Copyright © 1996 R.J. Kilcullen
To use this reading guide you will need to have before you either the course Readings book or Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
This is the first cassette for the course POL264, Modern Political Theory. This course is a continuation of POL167, Introduction to Political Theory. You will need to refer sometimes to the POL167 course materials, so keep them handy. You will also need two volumes of POL264 course materials available from the Universities Cooperative Bookshop. Volume 1 is the Readings book containing extracts from the authors studied in this course. Volume 2 contains articles from journals, chapters from books and printed lectures (some of the lectures given when the course was taught as a conventional lecture course). The purpose of these cassettes is to guide you through the readings. Listen to them with the Readings book open before you, and also have a notebook handy.
POL167 began with John Stuart Mill's Representative Government, and certain other political writings of his, then went back to Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and through the middle ages and the early modern period up to and including David Hume. This course, POL264, begins with Hume's contemporary and friend, Adam Smith, and then goes to John Stuart Mill again (this time his philosophy of history and ethics), to Darwin and Huxley, Marx and Engels, Max Weber, Roberto Michels, Joseph Schumpeter, John Rawls and Robert Nozick (recent American writers). Most of these writers are concerned in one way or another with the project of deriving a political and social philosophy from a philosophy of history. This project can be traced back to various French writers of the 18th century, such as Montesquieu. (In fact, it was anticipated in the 14th century by the Muslim writer Ibn Khaldun, under the influence of Aristotle; see POL167 Supplementary Readings, p. 102 ff.) This project of deriving a political and social philosophy from a philosophy of history is an attempt to construct a natural history of human society. Recall Aristotle's remark that "man is by nature a political animal"; according to Aristotle, the goal toward which humanity develops, beginning with families, and then villages, is life in a polis, a city. "Man is by nature a political animal" means that human society tends to develop towards the goal of city life. The 18th and 19th century writers would have said that man is by nature a social animal. They did not accept Aristotle's view that the polis was the final stage, and they thought there were more stages than he knew about, but their project was in principle similar to his. They thought there was too much fiction in 17th century theories about the transition from the so-called "state of nature" to civil society; they wanted to give a realistic and credible account of the processes of social change. They thought of this as a process through stages: for some time society would have a certain character, then would come a period of transformation, to be followed by another stage. Hume and Adam Smith seem to think that what Smith called "commercial society" was the final stage, but before long other writers (such as Malthus and Ricardo) were pointing out features of commercial society that gave grounds for believing that further social development of some kind must take place. According to Marx, the commercial society Smith had described had developed into the specific form of Capitalism, and the dynamic of Capitalism would in turn give rise to another, and final, stage, Socialism. Political philosophy in the 19th century was based on, or heavily influenced by, such philosophies of social history.
So let us begin to read Adam Smith. This cassette is about his book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. So open the Readings book (or, if you do not have it, borrow from the library Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford, 1976). (BJ1005.S6.1976). Have handy also volume 4 of the POL167 course books. The Theory of Moral Sentiments is divided into parts, sections, chapters and paragraphs. I will refer to it by the page number in the Raphael and Macfie edition, and sometimes by the paragraph numbers. The paragraph numbers will be found in the margin. For example, on p. 9 (the first page in the Readings book), paragraph 2 begins "As we have no immediate experience".
The Theory of Moral Sentiments is a contribution to both psychology and ethics. Its purpose is to find a basis for ethical judgement in human psychology. The psychology is in terms of "propensities" (i.e. tendencies, dispositions, capacities) found in human nature: a human being placed in a certain situation has a propensity to act or react in certain ways. These propensities include:
In Smith's theory the immediate standard of right and wrong consists in the feelings of human beings. He seems to have been a Christian (of "latitudinarian" persuasion), but Christianity and theology are at one remove from his ethical system: no doubt a benevolent creator gave human beings these propensities, but in making moral judgements we need make no reference to God but can follow our feelings. (In English and European thought, music and literature the late 18th century was an era of feeling--cf. Laurence Sterne, Henry MacKenzie, Goethe, C.P.E. Bach.)
