John Buridan, On Aristotle's Ethics, book 10, q. 3{Sequitur alia questio que est secunda in ordine: Utrum scilicet istum actum anima add. Ja} {Sequitur consequenter quia philosophus hic dicit primo quod Ra} QUAMVIS autem *{nunc AuMuJaPbErPr} {? Ra} in tertio libro plane dictum sit quod voluntas libere se habet ad actum volendi, et libere producit eum {om. Ra} etiam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas, et quod liberius producit actum illum {istum Pr} {om. Er} {trs. RaPr} {om. Ja} volendi quam intellectus *{aliquem add. JaRaMuAuPbMzErPr} actum intelligendi (loquendo de libertate oppositionis), tamen non {om. Ra} est *{adhuc add. JaRaPr} ex hoc determinatum an intellectus *{etiam add. JaRaMuAuPbErPr} ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus libere producat {illum RaEr} *{istum JaPr} actum volendi etiam libertate oppositionis, nec *{et sic MuRaPbJaErPr} [AuMz=Pa] etiam an intellectus [om. Ra, in margin, after liberius] liberius dicatur producere {produci Pr} illum {istum JaPr} actum volendi ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus quam voluntas ea ratione qua dicitur [in margin Ra] voluntas? Et ideo {?non Ra} oportet de hoc {trs.231 Er} modo {trs. 312 JaRaErPr} querere *{facere JaRaErPr} questionem [in margin Ja]. |
Question 3: Whether the soul produces the act of willing more freely qua intellect than qua will?Although it was {nunc} already plainly said in Book III that the will is {se habere} free as regards the act of willing and freely produces it, {etiam} even {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, and that it produces the act of willing more freely than the intellect produces some act of understanding (speaking of freedom of opposition), nevertheless it is not yet determined by this whether the intellect {etiam} also {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect freely produces that act of willing also by freedom of opposition, nor, also, whether the intellect may be said to produce the act of willing more freely {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than the will {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. We must therefore now frame a question about this. |
| Sit {sed Ra} {fiat Er} ergo {igitur JaRaPrEr} tertia questio solum de productione actus volendi {voluntatis Ra}, an {om. Ra} scilicet illum {istum JaErPr} actum anima producat liberius ea ratione qua {ipsa add. RaPr} dicitur intellectus quam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas? | Let the third question, then, be only about the production of the act of willing, namely: Whether the soul produces that act more freely {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will? |
| Et *{om. JaRaErPr} arguitur {dicitur Er} primo quod questio nulla sit, quia anima {om. Ra} non dicitur intellectus in ordine ad actum volendi, ergo {igitur JaRaPr} in productione {?introductione Ja} actus volendi nulla debet attribui libertas anime ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, sed solum ea {om. Ra} ratione {om. Ra} qua dicitur voluntas. |
[Preliminary arguments]It is argued first that the question is a nullity, because the soul is not called intellect in relation to the act of willing, therefore in the production of an act of will no freedom should be attributed to the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, but only {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. |
| Oppositum arguitur, quia anima producit *{volitionem add. AuPbJaRaPr} [Mz=Pa] ea ratione qua est {om. Pr} informata {trs. JaRa} apprehensione intellectuali obiecti sub ratione boni vel mali; sed hoc convenit {contingit JaPr} ei *{sibi JaRaPr} ea ratione qua dicitur [Ja 326 va] intellectus *{non ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Igitur /ergo JaPa\ producere volitionem convenit anime ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus add. AuMzPbMuJaRaPr}. | The opposite is argued, because the soul produces a volition {ea ratione qua informata est} qua informed by an intellectual apprehension of the object {sub ratione} under the concept of good or bad; but this befits it {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, not {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. Therefore to produce a volition befits the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect. |
