to those who are in need and have not demanded them; such action is nobler and pleasanter to both persons); but when our friends are prosperous we should join readily in their activities, but be tardy in coming forward to be the objects of their kindness; for it is not noble to be keen to receive benefits. Still we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill-joys by repulsing them; for that sometimes happens' (1171 b13-). [The last sentence touches on a difficulty: how to combine giving and taking. If both wish to give but are hesitant and tardy about receiving, exchange is inhibited. 'Friendship requires time and experience and familiarity', until 'each... has been trusted by each' (1156 b25f, 1158 a14); but once trust has been established, perhaps we should trust one other not to suspect self-interest if we take as readily as we give.]

The need for friends as Aristotle analyses it seems to include no element of yearning or hunger or inner conflict, as Plato's does (Phaedrus 251-). The good man seeks friends calmly, out of benevolence. In fact Aristotle's whole treatment of the good life is much cooler than Plato's. There is no yearning for the Good as something ideal and unattainable. Virtue is the focus of attention, not those imperfect states between vice and virtue through which some struggle toward perfection. Plato shows Socrates encountering ordinary people, especially young people, awakening in some of them a discontent with their present condition and a desire for something better, and love is somehow part of the awakening. Aristotle's lectures on ethics are addressed to those who have already been educated in good habits (1095 b5); 'a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science (1095 a3). If Aristotle's exoteric writings had survived (e.g. the Protrepticus) we might have got a different impression.

IV Political Science

It may puzzle the modern reader that the Nicomachean Ethics is presented as the first part of an inquiry into 'Political Science', and that Political Science (commonly believed to be a recent American invention, and a soft option) is said to be 'the most authoritative art' and 'most truly the master art' (I.2).

On the other hand, in the Politics Aristotle presents the statesman's work as being governed by ethical considerations. 'A state exists for the sake of a good life', 'virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called' (Politics III.9); 'he who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life' (Politics VII.1) These remarks suggest that ethics is the master art to which political science is subordinate, and not vice versa.

Aristotle might reply that neither is subordinate, they are simply two parts of the one subject, which can be called ethics or politics indifferently. The reason is that 'the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state' (Politics VII.2), 'the end of individuals and of states is the same' (Politics VII.15). Aristotle thinks of the citizens as a body of friends, or (more realistically) a network of groups of friends, who share a common life, in which opposition of interests is minimal, since a friend is 'another self'. There 'arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means to it' [or, if not means, then the communities in which it takes place] (Politics 1280 b35). We need friends 'since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others' (E.N., 1169 b18); this is the meaning of Aristotle's dictum that man is by nature a political animal (Politics 1253 a2) -- man is an animal that lives best in a polis or city. The end of political activity is not the production of external goods (affluence, economic growth, the national income), or military power (Politics VII, 2, 14); it is to enable citizens to live a life of leisure together as friends, sharing in intrinsically worthwhile activity (Politics VII. 3, 15).

Insofar as citizens are disinterestedly friendly towards one another, the opposition between 'mine' and 'thine' is overcome. Lawgivers seem to care more about friendship than about justice, since 'when men are friends they have no need of justice' (E.N., 1155 a26). 'I do not think that property ought to be common, as some maintain, but only that by friendly consent there should be a common use of it' (Politics VII.10). '"Friends" as the proverb says, "will have all things in common". Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further' (Politics II.5). Friendship is most likely if citizens set their hearts not on scarce external goods, which bring people into competition and conflict, but on intrinsically worthwhile activities, and especially thought and discussion, for which a large supply of external goods is unnecessary (E.N., 1177 a28-, 1178 a25-, 1178 b35-). A good person 'does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country... he will throw away the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility' (E.N., 1169 a20). Aristotle's political ideal is a kind of communism.

But although ideally an individual's good and the good sought by the state are not in opposition but are identical, the most appropriate name for the study of the good for man is not Ethics but Politics, because the state seeks the good of many, which is a higher purpose than the good of just one individual. 'For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states' (E.N., I.2). Nevertheless, the politician's activity is inferior to the philosopher's. Politics is the 'master art', but it is merely an art, concerned with production. The politician tries to produce the conditions of the happy life, the philosopher lives it (1177 b15).

(Aristotle's conception of Political Science as a master art is taken from Plato; see Statesman 304A-305E, 311C, and compare E.N., 1094 b1-. Plato also regarded philosophy as superior to politics; the person best qualified to rule will regard ruling as an interruption to something better, a return to the cave, to be made only as a duty or out of friendship for fellow citizens; Republic 519C-. Statesmanship is a productive and ministerial art, a sort of weaving; Statesman, 287B-, 305E.)

V Some Reflections

'Life is action, and not production' (Politics 1254a8)

Compared with modern approaches to politics, Aristotle's is much more ethical. Politics is often presented in newspapers and television as if it were a game played to entertain the public by two teams whose leaders are admired or despised according to the technical skill they show in scoring points and winning elections; the rules of the game are usually taken as fixed, although sometimes there is talk of making them fairer. Aristotle shows an interest in technique, especially in the design of political institutions, but he does not forget that politics is instrumental to the good life. It is this which provides the standard by which the efficiency of institutions and the skill of leaders are to be assessed. This was also Plato's attitude.