A question you might bear in mind in reading this book: Does Adam Smith account for the purported objectivity of moral judgements (e.g. judgements of justice)? Isn't being guided by one's feelings just subjectivity?
This may remind you of Hume; see the passage from Hume's Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals in D.D. Raphael, British Moralists, paragraph 576 (in POL167 Readings, p. 360). There Hume says:
The interests of society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us... Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish... yet in instances, where [his own interest] is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel some propensity to the good of mankind... Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement?And in paragraph 588 (POL167 Readings, p. 361) he says:
Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and where every thing else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind... A moral distinction, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation [or approval].So both Hume and Adam Smith reject the thesis of Hobbes that human beings are totally selfish. The writer who had argued most strongly against Hobbes's thesis was Joseph Butler. Extracts from his writings will be found in Raphael, British Moralists (BJ601.R3), vol. 1. Butler's footnote to paragraph 388 is pretty close to the passage from Hume's Inquiry in POL167 Readings, p. 360. See also paragraphs 382-3, 386, 388-9, 414-5, 417, 422. Butler tries to sort out the notion of "self-interest" or "self-love". He points out that besides self-love in the sense of a general desire for one's own happiness there are and must be particular desires for this or that external thing or good--for honour, power, etc.-- unless we desired such things there would be no way for self-love to pursue happiness. These particular desires are, he insists, for those external things; attaining them is a means to happiness, but it could not be that unless we really did desire those things for themselves and not merely as a means to our own happiness. The particular things we desire can include, and generally do include, the happiness of other persons. Thus we really do desire the happiness of others for their sakes, even though it is also true that furthering the happiness of others may further our own happiness--we desire it not simply as a means to our own happiness, but as desirable in itself. There is no more inconsistency between love of self and love of others than there is between love of self and love of any of the other particular goods that we get satisfaction from. We don't value them simply because they give satisfaction, they give satisfaction because we value them. So when Smith says, "though he derives nothing from it [i.e. the happiness of others] except the pleasure of seeing it", the reference to "the pleasure of seeing it" doesn't mean that we do after all care about others only as a means to our own pleasure--rather, we get pleasure from seeing the happiness of others because we do really care about their happiness, and not merely as a means to our own.
Sympathy, how it works, is the topic of the second paragraph on p. 9: "As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation." We do not directly sense the feelings of others. I do sense what is being done to you; I must then imagine how I would feel if that were being done to me, and as a result of imagining this I feel for you.
As he says in paragraph 5 (p. 10), he is using "sympathy" in a broad sense, to mean not only compassion but fellow feeling of any sort--as for example we might be said to sympathise with someone's joy when we feel happy for them.
READ pp. 11-12, paragraphs 6-7, 10-11.
Propriety means the proper or appropriate relationship between one's feelings and the situation that evokes them. If we say, in modern language, that someone has "over-reacted" to a situation, we are saying that the degree of feeling behind that person's words or actions is more intense than the situation justifies. As Smith says, the person's passions are "unsuitable to the causes which excite them".
Smith says that the spectator's feelings, when he imagines himself in that person's place, are the measure of the appropriateness of that person's feelings. Later on he will modify this. If I am especially afraid of spiders, I may feel great horror when I see a spider on you; but I may recognise that my horror is excessive, and that yours is too--on reflection, I may recognise that we are both over-reacting.
But setting that point aside for the moment, Smith is arguing that the only standard available to me for judging the appropriateness of your feeling is my own feeling. If, when I consider your situation, I feel for you the feelings you seem to be having, then I must regard your feeling as appropriate. Notice in paragraph 2:
To approve or disapprove... of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own.In paragraph 10:
I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment [when I imagine myself in your place], of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.In making human feeling, and not God's will, or natural law, or some other superior standard, the criterion of propriety Adam Smith was rejecting a long tradition.
