John Buridan, On Aristotle's Ethics, book 10, q. 5QUINTO queritur utrum humana felicitas sic consistat in actu intellectus vel in actu voluntatis? |
Question 5: Whether human happiness thus consists in an act of intellect or in an act of will?Fifth it is asked whether human happiness thus consists in an act of intellect or in an act of will? |
| Arguitur *{primo add. JaRaPr} quod consistit {consistat JaPr} in actu voluntatis, quia dicunt aliquid *{quidam MzJaRaPr} theologi quod secundum actum voluntatis magis meremur, ideo *{etiam add. JaPr} rationabile est {om. Ra} quod secundum actum voluntatis principalius premiemur {premietur Mz}; premium autem finale est ipsa {om. Ja} felicitas; ergo {igitur Ra} {om. JaPr}, etc. |
[Preliminary arguments]It is argued first that it consists in an act of will. For some theologians say that we merit more {secundum} according to the act of will, therefore it is also reasonable that we should be rewarded more principally {secundum} according to the act of will; the final reward, however, is happiness itself; therefore, etc. |
| Item *{om. JaRaPr}, secundo *{etiam add. JaPr}, dicunt {etiam add. Ra} aliqui theologi quod summa virtutum hominibus *{homini MzRaPr} inexistentium est caritas, que est ipsius voluntatis; ideo actus eius qui {que Pr} est actualis amor dei est actus summus et optimus, et per consequens in {om. Ja} illo {om. Ja} {quo MzRaPr} consistit [Ra 30 b] humana {om. Ja} felicitas. Ideo primum mandatum dominicum est {om. Ra} de illo amore: "Diliges {dilige MzJaRaPr} dominum {om. JaRaPr} deum tuum {om. JaRaPr} *{ex toto corde add. MzJaRaPr}", etc. | Second, some theologians also say that the highest of the virtues existing in man is charity, which is a virtue of the will; therefore its act, which is the actual love of God, is the highest and best act, and consequently human happiness consists in that act. Therefore the first of the Lord's commandments is about that love: "Love the lord your God with your whole heart", etc. |
| Tertio, quia in illo actu {?potentiaque Ja} {potius Pr} consistit humana felicitas secundum quam {quem Ja} {amorem add. Pr} homo maxime {om. Pr} unitur obiecto beatifico; sed hoc est secundum actum voluntatis, qui est amor; nam {non Pr} secundum intellectionem non {om. Mz} intime unitur intelligens cum intellecto; quia ita intelligimus quod {quia Mz} {et Ra} refutamus et fugimus sicut quod acceptamus et prosequimur; sed amor sic unit amans {amoris Ra} amato quod amicus est "alter ipse", ut dicit Aristoteles; et quod ipsi {amicus Ra} *{amici JaPr} condonant {contemnant Mz} {condempnant Au} [MuPb=Pa] se {sese Pr} sibi invicem. | Third, because human happiness consists in the act {secundum} by which man is {maxime} most of all united with the beatific object; but this is {secundum} by the act of will, which is love. For one who understands is not united {secundum} by the act of intellection intimately with what is understood, for we understand what we reject and flee in the same way as we understand what we accept and seek. But love unites one who loves with what is loved in such a way that the friend is another self, as Aristotle says, and so that friends {condonant} devote themselves to one another. |
| Quarto, quia {ita add. Ra} vetula amans deum, licet de deo modicam {modicum Ja} habeat {habens Ja} {trs. 3412 JaRaPr} noticiam, placet deo quia {quod MzJaPr} amat, {ipsum add. JaPr} et *{om. MzJaRaPr} tamen *{om. JaRaPr} {quantum Mz} magnus *{autem add. MzJaRaPr} clericus multas {multam Ja} habens de deo noticias {notitiam Ja} {trs.312 Pr}, si {om. Ja} non amat {diligens Ja} deum, non placet deo; sed illud est nobis {om. Pr} longe {valde MzJaRaPr} {trs. Mz} {nobis add. Pr} melius et felicius {facilius Ra} per quod placemus deo quam per quod ei non placemus {trs.231 Pr}. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} amare deum est *{in add. JaRaPr} nobis *{valde /multo JaPr\ melius et add. JaRaPr} felicius {felixius Ra} {multo add. Mz} quam cognoscere ipsum *{deum MzJaRaPr}. | Fourth, because an old woman who loves God, though she has little knowledge of God, pleases God because she loves him; a great cleric, however, who has much knowledge of God does not please God if he does not love God. But something through which we please God is much better and happier for us than something through which we do not please him. Therefore to love God is much better and happier in us than to know God. |
| Item, in meliori actu {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] consistit *{magis add. MzJaRaPr} {trs. Ra} humana felicitas, cum felicitas sit quid optimum in homine; sed probatur quod actus voluntatis sit melior, quia *{actus add. MzJaRaPr} est ille {iste Ja} {trs. MzJaRaPr} melior quidem *{qui est MzJaRaPr} {actus add. JaPr} determinatus ad bonum *{bonos JaRaPr} quam {om. Ra} ille {om. MzJaRaPr} qui est {om. Mz} indifferens bonis et malis; verus autem amor, scilicet {amor add. Ra} amicitie, non est nisi inter bonos, et nihil amamus nisi *{sub add. MzJaRaPr} ratione boni vel apparentis boni; intelligimus autem bonum sub ratione boni, et malum sub ratione mali; ergo {igitur JaRaPr}, etc. Et Aristoteles, nono {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] Metaphisice, utitur tali *{simili MzJaRaPr} ratione ad probandum quod studiose *{studiosa MzJaRaPr} potentie *{potentia MzJaRaPr} actus sit melior et honorabilior. | Again, human happiness consists more in the better act, since happiness is something best in man. But it is proved that the act of will is better, because an act determined to the good is better than one indifferent to goods and evils. But true love, namely love of friendship, does not exist except between the good, and we do not love anything except under the {ratio} concept of good or apparent good. However, we understand good under the {ratio} concept of good and bad under the concept of bad. Therefore, etc. In Metaphysics, Book IX, Aristotle uses a similar argument to prove that the act done by means of a virtuous power is better and more honorable. |
| Item, ceteris [Pa 212 ra] paribus actus et *{vel JaRaPr} potentia {potentiae Ja} dicunt *{dicuntur MzJaRaPr} meliores et nobiliores que *{qui MzJaPr} sunt melioris obiecti, ut {et prout Ra} {om. Ja} patet secundo *{decimo JaRaPr} huius {om. Pr} et prohemio De Anima; ergo {igitur JaRa} {ita Pr} sequitur *{similiter JaRaPr} si sint {sunt JaPr} duo actus vel due potentie circa idem obiectum {bonum Ra} quod *{tamen MzRaPr} {cum Ja} ille est *{esset MzJaRaPr} melior et nobilior qui fertur in illud obiectum sub ratione melioris; sic {sit Ra} *{autem add. MzJaRa} {enim Pr} est de voluntate; fertur enim voluntas in deum sub ratione boni et optimi, intellectus autem magis sub ratione entis aut {et Ra} veri; ergo {igitur JaRaPr}, etc. | Again, other things being equal, acts or powers are called better and nobler if they are of the better object, as is clear in Book X of this work and in the prologue to De anima; therefore, similarly, if there are two acts or two powers concerning the same object, the better and nobler would, however, be the one which was {fertur} carried to that object under the concept of better. But this is true of the will; for the will is carried to God under the concept of good and best, but the intellect rather under the concept of being and true. Therefore, etc. |
| Item, beatitudo inter ea que beato insunt {om. Mz} {trs. Ra} *{beato insunt: sunt in beato JaPr} est sibi maxime amabilis; sed {multo add. Ra} *{in beato add. MzJaPr} voluntas est {trs. Mz} sibi amabilior quam intellectus *{intellectio RaPr} {ergo etc add. MzJa} *{igitur etc add. RaPr}: probatio *{minor patet /probatur Pr\ MzJaRaPr}, quia unaqueque potentia sicut et unaqueque res plus inclinatur naturaliter {trs. JaRaPr} ad *{suum add. JaRaPr} actum proprium {om. RaPr}[Ra in margin] quam ad actum alterius potentie; ergo {igitur JaRaPr} voluntas cuius {?cuiusque Ja} est {om. Ja} {trs. Pr} amare plus amat in ipso beato actum volendi qui est eius actus {trs. Ra} proprius quam actum intelligendi qui est alterius potentie. | Again, among the things that are in the blessed, beatitude is most of all lovable to him; but in the blessed the will is more lovable to him than an act of intellect; therefore, etc. The minor is clear, because each power, like each thing, is more inclined naturally to its own act than to the act of another power; therefore the will, whose act is to love, loves in the blessed more the act of willing, which is its own act, than the act of understanding, which is the act of another power. |
| Et confirmatur, quia [Ra 31 a] beatitudo {voluntas Ra} *{felicitas JaPr} est quid delectabilissimum, primo huius; actus autem volendi est {in Pr} beato {est add. Pr} delectabilior quam actus intelligendi; ergo {igitur RaPr}, etc. Minor probatur, quia (ut dictum est {in add. Mz} secundo huius, {in add. Ja} questione secunda *{undecima JaPr} {11 AuPbMu}) delectabile dicitur ex eo quod apprehensibile est sub ratione convenientis ipsi appetenti; tale enim adeptum delectat; appetens autem dicitur {intellectus est add. Pr} voluntas et non intellectus {et... intellectus: om. Pr} ea ratione qua dicitur {om. Ra} intellectus, et {igitur JaRaPr} {ergo Mz} convenientissimum {convenientissime Mz} voluntati {om. Pr} [in margin Pr] ea ratione qua dicitur {om. Ja} voluntas {om. Ja} est {et JaPr} delectibilissimum, et hoc est actus volendi qui est proprius actus {trs. Mz} eius ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas; ergo {igitur MzJaRa}, {om. Pr} etc. | This is confirmed, because happiness is something "most {delectabilis} pleasurable", according to Book I of this work [1099 a24]; but the act of willing is more pleasurable to the blessed than the act of understanding; therefore, etc. The minor is proved, because (as was said in Book II of this work, in Question 11 [fol. 31 v]) {delectabile dicitur} something is called pleasurable because it can be apprehended under the concept of {conveniens} befitting the {appetenti} desirer; for when such a thing is {adeptum} obtained it gives pleasure. But the desirer is called will and not intellect {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect; therefore what is most befitting to the will {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will is most pleasurable, and this is the act of willing which is its own act {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will; therefore, etc. |
| Item, cuius [Ja 330 rb] oppositum est peius *{melius JaPr}, illud {hoc MzJaRaPr} est melius *{peius JaPr}, ut habetur in Topicis, et in nono *{octava MzJaRaPr} huius {Ethicis et Ja} de regno et tyrannide; sed odire deum, quod opponitur ad amare, est peius quam ignorare, quod opponitur ad cognoscere; ergo {igitur JaPr}, etc. | Again, that is better of which the opposite is worse, as we read in Topics [157 b18], and in Book VIII of this work [1160 b10], concerning kingship and tyranny; but to hate God, which is the opposite of loving, is worse than to be ignorant of him, which is the opposite of knowing; therefore, etc. |
| Item, delectatio est actus non intellectus sed voluntatis; et {sed Pr} tamen in vicesima octava questione {trs. 312 JaRaPr} septimi libri argutum fuit {est MzJaRaPr} quod delectatio sit {om. Pr} in homine quid optimum {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] {trs. 3412 Ja} et delectabilissimum *{om. JaRaPr} et {om. Pr} finalissimum, scilicet propter quod finaliter sunt operationes {trs.231 Pr} *{et add. JaRa} intellectus et voluntatis; ad quod sequitur quod vere {verus Ra} in ea consistit {consistet MzJa} humana felicitas. | Again, pleasure is an act not of intellect but of will; and yet in Question 28 of Book VII [fol. 162 v] it was argued that in man pleasure is something best and most final, namely that on account of which the activities of both intellect and will finally exist; it follows from this that human happiness truly consists in that. |
| Item, cum libertas sit nobilis conditio, potentia est nobilior que est liberior, [163 va] et per consequens ab ea procedit actus {et Ja} nobilior et felicior; si ergo {igitur JaPr} [Ra in margin] voluntas sit potentia liberior [nobilior Ra margin] intellectu, actus eius erit nobilior {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] et {om. Ra} felicior {om. Ra}; tunc ergo {igitur JaPr} ad arguendum quod voluntas sit *{potentia add. MzRaPr} liberior oportet *{om. MzJaRaPr} capere *{cape MzJaRaPr} rationes que *{ad hoc add. JaRaPr} adducebantur {ducebantur Ra}[adducebantur Ra margin] in principio prime questionis huius *{om. MzJaRaPr} decimi *{om. MzJaRaPr} {ideo add. Mz}. | Again, since freedom is a noble condition, the freer power is the nobler and consequently has a nobler and happier act; if, therefore, the will is a freer power than intellect, its act will be nobler and happier; then to argue that the will is therefore the freer power, take the arguments adduced for this at the beginning of the first Question [of Book X]. |
| Oppositum arguitur ex eadem {eodem Ja} {questione add. Mz} maiore {om. Mz} subsumendo *{sumendo MzRa} quod intellectus est {sit Ja} potentia liberior quam voluntas, et *{quod JaRaPr} potest argui {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] per rationes que adducte fuerunt *{ad hoc add. JaRaPr} in eadem *{om. MzJaRaPr} prima questione, et etiam per decimam conclusionem tertie questionis {trs. Ja} eiusdem *{om. MzJaRaPr} decimi *{om. MzJaRaPr} libri *{om. MzJaRaPr}. | The opposite is argued from the same major, taking [as minor the proposition] that the intellect is a freer power than the will, which can be argued by means of the arguments adduced for this in the first Question, and also by means of the tenth conclusion of Question 3. |
