John Buridan, On Aristotle's Ethics, book 10, q. 4[Ra 21 a] QUARTO {om. Pr} querendum est {nunc quarto add. Pr} in quo actu consistit {consistat JaPr} humana felicitas, vel in quibus? Et potest questio fieri {trs. JaRaPr} sub hac forma: Utrum humana felicitas consistat {consistit Ra} in uno actu vel pluribus? |
Question 4: Does human happiness consist in one act or several?Fourth it should be asked, Which act or acts does human happiness consist in? The question can be asked in this form: Does human happiness consist in one act or several? |
| Arguitur {primo add. JaPr} quod in uno per Aristotelem dicentem *{primus huius add. Ra} quod "humanum bonum", i.e. felicitas, "est anime operatio secundum virtutem perfectissimam *{om. JaRaPrZn}; si autem plures sint *{om. JaRaPrZn}[sint in Ra margin] virtutes, secundum perfectissimam et optimam" [1098 a17]. Et *{om. JaRaPr} non dicit *{igitur add. JaRaPr} "operationes" {anime add. Pr} nec *{dicit add. JaRa} "secundum virtutes", sed dicit "operatio" et "secundum virtutem" unam et {om. Ra} *{scilicet JaPr} "perfectissimam et optimam"; et idem *{etiam add. JaRaPr} dicit et magis *{trs. JaRaPr} dearticulat in decimo libro. |
[Preliminary arguments]It is argued that it consists in one. Aristotle says, in Ethics, Book I, that "the human good", that is, happiness, "is an {operatio} activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are many virtues, in accordance with the most perfect and the best" [1098 a17]. He does not say "activities" or "according to the virtues", but says "activity" and "according to" one "virtue", namely "the most perfect and the best". He also says the same thing again and {dearticulat} in detail in Book X. |
| Item, primo huius dicit Aristoteles, "Optimum igitur {om. Ja} et pulcherrimum et delectabilissimum felicitas" [1099 a24]; tale {om. Pr} autem non est nisi unum, quia quod per {om. Ra} superabundantiam {abundantiam Ja} dicitur uni soli convenit. | Also, in Ethics, Book I, Aristotle says, "Happiness is therefore both the {pulcherrimum} finest thing and the most pleasurable" [1099 a24]; but such a thing is one only, because {quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit} a superlative applies to one only. |
| Item, primo huius dicit Aristoteles finem aliquem esse operationum humanarum "quem {propter quid Ra} propter seipsum *{ipsum JaRaPrZn} volumus, alia vero propter ipsum *{illum JaRaPrZn}" [1094 a17] quem {quid Ra} dicit esse bonum et optimum; et per illum {istum JaPr} intendit {om. Pr} humanam felicitatem; et tamen ista non possunt convenire {trs. 312 JaPr} duobus actibus humanis, quia non {om. Ra} debet {dicit Ra} esse in homine perfecto inordinatio {ordinatio RaPr} ["in" between lines in Pr], sicut nec in maiori mundo; esset autem inordinatio {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] actuum humanorum si essent duo optimi et eque finales, quorum neuter in alterum *{alium JaRaPr} ordinaretur finaliter {trs. JaRaPr}. Oportet ergo {igitur JaRaPr} esse unicum {unum Pr} talem, et illud {ille JaRaPr} est felicitas. | Also, in Ethics, Book I, Aristotle says that there is some end of human activities "which we will for its own sake, and other things for it" [1094 a17]; he says that it is good and best, and he is referring to human happiness. Yet this cannot apply to two human acts, because in a perfect man there should not be a lack of order, just as there should not in the greater world; but there would be a lack of order among human acts if there were two best and equally final acts neither of which was ordered finally to the other. There must therefore be {unicus} only one such act, and that is happiness. |
| Item, speculatio est unus actus {et add. JaPr} non duo; et tamen decimo huius Aristoteles {om. JaPr} concludit, "Quare utique erit {esset Ra} felicitas {om. Ja} speculatio quedam" [1178 b32] {etc. add. Ra}. | Also, {speculari} thinking is one act, not two; and yet in Ethics, Book X, Aristotle concludes, "Therefore, indeed, happiness will be some kind of {speculari} thinking" [1178 b32]. |
| Item, Seneca non cessat clamare in epistolis suis quod unum "*{unicum JaRaPrZn} est homini *{hominis RaPrZn} bonum", et quod illud est ratio perfectissima *{perfecta RaPr}. {ideo add. RaPr} {item add. Ja} In {om. Pr} epistola "Inimicitias" concludit quod "sola ratio perfecta" {om. Ja} hominem {om. Pr} "beatum {perfectum Ra} facit" [Ep. LXXVI.16, p. 156]. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} felicitas in uno {om. Ra} actu consistere videtur. | Also, Seneca does not cease {clamare} to proclaim in his Letters that "man's good is {unicum} one thing alone" and that it is perfect reason. In his letter "Inimicitias" he concludes that "only perfect reason makes a man happy" {p. 156} [LXXVI.16]. Therefore happiness seems to consist in one act. |
| Ad {sed JaRaPr} oppositum arguunt aliter opinantes pluribus auctoritatibus et rationibus, quoniam {quod non Pr} omnes qui dicunt {dicent Ra} *{dicerent JaPr} humanam felicitatem in uno actu consistere dicunt *{dicerent JaRaPr} quod hoc {hec Ra} est *{esset JaRaPr} vel in actu intellectus, ut in {om. Ra} dei {om. Ra} [in dei Ra margin] visione {om. Pr} vel {om. Pr} speculatione, vel in actu voluntatis, ut in {om. Ra} dei {om. Ra} [in dei Ra margin] amore, scilicet in illo istorum qui est perfectissimus et {om. Ja} optimus. Sed arguitur quod hoc {om. JaPr} sit impossibile quemcunque illorum dicas. Quia *{ut AuJaMuMzPbPr} si {sic Ra} dicas {dicis JaPr} quod actus nobilissimus qui potest homini inesse {esse Pr} sit clara dei visio, tunc {tamen Ra} probo quod ille non esset essentialiter felicitas. Quia *{si esset essentialiter felicitas add. JaRaPr} tunc {et Pr} ipso *{sole add. JaRa} {solo Pr} manente, aliis actibus ablatis {manentibus Ja}, sicut auferri possunt {posset Ra} {possent JaPr} [Ra 21 b] per potentiam dei absolutam (ut aliqui theologi dicunt {? Ja}) {quod add. Ra} adhuc homo {trs. Ja} esset felix, sicut lapis {homo Ja} esset albus manente in eo albedine {et tamen add. Ja} omnibus aliis accidentibus {om. Ja} remotis; et {om. Pr} tamen illud {om. Ja} consequens est falsum, scilicet {om. Ja} quod homo clare videns deum {om. Pr} sine alia {aliqua Au} delectatione et sine amore {om. Pr} dei diceretur beatus. Oportet enim {igitur Pr} felicitatem esse delectabilissimam, ut dicit Aristoteles. Ergo {igitur RaPr}, etc. {ergo, etc: om. Ja} | On the opposite side those who think otherwise argue by many texts and arguments. All who would say that human happiness consists in one act would say that this is either an act of the intellect, for example the vision or {speculari} thought of God, or an act of the will, for example love of God -- whichever of these is most perfect and best. But it is argued that this is impossible, whichever of them you say. For example, if you say that the most noble act that can exist in man is the clear vision of God, then I prove that this would not be happiness essentially: for if it were happiness essentially, then with it alone remaining and all other acts being removed (as they could be by God's absolute power, as some theologians say), a man would still be happy, as a stone would be white if whiteness remained in it and all other accidents were removed; but that conclusion is false, namely that a man who saw God clearly without any pleasure and without love of God would be called happy. For happiness must be "most pleasurable", as Aristotle says [1099 a24]. Therefore, etc. |
| Et confirmatur fortius, quia dicunt illi theologi quod in anima Sortis cum clara dei {trs. RaPr} visione posset deus formare {om. Pr} intensam tristitiam sine delectatione, et odium dei sine amore; an igitur {ille add. Ra} esset felix? Constat mihi quod ego non vellem {non vellem: nollem Ra} talem felicitatem. | This is quite strongly confirmed. Those theologians say that God could form in Socrates' soul, together with the clear vision of God, an intense sadness without pleasure and hatred of God without love. Would he therefore be happy? I am sure I would not wish for such happiness. |
| Item, omnis potentia humana est felicitabilis cuius opus innatum est attingere ad obiectum {bonum Ra} beatificum, quod est ipse deus. Tales autem *{potentie JaRaPr} non sunt potentia vegetativa vel sensitiva {trs.321 Pr}, vel secundum locum motiva, vel appetitus sensitivus; sed tales sunt intellectus et voluntas. Per intellectum enim deum intelligimus, et {om. JaPr} per voluntatem ipsum amamus. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} secundum ambas {om. Ra} illas potentias homo est vere {om. Ra} felicitabilis {felix Ra}. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} si secundum {per Ra} unicam illarum {istarum Pr} potentiarum {om. Pr} felicitaretur, ipse non perfecte felicitaretur {trs. Ja}, neque {nec JaPr} totaliter, sed diminute et partialiter, quod non est dicendum, propterea *{om. JaRaPr} quia nihil diminutum attribuitur felictati. Unde *{decimo huius add. JaRaPr} "nihil *{enim add. RaPrZn} imperfectum est eorum que felicitas" [1177 b25], decimo *{om. JaRaPr} huius *{om. JaRaPr}. Ergo {igitur Ra} necesse est felicitatem integrari {integrare Ra} essentialiter {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] ex actibus illarum potentiarum et non esse {om. Ja} actum unicum unius {om. Ja}[Ra: illius poten deleted; unius Ra margin] illarum {earum Ra}. | Again, any human power is {felicitabilis} capable of happiness if its activity is {innatum} capable of attaining the beatifying object, God himself. Now the vegetative and sensitive powers, the power of locomotion and the sensitive appetite are not such powers, but the intellect and the will are, for through the intellect we understand God and through the will we love him. {secundum} In respect of both of these powers, therefore, a man is truly {felicitabilis} capable of happiness. Therefore if he were made happy {secundum} in respect of only one of these powers, he would be made happy not perfectly or totally but in a diminished and partial way; and this should not be said, because nothing diminished is attributed to happiness (thus, in Ethics, 10, [Aristotle says], "There is nothing imperfect in the things that constitute happiness" [1177 b25]). Happiness must therefore {integrari} be made up essentially of acts of those powers, and cannot be the single act of only one of them. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, felicitas ponitur {dicitur etiam Ra} consistere in perfecta dei contemplatione que nec est dei cognitio sine amore, nec amor sine cognitione, sed ex ambobus constituta. | Also, happiness is asserted to consist in the perfect contemplation of God, which is not knowledge of God without love, nor love without knowledge, but is made up of both. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, felicitas ponitur esse quid [-dam added between lines, Ja] per se sufficientissimum, et nullus actus unicus {om. Ra} est {om. Ra}[unicus est Ra margin] per se sufficientissimus. | Also, happiness is asserted to be something most sufficient through itself, and no {unicus} single act is most sufficient through itself. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, dicit Aristoteles, primo huius, "non omnino {enim add. RaZn} felix {est add. Pr} qui spem *{specie Zn} turpissimus est *{om. RaPr} vel ignobilis, vel solitarius et sine prole" [1099 b5]; et quomodo esset hoc {om. Ra} {trs. JaPr} verum {om. Ra} si felicitas {felix Ra} consisteret *{in add. JaRaPr} uno actu, sive intellectus sive voluntatis? | Also, Aristotle says, Ethics, Book I: "A man is not at all happy if he is very ugly in appearance, or low born, or lonely and without offspring" [1099 b5]. How would this be true if happiness consisted in one act, whether of intellect or of will? |
| Ad idem etiam [Pa 209 va] potest allegari Aristoteles, vii {iv JaPr} Politicorum, dicens "quod {concede quidem igitur Ra} *{quidem igitur add. JaZn} unicuique tantum adiacet felicitatis {trs. 321 JaRaZnPr} quantum quidem virtutis et prudentie, et eius quod est agere secundum has {hac Ra} sic confessis {confestim Ra} *{confessum JaZnPr} nobis" [1323 b21]. Dicit igitur Aristoteles non solum prudentie pertinentis ad intellectum nec solum virtutis pertinentis ad {per Ja} voluntatem {pertinentis ad voluntatem: om. Ra}[Ra in margin], sed simul virtutis {sed simul virtutis: om. Ra} et prudentie. Et ponit super hoc {hanc Ra} rationem dicens: "Nullum autem bonum opus, neque viri neque civitatis, sine {secundum JaPr} [sine Pr in margin] virtute et prudentia" [1323 b32]. | To the same effect one could also quote Aristotle, Politics, Book VII, who says, "Let us acknowledge that each one has just so much happiness as he has of virtue and prudence and of virtuous and prudent action" [1323 b21]: he says, then, not only "of prudence", pertaining to the intellect, and not only "of virtue", pertaining to the will, but "of virtue and prudence" together. Upon this he builds an argument: "But there is no good work, of one person or of a city, without virtue and prudence" [1323 b32]. |