Notice in paragraphs 3 and 4 the beginnings of Smith's account of the place of rules in morality. He refers to this 3 or 4 lines from the end of paragraph 4. Sometimes I may judge your feelings not by comparing them with my own sympathetic feeling but by applying general rules. These rules are empirical generalisations telling me how I would feel if I took the time and trouble to imagine myself in your situation.
paragraph 8: "philosophers have of late years"; Smith means Hume. See Hume's Treatise (ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. Nidditch), p. 499 (POL167 Readings, p. 347). In that passage Hume talks of interest, and of what is pernicious. These are terms that refer to effects, not to cause. Hume's general thesis about virtue is that a virtue is a quality of character that is useful to mankind. The passage already referred to in the Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals comes from a section entitled "Why utility [i.e usefulness] pleases" (POL167 Readings, p. 360); his answer is that usefulness to mankind pleases us because we do care, to some extent, about the welfare of other people. See the end of the passage in POL167 Readings, p. 361:
Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak... they must still... where every thing else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous.Again, Hume's language refers to purposes or effects, not causes. Smith wants to correct Hume by drawing attention to the fact that we judge propriety of feeling by judging whether it is proportionate to the situation that has caused it; we are not concerned only with the effects it is likely to produce. Perhaps you should re-read pp. 16-8 before going on.
READ pp. 21-3, paragraphs 6-10.
These paragraphs reinforce the earlier point (pp. 11-12) that the sympathetic feeling may be different in degree and kind. As he says here, in paragraph 7, it is "a passion somewhat analogous to what is felt by the sufferer", always "in some respects, different from what he feels".
It might be worth noticing the various metaphors Smith uses in speaking of sympathy. On p. 16, paragraph 1, he speaks of "the man whose sympathy keeps time to my grief"; on p. 22 he speaks of emotions that "beat time to" another person's. Four lines down on the same page he speaks of the spectators' being "capable of going along with" him. On p. 21 he says that the spectator should try "to put himself in" the other's situation, and try "to bring home to himself" the other's circumstances.
READ chapter V, paragraph 1, and the editor's comment.
The ethics of the ancient Stoics were an important influence on Adam Smith. There is an extensive discussion of Stoicism later in the book. Like the Stoics (and unlike Hume and Hutcheson), Smith emphasised the importance of self-control.
In paragraph 2, "beneficent" means "beneficial".
In paragraph 3, consider the case when someone has harmed another by accident or out of excusable ignorance: Do they deserve punishment?
In paragraph 4: "In this case too"--i.e. when punishment is inflicted. "From which the action proceeds", i.e. the action of inflicting punishment.
Merit or demerit depends on beneficial or harmful effects. If A does something that harms B, B may resent A's action and attempt to inflict some punishment. How do we judge whether the punishment would be deserved? Smith suggests: by considering the propriety of both the feeling of resentment that prompts B's attempt to punish A, and also the feelings or motives that prompted A to do the act that B now resents: that is, whether A's motives were appropriate to the original situation, and whether B's desire to punish is an appropriate reaction to A's action. We do not judge whether punishment is deserved by considering whether inflicting punishment would have good effects (though we may consider effects in deciding whether actually to inflict a punishment that is deserved). Similar remarks apply to gratitude and reward.
READ pp. 87-8, 89-90, paragraphs 5-6, 9-10 and the editor's comment.
In paragraph 5, the "efficient" and "final" causes are respectively the cause and the purpose. According to Smith, purpose is to be attributed to the person who makes the thing, not to the thing itself. The wheels of the watch don't have a purpose, though the person who made the watch intended it for some purpose.
In paragraph 6, compare Hume, POL167 Readings, p. 347.
In paragraph 10, first line, underline "society", and eleven lines down "individuals".
Before going on you might re-read paragraphs 5-6, 9-10.