| Item, quia {om. Ja} speculatio est actus intellectus, et *{om. MzJaRaPr} non *{actus add. MzJaRa} voluntatis, et tamen secundum Aristotelem felicitas est quedam speculatio. Dicit enim expresse in {om. RaPr} 10 {Ethicorum JaPr} {huius Mz} et probare {primo Ja} intendit quod perfecta felicitas quedam est speculativa {trs. 321 MzJaRaPr} operatio {comparatio Ra}, et concludit in fine capituli dicens, "Quare utique {virtus Ja} erit felicitas speculatio quedam {om. Ra}". Idem {item JaPr} patet {apparet JaRaPr} per Senecam {idem add. JaPr}, quia ratio {ideo JaPr} est {om. Ja} {actus add. MzJaRaPr} intellectus, *{et add. MzJaRaPr} non voluntas *{voluntatis MzJaRaPr} *{scilicet add. MzRaPr} ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas; et tamen Seneca dicit (ut allegatum est in quarta *{precedenti MzJaRaPr} questione) quod in homine optimum quid est ratio, et quod sola ratio perfecta beatum facit. | Again, because {speculari} thinking is an act of intellect and not an act of will, and yet according to Aristotle happiness is some sort of {speculari} thinking. For he says expressly in Ethics Book X, and {intendere} sets out to prove, that perfect happiness is a certain activity {speculari} of thought, and at the end of the chapter concludes, "Therefore indeed happiness will be some sort {speculari} of thinking" [1178 b32]. The same appears from Seneca, because reason is an act of intellect and not of will, namely {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will; and yet Seneca says (as was quoted in the preceding Question) that the best thing in man is reason and that only perfected reason makes him happy. |
| Deinde posset quis {aliquis RaPr} arguere quod humana felicitas nec {non RaPr} sit actus intellectus nec voluntatis *{intellectus nec voluntatis: voluntatis nec actus intellectus RaJaPr}, sed sit {om. RaPr} ipsamet anima. Quia felicitas ponitur esse optimum bonum humanum, et hoc est {ipsa add. Pr} anima; est enim omni accidente {accidenti Ja} nobilior et melior {trs. 321 JaRa}, ut dicit Commentator, secundo De Anima. | Then one could argue that human happiness is neither an act of will nor an act of intellect but is the soul itself. For happiness is asserted to be the best human good, and this is the soul; for it is nobler and better than any accident, as the Commentator says, De anima, Book II. |
| Potest etiam argui quod consistit {consistat Pr} in opere {operatione JaRaPr} sensus. Quia concessum est [Ra 32 b] in prima questione huius decimi {om. JaPr} quod sensus est perfectior et {om. Ja} intellectu et voluntate, et potentie {potentia JaRa} [PbPrMu=Pa] perfectioris et melioris {trs. 321 Ra} {perfectioris et melioris: nobilior et melior Ja} debet esse operatio perfectior et melior {trs. 321 Ra}, quia felicitati multa nomina attribuimus in superlativo gradu, ut quod est quid optimum, delectabissimum [sic], et perfectissimum *{delectabissimum et perfectissimum: perfectissimum et /om. Mz\ delectabilissimum MzJaPr}, etc. | It can also be argued that it consists in an {operatio} activity of sense. For it was conceded in Question 1 of this Book X [Solution of the doubt, on "total" sense] that sense is more perfect than intellect and will, and the more perfect and better activity should belong to the nobler and better power; for we attribute to happiness many words in the superlative degree, for example that it is something best, most perfect, most desirable, etc. |
| Notandum est {quod add. Ra} de quibusdam talibus nominibus quod {om. Ra} sive ipsa *{sint pure add. MzJaRaPr} sinonima sive aliquo modo differant secundum rationem, tamen reputamus ea omnia pro eodem supponere, et ideo de quocumque subiecto fuerit probatum unum illorum, reputo quodlibet aliorum {illorum Ra} {eorum Pr} tamquam probatum de illo {isto JaPr} eodem subiecto {trs. Ra}, et *{similiter add. MzJaRaPr} de quocumque illorum probatum fuerit {trs. Pr} {est Mz} aliquid predicatum, reputo idem predicatum {reputo... predicatum om. Ra}[reputo predicatum idem Ra margin] tanquam probatum de quolibet illorum *{aliorum MzRaPr}, {probatum... illorum om. Ja} et enumero {numero MzPr} ad presens plura illorum nominum, ut actus optimus, actus nobilissimus, actus perfectissimus, {trs. 3412 JaPr} dignissimus, excellentissimus, honorabilissimus, item et amantissimus (cum magis bonum magis debeat amari ceteris paribus), et finalissimus (quia cum in ordine essentiali finium semper finis sit melior ordinatis ad ipsum, necesse est finem ultimatum et finalissimum aliorum esse optimum {trs. 231 JaRaPr}); item {iterum Ra} etiam liberrimum *{liberrimus MzJaRa} {liberius Pr} (quia quod est liberrimum libertate finalis ordinationis, hoc est simpliciter liberrimum, ut *{secundum JaRaPr} dictum *{dicta JaRaPr} est *{om. JaRaPr} prius); et idem {illud Ra} etiam *{om. JaRaPr} est {om. Mz} optimum et finalissimum, ut etiam {om. Ja} dictum est {fuit JaPr} {trs.231 Mz} prius. |
[Reply to the question]It must be noted concerning some such names that, whether they are purely synonymous or differ {secundum} in concept in some way, yet we regard them as all standing for the same thing, and therefore when one of them has been proved of some subject, I regard each of the others as having been proved of the same subject, and similarly when any predicate has been proved of any of them, I regard that predicate as having been proved of each of the others. And I now list some of these words: best act, most noble act, most perfect act, most worthy, most excellent, most honorable; also, most lovable (because the greater good should be loved more, other things being equal), and most final (because since in the essential order of ends the end is always better than the things ordered to it, the ultimate and most final end must be best of all); also, most free (because that which is most free by the freedom of final ordination is simply freest, according to things said earlier, and the same thing is best and most final, as was also said earlier). |
| Adhuc etiam oportet quod pro eodem supponat {supponet Au} iste terminus {om. AuMz} actus delectabilissimus, quia ex eo delectatio in aliquo bono {om. Pr} apprehenso sub ratione {boni add. Ja} [boni add. Er and deleted] presentis et adepti {operandi Au} dicitur {om. Au} potior et maior ceteris paribus quod {quia Er} illud bonum est apprehensum {sum add. Au} sub ratione melioris et convenientioris {perfectioris Ja} et secundum perfectiorem apprehensionem {determinationem Ja}, prout in septimo libro determinatum *{declaratum MzRa} fuit; constat autem quod [intellectus et add. Ra margin] apprehensio intellectualis et recta est perfectior quam sensualis vel *{et JaMuEr} {om. Au} obliqua et {est Mz} falsa; ergo {igitur JaRaAuMuPrEr} in illo {isto Pr} actu maxime delectamur {maxime delectamur: om. Mu} {quantum add. Au} quem {quam MzPbMuAuEr} [PrRaJa=Pa] {in add. MuAu} apprehensione intellectuali recta et vera apprehendimus [Ja 330 va] sub ratione optimi {om. Au; in margin} *{adepti. Sed constat quod ratione recta et vera non /om. Ja\ apprehendimus /sed... apprehendimus: om. Pb [see below]\ sub ratione optimi /sub... optimi: om. Au margin\ add. MzJaPb; RaAu in margin} [ErMu=Pa] nisi {non Mz} id *{om. MzJaPbMuPr} quod est optimum, nec sub ratione {nisi... ratione om. AuRaPr}[RaAu add in margin] actus nostri optimi *{trs. 312 MzMuAuJa} {actus nostri optimi: optimi actus sed restat quod rationi recta et vera non apprehendimus nostri Pb} nisi {non Ra} id *{om. MzJaRaMuAuPr} quod est optimus {nec... optimi om. Pb} actus {trs. Ja} noster -- aliter apprehensio esset falsa {trs. 2341 Pb}; ergo {igitur JaRaAuPr} inter actus nostros maxime delectamur in optimo vel de optimo, sic per modum optimi apprehenso et tale {talem Au} cuius apprehensionem per modum optimi {apprehenso... optimi om. Ra}[Ra in margin] et convenientissimi sequitur maxima delectatio {delectatione Ja} voco delectabilissimum {trs. Pb}. Idem {item etiam Ja} est ergo {om. Ja} {igitur MuAuRaPr} {trs. MuAuMzRaPr} actus noster optimus et actus noster delectabilissimus. | Further, the term "most pleasurable act" must also stand for the same thing, {quia ex eo} since pleasure in some good apprehended under the concept of present and possessed is said to be stronger and greater, other things being equal, {quod} because this good is apprehended under the concept of better and more fitting and in accordance with a more perfect apprehension, as was explained in Book VII; but it is certain that correct intellectual apprehension is more perfect than sensual and oblique and false; therefore we take pleasure most of all in that act which we apprehend by a correct and true intellectual apprehension under the concept of best and possessed. But it is certain that by a correct and true concept we do not apprehend under the concept of best anything except what is best, nor under the concept of our best act anything except what is our best act -- otherwise the apprehension would be false; among our acts, therefore, we take pleasure most of all in the best (or [the act] about the best [object]) thus apprehended in the best way. And such a thing, upon the apprehension of which in the best and most fitting way the greatest pleasure follows, I call most pleasurable. Our best act, therefore, is the same as our most pleasurable act. |
| Cum ergo {igitur JaRaPr} in principio questionis supposuerimus quod vel in actu intellectus vel {in add. MzJaRaMuPr} actu voluntatis consistit humana felicitas ad sensum ibidem {datum vel Ra} expositum, *{et add. JaRaMuPr} [Au=Pa] omnis talis actus est alicuius {actus MzAu} obiecti quod intelligimus *{intendimus JaMuPr} vel {id est Ja} quod volumus aut quod *{nolumus JaMuPb} amamus vel odimus in quo nobis complacet {placet Ra} vel displicet, etc. [no new para: same sentence continues], et *{om. MzAuEr} ego {om. JaPr} {ponendo add. Er} pono istam conclusionem primam quod {iste add. Ja} actus in quo consistit humana [Ja 33a] felicitas, sive sit actus voluntatis sive intellectus {trs. 321 MzJaRaPr}, est circa deum obiective, quia {quod Ja} oportet illum {istum Pr} [Mz 163 vb] actum inter omnes alios actus intellectus vel {et Ja} voluntatis esse nobiliorem et nobilissimum, ut supponitur; sed constat {stat Ra} quod ceteris paribus actus qui est nobilioris obiecti est nobilior. Longe {valde MzJaRaPr} enim esset {om. Ra} nobilius et excellentius intelligere deum {om. Ra} quam festucam, etiam *{om. MzJaRaPr} si esset eque firma et {vel Ra} evidens utraque {om. Ja} intellectio {om. Ja} et eque specialis -- immo etiam *{et add. MzJaRaPr} quamvis multa differentia {om. Ra} {trs. JaPr} esset in evidentia, ut *{hoc MzJaRaPr} concedunt omnes philosophi; sed {om. Ja} omnium bonorum {obiectorum Ra} [AuPbMzMuJa=Pa}] sive intellectus sive voluntatis, deus *{solus add. JaPr} est obiectum nobilissimum {solus add. Mz}; igitur {obiective add. Pr} ipsius solius *{om. MzRaPr} tanquam *{om. MzRaPr} obiecti {om. Pr} {obiective Ra} est ille {ipse Mz} actus {igitur... actus: obiective dei {om. Pr} ipsius est actus iste Ja} in quo consistit humana felicitas. Et in hoc {quo Ja} concordant omnes theologi {om. Ja} et {om. Ja} morales philosophi {trs. Ja}, et est omnibus indubitabile *{concedentibus add. MzJaRaPr} quod homo debeat secundum rectam rationem magis amare deum quam seipsum, de quo fuit dictum {trs. MzJaRaPr} in nono questione septima {prima Mz} *{in nono questione septima: in septima /prima Au\ questione noni libri JaRaMuPbAuPr} | {cum} Since, therefore, we supposed at the beginning of the Question that human happiness consists either in an act of intellect or an act of will (in the sense there explained), and every such act is of some object, which we aim at or will or nill, love or hate, {in quo nobis complacet vel displicet} toward which we have favour or disfavour, etc., I assert this first conclusion: that the act in which human happiness consists (whether it is an act of will or of intellect) is about God as object, because {inter} in comparison with all our other acts of intellect or will that act must be nobler and most noble, as is supposed; but it is certain that the act which is of a nobler object is nobler, other things being equal. For to understand God would be far nobler and more excellent than to understand a straw, if both intellections were equally firm and evident and equally specific (indeed even if there were much difference in evidence). All philosophers concede this. But of all goods, whether of intellect or will, God alone is the most noble object; therefore the act in which human happiness consists is of God himself as object. All theologians and moral philosophers agree in this, and it is beyond doubt for all who concede that man should according to right reason love God more than himself, about which something was said in Question 7 of Book IX [fol. 199 rb]. |
| Pro secunda *{alia JaRaPr} conclusione {om. Ra} notandum *{est add. JaRaPr} quod de necessitate omnem actum voluntatis {volicionis Pr} precedit actus intelligendi quod *{quo JaRaPr} volibile {velle Ra} {nobilem Ja} seu obiectum voluntatis apparet bonum vel malum. Dico bonum si debeat sequi complacentia {contemplativa Mz}, acceptatio {om. JaPr}, *{amor add. MzJaPr} desiderium aut {vel Ja} delectatio {acceptatio... delectatio: delectatio, acceptatio, amor vel desiderium Ra}. {et add. MzJaPr} Dico malum si debeant sequi actus oppositi. Hec alias dicta sunt et apparent tertio De Anima. Appetibile enim movet *{animam add. Ja} eo quod sic {om. Ja} *{sit MzPr} intellectum vel {aut JaPr} {om. Mz} imaginatum, et movet {eo... movet om. Ra}[Ra in margin] quia bonum [Pa 212 va] vel apparens bonum, ut ibidem {ibi JaRa} dicitur. Et cum iudicatum fuerit obiectum bonum et nobis bonum, sequitur necessario complacentia in illo obiecto {trs. Ra}, ut dictum est in tertio libro. Et si {sicut Ra} illud iudicium *{iudicatum MzJaAuMuPbPr} [Ra=Pa] fuerit verum *{om. JaAuMuPbPr} [MzRa=Pa}] certum et firmum de pura bonitate obiecti sine aliqua {alia JaPr} ratione malitie {om. Ja} consequentis vel concomitantis, tunc sequitur necessario non solum complacentia sed amor et acceptatio, prout hoc *{om. JaRaPr} [Pr=Pa] dictum est {fuit MzRaPr} {om. Ja} in octava questione septimi {primi Mz} libri. | {pro} For the sake of the next conclusion, it must be noted that, of necessity, every act of will is preceded by an act of understanding by which the willable thing or object of will appears as good or bad. I say good if {complacentia} favour, acceptance, love, desire or pleasure should follow; I say bad if the opposite acts should follow. These things were said elsewhere and will be clear [in the Questions] on De anima, Book III. For the appetible moves the soul because it is understood or imagined, and it moves because it is good or seemingly good, as was said there, and when the object has been judged good and good for us, {complacentia} favour toward that object necessarily follows, as was said in Book III. And if it was a certain and firm {iudicatum - ?} judgment of the pure goodness of the object without any character of consequent or concomitant wickedness, then not only {complacentia} favour but love and acceptance necessarily follows, as was said in Question 8 of Book VII [fol. 145 rb]. |