| Immo etiam *{et add. JaRaPr} alii morales et sacra scriptura videntur idem intendere. Nam *{om. JaRaPr} multe {namque add. Ra} *{enim add. JaPr} auctoritates sacre scripture videntur clare dicere quod in dei [Ra 22a] visione [Ja 327 vb] consistit {consistat JaPr} humana felicitas {om. Ra}[Ra in margin], et multe alie quod in dei amore {in dei amore: videtur visione Ra}, quod non est *{ita add. JaRaPr} nisi {om. Ja} quia non {nec RaPr} {om. Ja} tantum in isto nec tantum in illo sed coniunctim et integraliter in ambobus. Et sic esse videtur de Seneca et {de add. JaRaPr} Tullio. Modo enim dicunt unum, modo {dicunt add. JaPr} aliud. Verbi gratia, Tullius in *{de add. JaRaPr} Paradoxis dicit {dixit Ra} {om. JaPr} "omnes sapientes *{esse add. JaRaPr} liberos et omnes stultos servos", et {om. Ra} sic libertatem {?liberationem Ra}, et per consequens felicitatem, attribuit sapientie, que et *{est JaRaPr} habitus intellectualis: sed etiam statim in {om. JaPr} eodem libro querit: "Quid enim est libertas?", et respondet "Potestas vivendi ut velis". Et sic attribuit eam voluntati. Similter Seneca valde sepe {om. Ra}[pluries Ra margin]*{pluries JaPr} attribuit felicitatem sapientie et recte rationi, et sepe etiam virtutibus moralibus. Verbi grati, in epistola "Agnosco" [XXXI.8, vol. 1, p. 226] dicit, "Quod non potest {debet Ja} esse nisi rerum scientia contingat et ars {esse... ars: scientia et ars JaRaPr}, per quam divina et humana noscantur", hoc est, summum bonum, et per consequens felicitas {felix Ra}. Et in epistola que incipit "Epistola tua" dicit, "Bona illa sunt vera que ratio dat, solida...", etc. {om. Pr} [Epistola LXXIV.16, vol. 2, p. 122]. Idem {ideo JaPr} dicit post quod "ratione nihil valentius est" [LXXIV.20, vol. 2, p. 126]. . Et in epistola sequente [LXXVI.9, 10, p. 150, 152], "In homine optimum quid est ratio; hec recta et consumatur *{consummata AuJaMzMuPbZnPr} {insinuata Ra} felicitatem hominis implevit". Ideo concludit post [LXXVI.16, p. 156] quod "sola ratio perfecta beatum {bene Ra}[beatum Ra margin] facit". Et {om. JaRaPr} sic *{igitur JaRa} {ideo Pr} manifestum est quod in {om. Pr} illa {ille JaPr} epistola {in illa epistola: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] Seneca felicitatem consistere posuit {ponit Pr} in ratione et sapientia. | Indeed, other moralists too, and sacred scripture, seem to {intendere} think the same thing. Many texts of sacred scripture seem to say clearly that human happiness consists in the vision of God, and many others that it consists in love of God: this is only because it does not consist in the one or the other alone but jointly and integrally in both. And this seems to be true of Seneca and Cicero: sometimes they say the one thing, sometimes the other. For example, Cicero says in De Paradoxis [Paradoxa V.33] that all the wise are free and all the foolish slaves, and thus he attributes freedom, and consequently happiness, to wisdom, which is an intellectual habit; but also immediately in the same book he asks, "What is freedom?", and answers, "The power to live as you will" [Paradoxa V.34], and thus he attributes happiness to the will. Similarly Seneca very often attributes happiness to wisdom and right reason, and often also to the moral virtues. For example, in his letter "Agnosco" {vol. 1, p. 226} [XXXI.8] he says, "That cannot be, unless there is knowledge of things and the art by which divine and human matters are known" (that is, the highest good, and consequently happiness). In the letter that begins "Epistola tua" he says: "True goods are those which reason gives, solid and eternal" etc. {vol. 2, p. 122} [LXXIV.16]; he says the same afterwards, that "nothing is stronger than reason" {p. 126} [LXXIV.20]. And in the following letter: "The best thing in man? Reason...This, if right and perfected, completes the happiness of man" {p. 150} [LXXVI.9]; he therefore concludes afterwards that "only perfected reason makes one happy" {p. 156} [LXXVI.16]; it is manifest, therefore, that in that letter Seneca asserted that happiness consists in reason and wisdom. |
| Sed tu dicis *{diceres JaRa} {dices Pr} statim {trs. JaRaPr} quod omnes auctoritates Senece et rationes super quas fundatur *{fundantur JaRaPr} concludunt oppositum eius quod *{tu add. JaRaPr} volebas probare {om. Pr}. Intendebas enim concludere quod non solum in actu intellectus {om. Ra} (cuius modi {om. Ra} sunt sapientia, {et add. Pr} scientia {om. Ra} et {om. RaPr}[scientia et Ra margin] ratio) {om. Pr} consistit humana felicitas - immo etiam *{om. JaPr} in coniuncto ex actu intellectus et actus {actum Ja} {om. Pr} voluntatis {immo... voluntatis om. Ra}[in Ra margin, but etiam and actus omitted]; et auctoritates allegate dicunt expresse quod in solo actu intellectus. Inquit enim Seneca {om. ErPr} {enim Seneca: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] "sola ratio perfecta {om. Er} beatum {bene Ra}[aliter beatum Ra margin] facit", et qui videret {videt JaRa} omnes libros eius *{suos JaRaErPr} ipse {semper add. RaEr} exclamat et extollit {tollit Ja} sapientiam super omnia humana bona. |
[Objection]But you would say immediately: All of Seneca's texts and the arguments on which they are based prove the opposite of what you wanted to prove. You meant to infer that human happiness consists not in an act of the intellect (such as wisdom, science, and reason) alone, but rather in {coniuncto} a conjunction of an act of intellect and an act of will; but the texts quoted say expressly that it consists in an act of intellect only. Seneca says, "Only perfected reason makes one happy", and {qui videt} whoever sees all his books [will see that] he cries up and extols wisdom above all human goods. |
| Respondetur tamen quod si {om. Ra} exquisite videatur {videtur Ra} intentio Senece seu opinio, apparebit quod ipse bene {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] scivit distinguere inter virtutes morales quas diximus esse virtutes appetitus seu voluntatis, et inter prudentiam quam diximus *{dicimus JaPr} virtutem intellectus practici {practice Ja}, sicut patet {apparet Ra} ex illo parvo {eius Ra} libello suo {om. Ra} pulcherrimo vocato De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Et utrasque vocat *{vocavit JaRaPr} virtutes seu virtutum {virtutem Ra} species in dicto libello. Has quidem virtutes anime nostre ut {quod Ja} dicitur appetitus practicus illam {istam JaPr} autem eiusdem anime nostre ut dicitur intellectus practicus. Sed neutras divisim dicit *{dixit JaRaPr} esse virtutes simpliciter anime humane ut humana anima {trs. RaPr} dicitur quia virtutem oportet esse perfectam dispositionem eius cuius {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] dicitur [Ra 22 b] virtus ea ratione qua dicitur virtus eius; sed *{et JaRaPr} nulla earum *{illarum RaPr} divisim est perfecta dispositio anime humane secundum quod dicitur anima humana {trs. 231 Ra} {trs. Ja}, nec {neque Ra} etiam {anime... etiam: om. Pr} *{anime add. JaRaPr} humane practice secundum quod dicitur *{anima RaPr} humana practica. |
[Answer]It is answered, however, that if Seneca's {intentio} meaning or opinion be looked into {exquisite} carefully, it will be clear that he well knew how to distinguish between the moral virtues (which we have said are virtues of appetite or will) and prudence (which we say is a virtue of the practical intellect). This is clear from that very fine little book of his called On the Four Cardinal Virtues. In that book he has called both of these [i.e. moral virtue and prudence] "virtues" or "kinds of virtue" -- the former being virtues of our soul {ut dicitur} qua practical appetite, the latter of our soul {ut dicitur} qua practical intellect. But he has not said that either of them separately are simply virtues of the human soul {ut dicitur} qua human soul; for a virtue must be a perfect state of that of which it is said to be the virtue {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua its virtue, and neither of those separately is a perfect state of the human soul {secundum quod dicitur} qua human soul, nor even of the practical human soul {secundum quod dicitur} qua practical human soul. |
| Et videtur quod hoc debeat {habeat Ra} Aristoteles concedere. Quod enim {om. Ja} {scilicet add. Pr} virtus sit dispositio perfecta habentis patet septimo Physicorum {Politicorum Ra} {verbi gratia add. Ra}. "Virtus enim perfectio est. Unumquodque enim tunc maxime perfectum est cum attingit proprie virtuti" [Physics, VII.3, 246 a13]. Similiter in secundo huius *{dicitur add. Pr} {et dicitur add. Ja}: "Virtus omnis {hominis Pr} cuius utique fuerit virtus et {illud add. Ra} {ad add. JaPr} *{id add. Zn} bene habens perficit, et opus eius {suum Ja} bene {bonum Ra} reddit" [1106 a16]. Postea in {om. Pr} sexto huius apparet quod {quia Ja} [Pa 209 vb] licet virtus moralis divisim contra prudentiam reddat {redderet RaPr} voluntatem practicam perfectam ut voluntas dicitur, et opus eius bene quantum spectat ad voluntatem, ut voluntas dicitur {et opus... dicitur om. Ra}[Ra in margin], et sic de prudentia quantum {om. JaRa} ad intellectum practicum, tamen neutra divisim reddit totam animam {trs. Ra} activam perfectam nec opus eius {trs. RaPr} bene. Sed *{sicut JaRaPr} Aristotles confiteri {concedi Ja} videtur, dicens virtutem moralem principalem non posse esse sine prudentia. Propter quid {?quid Ja}, ut dicit, "omnes quando {quandoque Pr} diffiniunt virtutem apponunt habitum {additum Ra}, dicentes et ad {om. Zn} que est {om. Zn} secundum rectam rationem" [1144 b22]. {et add. JaPr} Tandem {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] concludit "manifestum" esse "ex dictis quoniam [quam Zn] non {est add. Pr} possibile bonum esse principaliter {esse principaliter: principaliter ?non esse Ja} sine prudentia" [1144 b32]. Tunc sequitur adhuc enim *{tunc... enim om. JaRaPr} "neque {nec JaRa} prudentem sine morali virtute". Et in septimo Politicorum, ut preallegatum fuit, "Nullum autem bonum opus est, neque viri *{uni JaRaPr} neque civitatis, sine prudentia et virtute" *{trs. 321 JaRaZnPr} [1323 b32]. Et ita secundum {trs. Ja} predictas deductiones [Ja 328 ra] ratiocinando {rationabile RaMz} [AuPbMuJa=Pa] videtur {vult Ja} *{dicere add. JaRaPr} quod virtus anime active secundum quod activa dicitur est aggregatio *{congregatio JaRaPr} virtutis moralis {trs. Ra} et prudentie {om. Pr} et {om. Pr} neutra divisim. Deinde considerandum est {om. Ra} quod *{om. JaRaPr} (sicut dicit Aristoteles nono Ethicorum) *{quod add. JaRaPr} cum homo sit aggregatus *{congregatus JaRaPr} ex anima et corpore *{et add. JaRa} ex parte sensuali {et add. JaRa} intellectuali, tamen, cum {trs. Ja} in hac congregatione homo sit principalissimum, homo maxime dicitur hic, id est *{id est: scilicet JaRaPr} intellectus; et ita {om. Ja} intendit {Aristoteles add. Mz} de aliis {de add. Ja} congregationibus, dicens: "Quemadmodum autem {om. Ra} et civitas principalissima *{principalissimum JaRaZnPr} maxime videtur esse {trs. JaRaZnPr} et omnis alia congregatio, sic {si Ja} et homo" [1168 b31]. Si igitur dicamus {trs. Ja} quod in {ibi Ja} illa congregatione virtutis moralis et prudentie que est [vir]tus anime active principalissimum {principalissima Ja} est prudentia, sequitur quod secundum talem denominatioem congregationis a principaliori omnis virtus hominis secundum virtutem *{vitam JaRaPr} activam ut activa est {om. Ra}, est prudentia; | And it seems that Aristotle ought to concede this. For it is clear from Physics, Book VII, that virtue is a perfect state of that which has it: "Virtue is a perfection. Each is then most of all perfect when it attains its appropriate virtue" [246 a13]. Similarly in Ethics, Book II, it is said: "Every virtue both perfects that which has it and makes its work good" [1106 a16]. Afterwards, in Book VI, it appears that although moral virtue {divisim contra} as distinct from prudence makes the practical will perfect {ut voluntas dicitur} qua will and its work good so far as it relates to will {ut voluntas dicitur} qua will (and similarly of prudence in respect of practical intellect), nevertheless neither separately makes the whole active soul perfect nor its work good -- as Aristotle seems to confess when he says that {virtutem moralem principalem} moral virtue in the proper sense cannot exist without prudence [1144 b16-17]. Accordingly, as he says, "All who define virtue posit a habit and add 'which is in accordance with right reason'" [1144 b22]. Finally he concludes that it is "clear from what has been said that it is not possible to be good {principaliter} in the proper sense without prudence, nor prudent without moral virtue" [1144 b32]. And in Politics, Book VII, quoted above: "There is no good work, of one person or of a city, without virtue and prudence" [1323 b32]. And thus, reasoning according to the above inferences, he seems to say that the virtue of the active soul {secundum quod dicitur} qua active is an {congregatio} aggregate of moral virtue and prudence and neither separately. Next we must consider (as Aristotle says in Ethics, Book IX) that since man is {congregatus} an aggregate of soul and body and of a sensual and an intellectual part, nevertheless, since the man is the most principal part in this combination, man is called chiefly this, namely intellect; and so Aristotle holds of other {congregatio} aggregates, saying: "And just as a city and every other aggregate seems to be chiefly its most principal part, so also man" [1168 b31]. If, therefore, we say that prudence is the most principal part in the aggregate of moral virtue and prudence that is the virtue of the active soul, it follows that (in accordance with this naming of an aggregate from the more principal part) all human virtue {secundum} relating to the active life as active is prudence. |