In saying that we must judge the appropriateness of others' motives and feelings by comparison with our own sympathetic feelings Smith did not assume that our feelings will necessarily be appropriate. Here he suggests a way of correcting them. I sympathise with you by imagining myself in your place: I correct my sympathetic feelings by imagining the reaction of an impartial spectator who puts himself in your place. Suppose you and I are friends, and that some person who has hurt you is someone I do not like; I may well sympathise more than I should with your resentment and urge to punish. So I must imagine some impartial spectator and try to bring my feelings into line with those of the impartial spectator. Notice that there is no standard of propriety except someone's feelings, the feelings of some human being; we cannot correct our feelings by comparison with any set of abstract principles, or with the supposed perceptions of any other kind of being such as God (unless we suppose ourselves to share those perceptions).
According to Smith (in passages not included in the Readings), we not only wish to be praised, but we also wish to be worthy of praise: and we wish for worthiness not only because of the praise the worthiness is likely to bring but for its own sake. "It is by no means sufficient that, from ignorance or mistake, esteem and admiration should, in some way or other, be bestowed upon us", p. 114. Also, "it often gives real comfort to reflect, that though no praise should actually be bestowed upon us, our conduct, however, has been such as to deserve it", p. 115. Nature, i.e. God, has made us desire not only to be praised, but to deserve praise. This is what makes us concerned about what an impartial and well-informed specator would think and feel about what we are doing, and not just about the reactions of actual spectators.
READ pp. 117, paragraph 7, and pp. 130-131, paragraph 32.
Again in this passage Smith seems to be disagreeing with Hume. What keeps us in the right way is not benevolence or love of mankind but conscience--consciousness of, and concern for, the judgment of an ideal spectator, knowledgeable and impartial. Smith is perhaps influenced by Joseph Butler (cf. Raphael, paragraphs 379-80, 395-403). According to Butler conscience is the most authoritative part of human nature which should by right rule the passions (cf. Plato's reason, the ruling part of the tripartite soul). There doesn't seem to be any counterpart of conscience in Hume's theory.
To try to imagine what an impartial spectator's sympathies would be is Smith antidote to our tendency to favour ourselves and our friends over the rest of mankind. Other philosophers have tried to correct this tendency either (the sentimentalists) by trying to increase our concern for the interests of the rest of mankind, or (the Stoics) by trying to reduce our concern for our own interests. Smith remarks that "Both perhaps, have carried their doctrines a good deal beyond the just standard of nature and propriety", p. 139. The sentimentalists try to make us conscious of the miseries of the generality of mankind. But, Smith says,
that we should be but little interested... in the fortune of those whom we can neither serve nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very remote from us, seems wisely ordered by Nature. (p. 140)The fact that we would not be greatly depressed over the fate of "the great empire of China" is somethings "wisely ordered" by the creator, because we couldn't do anything about such a disaster.
The Stoics, trying to reduce our concern for ourselves, say that we should regard something that happens to us with as much detachment as if it had happened to another person. Smith comments:
The man who should feel no more for the death or distress of his own father, or son, than for those of any other man's father, or son, would appear neither a good son nor a good father. (p. 142)Parents' affection for their own children is especially strong:
Nature [i.e. God], for the wisest purposes, has rendered.... parental tenderness a much stronger affection than filial piety. The continuance and propagation of the species depend altogether upon the former, and not upon the latter. In ordinary cases, the existence and preservation of the child depends altogether upon the care of the parents. Those of the parents seldom depend upon that of the child. Nature, therefore, has rendered the former affection so strong that it generally requires not to be excited, but to be moderated. (p. 142)Notice the explanation in terms of Nature's wisdom and purposes of something that would later be explained by the theory of evolution.
Similarly it is appropriate to love our own country more than other countries:
That wisdom which contrived the system of human affections, as well as that of every other part of nature, seems to have judged that the interest of the great society of mankind would be best promoted by directing the principal attention of each individual to that particular portion of it, which was most within the sphere both of his abilities and of his understanding. (p. 229)Propriety, then, does not require that we eradicate these special affections, and Stoic apathy (lack of feeling) is inappropriate. Still, self-command is needed. This is a Stoic virtue that Smith endorses. It is acquired by the practice of taking the viewpoint of the impartial spectator. Self-command seeks not apathy but appropriateness of feeling.