| Ex his autem sequi videtur quod si de pura et {om. Ra} firma {trs. 321 MzJaRaPr} bonitate obiecti fuerit iudicium perfectum {trs. RaPr}, scilicet firmum et certum {trs. 321 Ja}, tunc *{illud add. MuMzAuPbJaRaPr} necessario {necessarium Au} *{iudicium PbMuJaRaPr} sequitur perfectus amor seu *{et MzJaRaAuPr} acceptatio et *{seu AuMzJaRaPr} volitio perfecta, et si tunc {illud Au} *{om. MuRaJaPr} iudicium non fuerit perfectum non sequitur perfecta acceptatio {et volitio... acceptatio: om. Pb}. Istud {idem Mz} declaro (licet videatur quod {om. Mz} debeat {om. Mz} {debet RaPr} per se concedi) primo quod {quia Pr} ad *{om. MzJaRaPr} tale perfectum iudicium sequitur perfecta acceptatio {trs. Ra} et perfectus amor, quia ad aliquid {aliquod MzRa} perfectum *{om. MzJaRaPr} iudicium potest sequi perfecta {perfectus Mz} acceptatio {appetitio Ra} et perfectus amor *{et... amor om. RaJaPr}, et non potest sequi perfectior acceptatio ad iudicium imperfectum quam {om. Ja} ad {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] perfectum [imperfectum changed to perfectum Ra]; ergo {igitur JaRaPr} ad tale perfectum iudicium potest sequi perfecta acceptatio. {et perfectus amor... acceptatio om. Mz} Sed si potest sequi, sequitur, quia {quod Mz} dictum est quod non sequitur per modum libertatis oppositionis, licet *{sed MzJaRaPr} per modum libertatis *{necessitatis MzRaJaPr} naturalis {om. Ra}; tale autem sequitur {tale Ja} tantum quantum *{sequi add. MzJaRaPr} potest (dico *{om. JaPr} nisi deus de potestate absoluta velit auferre vel superaugere); ergo {igitur Mz} {om. Ra} etc. {om. Ra} | From these points, however, it seems to follow that [1] if there {fuerit, fut. perf. indic.} is a perfect judgment -- that is, one that is firm and certain -- of the firm and pure goodness of the object, then perfect love and acceptance or perfect volition {sequitur, pres.} follows that judgment, and [2] if the judgment is not perfect, perfect acceptance does not follow. I explain this (though it seems it should be conceded per se) -- [1] first, that perfect acceptance and perfect love follows such a perfect judgment. For perfect acceptance can follow upon some judgment, and a more perfect acceptance cannot follow upon an imperfect judgment than upon one that is perfect; therefore perfect acceptance can follow upon such a perfect judgment. But if it can follow, it does follow, because it has been said that it does not follow through the mode of freedom of opposition but rather through the mode of natural necessity; but upon such, as much follows as can follow (I say, unless God of his absolute power wills to subtract or add); therefore, etc. |
| Probo etiam {sic add. Mz} {quod add. MzJaRaPr} eodem modo quod {om. MzJaRaPr} si iudicium {illud add. JaRa} non fuerit perfectum, non sequitur amor [Ra 34b] perfectus seu acceptatio perfecta, quia causis {tamquam Ra}[causis Ra margin] necessario requisitis ad esse et productionem alicuius effectus existentibus diminutus *{diminutis MzJaRaPr} non videtur possibile quod proveniat {eveniat Ja} effectus perfectus. Sed iudicium de bonitate obiecti est causa necessaria ad productionem volitionis, ut dictum fuit: immo etiam et necessaria ad esse eius et permanentiam; apparet enim {etiam Pr} quod cessante actuali cognitione, cessat omnis volitio {cognitio Pr} vel complacentia vel delectatio, ut in somno perfecto quod {qui Ra} est sine somnio {sompno Ra} {trs. 231 Ra}. Verum est tamen *{om. MzJaRaPr} quod ex somnio proveniunt {om. Ra} sepe delectiones et {aut JaRaPr} tristitie aut timores *{etc. add. MzJaRaPr} quod *{ideo add. JaPr} est quia somnium est quedam apprehensio. | I prove also that, in the same way, [2] if the judgment was not perfect, perfect love or perfect acceptance does not follow. For if the causes necessary to the being and production of some effect exist in an impaired state, it does not seem possible for a perfect effect to come about. But the judgment concerning the goodness of the object is a cause necessary to the production of a volition, as has been said -- indeed also necessary to its being and permanence; for it seems that when actual cognition ceases, all volition or {complacentia} favour or pleasure ceases, as in perfect sleep without dreaming. (It is true that pleasures and sadnesses or fears, etc., often come from a dream, which is because a dream is some sort of apprehension.) |
| Item, sicut impossibile [im interlinear Mz, in margin Pr] [Mu=Pa] {possibile Ja} est voluntatem ferri in incognitum *{obiectum add. MzJaRaPr}, ita videtur pari ratione quod non possit {posset Ja} plus {om. Ra} ferri in obiectum quam ipsum sit cognitum. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} non posset plus {trs. Ra} amare quam apparet {appareat MzRaJaPr} esse *{mihi MzJaRaPr} amandum. Quod enim est ultra gradum cognitum est tanquam incognitum. Ideo videtur quod non potest voluntas ferri ultra gradum iudicatum. | Also, just as it is impossible for the will to be {ferri} carried to an unknown object, so, by a like argument, it seems that it cannot be carried to an object more than it is known. Therefore it is not possible to love more than it seems to me I should love, for what is {ultra gradum} beyond the level known is, {tanquam} so to speak, unknown. It seems, therefore, that the will cannot be carried beyond the level judged. |
| Neque {nec JaRaPr} contra {om. Ja} hoc {om. Ja} valet obiectio que *{om. MzJaRaPr} fiunt *{om. MzJaRaPr} quia {qua JaPr} sepe {contra filium add. Ra} {de filio add. MzJaPr} dicit pater vel mater {trs.321 Pr} de {om. MzJaRaPr} filio {om. MzJaRaPr}: "Scio quod malus {malum Pr} est et {om. Mz} quod nimis diligo eum, {quoniam add. Mz} *{sed add. JaRa} nec *{non MzJaRa} possum cessare quin diligam eum". {nec... eum: om. Pr} Dico enim quod ibi {om. Pr} est obviatio {obviaus Mz} sensus ad rationem. Illa enim mater vere {om. Ra} concludit quod secundum rationem {trs. 231 JaRaPr} ille {iste JaPr} non est {sit Pr} sic {trs. JaRa} amandus; sensus autem ex naturali inclinatione iudicat quod sit valde amandus, et vincit sensus rationem *{om. MzJaRaPr} et non permittit intellectum sistere in iudicio rationis. Unde sensualiter illa *{om. MzJaRaPr} mater amat illum *{om. JaPr} filium {om. Mz} *{suum add. JaPr} sicut gallina pullum suum, {om. Pr} et plus inquantum intellectus contrahitur {trahitur JaPr} ad sensum, et iudicat tandem cum sensu dimittens rationem de {om. Mz} malicia {dicitur add. Mz} eius. | There is no force against this in the objection that often a father or mother says of their son, "I know he is bad and that I love him too much, but I cannot stop loving him". For I say that here sense is obstructing reason. The mother truly concludes that according to reason he should not be loved thus, but sense judges from natural inclination that he is to be loved very much, and sense conquers and does not permit intellect to stand fast in the judgment of reason. Thus the mother loves her son sensually, just as a cock loves his hen, and loves more the more intellect is drawn to sense, and at last judges with sense, out of its wickedness dismissing reason. |
| Item quia *{om. JaRaPr} si voluntas posset ultra iudicium, hoc sibi proveniret ex sua libertate oppositionis. Sed ex sua *{illa RaPr} libertate [Mz 164 ra] non potest hoc sibi {trs. JaPr} provenire; ergo {igitur JaRaPr}, etc. Maior conceditur, et {om. JaPrPr} {sed MzRa} minor prima facie videtur falsa, quoniam voluntas ex sua libertate potest minus velle vel amare quam sit iudicatum esse bonum -- immo potest non velle. Si ergo {igitur JaRaPr} potest minus {velle add. Ra}, quere non potest maius {? Ra}? Respondetur per rationem priorem quod non est simile de minus et de maius {magis RaPr}, quia minus clauditur in maiori; ideo {igitur Ra} illud minus non est incognitum. Sed maius quantum ad gradum secundum {om. JaPr} {in MzRa} quem *{quo JaRaPr} excedit est incognitum, quia sic non includitur {clauditur MzJaPr} in minori. | Also, if the will had power beyond judgment, this would come to it from its freedom of opposition. But it cannot come to it from that freedom; therefore, etc. The major is conceded. The minor at first seems false, since the will can, {ex} by its freedom, will or love less than has been judged to be good -- indeed, it can not-will. If, therefore, it can will less, why not more? This is answered by means of the earlier argument that less and more are not alike, because the less is included in the greater and therefore that less is not unknown, but the greater, in respect of the level {in} by which it exceeds, is unknown, because thus it is not included in the less. |
| Declaro ergo {igitur JaRaPr} dictam minorem, quia (sicut {om. Ra} dictum est in tertia questione {trs.23451 Pr} tertii libri) libertas non est nobis data finaliter ad malum sed ad directionem. [Pa 212 vb] Videamus {videmus AuMz} [JaPbMu=Pa] igitur {ergo Mz} quod si {sit Ra} iudicium de bonitate obiecti *{non add. MzJaRaPr} sit perfectum {trs. 231 Mz}, tunc {?tamen Ja} libertas de non acceptando {accipiendo JaRa} iudicatum vel de minus acceptando {accipiendo JaRa} expedit nobis vel saltem *{statim MzJaRaPr} ad non acceptandum {accipiendum JaRa} malum vel ad *{tutelam seu /vel RaPr\ add. MzJaRaPr} *{ad add. RaPr} cautelam ne {ut Ja} forte acceptemus [Ra 35 a] malum. Nam si quod iudicio [Ja 331 ra] illo apparet bonum non sit bonum vel *{sed Ra} sit *{om. MzJaRaPr} malum, ut {vel Ra} si sit iudicium erroneum, tunc statim expedit non acceptare, quia acceptaretur malum; si autem illo iudicio apparens bonum sit {om. Pr} bonum, {om. Pr} tamen non est certum quod sit bonum, igitur {ergo Mz} ne acceptetur {non... acceptetur om. Ra}[Ra in margin] malum {om. Ra}, tutela {est add. MzJaRaPr} et cautela {trs. 321 Mz} bona est {om. MzJaRaPr} differre acceptationem donec plenius {plene Ja} ostendatur veritati *{veritas MzJaRaPr} quod sit bonum et non malum. Sed {si Mz} in {im- Mz} plus {om. Ra} acceptando quam sit iudicatum nullo modo *{horum modorum JaRaPr} {modorum Mz} prodesset libertas. Nam si tali {om. MzJaRaPr} iudicio apparens bonum non sit bonum sed malum, nocet *{noceret JaPr} {nocere Mz} acceptare illud, et adhuc plus nocet *{noceret Pr} acceptare plus; si autem quod illo {isto Ja} iudicio apparet bonum sit bonum, tamen non est certum quod sit {om. Pr} bonum {om. Pr} iam *{ideo MzJaRaPr} acceptare ipsum, et plus non est cautela neque tutela, sed periculum et casus. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} non est {trs. 231 MzJaRaPr} nobis {om. Ra} [Ra in margin] ad hoc data {om. Ra} [Ra in margin] libertas {trs. 3412 MzJaRaPr} . | I explain the minor, therefore, because (as was said in Question 3 of Book III [fol. 62, (rather, 42) v]) freedom was not given to us finally for evil but for direction. Let us {videamus} ask, therefore, what if the judgment concerning the goodness of the object is not perfect? Then freedom not to accept what has been judged, or to accept less, is beneficial to us, either immediately for not accepting evil, or as a precaution or a safeguard against accepting what is perhaps evil. For if what by that judgment seems good is not good but evil (as when the judgment is erroneous), then not accepting is immediately beneficial, because evil would be accepted; if, however, what by that judgment seems good is good, but it is not certain that it is good, then, lest we accept evil, it is a precaution and a good safeguard to defer acceptance until the truth is shown more fully that it is good and not evil. But freedom in accepting more than has been judged would be beneficial in none of these ways. For if what seems good in a judgment is not good but evil, to accept it would do harm, and still more harm to accept more; if, however, what by that judgment seems good is good, but it is not certain that it is good, then to accept it, and more, is not a precaution or a safeguard but a danger and a {casus} fault. Freedom was therefore not given to us for this. |
| His ergo {igitur MzJaRa} premissis, ego ponam {pono Pr} secundam conclusionem ad principale propositum quod humana felicitas non consistit {possit Ja} in {om. Ja} intellectuali apprehensione essentie {esse Mz} seu bonitatis divine falsa vel {vero Ra}[vel Ra margin] infirma vel incerta *{ficta JaPrPb} {victa AuMu} [ErMz=Pa], nec in aliquo actu voluntatis sequente talem apprehensionem. Quia omnis talis apprehensio est imperfecta {trs. MzJaRaPr} et defectuosa, et {igitur Pr} etiam {om. Ja} omnis {trs. MzRaPr} actus voluntatis sequens talem naturaliter est *{talem... est om. MzJaRaPr} imperfectus, ut dictum est; sed in nullo *{actu add. MzJaRaPr} imperfecto *{seu defectuose add. MzJaRa} {seu voluptoso add. Pr} consistit *{humana add. MzJaRaPr} felicitas; nichil enim imperfectum est {om. Pr} {in Mz} {trs. Ja} eorum que felicitas, ut habetur decimo huius {Ethicorum MzRaPr} . | Having laid down these points, I will assert a second conclusion relating to the main point: that human happiness does not consist in an intellectual apprehension of the divine essence or goodness that is false or infirm or fictitious, or in any act of will following upon such an apprehension. For every such apprehension is imperfect and defective, and also every following act of will is imperfect, as has been said; but human happiness does not consist in any imperfect or defective act; for "there is nothing imperfect in the things that constitute happiness", as we read in this Book X of the Ethics [1177 b25]. |