| quam intendebat Seneca per rationem et etiam per sapientiam, quia {et Ra} semper {om. Er} ipse locutus [e]st de felicitate practica {trs. 23451 JaPrMu} secundum quam prudentia dicitur sapientia. Sic etiam *{enim JaRaPr} dicit {om. Ja} Seneca omnes virtutes anime {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] rationes et fortitudinem esse scientiam {substantiam JaPr}. Unde in epistola "Si {sic Ja} vales" querit "Quid est sapientia?" Et respondet quod {om. JaPr} "Semper idem velle atque idem [Ra 23 b] nolle" {trs. 4231 JaRaPr} [Epistola, XX.5, p. 134] licet velle et nolle {trs. 321 JaRaPr} sint actus {om. JaRaPr} ipsius voluntatis. Et in epistola "Claranum" dicit expresse quod "omnes virtutes sunt rationes" *{trs. JaRaZnPr} [Epistola LXVI.32, p. 22]. Et in epistola "Peperceram" dicit, "Non est {om. Ra} enim {trs. Pr} [fortitudo] inconsulta temeritas nec periculorum amor nec formidabilium appetitio: scientia est distinguendi quid sit malum et quod *{quid RaZnPr} non sit" [Epistola LXXXV.28, p. 302]. Ad istam igitur intentionem et ad istum modum loquendi putandum est Socratem locutum fuisse, cum dixit {dicit Ra} {dixisset Pr} omnes virtutes esse rationes et prudentias, ut narrat Aristoteles sexto Ethicorum. Nec Aristoteles ibidem videtur {trs. JaRa} illa {ista Pr} dicta reprehendere *{bene add. JaRaAuPb} {unde MuPr} secundum istam intentionem, sed reprehendit illa {ista Ja} verba eo modo quo reprehenderentur eius verba impropria *{propria RaMzAuPb} [JaPr=Pa] cum dicit {dixit Ja} civitatem et omnem congregationem esse principalissimum {principalissima Ra} et hominem esse intellectivum *{intellectum RaMuPbAuPr}. | This is what Seneca meant by reason and also by wisdom, because he always spoke of practical happiness, {secundum } in relation to which prudence is called wisdom. For thus Seneca says that all virtues of the soul are reasons and that courage is knowledge. In the letter "Si vales" he asks, "What is wisdom?", and answers that it is "always to will the same and nill the same" {p. 134} [XX.5], though willing and nilling are acts of the will itself. And in the letter "Claranum" he says explicitly that "all virtues are reasons" {p. 22} [LXVI.32]. In the letter "Perperceram" he says, "Courage is not thoughtless rashness nor love of dangers nor appetite for fearful things: it is knowing how to distinguish what is evil and what is not" {p. 301} [LXXXV.28]. Socrates must be thought to have spoken in accordance with this {intentio} opinion and in this manner of speaking when he said that all virtues are reasons and prudences, as Aristotle reports in Ethics, Book VI [1144 b28]. Aristotle there does not seem to criticize those statements {secundum} in that meaning, indeed, but he criticizes the words as his own words would be criticized when he says that a city and every aggregate is its most principal part and that a man is his intellect. |
| Ex istis {hiis Ra} igitur omnibus videtur esse dicendum quod felicitas practica de qua predicti philosophi maxime loquebantur nec sit divisim actus intelligendi secundum prudentiam, nec actus volendi secundum virtutem moralem {trs. JaRaPr}, sed actus ex illis actibus {om. Ja} congregatus secundum virtutem perfecta *{perfectam JaRaPr} et *{etiam JaRaPr} ex illis partialibus virtutibus {congregationibus Ja} congregatam {congregatum Ra}. In qua tum *{tamen JaRaPr} congregatione pars principalior {et add. Pr} nobilior {et maior add. Pr} et melior esset prudentia et actus prudentie secundum delectationem *{declarationem JaRaPr} intentionis philosophorum preallegatorum. Et proportionabiliter videtur {videretur Ra} esse dicendum de {dicendum de: que Ja} felicitate contemplativa quantum ad actus intellectus contemplativi {contemplativam Ja} et {actus add. Pr} voluntatis contemplative, prout ipsa dicitur felicitas anime humane, ut est et dicitur contemplativa. Unde puto {puta Pr} quod in patria clare visioni que proprie et secundum se *{et secundum se: om. JaRaPr} non debeat *{debet JaRaPr} dici practica correspondeat amor, qui etiam {om. Ja} {et Pr} proprie non debet dici amor {actus Ra} practicus, et *{sed JaRaPr} contemplativus. [Pa 210 ra] |
[Reply to the question]In view of all this, therefore, it seems we must say that practical happiness, of which the above-mentioned philosophers were {maxime} especially speaking, is not {divisim} separately the act of understanding in accordance with prudence nor the act of willing in accordance with moral virtue, but an act {congregatus} aggregated from these acts according to a perfect virtue also aggregated from those partial virtues. In this aggregation, however, the part that is more principal, more noble and better would be prudence and the act of prudence, according to the explanation of the meaning of the philosophers quoted above. And it seems we must speak {proportionabiliter} correspondingly of contemplative happiness in respect of acts of the contemplative intellect and of the contemplative will, in so far as it is called happiness of the human soul as it is (and is called) contemplative. Thus I think that in the fatherland [heaven], corresponding to clear vision (which properly should not be called practical) is love (which also properly should not be called practical love but contemplative). |
| {et add. Pr} Ego credo quod non sit possibile modum istum dicendi rationibus improbare multam habentibus efficaciam, nec puto quod istum modum negasset Aristoteles ad sensum predictum. Tamen, his non obstantibus, potest dari alius modus {dicendi et add. Ra} loquendi {et dicendi add. JaMuMz}, videlicet quod cum felicitas debeat {debet Ja} dici {esse Ra} quid optimum et perfectissimum eorum que innata sunt inesse felici seu {vel Ra} felicitabilis *{felicitabili JaRaMuPbPr} secundum virtutem *{speciem JaRaMuPbAuPr}, optimum autem eorum que homini *{naturaliter /om. JaPr\ innata sunt add. AuMuMzPbJaRaPr} inesse potest {dici add. Ra} dupliciter considerari {contemplari JaPr}: uno modo optimum via compositionis seu aggregationis {congregationis Pr}, alio modo via divisionis seu {seu aggregationis... seu om. Ra}[Ra in margin] resolutionis: et sic utroque horum {istorum Ra} modorum potest dici humana felicitas. |
[A distinction: aggregation vs. division]I believe it is not possible to disprove this mode of speaking by arguments of much force, and I do not think that Aristotle would have denied this mode in the above sense. However, despite this, it is possible {dari} to offer another mode of speaking: namely, that since happiness should be said to be something best and most perfect in kind of the things capable {innata} of existing in the happy man (or man capable of happiness), and since the best of the things naturally capable of existing in man can be considered in two ways, as either best in the way of composition or aggregation or best in the way of division or resolution, so human happiness can be spoken of in each of these ways. |
| Via ergo {igitur JaRaPr} compositionis optimum in homine {trs. 231 Ra} est congregatio ex omnibus virtutibus *{et add. JaRaPr} operationibus et dispositionibus que innate {innata JaPr} sunt homini convenire {invenire Ja} spectantibus ad ipsius meliorationem, tam secundum animam et singulas potentias anime quam [Ra 24a] secundum corpus et singulas partes ad integritatem corporis pertinentes. Hoc igitur nomen felicitas {?felicitatis Ja} istomodo {ita JaPr} supponeret {nomen felicitas istomodo supponeret: non supponitur Ra}[nomen felicitas supponeret Ra margin] pro tali congregatione adhuc appellando sufficientem [Ja 328 rb] adiacentiam extrinsecorum bonorum ad hoc quod homo valeat exercere expedite {expedire Ja} singulas operationes sibi convenientes et secundum virtutes anime et secundum virtutes {anime et secundum virtutes: om. Ra} [Ra in margin] corporis; et {om. Ra} ista est felicitas que a Boetio *{que a Boetio: om. JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} [Ra in margin] describitur *{descripta JaRaPr} que *{quod JaRaPr} est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Et sic {om. Ja} "nihil imperfectum est {trs. Ra} eorum que felicitas", ut dicitur {om. Ra} in decimo {quarto Ra} huius [1177 b25]. Et sic diceret aliquis {om. Ra} *{Aristoteles JaPrPbMzAu} quod ille non esset simpliciter homo felix qui esset membro truncatus, {trs.231 Pr} vel egritudine detentius *{detentus JaRaPr}, vel incarceratus, aut infortunatus, vel carens *{amicis vel /aut Ra\ add. JaRaPr} divitiis exterioribus, prout notabatur in primo libro. Et *{prout add. JaRaPr} philosophi, fide Catholica et spirituali *{speciali Ja} [Au=Pa] {om. ErPb} [MuRaMzPr could be either spirituali or speciali] ac *{om. JaPr} supernaturali revelatione {renovatione Ra} [aliter revelatione Ra margin] carentes, scirent huiusmodi *{hoi=homini AuJaRaMuPr} [Mz=Pa] felicitatem attribuere in hac vita. | In the way of composition, then, the best in man is an aggregation of all the virtues, activities and states capable of befitting a man and relating to his betterment, both {secundum} in the soul and each power of the soul and {secundum} in the body and each part belonging to the wholeness of the body. In this way, therefore, the word "happiness" would stand for such an {congregatio} aggregation, yet {appellando} signifying by appellation the {adiacentia} possession of {extrinsecus} external goods sufficient for a man to perform {expedite} without encumbrance every activity befitting him in accordance with the virtues of both soul and body. This is the happiness described as a "condition made perfect by the aggregation of all goods" [Boethius, Consolation, III.pr.2], and thus "there is nothing imperfect in the things that constitute happiness", as is said in Book X of this work [1177 b25]. In this way Aristotle would say that a man missing a limb, or {detentus} gripped by sickness, or in prison, or unlucky or without friends or outward riches would not be simply a happy man, as was noted in Book I, and in the sense in which philosophers lacking the Catholic faith and any special supernatural revelation {scirent} knew to attribute happiness to a man in this life. |
| Via autem resolutionis, optimum in homine diceretur illa dispositio vel ille actus aut quocunque nomine nominetur que vel qui {esset membro... qui: om Pb} in predicta congregatione resoluta in suas partes esset optimum *{aliorum add. JaRaPr} et finalissimum aliorum, et *{om. JaRaPr} ad quod {om. Ja}[Jam] singula alia finaliter ordinarentur - non {dico add. Ra} quod illa resolutio fiat secundum {per Ra} realem remotionem partium abinvicem, sed secundum rationem distincte partes omnes considerantem {considerandum Ja}. Si igitur dicamus quod illud sic *{om. JaRaPr} optimum sit actus speculationis circa {per Ra} divinam essentiam, nos dicemus quod ille actus erit humana felicitas, ita quod hoc nomen felicitas {humana add. Ra} supponit precise pro illo {isto JaPr} actu, sed tamen non absolute a connotationibus; immo connotat {? Ja} sive {seu Ra} {? Ja} {om. Pr} appellat omnia prerequisita ad expeditum exercitium {trs. Ja} illius actus speculationis {exercitus Ja}, et nauraliter consequentia vel {et Ja} annexa {? Ra}, et sic {sicut Pr} appellat primitus amorem dei tanquam naturaliter consequentem ex illa speculatione si sit recta et perfecta *{et add. JaPr} delectationem his actibus connexam {annexam Ja} naturaliter, deinde etiam {om. Pr} appellat virtutem sapientie secundum quam est illa speculatio perfecta {trs. JaRaPr}; consequenter appellat prudentiam et virtutes morales parantes locum sapientie, ut dictum est in sexto *{libro add. RaPr}, deinde sensuum vivacitatem, deservientium intellectui ad speculationem, et tandem virtutes corporis et bona exteriora, sicut satis deductum fuit in {om. Ra} xvi questione primi libri *{huius JaRaPr}. et certum est quod istum modum loquendi {om. Ra} tenuit {? Ja} Aristoteles. Nec contra {om. Ja} istum modum {tenuit... modum: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] valent rationes que prius fiebant; faciliter enim respondendum {respondetur Pr} est {om. Pr} ad eas {faciliter... eas: om. Ra}[faciliter enim respondetur ad eas Ra margin]. | In the way of resolution, however, the best in man would be said to be the state or act (or by whatever word it is called) that, in this aggregate resolved into its parts, would be best of all and the ultimate end of the others, to which every other would be ordered {finaliter} as end -- not that this resolution should be made {secundum} by really removing parts from one another, but {secundum} by reason distinctly considering each part. If we say, therefore, that what is best is an act of {speculari} thought regarding the divine essence, we will say that this act is human happiness, so that the term "happiness" stands for that act precisely, yet not cut off from connotations; rather, it connotes or {appellat} signifies by appellation all the things prerequisite to the {expeditum} easy performance of that act of {speculari} thought and the things naturally following upon or annexed to it. Thus, in the first place, it signifies by appellation the love of God, as naturally following upon that {speculari} thought if it is right and perfect, and the pleasure naturally connected with these acts; and then it also signifies by appellation the virtue of wisdom in accordance with which that {speculari} thought is perfect; {consequenter} next it signifies by appellation prudence and the moral virtues, which prepare a place for wisdom, as was said in Book VI [cf. fol. 139 rb]; then vivacity of the senses, which serves the intellect in {speculari} thinking; and finally the virtues of the body and exterior goods, as was sufficiently {deductum} shown in Question 16 of Book I of this work [fol. 15 r]. It is certain that Aristotle used this mode of speaking. The arguments advanced before have no force against it, for they are easily answered. |
| Ad primam ponamus quod clara dei visio {trs. JaRaPr} sit humana felicitas in patria. Tu arguis quod tunc esset [Ra 25 a] felix si clare videret deum sine delectatione, immo cum tristita et odio dei. Ego nego, immo potius esset miser, quia tunc illa {ista Ja} {clara add. Ra} visio {dei add. Ra} non esset felicitas propter defectum appellatorum, sicut simitas, que licet supponat {supponit Pr} *{solum add. JaRaPr} pro cavitate, tamen appellat nasum; ideo {illa add. Ra} {ista add. JaPr} magnitudo et cavitas [Pa 210 rb] nasi que est simitas, si removerentur {removeretur JaRaPr} a {de Ja} naso et ponerentur in lapide, ipsa non amplius esset simitas, propter defectum connotati. Et ita, licet Aristoteles teneat felicitatem esse actum speculandi, tamen dicit in septimo huius quod dicentes hominem rotatum vel {et Ja} infortunatum esse felicem si sit bonus, *{etiam add. JaRaPr} licet actu speculetur nihil {licet... nihil: licet actus speculetur actu ?nihil Ja}, dicunt et {?vel/ut Ja} in primo huius similter. Et *{om. JaRaPr} quod *{igitur add. JaRaPr} dicebatur de albedine non est ad propositum, quia albedo significat id {illud RaPr} {om. Ja} pro quo supponit sine connotatione aliorum. |