In comparison with other ethical theories Aristotle's seems to me superior in a number of important ways. Deontological theories (i.e. theories whose central notion is Duty) concentrate exclusively on moral desert; only voluntary acts -- in the last analysis, only intentions, inner volitions -- are ethically significant, because moral merit depends entirely on the will; morality is a matter of rules, and it does not matter morally what we do, or what we achieve, or what happens to us, as long as we intend nothing contrary to the rules of duty. Aristotle's theory is not deontological. In fact duty gets too little attention -- the good man is not selfish, but there is no mention of duties owed to human beings as such, including those who are not one's friends. There seem to be no rules, or at least they are not emphasised (see 1110 a28). There are objective standards (1113 a25-6, 1114 b7-, 1176 a15), but they are difficult or impossible to formulate in abstract terms; one learns the standards by associating with virtuous people and becoming virtuous oneself -- a virtuous person decides intuitively, not by applying rules of duty.

The central notion in Aristotle's ethics is the good life. Everything that people do, and everything that happens to them, is of ethical significance, as Aristotle conceives of ethics, insofar as it helps or hinders or is part of the good life. An act or occurrence may matter ethically even if it is involuntary; it will not then deserve praise or blame, but it may affect the value of life. A good will, as Aristotle would understand it, must seek to exercise some control over such things -- to be careful of life and health, money, etc., but always in subordination to the overall goal.

Comprehensiveness, and orientation to an overall goal, is a feature of teleological theories generally. What makes Aristotle's different is that the goal is activity of certain kinds. The goal is to engage in the activities of the various virtues, appropriately mixed, with a few close friends, in a city which promotes worthwhile activities and friendship. This is not a goal in the future (as heaven is for Christians); one's aim is to act in certain ways from day to day throughout a complete life. To keep this activity going one must invest some time now so that the conditions of the good life are secured for the future ('production'); but people who habitually use all, or too much, of their time preparing for the future are not living the good life 'throughout a complete life', because they are not living it now. They may not live the good life even in the future; they may die or may lose the family or friends for whom they make many of their plans, and other changes in circumstances may make their investments useless. Practical wisdom involves knowing how to allocate time -- judging the right moment to switch back and forth between production and action, and between practical action and intellectual activity, so as to strike the right balance between means and ends and among different elements of the end.

Our own way of life does not measure up well against Aristotle's standard. S. Burenstam-Linder, The Harried Leisure Class (Columbia UP, New York 1970; HB199.B84) does not mention Aristotle, but it is a book Aristotle would probably have endorsed. It is an essay in the economics of time-allocation, taking into account something generally overlooked in economic analysis, that consumption requires time. The book includes many concrete illustrations which I find very telling. Increases in productivity have led to a 'time famine'; the increased yield on time spent in instrumental activities has made people feel that they cannot afford to waste time. But this attitude threatens consumption, which was supposed to give production its point; people produce for the sake of producing, or do everything for the sake of something they can never get round to doing, making or buying objects many of which they never have time to use. Among the 'consumption' activities threatened is friendship: the feeling that the other person must be too busy is an obstacle to making friends; to spend time in unproductive conversation is not only wasteful, it is also inconsiderate.

It seems to me that academic life is affected by the same forces. Students are not living now, but preparing for the future. They are always short of time. Division of labour increases productivity, teachers are specialists, contacts are brief and limited. Academics are praised as 'productive scholars' if they produce artefacts such as the one you are now reading, only published; the chief use of these is to provide material for producing others. The transformation of the intellectual life into a form of production has been helped along by K.R. Popper, who says that past philosophers were mistaken in supposing that knowledge requires a person knowing -- knowledge may be 'objective' in the sense that it consists in objects (e.g. computer offprints) and need not ever exist in anyone's mind. (See K.R. Popper Objective Knowledge (BD161.P73), p.106 ff.)

Burenstam-Linder distinguishes consumption which is 'goods-intensive' from consumption which is not. Increasing productivity emphasises the former and threatens the latter. But the promise of increased satisfaction held out by these goods is often illusory. If we relied less on elaborate consumer goods we would not need to spend so much time in production, there would be more time for activities for which elaborate equipment is not needed and our overall satisfaction might be greater. (There are other reasons too for putting less emphasis on production -- pollution, diminishing physical resources, etc.; see E. Schumacher Small is Beautiful, London 1973, HD82.S3789, another Aristotelian book.)

The economist's language is not the same as Aristotle's but translation is not difficult. For 'consumption' substitute 'action', for 'consumer goods' substitute 'possessions' ('a possession is an instrument of action', Politics 1254 a3). Action is not for the sake of satisfaction ('pleasure'), but of course pleasure is a by-product of acting well; so 'whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life' makes little practical difference 'for they seem to be bound up together' (1175 a18). The quantity of possessions 'needed for a good life is not unlimited, for the instruments of any art are never unlimited' (1256 b32-35). It is unnatural to seek wealth without limit (Politics I.9). One of the advantages of the philosopher's life is that it is more 'self-sufficient', since 'it would seem to need external equipment but little' (1177 a28, 1178 a25). So in different language Aristotle seems to say much the same as is being said by Burenstam-Linder and other modern social critics.

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