Compare p. 17, paragraph 3. The rules mentioned in that passage are psychological generalisations about how we feel when we enter into some type of situation. In the present passage the rules are moral rules, but they are founded on psychological generalisations about how an impartial spectator would react.
Utilitarians (e.g. J.S. Mill) sometimes say that moral rules are generalisations based on particular judgments of cases of a given type. But the Utilitarian's judgments are in view of the effects of actions of that type. Smith's impartial spectator judges by whether he (the impartial spectator) can sympathise with the feelings that cause actions of the type.
In paragraph 5 Smith points out a difference between his theory and "moral sense" theories. Moral sense theories are a kind of intuitionism--through our reason we "see" that an act is wrong (or, according to the moral sense theories, through our organ of moral sensation we feel that it is wrong), by direct intuition (viewing--in Latin intueri means "to see").
paragraph 7: Notice again the explanation in terms of Nature's purposes and wisdom.
paragraphs 8, 11: According to some intuitionist theories, by reason we intuitively see the truth and bindingness of axiomatic moral principles. (Cf. Thomas Aquinas's natural law.) According to Smith we do not intuit general principles; general rules summarise many individual judgments made in particular cases. (In paragraph 8, third sentence, the old-fashioned punctuation may mislead. Delete the semicolon after "actions".)
This is often true of business activities. The effort required to get wealth is generally not justified by the extra happiness wealth may bring. "Power and riches... are enormous or operose [laborious] machines contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences", p. 182.
If we consider the real satisfaction which all these things are capable of affording, by itself and separated from the beauty of that arrangement which is fitted to promote it, it will always appear in the highest degree contemptible and trifling. (p. 183, emphasis added).But we rarely see it as it really is. The deception is useful, however.
READ pp. 183-5, paragraph 10.
This is one of only three passages in which Adam Smith refers to the "invisible hand" (the main other one is The Wealth of Nations.IV.ii.9). Here the invisible hand is God's providence. (An objection: if the rich had not diverted labour to the production of "baubles and trinkets" there might have been more food.)
READ pp. 186-7, paragraph 11.
READ pp. 187-8, paragraphs 1-5.
paragraph 3, nature: Cf.II.ii.3.5, p. 87.
The same unerring wisdom, it will be found, which regulates every other part of her [Nature's] conduct, directs, in this respect too, the order of her recommendations; which are always stronger or weaker in proportion as our beneficence is more or less necessary, or can be more or less useful. (p. 218)Thus Nature directs us first to take care of ourselves, then of members of our family and household, and so on. (Affection among family members is not based on blood relationship but on living together, Smith argues.) Similarly Nature prompts us to have care of our own country before others. Every nation is divided into "orders and societies", and it is natural to care most about the order or class to which one belongs.
READ pp. 231-4, paragraphs 10-18.
In the early stages of the French Revolution the various privileged orders or corporations (of lawyers, clergy, nobles) were called on to give up their legal privileges and accept "equality before the law".
Respect for the established constitution, and concern for the welfare of citizens, may come into conflict.
On the "spirit of system" (paragraph 15), see above, p. 185, paragraph 11.
READ pp. 236-7, paragraphs 5-6.
Like Hutcheson and Hume, Smith rejects the theory that morality consists in conformity with reason:
READ pp. 319-20, paragraphs 6-7.
In the 18th century theories later called "intuitionist" divided into
READ p. 326-7, paragraphs 16-17.
In Hume's theory the spectator sympathises with the sufferer's feelings of the effects of the action, rather than with the motivating feelings of the doer.