[Answers to the preliminary arguments on the opposite sideTo the first we assert that the clear vision of God is human happiness in the fatherland [heaven]. You argue that then someone would be happy if he saw God clearly but without pleasure, indeed with sadness and hatred of God. I deny this; indeed he would instead be miserable, because that vision would not then be happiness because of the lack of things signified by appellation. Similarly snubness, though it stands for the curvature only, yet signifies the nose by appellation; therefore, if the magnitude and curvature of the nose (which is snubness) were removed from the nose and placed in a stone, it would no longer be snubness, because of the lack of something connoted. And thus, although he held that happiness is an act of {speculari} thought, Aristotle nevertheless says in Book VII of this work that those who say that someone on the rack or unfortunate "is happy if he is good, are", are (even if he actually engages in {speculari} thinking) "speaking nonsense" [1153 b20]; and similarly in Book I of this work. What was said about whiteness is therefore not to the point, because whiteness {significat} signifies what it stands for without {connotatione} connoting other things. |
| Ad aliam, que dicit quod tam voluntas quam intellectus est felicitabilis, {ego add. Ra} concedo. Sed ad solvendum clare istam rationem premittenda erit quedam alia distinctio de felicitate. Ideo nunc transeo. [new para. Ja] Ad rationem sequentem | To the next, which says that both will and intellect are capable of happiness, I grant it. But to solve that argument clearly a certain other distinction about happiness will have to be laid down first. Therefore I now pass on. |
| [new para. RaPa] quando dicitur quod felicitas est dei {om. Ra} perfecta {trs. Pr} contemplatio, ego possum concedere. Sed ista {illa Ra} contemplatio est speculatio seu visio dei, tamen nomen contemplationis connotat, sicut nomen felicitatis, adiacentiam amoris et delectationis naturaliter connexorum illi speculationi vel visioni. Et tu dicis visio *{non add. JaRaPr} est perfecta contemplatio. Ego dico quod verum *{immo PbRaAuMuMzPr} {in hoc Ja} est {om. PbRaAuMuMz} adiacentibus sibi amore et delectatione, sed si non adiacerent ipsa {si...ipsa: om. Pb} non esset perfecta {magna Ra} {om. Pb} contemplatio {perfecta add. Ra} - immo {est adiacentibus... immo: om. Pr} nec {non AuPb} esset *{contemplatio nec etiam */om. JaMu\ esset /actus Ra\/oportet Pb\ add. RaMuJaPb} perfecta visio {adiacentibus... visio: om. JaMu}. Bene enim esset visio perfecta {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] sua essentiali perfectione, sed non sequitur, "ergo {igitur JaRaPr} {ita etiam Mu} perfecta *{donec etiam est /om. Ja\ perfecta add. JaRaMuMzPr} perfectione *{per /se add. Ra\ perfectiones JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} innata *{innatas JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} sibi {trs. JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} adiacere", sicut homo sine virtutibus moralibus {om. Pr} et {om. Pr} intellectualibus {trs. 321 JaRa} [Ja 328 va] non esset simpliciter homo perfectus, licet tamen esset perfectus secundum perfectionem essentialem. | To the argument following, when it says that happiness is the perfect contemplation of God, I can concede it. This contemplation is the {speculari} thought or vision of God; however, the word contemplation connotes, just as the word happiness does, the {adiacentia} presence of the love and pleasure naturally connected to that {speculari} thought or vision. And you say that vision is not perfect contemplation. I say that it is indeed if love and pleasure {adiacentibus sibi} are present with it, but if they were not {adiacerent} present it would not be perfect contemplation -- indeed, it would not be contemplation and it would not be perfect vision. It would indeed be a vision perfect by its essential perfection, but it does not follow, "therefore, perfect" until it is also perfect through the perfections able to be {sibi adiacere} present with it, just as a man without moral and intellectual virtues would not be simply a perfect man even though he would be perfect in {secundum} essential perfection. |
| Ad aliam que arguit de per se sufficientia felicitatis: dictum est {enim add. JaPr} *{in add. JaRaPr} xiii *{xiv JaRaPr} questione {om. Ra} primi libri, ubi positi fuerunt quattuor modi per se sufficientie ipsius et adhuc *{om. JaRaPr} posset addi quintus {modus add. Ra}: quia felicitas *{sic add. JaRaPr} est per se sufficientissima quod {quia RaPr} nullo indiget quod esset sibi *{vel felici add. JaRaPr} conveniens ad perfecte {perfectionem JaPr} vivere, quoniam hoc non indigeo quod habeo. Speculatio {speculationem Ja} autem que est humana felicitas omnia habet sibi adiacentia que conveniunt homini ad perfecte {perfectiones Ja} [Ra 15 b] vivendum {vivendi Ja}, et {om. JaPr} secundum corpus et secundum animam. Aliter ipsa non esset felicitas. Unde concedo quod felicitas *{speculatio JaRaPr} posset multis {melius Ra}[aliter multis Ra margin] indigere requisitis ad vitam perfectam hominis {trs. 231 JaPr}, sed tunc illa non esset felicitas humana. Ideo hec est per se vera: Felicitas est {om. Pr} {per se add. Ra} sufficientissima, sic quod nullo indiget {eget Ra}, ut dictum est {ut dictum est: om. Ra}. | To the next, which argues from the {per se} essential sufficiency of happiness: For it has been said in Question 14 of Book I [fol. 14 r], where four modes of its essential sufficiency were posited (and a fifth can be added), that happiness is essentially most sufficient if it needs nothing that would be suitable to it or to the happy man for living perfectly (since I am not in need of what I have). But the {speculari} thinking that is human happiness has added to itself everything suitable to a man for perfect living both {secundum} in body and in soul; otherwise it would not be happiness. Thus I concede that {speculari} thinking could be in need of many things required for the perfect life of man, but then it would not be human happiness. Therefore the statement, "Happiness is most sufficient, so that it is in need of nothing", is true per se, as has been said. |
| Omnes autem auctoritates sive sacre scripture sive philosophorum {trs. 4312 Ja}, licet expresse dicerent felicitatem in dei amore {trs. JaRaPr} consistere vel in delectatione vel in amore et visione *{in amore et visione: simul visione ac amore RaPr}, aut felicitatem etiam {om. Ra} {?et Ra} {trs. Pr} esse amorem vel delectationem vel coniunctum ex amore et visione, exponerentur quod hec dicta fuerunt ad signandum {significationem seu signandum Ra} quod non potest {posset RaPr} esse felicitas sine illis, vel quod hec sunt necessario annexa *{consequentia JaRaPr} felicitati *{ad felicitatem JaRaPr}, vel consequentia *{connexa JaRaPr} ipsam {felicitati JaRaPr}, vel aliquo tali modo. {trs. Pr} Sepius enim sermones ponuntur non secundum verborum propriissimas significationes {om. Pr} et {om. Pr} acceptiones. | And all the texts, whether of sacred Scripture or of the philosophers, even if they were to say expressly that happiness consists in love of God or in pleasure or in love and vision together, or that happiness is love or pleasure or a {coniunctum} combination of love and vision, would be explained as meaning that these were mentioned to indicate that happiness cannot exist without them, or that they follow necessarily upon happiness or are connected to happiness, or in some such way. For sentences are very often not asserted {secundum} in the most proper significations and meanings of the words. |
| Nunc ergo {igitur JaRaPr} admissa hac prima felicitatis distinctione {trs. Ja}, cuius membra coincidunt, que *{quantum JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} ad realem humanorum bonorum existentiam et eorum ordinationem in homine felici {felice JaPr} {homine felici: felicitatem Pb}, ego ponam {pono AuJa} [PbMzMu=Pa] adhuc {om. Ja} unam *{om. JaRaPr} aliam distinctionem de {ipsa add. RaPr} felicitate. Et notabo quod {om. Ja} cuicunque convenit habere propriam virtutem, ei convenit felicitas, et *{om. JaRaAuPbMuMz} si expedite operatur *{operetur AuPbMzMuPr} secundum illam {istam Ja} virtutem, habet *{om. JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} felicitatem *{om. JaRaAuPbMuMzPr} vel proportionabile felicitati. Dico "convenit sibi {trs. Ja} felicitas" si ipsum sit natum *{innatum JaPr} [Ra in margin] felicitari, "vel proportionabile" {dico... proportionabile: om. Ra} [in Ra margin] *{felicitati add. RaMuMzPr} si non proprie {trs. Ra} dicatur {trs. Pr} felicitabile {esse add. Ra}. Omne enim {om. Ra} quod attingit proprie virtuti {virtutem Ja} et operatur secundum eam expedite {trs. 4123 JaRaPbMuMzPr} est perfectum *{ut sic add. JaRaPbMuMzPr} et optime se habens et per consequens est felix vel [aut Ra margin] proportionabile {et... proportionabile: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] *{se habens add. JaMuMzPr} felici {felicitate Mu} *{felicitati JaPr}. Constat autem quod totius habentis partes diversas et ad diversas operationes naturaliter ordinatas assignanda est virtus [Pa 210 va] propria, *{et add. JaRaPrEr} uniuscuiusque partis et *{om. JaRaPrEr} eius virtus est *{etiam JaRaPr} ei *{om. JaRaPr} propria, et *{alicuius altera. Alia enim est virtus propria et add. JaRaPr} optima complexio cordis, et {om. Ra} alia {est add. Ra} cerebri, et {om. Ja} alia manus, et alia {om. Pr} oculi, et {om. Pr} cuiuslicet *{cuiuslibet JaRaPr} partis virtus propria alicuius *{om. JaRaPr} partis *{om. JaRaPr} illam {istam JaPr} partem bene se habentem perficit, et opus eius bene reddit; *{puta, oculi virtus et oculum studiosum facit et opus eius oculi /om. Pr\ bene reddit /bene reddit: om. Ja\ add. JaRaPr} oculi enim virtute bene {oculi... bene: om. Ra}[Ra in margin]{eius add. Ra} videmus, ut notatur in secundo huius. Ex quibus sequitur quod cuilibet parti totius bene ordinati {ordinari Ra} convenit propria felicitas, vel {et Ja} propria dispositio partis {om. Ra} proportionabilis felicitati {felici Ja}. Si ergo {igitur JaRa} largo nomine {modo JaRa} omne proportionabili *{proportionabile JaRaPr} felicitati vocemus felicitatem, tunc [anime et add. Ra margin] et corporis in homine erit felicitas et anime felicitas, et cordis et cerebri et manus et oculi *{et add. JaRaPr} alia huius {huiusmodi JaRaPr} {etc. add. Ra} et alia illius. Ideo et *{etiam JaRaPr} cum animam ponamus potentiam *{potentialiter JaRa} partialem *{partibilem Ja}, alia erit virtus atque felicitas [Ra 26 a] anime sensitive inquantum *{ut JaPr} {om. Ra} sensitiva {om. Ra}, et {om. JaRa} alia appetitive {appetitiva Ja} inquantum *{ut RaPr} {puta Ja} appetitivus *{appetitiva JaRaPr}, alia intellectus ut intellectus, alia voluntatis ut voluntas *{alia speculativi ut speculativus add. Ja} et {om. Ra} alia etiam {om. Ja} intellectus {om. Ja} activi ut activus et {om. Ra} alia speculativi {speculativa Ra} ut speculativus *{et alia speculativi ut speculativus: om. Ja}. |
[A second distinction: happiness of whole vs. happiness of parts]Now, therefore, having introduced this first distinction of happiness (whose members {coincidunt} coincide in respect of the real existence of human goods and their ordering in the happy man), I will assert yet another distinction concerning happiness. And I will note that if it befits a thing to have its own virtue, happiness befits it, or something proportionable to happiness, if it acts unimpeded in accordance with that virtue. I say "happiness befits it" if it is itself capable of being made happy, "or something proportionable to happiness" if it is not properly said to be {felicitabile} capable of happiness. For everything that attains its own virtue and acts easily in accordance with it is, as such, perfect and is in the best state and, consequently, happy or proportionably related to happiness. But it is certain that if a whole has different parts naturally ordered to different activities, a special virtue must be assigned to it and also to each of its parts, one to one part and another to another. For the special virtue and best {complexio} condition of the heart is one thing, that of the brain another, of the hand another, of the eye another; and the virtue special to each part perfects the well disposed part and makes its work good. For example, the virtue of the eye both makes the eye {studiosus} good and makes the eye's work good, for "by the virtue of the eye we see well", as is noted in Book II of this work [1106 a19]. From these points it follows that a happiness of its own (or a special state of the part proportionable to happiness) befits each part of a well ordered whole. If, therefore, we call everything proportionable to happiness "happiness" in a broad sense, then there will be in man both happiness of body and happiness of soul -- and of heart, and brain, and hand, and eye, one happiness of this part and another of that. Therefore, also, since we assert that the soul is potentially {partibilem} divisible into parts, one thing will be the virtue and happiness of the sensitive soul as sensitive, another of the appetitive as appetitive, another of the intellect as intellect, another of the will as will, another of the speculative intellect as speculative, another also of the active intellect as active. |