| Inde videtur {videbitur Ra} sequi {om. Ja} corollarium {om. Ja} {corollarie Pr}, quod prout fidem distinguimus contra claram seu {et Pr} evidentem noticiam, felicitas humana {om. Ra} non consistit in actu fidei quantum ad illa {illam Ja} de quibus innati sumus habere evidentiam, sive dicamus in hac vita sive {dicamus add. JaRaPr} in patria. Talis enim actus non est perfectus; semper enim de eodem {enim... eodem: ideo actus Ja} de quo possumus habere evidentiam {trs. MzJaRaPr}, perfectius est scire cum evidentia quam credere sine evidentia. Sed tu dices {dicis Ra} {diceres Ja}, nonne ergo {igitur JaRaPr} noticia secundum fidem est noticia perfecta? Ego dico quod non, prout {secundum quod Pr} corollarium {? Ra} est {om. Ra} positum {trs. MzJaPr}. Unde licet diceremus fidem quam {om. Pr} de {sanctissima add. Ra} trinitate habemus manere quantum ad id {circa add. Ja} quod ipsa est cum beatitudine *{cum beatitudine: obiective JaPr} in {om. Pr} patria {om. Pr}, tamen non maneret *{manet JaPr} cum illa connotatione, {quod add. JaRaPr} scilicet {om. MzJaRaPr} {quam add. Mz} non esset de trinitate evidens noticia. | From this a corollary seems to follow, that, {prout} in so far as we distinguish faith from clear or evident knowledge, human happiness does not consist in an act of faith {quantum ad} in respect of things of which we are capable of having evidence, whether we speak of this life or of the fatherland [heaven]. For such an act is not perfect; concerning a thing of which we can have evidence it is always more perfect to know with evidence than to believe without evidence. But you will say, "Is not knowledge according to faith perfect knowledge?" I say not, as the corollary is asserted. Thus, although we would say that the faith we have of the trinity remains, in respect of that which it is objectively, in the fatherland, yet it does not remain with the connotation that there would not be evident knowledge of the trinity. |
| Utrum autem {om. Ra} noticia sit perfecta {trs. 231 MzJaRaPr} quam secundum fidem habemus de trinitate {beata add. Ra} in hac vita, {ego add. MzJaPr} dico quod sic, quantum {quod Ja} spectat ad statum viatoris {maioris Ja}, immo multo perfectior quam evidens {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] et demonstrativa scientia quod triangulus habet tres *{etc. add. MzJaRa}. Sed hoc non {om. Ja} est contra corollarium, quia {om. Pr} dicebatur {om. Pr} "de quibus innati sumus habere evidentiam".[Ra 35 b] | (But is the knowledge we have of the trinity in this life by faith perfect? I say that it is, in so far as it relates to the status of a wayfarer -- indeed, much more perfect than the evident and demonstrative science that a triangle has three, etc. [angles that add up to 180 degrees]. But this is not against the corollary, because it was said, "of which we are capable of having evidence".) |
| Tercia conclusio {questio Ja} ponitur quod humana felicitas secundum modum a principio questionis expositum non consistit {consistat Pr} in delectatione, quia dictum est {om. Ra} quod bonum finalissimum est optimum, et per consequens in eo consistit humana felicitas, et non in {om. Pr} aliio. Sed delectatio inter actus humanos non est bonum finalissimum, quia dictum est in vicesima {om. JaPr} octava questione septimi *{libri add. JaRaPr} quod principali {om. Ra} seu primaria intentione {quod add. Ra} delectatio est pro[p]ter operationem. Ergo {igitur MzJaRa}, etc. | A third conclusion is asserted, that human happiness {secundum modum} in the way explained at the beginning of the Question does not consist in pleasure, because it has been said that the most final good is the best, and consequently human happiness consists in it and not in something else. But pleasure is not the most final good among human acts, because it was said in Question 28 of Book VII [fol. 162 v] that by {principali seu primaria intentione} chief or primary purpose pleasure is for the sake of activity. Therefore, etc. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, istam conclusionem aliqui {trs. Ja} nituntur {trs.3412 Pr} probare seu declarare sic *{probare... sic: sic demonstrare MzJaRaPr}. Quia felicitas humana {trs. MzJaRaPr} [Mz 164 rb] inter omnes actus nostros debet esse nobis {nobilior Ja} delectabilissima; sed {?vera add. Ja} nulla {nostra JaRa} delectatio est nobis delectabilissima {sed... delectabilissima: om. MzPr}; ergo {igitur RaPr}, etc. Maior ponitur ab Aristotele, {etc... Aristotele: om. Pr} et conceditur tanquam principium. Et {om. Pr} minor {om. MzJaRa} [AuMuPr=Pa] probatur, quia {om. Ra} dupliciter dicitur {enim add. Ra} aliquid {trs. JaPr} nobis {om. Ra} delectabile: uno modo obiective, alio modo subiective. Obiective dicitur aliquid *{nobis add. JaPr} {trs. Pr} delectabile quia {quod Ja} nobis unibile seu adipiscibile [Pa 213 ra] et {seu Pr} apprehensibile per modum uniti nobis, seu adepti. Talem enim apprehensionem nostram sequitur necessario, et connectitur ei delectatio. Subiective autem dicitur {dicetur Mz} delectabile illa apprehensio quam sic necessario consequitur et cui *{ei MzJaRa} connectitur delectatio. Alii autem ponunt [Ja 331 rb] tercium modum quam *{quem MzJa} dicunt {Subiective autem dicitur aliquid delectabile illa apprehensio quam sic necessario consequitur et cui connectitur ei delectatio. Alii autem ponunt tercium modum quem dicunt add. Pr} delectabile formaliter, et dicunt hoc {trs. Ja} esse delectionem. Sed istum modum dimittimus *{dimittemus Ja} quia hoc {om. Ja} non est nisi sicut si *{om. MzJaRaPr} diceremus *{dicere MzJaRaPr} quod albedo est alba, {et add. Ja} quod anima est animata, quod motus movetur, et huiusmodi; et tales predicationes non recipimus *{nisi add. MzJaPr} tanquam proprias *{improprias MzJaRaPr}. Revertamur ergo ad duos {?? Ra} priores *{predictos JaPr} modos, et patet {apparet MzJaPr} quod delectabilissimum obiective non est nisi deus. {nullus deus add. Ra} Nam ipsum solum possumus apprehendere recta et vera apprehensione {apprehendere MzRa}, per modum optimi et nobis optimi secundum dicta prius; et ipse potest nobis uniri {trs. Ra} per gratiam et gloriam {trs.321 Pr} ex parte sua {sui Ja} et per eius contemplationem et {per add. Ja} amorem ex parte nostra. Et sic {si Ja} ipse potest apprehendi a nobis sub ratione boni *{om. JaRaPr} et *{om. JaRaPr} optimi *{et /ac Mz\ nobis optimi add. MzJaRaPr}, et sub ratione nobis uniti et adepti {quod add. Ja}, et nichil possumus aliud {trs. MzJa} sic {trs. Pr} 231apprehensione vera apprehendere et solam talem apprehensionem {?? Ja} sequitur maxima {maxime JaPr} delectatio. Ergo {igitur MzJaRaPr} solus deus est {sic add. JaRaPr} obiective {om. Ja} delectabilissimus. Et nulla {enim Ra} nostra {om. Pr} delectatio, immo *{etiam add. MzRaPr} nullus noster actus {trs. MzRaPr}, scilicet nobis inherens, est deus. Ergo {igitur RaPr} nulla nostra {om. Pr} {trs. Mz} delectatio est nobis delectabilissima obiective. Et hec deductio bene demonstrat {nobis add. Ja} primam conclusionem prius positam, scilicet quod in dono *{deo MzJaRaPr} vel circa deum consistit humana felicitas obiective. Sed iterum apparet quod nulla nostra delectatio {om. Mz} est nobis delictabilissima subiective, quia sic delectabilissimum est illa operatio seu apprehensio cui necessario consequitur et connectitur in nobis maxima delectatio, et illa est apprehensio dei, ut dictum est, que non est {om. Pr} delectatio; ergo {igitur MzRaPr}, etc. Cum ergo {igitur RaPr} neutro {nullo Ra} modo *{delectatio add. MzJaRaPr} {trs.312 Pr} sit nobis delectabilissima, [Ra 36 a] sequitur (ut videtur) quod ipsa non est nostra felicitas. | Also, some try to demonstrate this conclusion as follows. Human happiness should be for us the most pleasurable of all our acts; but no pleasure is most pleasurable to us; therefore, etc. The major is asserted by Aristotle and conceded as being a principle. The minor is proved, because something is said to be pleasurable to us in two ways, in one way objectively, in another way subjectively. Objectively something is said to be pleasurable to us because it can be united to or possessed by us and can be apprehended as united to or possessed by us, for pleasure necessarily follows such an apprehension and is connected to it. Subjectively an apprehension is said to be pleasurable if pleasure thus necessarily follows it and is connected to it. (Others, however, assert a third mode which they call formally pleasurable, and they say that this is pleasure. But let us dismiss this mode, because it is like saying that whiteness is white, that the soul [anima] is animated, that movement is moved, and such like, and we do not accept such predications except as improper. Let us therefore revert to the two modes above.) It is clear that what is most pleasurable objectively is nothing but God. For we can apprehend only him by a correct and true apprehension in the mode of best and best for us, according to what was said earlier; and he can be united to us, through grace and glory on his part and through contemplation of him and love on our part. And thus he can be apprehended by us under the concept of best and best for us and under the concept of united with and possessed by us, and we cannot apprehend anything else thus by true apprehension; and the greatest pleasure follows upon such apprehension only. Therefore only God is thus objectively most pleasurable. And no pleasure of ours, indeed also no act of ours (that is, inhering in us), is God. Therefore no pleasure of ours is most pleasurable to us objectively. And this deduction well demonstrates the first conclusion asserted earlier, namely that human happiness consists objectively in God (or [in some act] about God). But again it appears that no pleasure of ours is most pleasurable to us subjectively, because in this way the most pleasurable is the activity or apprehension upon which necessarily follows and to which is necessarily connected the greatest pleasure in us, and that is, as has been said, the apprehension of God, which is not pleasure; therefore, etc. Since, therefore, pleasure is not most pleasurable to us in either way, it follows (it seems) that it is not our happiness. |
| Sed tamen ista ratio {trs. Pr} non est {om. Pr} demonstratio {demonstrat Pr} ad predictam conclusionem, prout {ut Pr} mihi apparet. {quia add. MzJaRaPr} Dicerent enim {om. MzJaRaPr} sustinentes aliam opinionem quod felicitas nostra est nobis delectabilissima obiective non simpliciter (quia *{sed MzJaRaPr} solus deus, ut bene probatum est), sed inter omnes actus nostros. Quia {om. Ja} {quod Pr} ipsa sic est {trs. Mz} optima, et {quod Ja} optimum est delectabilissimum. Modo {om. Ra} non est probatum quod ipsa non sit obiective delectabilissima {obiective add. Ra} inter omnes *{om. MzJaRaPr} actus nostros; ideo sto magis in prima opinione *{om. JaRaPr} seu *{om. JaRaPr} ratione. Verum est quod ex *{hiis add. MzRa} {hic add. Ja} dictis sequitur corollarie quomodo felicitas humana est homini {bonum Ra} felici {trs. Ja} delectabilissima; non enim est {trs. Ja} sibi delectabilissima {sed add. Ja} obiective, sed {sicut Pb} deus {sed deus: om. Ja} [MuMzPr=Pa], sed bene inter actus humanos est sibi delectabilissima obiective {sed deus... obiective: om. Au}, quia beatus non solum intelligit et amat deum {trs. 312 MzJaRa} , sed reflexive potest intelligere et intelligit {intelliget Mz} se intelligere et amare et delectari. Quodcumque ergo {igitur Ra} istorum sic *{sit MzJaRaPr} optimum et felicitas *{hoc add. MzRa} {hic add. Pr} potest {?huius add. Ja} beatus *{om. MzJaRaPr} intelligere vere per modum obiecti *{optimi MzJaRaPr} presentis et habiti et *{om. MzJaRaPr} optimi *{om. MzJaRaPr} inter actus nostros, et talem apprehensionem cuius felicitas *{iam add. MzJaRaPr} est obiectum, consequitur necessario {necessaria Mz} maxima delectatio que posset *{possit MzJaPr} haberi obiective {trs. Ja} de aliquo actu nostro {om. Ra}. Sed etiam cum hoc felicitas est nobis delectabilissima {trs. Mz} subiective, si ponamus {ponimus JaRaPr} quod ipsa sit illa dei nobilissima apprehensio, quoniam est illa {illam Mz} {ista Ja} {trs. MzJaRaPr} cui consequitur necessario et connectitur simpliciter optima {et delectabilissima optima add. Ra} et perfectissima delectatio, ut dictum est. Cum autem dicimus illam apprehensionem esse delectabilissimam subiective, non est forte propria locutio, quia non recipit {respicit Mz} illam denominationem *{delectationem MzJaRaPr} sed anima; dictum enim fuit prius {trs. Ja} quod illa apprehensio non passive sed active se habet {habeat MzJaRaPr} [Mz 164 va] ad actum voluntatis sequentem: sed magis proprie {om. Ra} diceretur quod illa apprehensio esset [Pa 213 rb] delectabilissima connexive et causaliter causalitate activa inter actus nostros. | But that argument is nevertheless not a demonstration of the above conclusion, it seems to me. For those who maintain the other opinion would say that our happiness is most pleasurable to us objectively -- not simply (this is God alone, as was well proved) but among all our acts, because it is in that way best, and the best is the most pleasurable. Now it has not been proved that it is not objectively most pleasurable among our acts; therefore I stand instead on the first argument. What follows from these statements as a corollary is true, about how human happiness is most pleasurable to the happy man: it is not most pleasurable to him objectively (rather, God is), but it is indeed most pleasurable to him objectively among human acts, because the blessed man not only loves and understands God, but he can understand reflexively, and he understands that he understands and loves and takes pleasure. Therefore, whichever of those is the best and happiness, he can understand it truly in the manner of something best and present and possessed among our acts, and upon such an apprehension, of which happiness is already the object, necessarily follows the greatest pleasure that can be had objectively from any of our acts. But also, along with this, happiness is most pleasurable to us subjectively, if we assert that it is the most noble apprehension of God, since it is that upon which necessarily follows, and to which is connected, simply the best and most perfect pleasure, as has been said. However, when we say that that apprehension is most pleasurable subjectively, perhaps this is not a proper way of speaking, because not it but the soul receives that pleasure, for it was said earlier that the apprehension {se habet} is disposed not passively but actively to the consequent act of will; but more properly it would be said that that apprehension would be the most pleasurable among our acts connexively and causally, by active causality. |