165. To Adam Smith London April 12, 1759Dear Sir,
I give you thanks for the agreeable present of your Theory. Wedderburn and I made presents of our copies to such of our acquaintances as we thought good judges, and proper to spread the reputation of the book....I have delayed writing to you, till I could tell you something of the success of the book, and could prognosticate, with some probability, whether it should be finally damned to oblivion, or should be registered in the temple of immortality. Though it has been published only a few weeks, I think there appear already such strong symptoms, that I can almost venture to foretell its fate. It is, in short, this --
But I have been interrupted in my letter by a foolish impertinent visit of one who has lately come from Scotland. He tells me that the University of Glasgow intend to declare Rouet's office vacant, upon his going abroad with Lord Hope. [And so on, with various items of gossip]. But to return to your book, and its success in this town, I must tell you -- A plague of interruptions! I ordered myself to be denied; and yet here is one that has broke in upon me again. He is a man of letters and we have had a good deal of literary conversation. [More gossip follows.] But what is all this to my book, say you? My dear Mr Smith, have patience: compose yourself to tranquillity: show yourself a philosopher in practice as well as profession: think on the emptiness, and rashness, and futility of the common judgments of men; how little they are regulated by reason in any subject, much more in philosophical subjects, which so far exceed the comprehension of the vulgar.... A wise man's kingdom is his own breast; or, if he ever looks farther, it will only be to the judgment of a select few, who are free from prejudices, and capable of examining his work. Nothing indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood than the approbation of the multitude, and Phocion, you know, always suspected himself of some blunder, when he was attended with the applauses of the populace.
Supposing, therefore, that you have duly prepared yourself for the worst by all these reflections, I proceed to tell you the melancholy news, that your book has been very unfortunate; for the public seem disposed to applaud it extremely. It was looked for by the foolish people with some impatience; and the mob of literati are beginning already to be very loud in its praises. Three bishops called yesterday at Millar's shop in order to buy copies, and to ask questions about the author. The Bishop of Peterborough said, he had passed the evening in a company where he heard it extolled above all books in the world. The Duke of Argyle is more decisive than he uses to be in its favour. I suppose he either considers it as an exotic, or thinks the author will be serviceable to him in the Glasgow elections. Lord Lyttleton says, that Robertson and Smith, and Bower, are the glories of English literature. Oswald protests he does not know whether he has reaped more instruction or entertainment from it. But you may easily judge what reliance can be put on his judgment, who has been engaged all his life in public business, and who never sees any faults in his friends.
Millar exults and brags that two-thirds of the edition are already sold, and that he is now sure of success. You see what a son of the earth that is, to value books only by the profit they bring him. In that view, I believe it may prove a very good book.... In recompense for so many mortifying things, which nothing but truth could have extorted from me, and which I could easily have multiplied to a greater number, I doubt not but you are so good a Christian as to return good for evil; and to flatter my vanity by telling me, that all the godly in Scotland abuse me for my account of John Knox and the Reformation. I suppose you are glad to see my paper end, and that I am obliged to conclude with
Your humble servant, DAVID HUME
In a moment you should look at the discussion questions and prepare your tutorial paper for the week 2 tutorial. After you have done that, if you have time, come back to this cassette and I will make some suggestions for further study. So turn to the discussion questions.
K. Haakonssen The Science of a Legislator, chs.2, 3, 4 (K457, S572, HS) (chapter 4 is printed in Articles and Chapters). Haakonssen draws attention to and tries to explain the high priority (in comparison with other virtues) that Smith gives in moral theory to the virtue of Justice, and to the high priority he gives among the functions of government to the administration of justice. The main point of the explanation is that according to Smith there is an assymetry between happiness and misery--the heights of enjoyment differ from basic contentment only by a trifle, whereas the possible depths of misery are immense. Hence sympathy with misery is more universal and more pungently felt. Spectators are much more inclined to intervene on behalf of someone injured than they are out of benevolence to support some scheme to add to someone's happiness. When we come to J.S. Mill's ethics, we will find that he gives a similar account of the importance of justice.
See Campbell and Raphael in A.S. Skinner and T. Wilson (eds.) Essays on Adam Smith (HB.103.S6.E78)
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