| Sed {om. Ja} tunc de toto ex pluribus *{partibus add. JaRaPr} constituto que sit virtus atque felicitas ipsius, et quomodo ab uniuscuiusque partis propria *{virtute et add. JaRaPr} {et add. Pr} felicitate distinguitur, oportet considerare. Et potest dici quod ex virtutibus partium ordinatis et {om. Pr} proportionatis {proportionaliter Ra} resultat virtus totius que non est nisi ordinata et proportionata congregatio virtutum {partium... virtutum: om. Ja} partium vel {et Ja} potentiarum. et sic differt virtus {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] totius a virtute partis, sicut differt {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] congregatio multorum ab uno illorum. Et ita etiam si felicitas ponatur in opere {operatione Ra} secundum virtutem, felicitas totius differt a felicitate partis sicut congregatio multorum operum {om. Pr} ab uno illorum {om. Ja}, et hoc est loquendo secundum primum {unum Pr} modum dicendi *{dictum JaRaPr} in priori distinctione. Sed si loquamur {loquatur Pr} secundo modo, scilicet secundum denominationem a principalissimo [Ja 328 vb] congregationis - sicut si congregationem generalem universitatis {om. Ra} vocaremus congregationem rectoris, et congregationem *{specialem add. RaPr} unius specialis *{om. RaPr} nationis vocaremus congregationem {rectoris... congregationem: om. Ja} procuratoris - tunc diceremus quod virtus totius est {esset est Ja} virtus {om. Pr} principalissime partis. Ut {et Ra} si in *{om. JaRaPr} virtutem animalis diceremus esse {om. Ra} complexionem cordis que est propria virtus cordis, ista igitur nomina virtus cordis et virtus animalis supponerent pro eodem, sed tamen differenter, quia hoc nomen virtus cordis non appellaret virtutem seu complexionem {trs. 321 Ra} cerebri, aut epatis, sed hoc nomen virtus animalis appellaret complexiones virtuosas cerebri et {om. Ra} epatis {om. Ra} et aliorum membrorum. Ideo posito quod cor {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] esset optime complexionatum et non cerebrum, tamen *{tunc JaRaPr} illa complexio cordis esset virtus cordis, sed non amplius {om. Ja} diceretur {esset Ja} virtus animalis propter defectum connotati. Et ita proportionabiliter debemus {debet JaRaPr} imaginari de felicitatibus totius et partium quo ad opera virtutum in quibus {quo Ja} consisterent {consistet Ja} ille {illa Ja} felicitates {felicitas Ja}. | But then we must consider, concerning a whole constituted out of many parts, what is its virtue and happiness, and how it is distinguished from the virtue and happiness proper to each part. It can be said that the virtue of the whole results from the ordered and proportioned virtues of the parts and is nothing other than the ordered and proportioned aggregate of the virtues of the parts or powers. The virtue of the whole differs from the virtue of a part in just the way an aggregate of many differs from one of them. So also, if happiness is placed in activity in accordance with virtue, the happiness of the whole differs from the happiness of a part as an aggregate of many actions differs from one of them; this is speaking in the first mode spoken of in the earlier distinction. But if we speak in the second mode, namely according to denomination from the most principal part of the aggregate -- for example, if we called the general congregation of the university the congregation of the rector and the particular congregation of nation [within the university] the congregation of the proctor -- then we would say that the virtue of the whole is the virtue of its most principal part. For example, if we were to say that the virtue of an animal is the state of the heart that is the virtue of the heart itself, then the terms "virtue of the heart" and "virtue of the animal" would stand for the same thing -- but differently, because the term "virtue of the heart" would not {appellare} signify by appellation the virtue or state of the brain or liver, but the term "virtue of the animal" would {appellare} signify by appellation the virtuous states of brain and liver and other members: supposing, then, that the heart was in its best state and not the brain, the state of the heart would then be the virtue of the heart but would no longer be said to be the virtue of the animal, because of a lack {connotati} of something connoted. And so we {imaginari} should think {proportionabiliter} correspondingly of the happinesses of whole and parts in respect of the virtuous activities in which those happinesses would consist. |
| Nunc ergo {igitur JaRaPr} descendamus specialiter ad felicitatem hominis et felicitates suarum partium, et loquamur secundum primum {proprium Ra} modum loquendi prioris distinctionis, quia ille est facilior et *{om. JaRaPr} melior *{om. JaRaPr}, et dividamus hominem primo in portionem inferiorem que dicitur {vocatur JaRaPr} vegetabilis et sensualis, et illa {ista JaPr} est {trs. JaRaPr} composita ex anima et corpore (cum vegetatio et sensatio non exerceantur nisi in organo corporeo), et in portionem superiorem, que vocatur intellectualis, que est anima precise (cum operationes proprie [Ra 26 b] illi portioni {proportione Ja} non {om. Ja}[space left] sint in organo corporeo). Portio autem inferior dividitur in vegetabilem et sensualem. Vegetabilis autem {om. Ja} dividitur in singula membra, quorum quodlibet est compositum ex anima et corpore, et habet complexionem propriam et vegetationem propriam. Sensualis autem dividitur in sensum et appetitum sensitivum. Constat autem quod virtus sensualis {naturalis Ja} ex naturali {perfectione add. Ra} complexione perfecta est ad {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] clare et {? add. Ja} distincte sentiendum; virtus autem appetitus ultra bonam et *{om. JaRaPr} naturalem complexionem [Pa 210 vb] requirit habitum bone assuefactionis *{consuetudinis JaRa} inclinantem {inclinantam Ra} ad obediendum rationi. Portio autem superior dividitur potentialiter {proportionaliter JaPr} {proportionabiliter Mu} [AuRaMz=Pa] in partem activam et in *{om. JaPr} partem contemplativam sive *{in add. JaRaPr} practicam et speculativam, et utraque pars dividitur in intellectum et {om. Ra} voluntatem, scilicet pars practica in intellectum practicum {om. Ja} et *{voluntatem practicam et pars /et pars: ? Ja\ contemplativa in intellectum contemplativum seu speculativum add. JaRaPr} pars speculativa in intellectum speculativum *{pars... speculativum om. RaPr} et voluntatem contemplativam seu speculativam (quam non dico speculativam quia speculetur formaliter, sed quia eius actus ut sic sequitur actum speculationis). Virtus ergo {igitur JaRaPr} intellectus speculativi secundum Aristotelem est sapientia {sapientiam Ja}, et actus {actum Ja} secundum illam {istam JaPr} virtutem est speculatio circa divina, que *{est add. RaPr} felicitas intellectus speculativi; et virtus voluntatis speculative {speculationis Ra} {speculativi Ja} esset amor habitualis dei et totius ordinationis entium ut a deo dependens, et actus secundum illam {istam JaPr} virtutem esset actualis amatio dei *{etc. add. JaRaPr} consequens predictam actualem speculationem: que amatio esset felicitas voluntatis speculative. Et secundum veritatem felicitas {felicitatis Ra} intellectus speculativi *{om. JaPr} seu *{om. RaPr} {in Ja} contemplativi {om. Ra} {contemplative Ja} est visio clara dei *{et add. JaRaPr} felicitas voluntatis {partis Ja} speculative *{om. JaRaPr} seu *{om. JaRaPr} contemplative est {om. JaRaPr} actualis amor dei. Et sic felicitas totalis partis contemplative esset connexio dicti amoris et dicte visionis. Virtus autem intellectus practici est prudentia, et eius felicitas est actus prudentie; et virtus voluntatis practice est connexio virtutum moralium cum {om. Ra} prudentia {om. Ra}; et felicitas cuius *{eius RaPr} {om. Ja} est actualis inclinatio secundum {ad Pr} illas {om. Ja} virtutes ad iudicium prudentie. Virtus ergo {igitur JaRaPr} totalis portionis superioris est congregatio dictarum virtutum, et {om. Ja} felicitas congregatio {om. Pr} dictarum felicitatum. |
[Application of the second distinction]Now, therefore, let us come particularly to the happiness of man and the happinesses of his parts, and let us speak according to first mode of speaking of the earlier distinction (because it is easier), and let us divide man first into [1] an inferior portion, called vegetable and sensual, composed of soul and body (since vegetation and sensation are exercised only in a corporeal organ), and [2] a superior portion, called intellectual, which is the soul {precise} alone (since the activities {proprie} specific to that portion do not exist in a corporeal organ). Now the inferior portion is divided into vegetable and sensual; the vegetable is divided into particular members each composed of soul and body with its own {complexio} condition and its own vegetating, and the sensual is divided into sense and sensitive appetite. It is certain that a natural {complexio} condition perfects the sense {virtus} power for sensing clearly and distinctly; the power of appetite, however, in addition to good natural {complexio} condition, requires a habit of good custom inclining it to obey reason. The superior portion is divided potentially into an active part and a contemplative part (or into practical and speculative), and both parts are divided into intellect and will: that is, the practical part into practical intellect and practical will and the contemplative part into contemplative or speculative intellect and contemplative or speculative will (which I do not call speculative because it formally {speculari} thinks, but because its act as such follows upon the act of {speculari} thought). According to Aristotle, then, the virtue of the speculative intellect is wisdom, and the act in accordance with that virtue is {speculari} thought concerning divine things, which is the happiness of the speculative intellect; the virtue of the speculative will would be habitual love of God and love of the whole ordering of beings as dependent upon God, and the act in accordance with that virtue would be actual loving of God, etc., following upon the above- mentioned actual {speculari} thinking, and this loving would be the happiness of the speculative will. According to the truth, the happiness of the contemplative intellect is the clear vision of God, and the happiness of the contemplative will is actual love of God; thus the happiness of the whole contemplative part would be the {connexio} conjunction of this love and this vision. The virtue of the practical intellect, however, is prudence, and its happiness is the act of prudence; the virtue of practical will is the {connexio} conjunction of the moral virtues with prudence, and its happiness is actual inclination in accordance with those virtues to the judgment of prudence. The virtue, therefore, of the whole superior portion is the aggregate of these virtues, and its happiness is the aggregate of these happinesses. |
| Et sic, expediendo breviter de beatitudine in prima *{patria RaJaMuMzAuPbPr}, quia illa {ipsa Ra} transcendit methas {metas RaPr} huius {istius JaRaPr} considerationis, nos non diceremus hominem propriissime {trs. JaPr} esse beatum an *{ante JaRaPr} eius resurrectionem, quia deficit ei *{corporis JaRaPr} beatitudo seu eius {cuius Ja} optima [Ra 27 a] dispositio que est de integritate beatitudinis hominis {om. Ra} vel connotata per beatitudinem hominis, cum proprie *{proprissime JaRaPr} dictus homo sit compositus ex anima et corpore. Tamen ego confiteor quod secundum denominationem a parte principaliori (prout dicit Aristoteles {trs. Ja} quod homo est ipse intellectus), beatus petrus ex beatitudine anime eius {cuius Ja}, [Ja 329 ra] licet non resurrexerit corporaliter, est tamen *{om. JaRaPr} vere beatus et homo beatus. Secundum autem Aristotelem dicendum est {? add. Ra} proportionabiliter {proportionaliter Pr} in hac vita: si enim homo sit felix secundum portionem superiorem practicam, non sequitur quod sit felix homo, sed {sit add. Ra} {est add. JaPr} felix activus {actus Ra}, non tamen *{felix add. JaRa} forte {felix add. Pr} speculativus, quod requiritur ad {hominem add. Pr} esse simpliciter {om. JaRaPr} hominem {om. Pr} {trs. Ja} felicem. Et si sit felix secundum sapientiam et prudentiam {trs. 321 Ra}, scilicet practice et speculative, tamen nondum {? Ra} {non Ja} sequitur quod sit felix homo, quia forte deficit felicitas alicuius partis portionis inferioris, ut si deficiat *{deficiant JaRaPr} oculus *{oculi Pr} aut *{aures Ja} pes *{pedes JaPr} aut manus vel impedita {pedita Ja} est pars vegetativa per egritudinem, {et add. Ja} ex quo sequitur impedimentum partis sensitive et iterum intellective quantum ad {om. JaPr} operis exercitium vel etiam ex {vel etiam ex: om. Ra} defectu nutrimenti non potest vegetativa in opus suum et impediuntur statim {cito JaRaPr} omnes alie virtutes. Et tamen felicitas hominis inquantum in hoc mundo naturaliter viventis secundum quod talis est {om. PbAuMuPr} [Pa=MzRaJa] talis {om. JaRaPrPbAuMz} congregatio felicitatum omnium huiusmodi partium, vel {nihil Pr} connotantur. Ideo non sequitur si portio superior est in sua felici *{felicitate JaMzAuPr} *{et add. JaPr} prosperitate {probitate Ra} quod ex hoc sit felix homo {trs. 312 JaRaPr}. Et *{om. JaRaPr} hec est intentio Aristotelis. | And so, dealing briefly (because it goes beyond the limits of this investigation) with blessedness in the fatherland [heaven], we would not say that a man is in the most proper sense blessed before his resurrection, because he would lack blessedness of body (or its best state), which belongs to the wholeness of human blessedness, or he would lack things connoted by human blessedness, since a man in the most proper sense is a composite of soul and body. However, I confess that according to denomination from the more principal part (as Aristotle says that man is the intellect itself), blessed Peter, although he has not risen corporeally, is truly blessed and a blessed man because of the blessedness of his soul. According to Aristotle we must speak in a corresponding way in this life. For if a man is happy according to the superior practical portion, it does not follow that he is a happy man, but he is a happy active man -- perhaps not a happy speculative man, which is required to being simply a happy man. And if he is happy according to wisdom and prudence, that is practically and speculatively, nevertheless it does not yet follow that he is a happy man, because perhaps the happiness of some part of the inferior portion is lacking -- for example, if eyes, feet or hands are lacking, or if the vegetative part is impeded by sickness (from which follows the impeding of the sensitive part, and also the impeding of the intellective part in performing its work), or also if because of lack of nourishment the vegetative part {non potest in} lacks power for its work and all the other powers are soon impeded. Nevertheless, the happiness of man as living naturally in this world, according as it is such, is (or connotes) an aggregate of the happinesses of all such parts. Therefore if the superior part is in its happiness and prosperity, it does not follow from this that he is a happy man. And this is Aristotle's {intentio} opinion. |