| Cum ergo {igitur Mz} {om. Ra} nullus ponat humanam felicitatem consistere in simplici complacentia vel desiderio, prout distinguitur ab actu volendi seu amore acceptatio *{acceptativo MuMzPr} [?acceptative Ra margin] quos *{que MuMzJaErPr}[que Ra in margin] pro eodem reputamus, manifestum est quod non restat nisi videre an felicitas consistit {consistat Pr} in illa perfecta dei apprehensione vel in actu volendi {seu... volendi om. Ra}[Ra in margin] et amandi consequente. Et melius placet michi ponere quod in apprehensione sive intellectione perfecta ipsius dei consistit {consistat RaPr} humana [Ja 331 va] felicitas. Et hec sit quarta conclusio et ultima. {?q Ja} | Since, then, no one asserts that human happiness consists in simple {complacentia} favour or desire, as distinct from the act of willing or acceptive love (which we regard as the same), it is manifest that it remains only to see whether happiness consists in that perfect apprehension of God or in the consequent act of willing and loving. And I prefer to assert that human happiness consists in the apprehension or perfect understanding of God himself. And this is the fourth and last conclusion. |
| Hanc *{conclusionem add. MzJaRaPr} ego teneo *{primo add. MzRa} quia Aristoteles et {om. Ja} Seneca {om. Ja} et alii antiqui {philosophi Ja} morales {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] in manifesto suorum sermonum omnino {omnes Ra} preferunt {precesserunt Ra} aliis actibus humanis rationem {ratione Ra} et speculationem {speculatione Ra}, et etiam omnibus {trs. MzJaRaPr} virtutibus humanis preferunt {om. MzJaRaPr} sapientiam. | I hold this conclusion, first, because Aristotle and Seneca and other ancient moral philosophers {in manifesto suorum sermonum} in the clarity of their words altogether prefer reason and {speculari} thinking to all other human acts, and also wisdom to all human virtues. |
| Secundo etiam persuaderi potest hec {ista MzJaRaPr} conclusio per rationes et auctoritates que in prima questione {trs. Ja} huius {om. Ra} decimi fuerunt adducte de libertate et divino *{dominio JaMzAuMuErRaPr} intellectus et etiam {om. Ja} in tertia questione. | Second, this conclusion can also be made persuasive by means of the arguments and texts quoted in Question 1 of this Book X concerning freedom and lordship of the intellect, and also in Question 3. |
| Et iterum posset *{potest JaPr} illa {ista MzJaRaPr} conclusio confirmari ex hoc {eo Ja} quod {quia Pr} multi theologi tenent quod {et Ra} quorumcumque duorum entium, quorum neutrum est deus [Ra 36 b] nec unum {nec unum add. Ja} de essentia seu de {om. MzJaRa} integritate alterius, deus utrumque potest a {om. Ja} reliquo {a reliquo: unum ab altero Ra} separare et sine reliquo conservare. Ideo dicunt quod deus de eius potentia {trs. Pr} absoluta posset in {om. Ra} anima Nicholai *{Petri JaRaPr} conservare claram {om. Ra} ipsius dei visione *{visionem MSS} auferendo amorem et omnem actum volendi, et econverso posset {potest JaPr} in eadem {ea MzJaRaPr} conservare dei amorem seu volitionem auferendo visionem et omnem actum intelligendi. | And again that conclusion can be confirmed from the fact that many theologians hold that of any two entities neither of which is God and neither of which is of the essence or wholeness of the other, God can separate either from the other and conserve it without the other. They say, therefore, that by his absolute power God could conserve Peter's soul a clear vision of God himself while taking away love and every act of will, and conversely could conserve in it the love of God or the will while taking away vision and every act of understanding. |
| Hec tamen {enim Ja} dicta {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] nec {non Ra} approbo ad *{om. JaPr} presens *{om. JaPr} nec reprobo, quia nec *{non MzJaRaPr} sunt de scientia quam dedit nobis Aristoteles, et excedunt nostram artium facultatem. Secundum quam tamen {om. Pr} (et non supra {sua Ra}) fuit intentio mea {nostra Ra} tractare {om. Ja} de moralibus in hoc libro, et si aliquando ego *{om. MzJaRaPr} transgredior, ego hoc reputo {puto JaPr} {trs. MzRaJaPr} factum *{om. MzRa} *{esse JaPr} incidentaliter *{incidentale JaRaPr}. Verum est tamen quod bene {om. Ra} ad dictam nostram {trs. MzJaRa} facultatem spectat considerare {om. JaRaPr} quid ex aliquibus positis {positis deleted Ja} possumus ultra concludere sive illa posita sint {sive Ra} {sicut Ja} possibilia sive impossibilia, et hoc tam {om. MzJaRaPr} in terminis moralibus {forte add. Ja} quam {et MzJaRaPr} naturalibus. Videamus ergo {igitur Ra} quid {trs. Mz} sequitur {sequeretur Pr} si esset clara visio {trs. MzJaPr} dei sub ratione nobis presentis et intimi et optimi secundum quod est in nostra vera beatitudine et {?scilicet add. Ja} circumscriberetur amor et volito acceptativa, posito tamen quod deus reliqua dimittat se consequi et precedere *{procedere MzJaRaPr} naturaliter sicut {trs. MzJaRaPr} innata sunt *{se MzJa} [Ra in margin] consequi et {sic add. Ja} precedere *{procedere MzJaPr} [Ra in margin]. Manifestum est mihi quod talem [tale Ra in margin] apprehensionem [apprehensione Ra in margin] sequitur {sequeretur Mz} naturaliter {innata... naturaliter: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] et inseparabiliter perfecta delectatio. In hoc enim consistit natura et {delectatio add. Ra} conditio {conditionis Ra} delectationis quod sit inseparabiliter passio propria talis apprehensionis, scilicet obiecti sub ratione boni {et add. Ra} presentis et obtenti. Sed pone econtra quod maneat amor et volitio sine visione, id est sine intellectuali apprehensione, non consequitur delectatio. Tunc arguamus sic. {om. Pr} Ille actus noster est perfectior quem *{qui JaRaPr} solitarie positum {quam add. Ra} modo predicto consequeretur *{consequitur JaRaPr} perfecta delectatio quam ille quem nulla delectatio sequeretur {consequeretur JaPr} {sequitur Ra}. Et ita secundum opinionem illorum theologorum concluderemus *{concludemus JaPr} nostrum propositum. | These statements I do not, however, approve or reject, because they do not belong to the science Aristotle gave us and go beyond our faculty of Arts -- according to which, however, and not beyond it, it was my purpose to treat of morals in this book, and if I sometimes transgress, I regard this as something incidental. It is true, however, that it does indeed belong to this faculty of ours to consider what we can further infer from certain assumptions, whether possible or impossible, and this in terms both moral and natural. Let us see, then, what follows if there were clear vision of God under the concept of present to us and intimate and best, {secundum quod} as in our true blessedness, if love and acceptive volition were set aside -- assuming, however, that God {dimittat} allows the rest to follow and proceed just as they are naturally apt to do. It is clear to me that perfect pleasure would naturally and inseparably follow upon such an apprehension, for the nature and condition of pleasure consists in being the inseparable property of such an apprehension, namely of an object under the concept of good, present, and possessed. But suppose, on the contrary, that love and volition remains without vision, that is, without intellectual apprehension: pleasure does not follow. Then let us argue thus. That act of ours upon which, posited by itself in the way described, perfect pleasure follows is more perfect than one upon which no pleasure would follow. And so, according to the opinion of those theologians, we conclude our point. |
| Iterum {item RaPr}, actus attingens primo et immediate ad {om. Ja} ipsum deum qui est obiectum beatificum est nobilior actu non primo et immediate attingente ad ipsum. Sed actus intelligendi est qui primo et immediate attingit {trs. 312 MzJaRaPr}, et {non add. MzJaRaPr} amor vel volitio non {om. MzJaRaPr} nisi mediante cognitione. Igitur {ergo Ja}, etc. | Again, the act that first and immediately attains God himself, who is the beatific object, is more noble than an act that does not first and immediately attain him. But it is the act of understanding that first and immediately attains, and love or volition only by means of cognition. Therefore, etc. |
| Hoc etiam apparet secundum quosdam theologos qui valde probabiliter ponunt (ut {om. Ra} {et Ja} michi videtur) quod in beatificatione anime in patria deus immediate et tanquam causa totalis agit in anima visionem sue essentie. Dico "immediate" [Pa 213 va] quia non mediante aliqua *{om. MzJaRaPr} alia specie intellectuali {intelligibile Ra} vel alio quecunque *{quocunque JaRaPr} representativo {representatione Ja} ipsius. Dico etiam "tanquam causa totalis" quia ad illam visionem facienda *{faciendam MSS} nichil {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] aliud concurrit [Mz 164 vb] active et determinative nisi deus. Volitio autem {aut Ja} vel {om. Ja} amor non sic {sit MzPb} primo et immediate fit {om. JaPrMuPb} [RaMzEr=Pa] ab ipso deo, sed mediante visione illa, que etiam visio [Ra 38 a] forte concurrit ad productionem amoris, sicut activuma [sic] {activum MzJaRa} secundarium et determinativum. Sed quod {sed quod: et sic Ja} *{sic add. RaPr} est primo et immediate {mediate Ra} a deo {et immediate a deo add. Ja} est {om. Ra} nobilius eo quod non sic. {sit Ra} Nam propinquius {sensus add. Ra} nobilissimo ceteris paribus {om. Ra} debet concedi nobilius sic *{sicut JaRaPr} {om. Mz} enim *{om. MzJaRaPr} Aristoteles ponens ordinem entium in dependentia eorum ab ipso deo poneret intelligentiam primo et immediate dependentem esse omni {cum Ja} alia sequente {consequente MzJaRaPr} nobiliorem {nobilior est Mz}. | This is also apparent according to certain theologians, who very probably (as it seems to me) assert that in the beatification of the soul in the fatherland [heaven] God immediately and as total cause brings about in the soul the vision of his essence: I say "immediately" because not by means of another intelligible species or anything else whatever representing him; I say also "as total cause" because nothing else concurs actively and determinatively to the making of that vision except God. But the volition or love is not thus first and immediately made by God himself, but [is made] by means of that vision, and perhaps in the production of love the vision concurs as a secondary and determinative active [cause]. But what is thus from God first and immediately is more noble than what is not, for what is closer to the most noble should, other things being equal, be conceded to be more noble -- just as Aristotle, when he posits an order of beings in their dependence on God, would assert that the intelligence depending first and immediately is more noble than every other that follows. |
| Et si iste rationes non sint {sunt JaPr} demonstrabiles *{demonstrationes MzJaRaPr}, tamen sunt persuasiones eque fortes sicut ille que {om. Ja} ad partem oppositam solent adduci, quod magis apparebit si videantur solutiones illarum {earum Ra}. | And if these arguments are not demonstrations, they are nevertheless persuasions as strong as those customarily brought forward for the other side, which will appear more clearly if their solutions are looked at. |
| Ad primam igitur {ergo MzJa} rationem *{alterius partis add. MzJaRaPr} adductam in principio {in principio: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] prime questionis, quando dicitur quod intellectus conparatur {operatur Ja} ad voluntatem {volitionem MzJa} sicut subiectus ad dominum, ego nego, sed [Ja 331 vb] potius econverso. Dico {quod add. Ja} enim quod intellectus (ut dicitur primo Politicorum) principatur appetitui principatu regali, non solum appetitui sensitivo sed etiam intellectivo, si non sit ordo perversus {versus Ra}. |
[Reply to preliminary arguments of Question 1]To the first argument for the other side brought forward at the beginning of the first Question, then, when it is said that the intellect is compared to the will as subject to lord, I deny it, but instead [I assert] the converse. For I say that, if the order is not perverted, the intellect (as is said in Politics, Book I) rules the appetite by a royal government, and not only the sensitive appetite but also the intellectual. |