| Ex qua clare manifesta sunt multa que in primo libro querebantur. Manifestum est enim quod neque {nec Ra} in bonis exterioribus consistit humana felicitas {nec in voluptatibus: om. Pr} nec in voluptatibus nec in virtutibus aliquibus {om. Ra} [Pa 211 ra] corporalibus aut {om. Ja} earum *{om. JaRaPrEr} operibus {om. Ja} - immo nec in virtutibus vel operationibus intellectualibus nisi partialiter, vel si iuxta secundum {om. JaPr} modum *{loquendi add. JaRaPrEr} {secundum add. JaPr} prime distinctionis dicatur in opere {operatione Pr} intellectus consistere. Hoc tamen non est sine adiacentia aliorum humanorum bonorum {trs. JaPr} corporis et anime. Et apparet etiam {mihi Ra} quod illa {ista Ja} verba Senece in *{om. JaRaPr} quibus videtur {om. JaRaPr} sepius exclamare {videtur add. RaPr} contra hanc Aristotelis sententiam quorum aliqua recitata fuerunt in octava *{sexta JaRaPr} [rather decima sexta] questione primi libri, scilicet quod bona corporis vel mala, sanitas vel egritudo, divicie vel paupertas, etc. {om. Ra}, nihil augmentant vel diminuunt de humana virtute vel {?vere Ra} felicitate, nec {vel Ra} {nichil JaPr} ad eam apponunt {ponunt Ja} vel auferunt, etc., *{manifestum est /etiam add. Pr\ quod add. JaRaPr} prout illa {om. JaRaPr} verba {om. JaRaPr} sunt vera, nihil procedunt contra Aristotelem. Nam si loquatur de felicitate hominis ut est compositus ex corpore et anima {trs. 321 JaRaPr} vivens naturaliter, ipse non dicit *{diceret JaRaPr} verum {trs. Ra}. Si autem loquatur secundum quid, i.e. {scilicet Ra} de virtute hominis quantum ad porcionem superiorem, verum dicit {est JaPr} de virtute acquisita, sed non de acquisitione eius specialiter quantum ad sapientiam. Multum enim obesset {abesset Ja} studio {studioso Ra} corporis egritudo, captivitas, necessariorum indigentia, etc. {om. Pr} Nec bene dicunt *{diceret RaPr} de felicitate si consistit {consistat Pr} in opere sapientie. Et licet bene diceretur *{diceret Pr} de opere intrinseco virtutis practice, non tamen de opere extrinseco {intrinseco Pr} quod iam transit in amicos {et add. Ra} vicinos, et {om. RaPr} in rem publicam, etc., quoniam {enim add. Ra} se habere bene secundum quodlibet istorum requiritur ad hominem optime se habere, quod est hominem esse felicem {felices Ra}.[From this point manuscript Mz is collated continuously][Mz 162 va] |
[Resolution of questions from Book I]From these points many things inquired about in Book I become clear. For it is manifest that human happiness does not consist in exterior goods or in pleasures or in any corporeal virtues or works -- indeed, it does not consists in intellectual virtues or activities except partially; or if, {iuxta} in accordance with the second mode of speaking of the first distinction, it is said to consist in the work of intellect, this is, however, not without the {adiacentia} possession of the other human goods of body and soul. It is also clear that the words of Seneca in which he often seems to exclaim against this opinion of Aristotle, some of which were quoted in Question 6 [rather, 16] of Book I [fol. 15 rb] -- namely, that goods or evils of body, health or sickness, riches or poverty, etc., in no respect augment or diminish human virtue or happiness nor add anything to it nor take anything away, etc. -- it is clear that so far as those words are true, they have no force against Aristotle. For if he speaks of the happiness of man as composed of body and soul and living naturally, he would not speak the truth. If, however, he speaks in a qualified way -- that is, about the virtue of man in respect of the superior part -- he speaks the truth concerning acquired virtue, but not concerning its acquisition, especially in respect of wisdom: for bodily sickness, captivity, lack of necessities, etc., greatly obstruct {studio} study. Nor would he speak well of happiness if it consists in an act of wisdom. And although he would speak well of the inward activity of practical virtue, he would not, however, speak well of the outward activity which now has its effect on friends, neighbors and the commonwealth, etc. {bene se habere} -- a good state in each of these is required for a man to be in his best state, which is to be a happy man. |
| Item, Seneca in illis verbis *{suis add. MzJaRaPr} valde bene et {om. MzRaPr} pulchre et {om. Ja} sancte loquitur comparative sed {et Ja} non simpliciter et absolute. Dico "comparative" quia tanta est excellentia portionis superioris ad inferiorem quod nulla admittenda est comparatio earum ubi est incompossibilitas salutis earum {ubi... earum om. Ja}, et hoc tenemus ex fide nostra {naturaliter Mz}. Et Aristoteles hoc idem crederet *{teneret MzJaRaPr}, videlicet {verum Mz}[Mz between lines] quod longe *{om. MzJaRaPr} eligibilius esset perdere divitias, {et add. JaPr} amicos, membrum {membra Ra}, immo corpus et vitam temporalem {corporalem Ra} in casu incompossibilitatis, quam {quod Mz} {om. Ja} levissima {levissimam PbAuMu} culpa *{macula RaEr} {om. MzJaPr} [culpa in margin Pr] maculare porcionem superiorem. Ista locutio comparativa {et add. Ra} est intentio {trs. Ja} Senece et {omnium add. Mz}[omnium add. Ra margin] moralium omnium {om. RaMz} {?hoium Ja} . Videtur enim loqui {locutus Pr} ita *{om. MzJaRa} ut ait {Seneca add. Ja} in epistola "Inimicitias {? Mz}": "Vir *{om. MzJaRaPr} bonus *{om. MzJaRaPr} "Ab honesto nulla re deterrebitur {deteres igitur Mz}; ad turpia {enim add. Ra} nulla spe *{om. JaRaZnPr}[Mz illegible] invitabitur [Mz illegible]". Non fuit tamen {om. Mz} intentio Senece quod homo simpliciter {om. Ra} et {om. Ja} optime se haberet {trs. 3412 Mz} cum {? Mz} est {esset Ra} in tormentis afflictus et *{in JaRaPr} {om. Mz} egritudine detentus, carens cibo, pecunia et amicis; quia si tunc deberet optime {trs. MzJa} {deberet optime: optime optime crederat Ra} *{deberet optime: optime crederet Pr} se habere, non deberet magis statum {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] alium {appetere add. Pr} {trs. 231 Ra} qui *{quam JaRaPr} illum {istum JaPr} {statum... illum: istum cibum quam illum Mz} appetere {om. Pr}. Quod {quam Mz} negat Seneca, dicens in libello *{suo add. MzJaRaPr} {trs. 2341 Mz} De beata {om. Ja} vita {om. Pr}, "Non contemnet se sapiens si fuerit minime stature esse, tamen se procerum {trs. Ra} vellet [Ja 329 rb] malam valitudinem tollerabit bonam optabit"; "Totum fortune regnum despiciam {despiciem Ra}, sed ex illo si dabitur electio meliora sumam". | Again, in these texts of his Seneca speaks very well and beautifully and {sancte} piously -- comparatively, but not simply and absolutely. I say "comparatively" because in relation to the inferior the excellence of the superior portion is so great that no comparison of them can be admitted when {incompossibilia} it is impossible for both to be preserved; and we hold this from our faith. Aristotle would hold the same thing, namely that when it is {incompossibilia} impossible for both to be preserved it would be preferable to lose riches, friends, a limb, indeed body and temporal life, rather than stain the superior portion by the slightest stain. This comparative statement is Seneca's opinion and that of all moralists. For he seems to speak as he says in the letter "Inimicitias": "Nothing will deter him from what is honourable, nothing will tempt him into baseness" {p. 157} [LXXVI.18]. However, it was not Seneca's {intentio} opinion that a man is simply in the best state when afflicted by torments, gripped by sickness, lacking food, money and friends; because if he then believed himself to be in his best state, he should not seek another state than this one. Seneca denies this. In his book De beata vita he says: "The wise man will not despise himself if he is very short, yet he will wish to be tall... He will put up with bad health, but he will wish for good health" [xxii.2-3]; "I will despise the whole kingdom of fortune, but if given the choice I will take the better things from it" [xxv.5]. |
| Et quamvis ista videatur esse vera determinatio felicitatis *{de felicitate MzJaRaPr}, tamen circa *{in MzJaRaPr} ea *{quedam add. MzJaRaPr} {questiones add. Ja} oriuntur {trs. Pr} questiuncule {om. Ja} {quarum add. Ja}. Prima *{una MzRaPr} est cum {quod add. Ra} homo se habeat {trs. Pr} optime {trs. 312 Mz} secundum animam et corpus, tamen *{om. MzJaRaPr} oportet *{eum add. JaRaPr} senescere et non se {om. Ja} habet *{habere JaRaPr} {haberet Mz} {eum add. Ja} tunc optime secundum corpus, in tantum quod ambulare non [Ra 28 a] potest et ita nullus senex esset homo felix, quod philosophi {philosophus Ja} non concesserunt {?concessunt Ja} {quod... concesserunt: om. Ra}[Ra in margin]. |
[Supplementary questions]Although this seems to be the true decision concerning happiness, yet certain small questions arise about it. One is this: when a man {se habet} is in the best state in soul and body, he must grow old and then not be in the best state in body, {in tantum} in that he cannot walk; and thus no old man would be a happy man, which the philosophers did not concede. |
| Secunda est utrum aliquis dormiens sit homo felix. {et add. Mz} Videtur quod non {videtur quod non: om. Pr}, quia tunc non operatur secundum virtutes intellectuales in quarum *{tamen add. MzJaRaPr} operatione {opere Pr} tu dicis humanam felicitatem {trs. Ja} consistere, saltem quantum {om. Ja} ad partem felicitatis longe *{valde MzJaRaPr} principaliorem. Sed contra *{econtra MzRaPr}, videtur {valde add. Ja} inconveniens si *{hominem add. Ra} {homo JaPr} {homines Mz} oporteat {om. Pr} ita sepe hominem *{om. MzJaRaPr} amittere {amitteret Pr} suam {summam Ja} felicitatem. | The second is whether someone asleep is a happy man. It seems not, because no activity then takes place in accordance with the intellectual virtues; in this activity, however, you say that human happiness consists, at least in respect of the part of happiness that is by far the more principal. But against this it seems unsuitable if a man must thus often lose his happiness. |
| Tertia est *{om. JaRa} si homo sub {? RaMz} tormentis {? Ra} {tormenti Mz} seu *{sub MzJaRaPr} egritudine infortunatus vel captivatus non sit homo felix, an ergo {igitur JaRaPr} est homo miser vel {homo add. JaRaPr} infelix? Et videtur quod non si ante erat {trs. JaPr} felix, quia {in add. Ra} primo huius nullus {om. Ja} [Ja interlinear] {utique add. Ra} beatorum fiet {fiat Pr} {fuit MzJa} {erit Ra} [AuMuZn=Pa] utrique *{om. MzJaRaAuPbMuZnPr} miser. | Third, if a man under torment or sickness, unfortunate or captive, is not a happy man, is he therefore miserable or unhappy? It seems not, if he was happy before, since in Book I of this work [Aristotle says], "No one who is happy will become miserable" [1100 b33]. |
| Quarta est *{om. Mz} si homo semper optime se habet {trs. Ja} secundum animam et corpus usque ad quadragesimum *{om. MzJaRaPr} quartum *{om. MzJaRaPr} annum *{quadragesimum add. MzJaRaPr}, et per totam sequentem vitam eius {trs. 231 Ra} maneat in captivitate sepe sub tormentis, sepe sub egritudinibus, et {vel Pr} huiusmodi, an unquam fuerit {fuit Mz} verum dicere de {om. Ja} illo {om. Ja} quod ipse {om. Ra} esset {fuit Mz} felix homo {trs. MzJaRaPr}? | Fourth, if a man is always in the best state {secundum} in soul and body until his fortieth year and for the whole of the rest of his life remains in captivity, often under torture, often under sickness and the like, was it ever true to say of him that he was a happy man? |
| Quinta est an {trs. Mz} sit {om. Mz} {est JaRaPr} dare felice {felici Mz} feliciorem? Videtur {arguitur Ra} quod non, quia esse felicem est optime se habere, et optime *{optimo MzJaRa} non est melius {et... melius: om. Pr}. | The fifth is {an sit dare} whether there is anyone happier than a happy man? It seems not, because to be happy is to be in the best state, and there is nothing better than the best. |
| Ad primam questionem ego respondeo quod hominem optime se habere est hominem esse felicem, sed non optime se habere simpliciter {trs. 312 MzJaPr} (esset enim deus), sed optime se habere secundum quod natura hominis permittit secundum totum tempus {? Ra} complete {completum MuMzJa} {om. Ra} [AuPb=Pa] vite sue, referendo ad quamlibet partem temporis illud optime se habere, scilicet *{om. MzJaRaPr} secundum *{om. MzJaRaPr} quod permittit et requirit etas illius temporis. Si enim in puericia se habeat optime {se habeat optime: om. Ra} ut {et JaPr} puer, in iuventute ut {et Ra} iuvenis {? Mz}, in virilitate ut vir {et add. MzPr}, in senectute ut senex, ipse simpliciter dicendum *{dicendus MzJaRaPr} est homo felix, et in omni tempore vite sue, et in qualibet parte illius {om. Ra} temporis, verum est dicere quod {om. Mz} ipse est homo felix. |
[Answer to the first]To the first question I answer that for a man to be in the best state is for him to be happy, but not to be in the best state simply (for he would be God) but rather in the best state {secundum quod} so far as the nature of man permits {secundum} for the whole time of his complete life, {referendo} relating to each part of time the best state that his age at that time permits and requires. If in boyhood he is in the best state as a boy, in his youth as a youth, in manhood as a man, in old age as an old man, he must be said simply to be a happy man; both in the whole time of his life and in each part of that time it is true to say that he is a happy man. |
| Contra {om. Ja} dices *{diceres JaRa} tu *{quia add. MzJaRaPr} tunc *{ipse add. MzJaRaPr} in tempore punicei *{pueritie MSS} diceretur vere homo felix; in quo {qua Ra} tempore {om. RaPr} tamen {trs. Mz} ipse {om. Ra} {in tempore... ipse: om. JaPr} nullam habet virtutem moralem aut {vel MzJaRaPr} intellectualem, et sic queretur *{sequitur MzJaRaPr} quod esset homo felix, sine sapientia {prudentia et Ra}, sine prudentia {sapientia Ra}, et sine virtute morali, quod est absurdum dicere et contra determinata {predeterminata Ra}. | Against: you would say that then in the time of his boyhood he would truly be said to be a happy man; but in that time he has no moral or intellectual virtue, and thus it follows that he would be a happy man without wisdom, prudence or moral virtue, which is absurd to say and contrary to what has been decided. |
| Ista ratio est sophistica, et magis phisica quam ethica. Ego enim possum vere {?verum Ja} diligere *{dicere MzJaRaPr} quod Sortes currit in illo tempore in quo ipse {om. Mz} non currit. Loquor enim in uno tempore pro alio tempore. Aliter non possem {possum MzPr} tibi {om. Ra} contradicere dicenti quod Sortes non currit, quia nescio tibi contradicere donec locutus fueris. Contradicam ergo {igitur JaRa} tibi {trs. Mz} {igitur add. Ja} dicendo quod Sortes currit, et forte {Sortes Ja} non currebat quando loquebaris {loquebar Ja} et currebat [Mz 162 vb] quando loquebar {trs. 231 Ra}. Ergo {igitur Ja} uterque dicit verum {Sortes non currit... verum: Pr illegible} et sic {et sic: igitur Pr} ambe contradictione *{contradictoriae MSS} [Ra 28 b] sunt vere. Dico quod non, quia {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] contradicendo ego non loquebar pro illo tempore in quo ego loquebar, sed pro illo in quo tu loquebaris, et {etiam Mz} sic {om. Mz} nos {om. Pr} ambo pro eodem tempore loquebamur, sed in diversis {temporibus add. Ra}. Si ergo {igitur JaRaPr} in {om. Mz} tempore punicie {pueritie MzJaRaPr} Sortis, ego dico {Sortis ego dico: om. Ra} Sortes est felix, ego dico verum, quia non dico hoc *{om. JaRaPr} pro {in Ja} tempore precise *{preciso JaRa} {trs. 312 Mz} in quo ego loquor, sed pro totali tempore vite Sortis in qua *{quo MzJaRaPr} ipse est, est *{om. MzJaRaPr} vere felix. Sed tu queris {queres Mz} *{quereres JaRaPr} non de loqui sed de esse, an Sortes est felix in tempore punicie *{pueritie MzJaRaPr}? Ego dico quod non nisi partialiter, quia ipse *{om. MzJaRaPr} est puer {trs. Ja} felix. {trs. Pr} An ergo {igitur RaPr} {om. Ja} ipse {igitur add. Ja} est felix tempore virilitatis {virtutis Ra} quando *{quo MzJaRaPr} *{tempore add. JaPr} ipse {om. Ja} est perfecte virtutibus *{virtuosus MzJaRaPr}, et secundum animam et secundum corpus {trs. 4231 MzRa}? Ego dico quod sic, secundum denominationem aperte *{a parte MzRaPr} principaliori felicitatis humane, quia est felix vir {trs. MzJaPr} {om. Ra}[Ra in margin], et virilitas est nobilor pars etatis humane *{om. MzJaRaPr}, sed non est [Ja 329 va] homo felix quia felicitas significat omniquaque perfectionem, et secundum corpus et secundum animam et secundum tempus {corpus Ja} conveniens naturaliter humane vite. Et hoc notavit {? Ra} Aristoteles decimo Ethicorum {huius Mz}, dicens: "Perfecta igitur felicitas hec utique erit hominis {homini conveniens Mz} accipiens longitudinem {hec... longitudinem: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] vite perfectam; nichil enim {om. Mz} imperfectum eorum que felicitas {infelicitas Ja}". Quomodo dices tu {trs. RaPr} nonne martires amore *{om. JaRaPr} dei {trs. Mz} *{qui add. JaRaPr} mortem {? add. Ra} passi *{sunt add. MzJaRaPr} vicesimo aut tricesimo sue etatis {trs. JaPr} anno fuerunt *{fuerint MzJaRa} homines felices. Diceretur quod non felices homines simpliciter, sed felices *{homines add. MzJaRaPr} secundum partem *{porcionem MzJaRaPr} superiorem, et etiam *{sic JaRaPr} feliciores quam {quamvis Ra} si {om. Ra} non passi fuissent *{mortem add. MzJaRaPr} pro {probatio et Mz} *{bono et add. JaRaPr} salute *{illius add. MzJaRaPr} partis superioris ad quam salus inferioris in casu incompossibilitatis nullam habet comparationem, ut dictum est *{prius add. MzJaRaPr}, et in resurrectione fient {sicut Ja} {fiunt Ra} *{vere add. MzMuJaRaErPr} felices homines totaliter. Et de hoc dictum est *{ante add. MzJaRa} in nona questione que soluta est in primo libro *{in nona... libro: om. MSS} | This argument is sophistical and more [a problem of] natural [philosophy] than ethical. For I can truly say that "Socrates runs" in the time in which he does not run, for I speak in one time for another time; otherwise I could not contradict you when you say that Socrates does not run, because I do not know to contradict you until you have spoken. I will contradict you, therefore, by saying that Socrates runs. And perhaps Socrates was not running when you spoke and was running when I spoke: "Therefore both speak the truth and thus both of two contradictories are true". I say that this is not so, because in contradicting you I did not speak for the time in which I spoke but for that in which you spoke, and thus we were both speaking for the same time, but in different times. If, therefore, in the time of Socrates' boyhood, I say, "Socrates is happy", I speak the truth, because I do not speak for the time {precise} alone in which I speak, but for the whole time of Socrates' life, in which he is truly happy. But you would ask not of speaking but of being, whether Socrates is happy in the time of his boyhood? I say that he is not -- except partly, because he is a happy boy. Is he therefore happy in the time of his manhood, when he is perfectly virtuous, both {secundum} in soul and in body? I say that he is, according to denomination from the most principal part of human happiness, because he is a happy {vir} adult, and adulthood is a nobler time of life; but he is not a happy {homo} human being, because happiness signifies perfection in every way, in body and in soul and in the {tempus} span naturally befitting human life. Aristotle notes this in Ethics, Book X, when he says: "This will be the complete happiness of man, assuming a complete length of life, for there is nothing imperfect in the things that constitute happiness" [1177 b24]. {quomodo} "What!", you say, "Were not God's martyrs who suffered death in their twentieth or thirtieth year happy men?" It would be said that they were not happy men simply but happy men according to their superior portion, and thus happier than if they had not suffered death for the good and preservation of the superior part, to which the preservation of the inferior part, when {incompossibilia} it is impossible for both to be preserved, has no comparison, as was said before; and in the resurrection they will become truly happy men totally. Something was said about this before. |
| Sed ad hoc quod secundo queritur dicam *{quod... dicam: Secunda /quarta Mz\ questio /conclusio Au\ soluta fuit in primo libro. Sed adhuc /ego add. RaMu\ nunc aliter quodammodo */solvo eam secundum logicam stipulationem add. ErRa\ et dico JaRaPrErAuPbMuMz} ut prius quod in tempore in {om. MzRa} quo quod *{om. MzJaRaPr} dormit {? Ja} verum est dicere quod ipse {om. Pr} est {om. Mz} felix. Sed tu {tunc Mz} queris {queritur Mz} utrum est felix pro *{in MzJaRaPr} illo *{om. MzJaRa} tempore pro {in JaPr} *{om. MzRa} quo dormit. {ego add. MzJaRa} Dico quod sic, quia ibi {? Ra} {in Mz} tempore {? Ra} {ibi add. Ra} accipitur indefinite {infinite Mz}, et est vera pro tempore totali {totalis Mz} vite sue, {et add. Mz} ideo simpliciter est vera {trs. 231 Mz}. Et tu concludes {contradicis Mz}, ergo {igitur Ra} dormiens est felix. {ego add. Mz} Concedo {concedendo Ra}, nec {non Ja} {neque MzRaPr} mirum, quia dormiens est vigilans, sed *{licet MzJaRaPr} non simul sed prius et posterius. Ego enim utor tempore tanquam presente non uno momento vel uno die sed totali tempore vite sue. Sed iterum {om. Pr} tu concludes, ergo {igitur JaRaPr} homo qui non speculatur est homo felix {est... felix: om. Ra}[Ra in margin]. {ego add. Mz} Nego [Ra 29 ra] consequentiam. Et {om. Mz} tu probas quia {om. Mz} {quod RaPr} nullus {nullum Ra} dormiens speculatur. Ego {om. Mz} nego. Sed concedo quod non {om. Mz} simul dormit et speculatur, sed prius et posterius. Sed pone {?pono Ja} quod per totam istam horam {trs. 231 Ra} {trs. Ja} dormiat. An igitur {ergo Mz} in ista hora speculatur? Dico quod non. An igitur {ergo Mz} in ista hora [Pa 211 va] est felix? Dico quod non, {An igitur is ista hora est... non: om. Ja} quia felicitas est secundum integrum tempus {trs. Ra} totius {om. Ja} vite. {sue add. Ja} Immo etiam posito quod in hac *{hora add. MzJaPr} tota *{vel add. MzJaPr} die ipse *{optime add. MzJaRaPr} contemplatur et anima {sic Mz} *{omnino JaRaPr} optime se habet secundum quod est possibile {trs. Mz} hominem naturaliter se bene {om. Mz} {trs. RaPr} habere {trs. Ja} per {om. Ja} unum {uno Ja} diem, {die Ja} ego dico quod ipse *{in add. MzJaRaPr} illo die {om. Ra} non est simpliciter homo {om. Mz} felix, {trs. 231 Ra} sed est felix secundum quid, {scilicet quia est homo felix add. MzMuJaRaErPr} quantum *{secundum quod MzMuMzRaErPr} {quod Ja} spectat ad statum hominis {sed est... hominis: om. Pb} per unam {unum JaRa} diem. Sed an {utrum MzJaRaPr} ipse dormiens per totam istam horam precise sit felix in ista hora modo predicto {scilicet add. Ra} secundum quid, {om. Ja} scilicet {om. Ra} quantum {scilicet quantum: et secundum quid Mz} spectat ad statum hominis per unam horam? {ego add. MzJaRaPr} Dico quod sit, *{sic MzJaPr} quia ipsum dormire hac hora {trs. 3412 Mz} {trs. 231 Ra} est ipsum hac hora optime se habere, scilicet multo melius quam {?quod Ra} si vigilaret. *{et /vel Ra\ specularetur add. MzJaRaPr} Pono enim quod in tempore {ipse add. Ja} priori {ipse add. MzPr} in {om. Ja} tantum vigilaverit {om. Ja} et {om. Ja} {tantum add. Mz} speculatus est quod sensus indiget {indigent Mz} requie naturali, {naturaliter Mz} scilicet somno, pro ista hora, tunc certe melius est sibi nunc dormire quam ultra superexcedere in vigilia et speculatione. Dormit enim non {ut Mz} finaliter ut dormiat, sed ut {ut... ut om. Mz} valeat melius vigilare et potentius speculari. Unde sicut dictum est ante {om. Ja} {trs. 312 MzRaPr} {quod add. Mz} nos *{non MzJaRaAuPbMuPr} dicimus {dico Pr} felicitatem hominis {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] in speculatione consistere non *{om. MzJaAuPmMuPr} tanquam in congregatione {consistere... congregatione: om. Ra} omnium bonorum ad felicitatem requisitorum, sed {om. Ra} tanquam in optima parte illius {istius Ja} congregationis. |
[Answer to the second]The second question was solved in Book I, but now I will solve it in accordance with a logical stipulation in a somewhat different way. I say, as before, that in the time when he sleeps it is true to say that he is happy. But you ask whether he is happy in the time when he sleeps. I say that he is, because there "the time" is taken indefinitely, and it is true for the whole time of his life, therefore simply it is true. You will infer, "Therefore the sleeping man is happy". I concede this, and no wonder, because the sleeping man is awake, though not at the same time but earlier and later. For I use "the time" as present not at one moment or one day but for the whole time of his life. But again you will infer, "Therefore a man who does not {speculari} engage in thinking is a happy man". I deny the inference. You prove it, because no one who is asleep {speculari} engages in thinking. I deny this, but I concede that he sleeps and {speculari} engages in thinking not at the same time, but earlier and later. But suppose he sleeps for the whole of this hour -- does he, therefore, {speculari} engage in thinking in this hour? I say not. Is he, therefore, happy in this hour? I say not, because happiness is according to the whole time of his whole life. Indeed, even supposing that during this whole hour or day he contemplates very well and his soul is altogether in a good state {secundum quod} as far as it is possible for a man to be naturally in a good state for one day, I say that in that day he is a happy man not simply but {secundum quid} subject to a qualification: that is, because he is a happy man {secundum quod spectat ad} so far as relates to the condition of a man through one day. But is a man sleeping for this whole hour happy precisely in that hour in the above manner subject to qualification -- namely, so far as relates to the condition of the man through one hour? I say yes, because for him to sleep this hour is for him to be in the best state for this hour, much better than if he were awake and {speculari} thinking. For I suppose that in an earlier time he was awake so much and {speculari} thought so much that for this hour his mind needed natural rest, that is, sleep; then certainly it is better for him to sleep now than to go to excess in wakefulness and thought, for he sleeps not for the sake of sleeping but to be better able to be awake and engage in thinking more strongly. Thus, as was said before, we do not say that human happiness consists in thought as in the aggregate of all the goods requisite to happiness, but as in the best part of that aggregate. |