| Et quando dicitur quod {om. Pr} "intellectus deprecatur" {etc add. Pr}, ego dico quod intellectus aliquando necessitat voluntatem sicut dictum fuit, sed non cogit eam neque violentat, quia hoc esset {esse Ja} non {trs. Ja} regaliter sed {magis add. Ra} tyrannice principari. Rex autem et papa non precipiunt subditis suis, saltem bonis, cogendo eos {om. Ja}, sed exhortative et {om. Pr} persuasive {om. Pr} precipiunt bene agere, ostendendo per suas leges et decretales quid {quod Mz} *{que JaRaPr} oporteat agere et {ea add. Ra} a quibus abstinere, et ita intellectus se {om. Ja} habet {om. Ja} ad voluntatem. Et huiusmodi exhortationes ut *{et JaPr} persuasiones regales vocatur {vocat Mz} Aristoteles "deprecationes", cum dicit quod intellectus ad optima deprecatur. Et mirabile est quomodo magni {magis non Au} *{magistri JaRa} [PbMuMzPr=Pa] viri *{om. MzJaRaPbMuErPr} utuntur ista auctoritate ad probandum quod intellectus subiciatur voluntati, cum Aristoteles dicat etiam *{om. MzRaPr} intellectum uti hac deprecatione ad appetitum sensitivum, quem dicit aliquando adversari rationi, cum tamen {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] nullus dicat intellectum esse subiectum appetitui sensitivo nisi in pravis et ordine perverso. Et Christus, verus dominus, usus {?? Mz} fuit ad {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] subditos suos huiusmodi deprecationibus, id est {id est: scilicet JaRaPr} exhortationibus et persuasionibus; et sic etiam faciunt boni prelati ad populum sibi subiectum {subditum JaPr}. Non nego tamen quin sint alie deprecationes inferiorum ad superiores, ut quod dent ipsis {sibi RaPr} de suis bonis {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] temporalibus, aut etiam de spiritualibus, docendo, consulendo, dirigendo; et sic voluntas deprecatur *{deprecaretur MuJaRaPbAuMzPr} intellectui si sciret deprecari. | And when it is said that the intellect "urges", I say that sometimes the intellect necessitates the will, as was said, but does not compel or do violence to it, because this rule would be not royal but tyrannical. The kings and the popes do not command their subjects, at least those who are good, by compelling them; rather, they command them by exhortation and persuasion to act well, showing by their laws and decretals which things ought to be done and which abstained from, and that is the way the intellect {se habet} relates to the will. Aristotle calls such royal exhortations and persuasions "urgings" when he says that the intellect "urges toward the best objects". And since Aristotle says that intellect uses this urging upon the sensitive appetite, which he says is sometimes opposed to reason, it is remarkable how masters [in universities] use this text to prove that intellect is subject to will, since no one says that the intellect is subject to the sensitive appetite except in the depraved and by a perverted order. And Christ, true lord, used such urgings to his subjects, that is exhortations and persuasions; and so also do good prelates to the people subject to them. I do not deny, however, that there are other urgings of inferiors toward superiors to give them some of their temporal goods -- or also of their spiritual goods, by teaching, advising, directing; and in that way the will would urge the intellect, if {sciret} it could urge. |
| Ad aliam, quando dicitur quod intellectus est sicut consiliarius, ego concedo. Sed qui potest dare bonum consilium est in hoc maior {melior Ra} quam ille {om. JaPr} qui {om. Pr} indiget consilio. Illi enim sunt sapientiores [Ra 38 b] qui sciunt {solent Pr} dare melius consilium, et in hoc digniores. Sed tu dicis, "Domini est {esse Ja} statuere finem sibi {trs. JaRaPr}, et a {suis add. Ra} consiliariis {suis add. Mz} sibi subiectis {subditis Pr} petere consilium de ordinatis ad finem statutum". Concedo quod domini est {om. Ja} esse finem vel finem {om. MzJaRaPr} sibi et aliis statuere {finem add. MzRaPr} {finos Ja}, sed intellectus est qui statuit finem nobis {trs. MzRa} {trs. 312 JaPr}, dicens quod ille finis {om. MzJaRaPr} est optime vivere, et per hanc evidentem sententiam voluntas necessario acceptat et vult optimam vitam. Deinde etiam {est Ja} querere et invenire et iudicare que sit illa vita optima est opus ipsius intellectus, quod est statuere finem secundum rationem specialem; et non potest voluntas acceptare tanquam finem et bonum quod {qui Ra} non predecreverit {predecrevit MzRaPr} {?predeterminaverit Ja} intellectus esse finem et bonum. Deinde quando {deinde quando: et Ja} dicitur ultra quod dominus petit consilium a subditis suis, ego dico primo {om. Ja} quod non, sed a sapientioribus se, qui in hoc sunt digniores; si autem consiliarii sint {sunt Ja} in aliquo alio subditi petenti consilium {om. Ra}[Ra in margin], hoc accidit. Videmus enim populares pauperes {om. Ra} et indoctos petere consilium in [Mz 165 ra] palatio regis {in palatio regis: om. Ja} ab advocatis multo excellentioribus eis, {om. Pr} et papa prelati et sacerdotes boni consulunt subditis suis ad salutem anime, et medicus patienti ad salutem corporis; et utinam {?nec Ja} nobis deus {trs. MzPr} consulere dignetur. Postea etiam dico {ultra add. Ra} quod voluntatis non est petere consilium. Petere enim et querere sunt actus ipsius intellectus. Quando {sed Ja} {cum Pr} etiam *{ultra add. MzJaRaPr} dicitur quod dato consilio tunc domini {deum Ra} est eligere, {et add. JaRaPr} ego dico quod adhuc in eligendo {in eligendo: intelligendo Ja} intellectus tenet {bene Ja} principatum {principatur Ja}, quia, stante consilio et deliberatione {delectatione Ra} {aliter deliberatione Ra margin} quod a sit simpliciter melius et eligibilius quam {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] b et {om. Ja} quod sint impossibilia *{incompossibilia JaPr}, eligere b et dimittere a non est in potestate voluntatis, licet possit nihil eligere; et hoc dicit auctoritas que allegabatur. Ex consiliari {consiliariis JaPr} enim iudicantes, desideramus secundum consilium; licet ergo {igitur Ra} consilium non necessitet ad eligere, tamen determinat si eligamus quid eligamus. Desideramus enim, i.e. eligimus et volumus, secundum consilium, si {sed JaPr} eligimus et volumus stante iudicio. | To the next, when it is said that "the intellect is like an adviser", I concede it. But someone who can give good advice is in this respect greater than one who needs advice, for those who know better how to give advice are wiser and in this respect worthier. But you say, "It is for the lord to appoint himself the end and to seek from advisers subject to him advice on matters ordered to the appointed end". I concede that it belongs to the lord to be the end or to appoint the end for himself and others, but it is the intellect which appoints the end for us, when it says that the end is to live in the best way, and {per} from that evident {sententia} judgment the will necessarily accepts and wills the best life. Then also it is the work of the intellect itself to seek and find and judge what the best life is, which is to appoint the end {secundum} according to a specific concept, and the will cannot accept as end and good anything that the intellect has not {predecreverit} predetermined to be the end and good. Then when it is said further that the lord seeks advice from his subjects, I say first that it is not so -- he seeks it from those wiser than himself, who in this respect are worthier; if the advisers are in some other way subject to the one seeking advice, this is accidental, for we see that the common people, the poor and ignorant, seek advice in the king's palace from advocates much superior to themselves, and the pope, prelates and good priests advise their subjects for the salvation of their soul, and a doctor [advises] his patient for the safety of the body. Would that God would deign to advise us! Next I say that also {voluntatis non est} it is not the will's part to seek advice, for seeking and inquiring are acts of the intellect itself. When, also, it is further said that "once the advice is given" then "it is for the lord to choose", I say that {adhuc} even in choosing the intellect {tenet principatum} holds first place, because, while the advice and deliberation stand fast that A is simply better and more worthy of choice than B and that they are {incompossibilia} not simultaneously possible, it is not in the power of our will to choose B and {dimittere} pass over A, though it can choose nothing; and this is what the quoted text says: "Judging from deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation". Therefore, although advice does not make it necessary to choose, nevertheless, if we choose, it determines what we choose. For "we desire", that is choose and will, "in accordance with deliberation", if we choose and will while the judgment stands. |
| Ad aliam, quando dicitur {ad... dicitur: om. Pr} quod secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum {trs. JaRaPr}, ego concedo, quod et secundum voluntatem et secundum intellectum; sed potius et principalius secundum intellectum, ut dictum est *{prius add. MzJaRaPr} in tertia questione. | To the next, when it is said that it is according to will that we are lords of our action, I concede, because [we are lords] both according to will and according to intellect, but more strongly and more principally according to intellect, as was said earlier, in Question 3. |
| Ad aliam, quando dicitur quod voluntas precipit intellectui quod speculetur, ad hoc ego dico primo quod voluntas, si precipit quod speculetur *{speculemur MzJaRaPr} {ad... speculetur: om. Er} , [Ja 332 ra] hoc preceptum est gratia speculationis, et sic iterum speculatio est finalior et melior *{quam illud /istud Pr\ preceptum add. JaRaPr}. Secundo dico quod non est {om. Ra} aliud precipere voluntatis quam velle, et tamen videtur quod velle non est {videtur Ra} precipere loquendo proprie, quia possum {potes Au} velle quod vadas ad eccelesiam et *{quod AuMuMzJaRaErPr} [Pb=Pa] [quod is relative pronoun, antecedent "quod vadas ad eccelsiam"] tamen {om. Au} nichil *{non Ja} {nisi Pr} [AuMzMuRaPb=Pa] tibi {est RaAu} {trs. Au} precipio {precipis Ja} {preceptum Au} {trs. Ja}. Tercio dico quod si sit ibi {trs. Ra} preceptum, tamen intellectus primo {prius Ra} precipit, sine [Ra 39 a] cuius precepto voluntas *{nichil add. MzJaPr} precipere non *{om. MzJaRaPr} potest. Antequam enim voluntas velit quod speculemur, intellectus presentiat *{presententiat MzJaRaPr} quod speculandum est {om. Ra}[Ra in margin], et postea {post JaPr} {prius Ra} voluntas secundum illam {om. Pr} sententiam vult et acceptat. Est ergo illa [om. Ra margin] sententia {vult... sententia: om. Ra}[Ra in margin] primum {prius Ja} preceptum, et volitio quod fiat est secundum preceptum {determinat add. Ra}; et primum preceptum {om. Ra} determinat *{ad add. MzJaRaPr} secundum, sic quod necesse est velle secundum {om. JaPr} illam sententiam, vel nihil velle. Ideo intellectus adhuc habet {potest Ja} in hoc {trs. 3412 JaPr} primum dominium, et omnino *{ideo JaPr} {in hoc add. Pr} magis videtur esse dominus qui {igitur Ra} principalius et liberius {trs. 321 Ra} facit preceptum. Et tamen {om. Ja} si volitio est preceptum, dictum est prius quod intellectus principalius facit illam volitionem quam {?quod Ja} voluntas, ad sensum *{sensus RaJaPr} {sensos Mz} alias declaratum *{declaratos MzJaRaPr}. | To the next, when it is said that the will commands the intellect to {speculari} think, to this I say, first, that if the will commands us to think, this command is for the sake of {speculari} thinking, and thus again {speculari} thinking is more final and better than the command. Second, I say that the will's commanding is nothing else but willing, and yet it seems that willing is not commanding properly speaking, because I can will that you go to church and yet not command you to do so. Third, I say that if there is a command there, nevertheless the intellect commands first, and without its command the will can command nothing. For before the will wills that we {speculari} think, the intellect {presententiat} pre-judges that {speculari} thinking should take place, and afterwards the will wills and accepts in accordance with that judgment. The judgment, therefore, is the first command, and the will that it be done is the second command; and the first command determines to the second, in such a way that one must will in accordance with that judgment or will nothing. Therefore the intellect still has in this the first lordship and therefore seems more to be the lord, since it more principally and more freely gives the command. And yet, if volition is a command, it was said before that the intellect more principally makes that volition than the will, in the senses elsewhere explained. |
| Ad aliam dico quod intellectus non cogitur, neque violentatur, sicut nec voluntas, sed necessitatur ad speculandum et gratia speculationis, ut dicebatur. Nec {neque Ra} voluntas est sufficiens ad sic necessitandum intellectum, aut aliquam aliam potentiarum nostrarum; immo requiritur iudicium previum {primum MzRa}. Sic *{om. MzJaRaPr} igitur {ergo Ja} illi {trs. MzJaRa} duo actus simul et neuter seorsum, scilicet iudicium quod est speculandum { trs.MzJaRa} {est add. Ja} et sequens volitio, necessitatur {necessitat Ja} *{necessitant MzRaPr} intellectum ad speculandum, sed *{et MzJaRaPr} iudicium principalius, secundum dicta in tertia questione. | To the next I say that the intellect is not compelled or violated, just as the will is not, but it is necessitated to {speculari} thinking and for the sake of {speculari} thinking, as was said. Neither is the will sufficient thus to necessitate the intellect or any other of our powers; rather, a previous judgment is required. Therefore those two acts together and neither separately, namely the judgment that one should {speculari} think and the resulting volition, necessitate the intellect to {speculari} think -- and the judgment more principally, according to what was said in Question 3. |
| Alia ratio non arguit nisi {om. MzPr} de libertate oppositionis, de qua ante dictum est {trs. 231 Ra} satis. | The other argument argues only of freedom of opposition, about which enough was said before. |
| Ad {om. Ja} aliam {alia Ja} que ponit quod actus voluntatis est posterior in esse et via generationis, ideoque {ideo MzJaRaPr} finalior et perfectior, dico quod ita arguebatur de delectatione {de delectatione: om. MzRa}[Ra in margin] {et add. Pr} in vicesima {om. Pr} octava questione septimi libri, et ratio {illa add. JaPr} ibi soluta fuit. Ideo solutionem {illam add. JaRaPr} ibi {ibidem JaRaPr} require. | To the next, which asserts that the act of will is posterior in being and by way of generation, therefore more final and more perfect, I say that it was argued thus of pleasure in Book VII, Question 28, and the argument was solved there. So look for the solution there [fol. 164 v]. |
| Ad aliam, dicitur primo quod, licet {om. JaPr} {trs. 231 Ra} non requiratur multa intelligentia ad esse bonum absolute {absoluta Ja} {ab salute Ra}, tamen multa requiruntur ad esse {bonum add. Ra} optimum et optime se habere. Requiritur enim sapientia et {om. Ra} opus sapientie; et hec satis dicta sunt {fuerunt Ra} {trs. 231 MzJaRaPr} in ultima questione sexti libri. Dicitur etiam secundo quod intellectus potius {om. Ra}[Ra in margin] et principalius operatur ad bene agere et {ad add. Ja} esse bonum quam voluntas, ut apparuit {om. Ja}. | To the next it is said, first, that much intelligence is not needed for being good absolutely, yet much is needed for being best and {optime se habere} to being in the best state, because wisdom and the work of wisdom is needed; these things were sufficiently said in the last Question of Book VI [fol. 139 rb]. It is also said, second, that the intellect {operatur ad} contributes more, and more principally, toward acting well and being good than the will does, as has become clear. |