| Et noli intelligere quod huiusmodi congregatio bonorum humanorum {trs. MzRa} integrans {integrat Ja} felicitatem vel requisita ad felicitatem sit tota simul; immo est [Mz 163 ra] secundum eius partes successive expansa per totalem vitam ipsius felicis, et est *{una add. MzRa} pro *{pars JaRaMzPr} {in add. Mz} una *{uno MzRa} die vel una hora alia et alia, alia die et alia hora, {alia et alia, alia die et alia hora: et alia ?aut alio Ra} {alia et alia, alia die et alia hora: et alia alio JaPr} *{alia et alia, alia die et alia hora: et alia alio vel alia Mz} ut modo loqui cum amico, nunc {modo MzJaRa} ire ad ecclesiam, modo dormire, modo speculari aut comedere, etc., {om. Ja} et quodlibet eorum quando oportet et ubi et {om. Mz} quomodo {om. Mz} etc. {om. Mz} Ideo si queratur de felici an sit felicior hora qua speculatur quam hora qua dormit, [Ja 329 vb] dicam {dico Ra} quod non, quia neutra hora est felix, sed *{concedo /exedo Ra\ quod add. MzJaRaPr} pars felicitatis que est in hora in {om. MzJaRaPr} qua speculatur est longe {valde MzJaRaPr} melior et honorabilior [Ra 29b] quam pars que est in hora in {om. MzJaRaPr} qua dormit. | Do not imagine that this aggregate of human goods making up happiness, or requisite to happiness, exists simultaneously as a whole; rather it is spread successively in its parts through the whole life of the happy man; one part is in one day or one hour and another in another -- for example now speaking with a friend, now going to church, now sleeping, now {speculari} thinking or eating, etc., and [doing] each of these when and where and how (etc.) it is right. Therefore if it is asked concerning the happy man whether he is happier in the hour in which he {speculari} engages in thinking than in the hour in which he sleeps, I will say no, because he is not a happy man in either hour; but I concede that the part of happiness which is in the hour in which he {speculari} engages in thinking is much better and more honorable than the part that is in the hour in which he sleeps. |
| Et ex predictis {dictis Ra} in *{hac add. MzJaRaPr} huiusmodi questiuncule {questiunculis Pr} solutione perficitur {conficitur add. Ra} materia *{consideratio JaRaPr} de continuatione {continuitate Pr} felicitatis de qua {alibi Ra} {aliquid Ja} in primo libro magis superficialiter dictum fuit {trs. 3412 JaRaPr} . | The things said above in this solution of this question complete the study of the continuity of happiness, about which something was said more superficially in Book I. |
| De tertia questione dicendum *{est add. MzJaRaPr} quod miseria est contraria felicitati. Contrareitas autem attenditur secundum {penes Ra} maximam distantiam, ut habetur decimo Metaphisice, vel saltem {om. Pr} secundum magnam et {om. Ra} notabilem distantiam. Modo dictum est prius quod porcio inferior comparata ad portionem superiorem nullius est nobilitatis {et add. Pr} [est add. Ra margin] in casu incompossibilitatis. Ideo ego dico quod nunquam homo {trs. Ra} dicitur miser propter defectum porcionis inferioris si superior {inferior Mz} bene se habeat, sed solum miseri dicuntur cum {quibus JaRaPr} porcio superior est vitiis infecta. De infelicitate {felicitate RaPr} {infelice Mz} autem dicendum est quod communiter istis nominibus {modis Mz} {trs. Pr} intemperantia, {vituperantur Mz} iniusticia, {iustitia add. Mz} {incontinentia JaRa} illiberalitas nos utimur tanquam contrariis istis {om. Ra} nominibus temperantia, iusticia, *{continentia add. Ra} etc., {om. Ja} et {om. Ra} *{sic add. MzJa} etiam isto nomine infelicitas vel infelix {idem add. Ra} possumus uti {om. Ra} contrarie huic nomini felicitas vel felix {om. Ra} *{possumus... felix: om. JaPr}; et tunc significant *{significunt MzJaRaPr} *{idem add. MzJaRaPr} miser et infelix. Ideo sicut de misero seu miseria dictum est sic dicatur de infelicitate sive infelici *{sicut... infelici: dicam /dicatur RaMzPr\ de infelici /infelicitate Ra\ /infelice MzPr\ sicut dictum est de misero MzJaRaPr}. Si autem infelicitas opponatur {diceretur JaPr} non contrarie sed {solum add. JaRaPr} privative ad felicitatem solum {om. JaRaPr}, tunc ille {iste JaPr} qui natus esset insensatus, scilicet non habens usum rationis {om. Ra} per {secundum totam Ra} vitam, ut {uti Ra} sunt *{om. MzJaRaPr} fatui naturales, diceretur infelix. Ille ergo {igitur JaRaPr} de que {quo MzJaRaPr} querebat questio neque {non Ja} *{nec MzAuRaPr} est miser neque *{nec MzJaRaPr} est {om. JaPr} infelix {felix Ja}, sed est non felix homo, quia {om. Ja} est {om. Ja} et non est {trs. Ja} simpliciter felix homo [infelix... homo: AuErMuMzPbPrRa=Pa]. |
[Answer to the third]About the third question it must be said that misery is the contrary of happiness. Contrariety, however, "results from the maximum difference", as we read in Metaphysics, Book X [1055 a5], or at least a great and notable difference. Now it was said before that when it is {incompossibilia} impossible for both to be preserved, the inferior part is of no nobility in comparison with the superior part. I say, therefore, that a man is never called miserable because of a defect of the inferior part if the superior is in a good state, but people are called miserable only if their superior part is infected with vices. Concerning unhappiness, however, it must be said that we commonly use the words intemperance, injustice, incontinence and illiberality as contraries of the words temperance, justice, continence, etc., and thus also we can use the words unhappiness or the unhappy as contraries of the words happiness or the happy, and then the miserable and the unhappy signify the same. Therefore let it be said of the unhappy man as it has been said of the miserable man. If, however, unhappiness is opposed to happiness not as a contrary but only privatively, then someone who had been born senseless -- that is, without the use of reason throughout his life, for example natural fools -- would be called unhappy. The man of whom the question was asked is therefore not miserable or unhappy but is a "not happy" man, because he is, but is not simply, a happy man. |
| Ad quartam questionem patet ex dictis {predictis RaPr} quod ille nunquam fuit felix homo {om. Ra}[Ra in margin], licet fuerit {fuit JaPr} felix puer, felix iuvenis, et {vel Pr} forte felix vir; et licet etiam {forte add. Ra} fuerit {fuit Ja} felix secundum porcionem superiorem. |
[Answer to the fourth]To the fourth question, it is clear from what has been said that he never was a happy man, though he was a happy boy, a happy youth, and perhaps a happy adult, and although he was also happy according to his superior part. |
| Ad quintam questionem videtur mihi esse {om. JaPr} dicendum quod non debemus loqui de homine felice {felici Pr} secundum imaginationem mathematicam, scilicet quod semper extreme bene se habeat {habeant JaPr}, ita quod non sit possibile excedere {concedere Mz} in melius quam *{quamtumcunque JaRaAuPbMuPr} habet *{om. JaRaAuPbMuPr} modico excessu. Nullus enim fuit talis nisi solus Christus. Immo non potest homo naturaliter esse {om. Pr} {trs. 312 MzJaRa} vivens in hoc mundo quin aliqualiter {aliquando Ra} deviet *{deviaret MzJaRaPr} a recto {puncto Ra} et *{om. MzJaRaAuPbMuPr} perfectissimo *{om. MzJaRaAuPbMuPr} medio virtutis, nisi miraculose regeretur {dirigeretur JaRaPr} et {om. Pr} valde supernaturaliter ipsum haberet *{valde... haberet: per /om. Mz\ valde /magnam Ra\ specialem gratiam supernaturalem AuMuMzJaRaPrEr}. Dicimus ergo {igitur JaRaPr} de {scilicet add. Ja} naturali {illa Mz} moralitate {quod add. Mz} loquentes quod {om. RaPr} cum dicimus *{esse idem add. RaPr} {idem esse ?secundum add. Ja} hominem {esse add. Mz} felicem et *{hominem add. MzJaRaPr} optime se habentem, nos [Ra 30 a] intelligimus per {om. Ja} hominem optime se habere quod {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] non deficiat in corpore vel in membris {membro Ra} notabili defectu, quod {cum Ra} sit moraliter bonus *{virtuosus MzJaRaPr} et {om. Pr} prudens et sapiens et dives et fortunatus, ita scilicet {videlicet Ja} quod in nullo istorum notabiliter deficiat. Et sic concedo quod potest esse felice felicior, et *{sicut JaRaPr} temperato temperantior {temperatior Mz}. Ideo grammatici magni {trs. MzJaPr} {grammatici magni: magni magistri grammatici Ra} dicunt {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] non repugnare superlativo quod iterum comparetur, ut optimus optimior optimissimus. |
[Answer to the fifth]To the fifth question, it seems to me that it must be said that we should not speak of the happy man according to a mathematical image, that is, that he is always at the extreme good state so that he could not become better by however small an improvement, for no one was such except Christ alone. Indeed, it is not possible to be a man living naturally in this world without in some degree departing from the correct mean of virtue, unless one were directed miraculously by a very special supernatural grace. We say, therefore, speaking of natural morality, that when we say that the happy man is the same as the man in the best state, we mean by a man's being in a good state that he is not defective in body or in members by any notable defect, that he is morally virtuous and prudent and wise and rich and fortunate -- that is, so that he is not notably deficient in any of these. And thus I concede that it is possible to be happier than a happy man, just as one can be more temperate than a temperate man. Great grammarians therefore say that a superlative admits of further comparison, for example "best, more best, most best". |
| Si autem iste non sint {sunt JaPr} dictarum questionum solutiones reales, tamen recipiantur {trs. MzJaPrEr} {tamen recipiantur: om. Ra}[recipiantur tamen Ra margin] sicut logice et lusive. [no new para. in RaMzJa] Et apparet quod omnes {eius Ja} rationes *{que add. JaRaPrEr} hinc inde facte {tacte Pr} {inde facte: indefinite Ra} *{fuerunt add. JaRaErPr} non procedunt contra determinata {predeterminata Mz} prius {om. MzJaRaPr} {et sic finitur q. ?quattuor add. Ra} [new para in Mz] [In Ra new question begins with heading 'ut autem pho] Quicunque duorum modorum {modorum add. Ra} loquendi de felicitate prius narratorum in presenti {precedenti MzRaJaAuPbPr} questione {trs. 567412 MzJaRaPr} teneatur. Tamen {si Pr} manifestum est quod humana felicitas consistit {consistat JaRaPr} quodammodo in uno actu, scilicet vel tanquam in illo {uno Ra} {isto Ja} actu qui est felicitas, vel tanquam in illo {isto Ja} qui est principalissimus et finis aliorum in congregatione {cognitionem Pr} {cognitionem eorum Ja} [Er=Pa] que est felicitas. Ideo querendum {inquirendum Pr} est utroque modo dicetur {dicatur MzJaRaPr}, scilicet *{om. MzJaRaPr} quis {quid Ra} sit ille {iste Ja} actus in quo consistit humana felicitas. Nam (ut dicit Aristoteles /philosophus Pr\ in /om. Pr\ primo {om. MzJaRa} huius) "ad vitam cognitio eius {huius Pr} magnum habet incrementum, et quemadmodum sagitatores signum {signa Mz} habentes {om. Ra} [Ra in margin] magis utique adipiscemur quod oportet". Ille enim est finis et signum {et add. Mz} in quem {quam Ra} oportet finaliter {trs. MzJaRa} ordinare {trs. Pr} omnes actus humanos - unde alii et alii secundum quod putant {possunt Mz} {computant Pr} illud signum et finem esse aliud et aliud, aliter et aliter ordinant vitam suam, alii peius, alii melius. Et quia nullus magnorum [Mz 163 rb] philosophorum *{et moralium add. JaRaPr} posuit {possunt Ra} [posuit Ra margin] illum {istum Ja} nisi {om. Ra} actum {actu Mz} {trs. JaPr} voluntatis [Ja 330 ra] aut actum {actu Mz} intellectus, quinta questio secundum sensus predictos formabitur {quinta... formabitur: etc. Pr} | If these are not real solutions to the questions, let them nevertheless be received as dialectical and {lusive} playful. And it seems that all the arguments advanced so far have no force against the things decided earlier, whichever we hold of the two ways of speaking of happiness reported earlier in the preceding [rather, in this] Question. Nevertheless, it is manifest that human happiness consists somehow in one act -- that is, either as in that act which is happiness, or as in that act which is most principal and the end of the others in the aggregate which is happiness. It must therefore be asked, in each way of speaking, What is the act that human happiness consists in? For as Aristotle says in Book I of this work, "Knowledge of it is a great addition to life, and like archers who have a target we will better attain what we ought" [1094 a23], for that is the end and the target to which we must finally order all human acts. Thus as they think the target and end to be one thing or another, different people order their lives differently, some worse, others better. And because none of the great philosophers and moralists asserted that happiness was anything but an act of will or an act of intellect, the fifth question will be formulated according to those {sensus} interpretations. |
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