| Ad aliam dictum fuit quod est quidam modus dominationis erroneus [Pa 214 ra] et innaturalis, et est in homine quando pars sensualis usurpat sibi {om. Ra} dominium super partem intellectualem in {ut Ra}[est in add. Ra margin] [Mz 165 rb] depravatis {?? Mz}, et {om. Mz} {sic add. Pr} nichil est ibi {om. Ja} boni {om. Ja} ut sic, sed totum male et {om. Pr} in {om. Pr} intellectu {intellectum Mz} et in voluntate et in {om. Ra} sensu. Propter quod in hoc {propter... hoc: seu Mz} casu nichil pertinet ad propositum de felicitate. Sic enim dominari malum est {trs. MzJaRaPr}, sicut et {subditi add. Ra} subici, et tamen in hoc solo casu est quod malitia pervertit et mentiri facit circa principia practica {trs. MzJaRaPr}. In bono autem dominio et ordinato intellectus habet dominium et principaliter operatur {ordinatur Mz} {et add. Pr} in statuendo finem, et in {om. JaRa} aliis {?malus Ja} sicut dictum {om. Pr} est ante {om. Ja}. De illa autem auctoritate {om. Ja} quod virtus intentionem facit rectam, etc. {et Ja}, dictum fuit clare in decima nona questione sexti libri. | To the next, it was said that there is a certain mode of domination that is erroneous and unnatural, which is in a man when in the depraved the sensual part usurps lordship over the intellectual part; and there is nothing there of good as such, but the whole is bad, in intellect and will and sense. Accordingly, there is in this case nothing to the purpose about happiness, for to dominate thus is bad, just as it is to be subject. Yet it is only in this case that "wickedness perverts us, and causes us to be deceived about practical principles". In a good and ordered lordship, however, the intellect has lordship and {operatur} is principally active in appointing the end and in other matters, as was said earlier. And concerning the text that "virtue makes the intention right", etc., something was said clearly in Question 19 of Book VI [fol. 135 r]. |
| Videtur ergo {igitur Ra} michi quod ultima conclusio *{et add. JaRaPr} nostra principalis {trs. MzJaRaPr} multum confirmatur per hoc quod iste rationes quibus alii {iste Ja} utuntur non sunt difficiles ad solvendum, sed quod econverso *{converse MzJaRaPr} ad partem nostram sunt fortissime rationes, ut {sicut MzRa} apparuit. | It seems to me, therefore, that our last and main conclusion is much confirmed by the fact that these arguments that others use are not difficult to solve but, when brought over to our side, are very strong arguments, as has become clear. |
| Nunc etiam {et Ja} solvende sunt rationes que contra partem nostram adducebantur in principio *{huius add. RaMzPr} questionis. Ad primam potest dici quod potius [Ja 332 rb] et principalius et liberius meremur per actum intellectus quam per actum voluntatis. Non enim solum volitio {trs. Mz} recta [Ra 39b] est actus meritorius, immo etiam {et JaRa} apprehensio agens et dirigens illam volitionem. Et si diceremus quod primus actus {om. Ra} meritorius esset volitio recta, tamen ad illam volitionem secundum predicta intellectus se haberet nobilius, {et JaPr} principalius et liberius, ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, quam voluntas ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Ideo rationabile esset quod etiam anima principalius et potius premiaretur ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus quam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. |
[Reply to preliminary arguments of Question 5]Now we must also solve the arguments adduced against our side at the beginning of this Question. To the first it can be said that we merit rather, and more principally and more freely, through the act of intellect than through the act of will. For correct volition is not the only meritorious act, but also the apprehension that brings about and directs that volition. And if we were to say that the first meritorious act was the correct volition, nevertheless, according to what was said above, the intellect would be related to that volition more nobly and more principally and more freely {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than the will {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. Therefore it would be more reasonable that the soul, also, should be rewarded more principally, and more, {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. |
| Item, anima dicitur diverse potentie, non sic quod ille sint diverse res, sed quia {quod JaPr} sunt ipsius anime diverse operationes. Constat autem quod diverse sunt operationes premium et meritum; ideo non est inconveniens, immo rationabile, quod secundum mereri et premiari anima dicatur diverse potentie. Differt {differunt Ra} enim secundum rationem posse mereri et *{posse add. JaRaPr} premiari, sicut posse velle et posse intelligere. | Also, the soul is said to be different powers, not in such a way that they are different things, but because there are different activities of the soul itself. Now it is certain that reward and merit are different activities; it is therefore not unsuitable, but is indeed reasonable, that {secundum} in relation to meriting and being rewarded the soul should be called different powers. For being able to merit is different in concept from being able to be rewarded, just as being able to will and being able to understand [are different]. |
| Ad aliam {ad aliam: item Ja} puto quod Aristoteles negasset {negavisset Ra} quod caritas esset {sit Ja} {fuisset RaMzPr} virtus excellentior quam sapientia, et forte quod ita Salomon extollit sapientiam sicut aliquis alius *{extollit add. Pr} {extollat add. JaMz} {extollet add. Ra} charitatem [aliter aliquis actus excellit caritatem Ra margin]. Et verum est quod in comparando istas tres {om. Ra} virtutes que *{om. JaRaMzPr} sint *{simul JaRaPr} {sunt Mz} fides, spes, {trs. JaRaPr} {et add. Ra} charitas, dictum {dicendum Ra} est quod maior earum est charitas. *{et add. JaRaMzPr} Neque mirum quia deus est charitas et summus amor, etiam {et Ra} secundum Aristotelem. Sed non {nec Ja} est fides neque spes prout fides connotat *{connotaret JaRaPr} inevidentiam {evidentiam Pr} articuli crediti, et spes carentiam {et spes carentiam: om. Ja} vel {seu RaPr} futuritionem {fruitionem Pr} boni sperati; et sicut multum differunt *{distant JaRaMzPr} fides in hac {om. Pr} vita {via Pr} {in hac vita: om. Ja} et clara visio in patria, sic multum distant {fides... distant om. Ra} [fides in via et clara visio in patria, sic multum distant Ra margin] charitas in via et charitas in patria, et non oportet {om. Pr} {est Ja} credere {om. Ra} [credere add. Ra margin] quod charitas in patria est {sit JaRaMzPr} nobilior quam clara visio. An autem charitas in via sit melior fide relinquo {delinquo Ja} relinquo {om. JaRaMzPr} theologis determinandum. {determinationem RaMz} {om. Ja} Audivi enim {trs. Ra} a Christo "fides tua salvam te {trs. Pr} fecit", sicut audivi "remittuntur {dimissa sunt Ja} ei peccata multa quoniam {quia JaRaPr} dilexit multum". | To the next, I think Aristotle would have denied that charity is a more excellent virtue than wisdom, and I think that perhaps Solomon praises Wisdom in the way another praises charity. And it is true that in comparing these three virtues together, faith hope and charity, it was said that the greatest of them is charity -- and no wonder, because God is charity and the highest love, even according to Aristotle, but he is not faith or hope, so far as faith would connote the inevidence of the articles believed and hope the lack or futurity of the good hoped for. And just as there is a great difference between faith on the journey [i.e. in this life] and clear vision in the fatherland [heaven], so there is a great difference between charity on the way and charity in the fatherland, and we must not believe that charity in the fatherland is nobler than clear vision. But whether charity on the way is better than faith I leave for theologians to determine, for I have heard from Christ, "Your faith has saved you", as I have also heard, "Many sins are forgiven her because she has loved much". |
| Ad aliam dico quod Aristoteles ponit ita {trs. JaRaPr} unionem intellectus cum intellecto sicut voluntatis cum volito. Dicit enim in {om. JaRaMzPr} tertio De Anima quod anima quodammodo est omnia, quod exponit non solum *{om. JaRaMzPr} quantum ad appetitum {omnia Ja} sed quantum ad communem rationem *{communem rationem: cognitionem JaRaMuMzPr}, dicens, "Scientia quidem scibilia quodammodo sensus autem sensibilia, et omnino *{immo Ra} {omnino immo Mu} {ideo Pb} [JaPrAuMz=Pa] unio {unius Ra} illa et condonatio {trs. 312 Ra} non fiunt sine apprehensione; immo prius et principalius per apprehensionem secundum dicta prius. Et quando dicitur quod intellectus ita intelligit refutanda et fugienda sicut acceptanda {appetenda Ja} et prosequenda, ego concedo; sed etiam {om. Ja} ad utrumque sequitur {om. Ra} actus in voluntate [sequitur add. Ra margin], scilicet {om. Ra} volitio et nolitio. Per intellectionem ergo {igitur RaMz} quod hoc est bonum per {et JaRaMzPr} acceptationem {ei add. Ja} sequentem quod *{om. JaRaMzPr} ego unio me illi, vel illud michi [Pa 214 rb] sicut possum. *{et sic per intellectionem quod est malum et /om. Ra\/et add. Ra margin\ refutationem sequentem ego divido me ab illo vel illud /vel illud: om. Ja\ a me sicut possum /sicut possum: om. Ja\ add. JaRaMzPr} | To the next, I say that Aristotle asserted a union of intellect with thing understood in the same way as of will with thing willed. For he says, in De anima Book III, that "the soul is in a way all things" [431 a20], which he explains not in respect of appetite but in respect of cognition, saying, "Knowledge indeed is somehow the knowable, and sensation the sensible" [431 b22]; and indeed that union and {condonatio} presence does not happen without apprehension -- indeed, [it happens] first and more principally through apprehension, according to what was said before. And when it is said that the intellect understands things rejected and avoided in the same way as it does things accepted and sought, I concede it; but also [I say that] upon both there follows an act in the will, namely volition and nolition. Therefore, through the intellection that this is good and the resulting acceptance, I unite myself to it, or it to me, {sicut possum} as much as I can; and in the same way, through the intellection that it is bad and the resulting rejection, I divide myself from it, or it from me, as much as I can. |
| Ad aliam diceret Aristoteles quod vetula {fetula Ja} non plus amat {trs. Ja} deum quam iudicet ipsum *{deum RaMzPr} {eum Ja} esse [Mz 165 va] bonum et {bonum et: om. Ja} amandum. Illa {ista Ja} autem vetula firmius iudicat et {iudicat et: om. Ja} credit deum esse super omnia {trs. 231 JaRaMzPr} amandum et colendum et eius precepta {mandata Ja} *{esse add. RaMzPr} servanda quam ille magnus clericus. Ille enim, quamvis sciat demonstrative deum esse optimum et principium *{om. JaRaMzPr} et *{om. JaRaMzPr} causam omnium, tamen {non add. Ja} sententiat {scit Ja} deum non esse meliorem sibi {trs. JaRaMzPr} quam voluptatem *{voluptates JaRaMzPr} vel pecunias vel honores, nec iudicat esse melius {trs. JaRaMzPr} servare precepta divina quam voluptuose vivere aut quam tyrannice dominari: immo iudicat oppositum, quod {om. Pr} patet {om. Pr} [Ra 41] quia eligit et facit oppositum, quod non sit *{est JaRaMzPr} sine previo iudicio. Et si dicat sepe {se Ja} quod melius [Ja 332 va] est {om. Ra} precepta divina {trs. Ja} servare, apparet quod hoc dicit ore solum {trs. Ra} et mentitur. {corde add. Ra} Sic ergo {igitur Ra} patet {apparet Ra} quod illa vetula non habet de deo nisi veras apprehensiones et firmissimas, licet non evidentes. Ille autem clericus multas habet de deo falsas estimationes, licet habeat demonstrative aliquas et multas veras. {trs. Ra} Et plures verarum quas habet, {vetula add. Pr} habet {om. Ra} infirmiores {firmiores Ja} etiam, licet eas demonstrative habeat. Hoc enim {om. Ra} non est impossibile, ut habetur septimo Ethicorum. Quidam {quod Pr} enim {om. Ra} credunt nichil minus quibus opinantur quam alii quibus sciunt. Et Commentator in prologo suo in principio {in principio: om. Ja} tertii Physicorum firmior *{fortior JaRaMzPr} fides vulgi est {trs. 4123 JaRa} {trs. 3124 Mz} fide philosophorum. Et dictum est quod *{dictum est quod: tamen JaRaMzPr} ceteris paribus {in add. Ja} iudicio firmiori de bonitate et amabilitate obiecti sequitur amor intensior. Dicamus ergo {igitur Ra} quod ista {illa RaMzPr} vetula est {om. JaPr} magis {trs. RaMz} {esset add. JaPr} grata deo non solum quia magis {om. Ra} [magis add. Ra margin] amat deum, sed etiam quia firmius iudicat deum esse amandum, et super omnia alia {esse add. Ja} *{amandum et add. JaRaMzPr} mandata eius {om. JaPr} *{super /mandata add. Mz\ omnia alia esse servanda add. JaRaMzPr} observanda *{om. JaRaMzPr} . | To the next, Aristotle would say that the old woman does not love God more than she judges that God is good and to be loved. The old woman, however, judges and believes that God should be loved and worshipped above all things and that his commands should be observed more firmly than that great cleric does, for although he knows demonstratively that God is the best and the cause of all things, he nevertheless judges that God is not better for him than pleasures, money or honors and does not judge that it is better to observe the divine commands than to live voluptuously or dominate tyrannically -- indeed, he judges the opposite, which is clear because he chooses and does the opposite, which does not happen without a previous judgment. If he often says that it is better to observe the divine commands, it is clear that he says this only with his mouth and is lying. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the old woman has of God only true and very firm apprehensions, though not evident, but the cleric has of God many false opinions, though he holds others demonstratively and many true opinions; and many of the true ones he has, he has also rather weakly, though he has them demonstratively. (For this is not impossible, as we read in Ethics Book VII. For some give no less belief to their opinions than others give to things they know, and the Commentator in his prologue to Physics, Book III [says], "The faith of the vulgar is stronger than the faith of philosophers".) Nevertheless, other things being equal, more intense love follows upon a firmer judgment of the goodness and lovableness of the object. Let us say, therefore, that the old woman is more pleasing to God not only because she loves God more but also because she judges more firmly that God should be loved and loved above all other things and that his commands should be observed above all others. |
| Aliquis forte diceret {dicit Pr} michi, "Tu proposueras loqui secundum philosophos, quia *{et JaRaMzPr} non loqueris nisi theologice. Philosophi enim *{pure add. JaRaMzPr} naturaliter procedentes non posuerunt {proposuerunt Ra} mandata divina". Et ego dico quod primo *{immo JaRaMzPr} *{posuerunt add. JaRaPr} omnes {om. Ra} {proposuerunt add. Mz} *{enim add. JaMz} philosophi magni morales qui neque fuerunt iudei {fidei Ja} {trs. JaRaMzPr} neque christiani dixerunt intellectum humanum esse deum {om. Ra} [deum add. Ra margin] vel quoddam divinum. Unde *{ut JaRaMzPr} Catho {qui dicit add. Ja} : "Si deus est animus nobis", {om. JaRaMz} etc. {ut carmina dicunt, hic est /tibi Zn\ precipue sicut /sit Zn\ pura mente colendus add. Pb}, et Seneca, epistola {om. Ja} "Facis {gratis Ra} rem optimam", "Prope est ad {a Ra} te deus, *{intellectus /totum add. Pb\ est add. JaRaPrPb} {iustus est add. MzEr} {meus est add. Au} tecum {totus Au} est, {tecum est: om. Pb} intus est". *{intus est: om. JaMzAuPb} Et quis {qui Mz} sit {om. Ja} ille deus dicit {in add. JaPr} epistola "Agnosco"; dicit enim de animo {om. JaPr} recto, bono et magno: "Quid {quam Ja} {quem Pr} aliud {tu add. JaRaMzPr} voces hunc quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem". Et {in add. JaPr} epistola "Claranum": "Ratio autem nichil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini {divina JaPr} spiritus {semper JaPr} immersa". *{mersa JaRaMzZnAuPr} Et Aristoteles in hoc decimo: {in hoc decimo: 10 Ethicorum JaRaPr} "Talis autem utique erit {om. JaPr} melior {et add. JaPr} vita quam {qua est Pr} secundum hominem; non enim {non secundum add. Ra} secundum {?sed Ra} quod homo est sic vivit, {meruit Ja} sed secundum quod in eo divinum aliquod *{aliquid JaMzPr} existit". {etc. add. Mz} Et non dicunt {dicant Ra} hec {hoc RaPr} quia credant {credat Ja} intellectum humanum proprie loquendo esse deum, {trs. Ja} sed quia est {om. Ra} ultra omnia corporalia deo similis et propinquus, et potens sua operatione ad {suam Ja} essentiam divinam {om. Ra} attingere. Et secundum hoc isti {illi JaRaMzPr} philosophi omnem sententiam intellectus humani perfecti et non seducti de agendis vocant preceptum divinum, et vitam secundum intellectum sic se {om. Ra} habentem *{vitam add. JaRaMz} divinam, {om. Pr} ut patet in hoc decimo. {in hoc decimo: 10 Ethicorum JaRaPr} | Perhaps someone would say to me, "You have purposed to speak according to the philosophers, but you only speak theologically: philosophers arguing purely naturally do not posit divine commands". And I say that indeed they did. For all great moral philosophers who were neither Jews nor Christians said that the human intellect is God or something divine. Thus Cato: "If God is our mind", etc. [Disticha, I.1]. And Seneca, in his letter "Facis rem optimam" {vol. 1, p. 272} [XLI.1]: "God is close to you, he is intellect, he is with you" [following Buridan's text]. And who that God is he says in his letter "Agnosco" {vol. 1, p. 228} [XXXI.11]; for he says of the mind that is right, good and great, "What else would you call this than God staying as a guest in the human body?" And in the letter "Claranum" {vol. 2, p. 8} [LXVI.12]: "But reason is nothing else than a part of the divine spirit immersed in the human body". And Aristotle, in Ethics Book X: "But such will be a better life than one according to humanity; for man does not live thus according as he is man, but as something divine exists in him" [1177 b27]. They say these things not because they believe that the human intellect is God properly speaking, but because it is, beyond all bodily things, similar and close to God and able by its activity to attain the divine essence. Accordingly, every judgment about what should be done that is made by a human intellect perfect and not seduced those philosophers call a divine command, and life in accordance with intellect in such a state they call a divine life, as is clear in Ethics Book X. |
| Ad aliam dicendum *{est add. JaRaMzPrEr} [From this point Er read, not Pr] quod voluntas non est magis determinata ad bonum quam intellectus. Sicut enim intellectus intelligit uno actu bonum sub ratione boni, et alio {alii Ra} actu {om. JaRaMzEr} malum sub ratione mali, ita {et add. JaMz} voluntas circa bonum sub ratione boni {sub... boni: om. Er} habet unum actum, scilicet complacentiam vel amorem seu volitionem, et circa malum sub ratione mali *{sub ratione mali: om. JaRaMzEr} habet alium actum, {trs. RaMz} scilicet displicentiam, {vel add. JaRaMzEr} odium seu nolitionem; {volitionem Ja} et sicut {si AuRaMzEr} [Ja=Pa] intellectus de malo potest iudicare quod sit bonum, ita et {etiam Er} voluntas consequenter potest illud acceptare tanquam [Ja 332 vb] bonum; immo omnino necesse est intellectum prius determinari ad iudicandum quod a sit bonum et [Ra 41 b] amandum *{quam voluntas possit /posse Ja\ se /om. Er\ determinare ad amandum add. JaRaMzEr} ipsum, nec {nichil Mz} potest esse actus voluntatis [Pa 214 va] perfectus *{et rectus add. JaRaEr} {et rationis add. Mz} nisi *{prius add. RaMzEr} naturaliter precedat *{sit JaMzEr} {om. Ra} actus intelligendi. *{rectus /rationis Ja\ et perfectus add. JaRaEr} | To the next it must be said that will is not more determined to good than intellect is. For just as the intellect understands good under the concept of good by one act, and evil under the concept of evil by another act, so also the will has concerning good under the concept of good a single act, namely {complacentia} favour or love or volition, and concerning evil it has another act, namely {displicentia} disfavour or hatred or nolition; and just as the intellect can judge of evil that it is good, so also the will can consequently accept it as good -- indeed, it is quite necessary that the intellect be determined to judge that something is good and should be loved before the will can determine itself to love it, and there cannot be a perfect and correct act of will unless by natural priority there is a correct and perfect act of understanding. |
| Ad aliam dico quod sicut [Mz 165 vb] in nostra beatitudine voluntas fertur in deum {in deum: inde Mz} sub ratione optimi, ita etiam et {om. JaRaMz} intellectus, et prius. {et prius: proprius Ja} Et {om. Ra} si dicas quod etiam intellectus fertur in deum {sub... deum: om. Er} secundum rationem universaliorem, ego dico quod tu arguis excellentiam et nobilitatem intellectus. Potentia enim anime superior in plura potest quam inferior, ut intellectus quam sensus {communis add. Er}, et sensus communis quam sensus exterior. | To the next, I say that just as in our beatitude the will is {ferre} carried to God under the concept of best, this is also true of the intellect, and earlier. And if you say that the intellect is also carried to God according to a more universal concept, I say that you are arguing the excellence and nobility of the intellect. For a superior power of the soul {in plura potest} has power in more things than the inferior, for example intellect than sense and common sense than an exterior sense. |
| Ad alias duas dicendum est {om. Er} quod quicquid est conveniens voluntati {eque add. Er} est conveniens intellectui, et eque huic sicut illi, quia idem est {om. Mz} ille et illa. Et si reduplicationes proficerent {profitentur Ra} ad concludendum unam partem questionis, tantum *{tamen JaRaMzEr} proficerent {profitentur Ra} {?proficientur Ja} pro parte nostra, quia voluntas non fertur nisi in iudicatum. Quod ergo {igitur Ra} intellectus {intentio Mz} iudicat convenientius, hoc voluntas magis vult, magis amat, et magis in eo delectatur; sed intellectus {intentio Mz} habet iudicare ceteris paribus {om. Ja} actum {actuum Er} suum *{proprium add. JaRaMzEr} convenientiorem quam actum alienum; ideo, {igitur Mz} etc. | To the next two it should be said that whatever is suitable to will is suitable to intellect, and is equally suitable to one as to the other, because the one and the other are the same. And if reduplications helped to prove either side of the question they would help our side, because the will is carried only to what has been judged. Therefore, whatever the intellect judges more suitably, that the will more wills, more loves and more delights in; but other things being equal, it is for the intellect to judge its own act more suitably than another's act; therefore, etc. |
| Ad aliam dicitur quod illa {ista Ja} comparatio {comparatio Er} habet locum {bonum Ra} in eodem modo oppositis, et tu non sic arguis. Quia odire et amare sunt contraria, cognoscere autem {om. JaRaEr} et ignorare non sunt nisi privative opposita. Unde ego concedam {concedo Ra} quod {om. Er} si iudicare deum esse {esset Er} optimum et semper {similiter Er} {super JaRa} {omnia add. Ra} amandum sit melius quam amare deum, tunc etiam iudicare deum esse {esset JaEr} pessimum et {om. Ja} semper {similiter Er} {super JaMz} odiendum {odire deum Mz} esset {esse Ra} peius, si esset possibile, quam odire deum. | To the next, it is said that this comparison has place in things that are opposites in the same way, and you do not argue thus; for to hate and to love are opposites, but to know and not know are only privative opposites. Thus I will concede that if to judge that God is best and always to be loved is better than to love God, then also to judge that God is worst and always to be hated would be worse, if it were possible, than to hate God. |
| Alia ratio remittit {remittatur Er} *{remittitur Pb} ad vicesimam octavam questionem septimi libri; {trs. Ja} ideo ibidem {om. JaRaMz} videatur. {ibi add. JaRaMz} | The next argument is remitted to Question 28 of Book VII, so let it be seen there [fol. 164 v] . |
| Et totum quod sequitur *{solutum add. JaRaMzEr} est usque ad illam {istam Er} rationem que {om. Ja} arguit {om. Ja} quod ipsa anima {trs. Mz} sit {est Ja} {trs.231 Er} felicitas, quia ipsa {om. JaRaMzEr} est {om. Ra} optima {optimum JaRaMzEr} bonorum humanorum. {trs. Ja} Et ego dico quod non sic dicimus felicitatem esse {trs. Ja} optimum humanum bonum, {trs. JaRaMz} sed inter ea que non sunt de substantia humana. Substantia enim humana est felicitabilis, non felicitas. | And everything that follows has been solved as far as the argument to the effect that the soul itself is happiness because it is the best of human goods: I say that we do not call happiness the best human good in that way, but [we call it the best human good] among those not part of the human substance. For the human substance is capable of happiness; it is not happiness. |
| Ad illam *{aliam JaRaMzEr} rationem {om. Ja} que arguit de sensu et eius *{om. JaRaMzEr} operatione, *{sensus add. JaRaMzEr} dicendum est quod, licet in bona ordinatione congregatum {aggregatum Ja} ex domino et servo sit perfectius et melius domino seorsum sumpto (saltem extensive, licet non [Pa 214 vb] forte {trs. Ja} intensive), tamen non est nobilior operatio {operatione Ra} in qua dominus indiget participare *{cum add. JaRaMzAuEr} [Pb=Pa] servo quam illa que est propria domino; immo operationes communes {om. Ra} [communes add. Ra margin] domino et servo ordinantur finaliter ad illam que est propria domino, tanquam ad nobiliorem et excellentiorem. Congregatum autem ex anima et corpore *{est add. JaRaMzEr} congregatum {congregatio Ja} ex domino et servo. Ergo {igitur RaEr} operationes proprie domino, scilicet anime, cuiusmodi sunt actus intelligendi et volendi, sunt nobiliores quam operationes coniunctis, *{coniuncti JaEr} scilicet sensus vel appetitus sensitivi. {sensitivus Ra} Hec de questione etc. {hec de questione etc.: om. JaRaMz} | To the next argument, which argues from sense and the activity of sense, it must be said that though in a good ordering the aggregate of master and slave is more perfect and better than the master taken by himself (at least extensively, though perhaps not intensively), nevertheless an activity in which the master needs to take part with the slave is not nobler than that which is proper to the master -- indeed the activities common to master and slave are ordered finally to that which is proper to the master as to what is nobler and more excellent. However, the aggregate of soul and body is an aggregate of master and slave. Therefore the activities proper to the master, namely to the soul, such as the acts of understanding and willing, are nobler than the activities of the combination [of body and soul], namely activities of sense or sensitive appetite. |
| {sequitur questio 6a finaliter add. Ra} *{queritur sexto /trs. Ra\ in quo actu intellectus consistit humana felicitas an in simplici vel in complexo, et si in simplici tunc in quo simplici et sic de complexo; et an in actu directo vel reflexo add. RaMzEr} {Explicunt longe questiones Byridani super libros ethicorum finite in vigilia ?privilegiorum Marie anno domini ?? add. Ja} | It is asked, sixthly, in what act of intellect does human happiness consist -- in a simple or in a complex act, and if in a simple then in which simple, and similarly of the complex, and whether in a direct or reflex act... [the work breaks off here]. |
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