| Sed etiam {om. Pr} arguitur {arguo JaRaMuAuPb} [Pr=Pa] quod voluntas {anima Ja} [MuAuPbMzRa=Pa] non {om. AuJa} [MzMuPb=Pa] producit volitionem ea {om. Ra} ratione {om. Ra} qua {que Ra} dicitur voluntas quia dicitur voluntas {om. Pb} non {trs. 312 RaAuMuMzPbPr} {om. Ja} nisi {om. Ja} ea ratione qua vult recipiendo in se volitionem, prout hoc *{hec JaRa} dicebamus esse notum {non tamen Ra} ex quid nominis, scilicet *{sed JaRaPr} ut sic non dicitur {in add. Ra} se habere ad volitionem nisi passive, et *{tamen add. JaRaPr} non dicitur producere volitionem ea ratione qua recipit eam et passive se habet; ergo {igitur JaRaPr} non producit volitionem ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Oppositum tamen huius {trs. Ra} est dictum {trs. JaPr} et presuppositum *{suppositum JaRa} in alia *{precedenti AuMuJaRaPr} [Mz=Pa] questione. | But I also argue that the will does not produce a volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, because it is called will only {ea ratione qua vult} qua willing by receiving the volition into itself, as we said that these things were known from {quid nominis} the verbal definition [see Question 1, Solution of the doubt]. But as such it is not said to be {se habere} disposed toward volition except passively; but is not said to produce a volition {ea ratione qua recepit} qua receiving it and being {se habere} disposed passively. Therefore it does not produce a volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. But the opposite of this was said and supposed in the previous Question. |
| Ista questio supponit {presupponit Pr} unum et querit aliud. Supponit enim quod anima producit actum volendi tam {quam Ja} {om. MuPb} ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus {magis add. Pb} quam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Et iam {ideo Ja} {om. MzEr} de hoc supposito argutum est {trs. Pb} {om. Er}. Nunc ex {pro Mz} utraque parte ex que {ex que: quia Ra} *{quo AuPbMzJaPrEr} {qua Mu} patet *{apparet AuPbMzMuJaPr} quod illud suppositum est dubium. Postea, viso quod sic, queritur utrum anima se habet {habeat JaRa} liberius {trs. 312 Ja} ad illum actum volendi ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus quam ea ratione {om. Ra} qua dicitur voluntas, vel etiam {dicitur add. Ra} utrum liberius dicatur producere actum illum {istum JaPr} {trs. Ja} ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus {voluntas Ja} quam {om. Ja} {vel etiam dicatur producere add. Ja} ea ratione quam *{qua JaRaPr} dicitur voluntas {intellectus Ja} *{vel econtrario add. RaPr}. Et ego {om. JaRaPr} totam istam questionem volo intelligere de libertate oppositionis. |
[Reply to the question]This question supposes one thing and queries another. It supposes that the soul produces the act of willing both {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect and {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. Argument has already been made about this supposition; now it is argued from both sides, since it appears that the supposition is doubtful. Afterwards, when we have seen that it is true, we ask whether the soul is {se habere} disposed more freely toward the act of willing {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, or, also, whether it is said to produce that act more freely {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, or vice versa. And I wish this whole question to be understood of freedom of opposition. |
| Quantum ergo {igitur JaRaPr} ad suppositionem *{suppositum JaRaPr} oportet videre quomodo anima producit actum volendi. Supponimus [Ra 16 b] enim ex dictis prius quod producit eum. Sed ad videndum quomodo oportet notare et {videre et add. Ra} supponere quod non producit illum {istum JaPr} nisi cum est informata cognitione rei volibilis sub ratione boni vel apparentis boni, quia omnes concedunt quod appetitus animalis prout distinguimus eum {ipsum JaPr} contra appetitum naturalem [animalem Ra, naturalem in margin] non fertur in incognitum. Etiam *{et JaRaPr} oportet {illa add. Mu} ulterius *{ultra JaRaAuPbMuPr} quod illa cognitio {om. Ra} sit intellectiva, non solum sensitiva, quia {sicut add. Ra} *{sic add. JaAuMuMzPr} {si add. Pb} distinguimus inter voluntatem et appetitum sensitivum secundum rationem, et inter actum volendi et actum sensualiter [spiritualiter Ra, aliter sensualiter in margin + sit] appetendi, quia *{scilicet quod JaAuMuPbMzPr} actus appetendi [quia actus appetendi Ra omits, but in margin scilicet actus appetendi] secundum quod sequitur iudicium {sensuale dicitur actus sensualiter appetendi et potentia isto actu appetens ut sic dicitur voluntas; actus appetendi secundum quod sequitur iudicium sensuale add. Ja} [two anticipations of later part of sentence] intellectuale {naturale Mz} dicitur actus volendi, et {om. Ra} potentia {vita Pb} {om. Ra} illo {illa Mu} {isto Ja} actu appetens {?appetitivo Ja} {appetitus Pb} ut sic {ut sic: om. Mu} dicitur voluntas: actus autem appetendi {appetitus Pb} secundum quod sequitur iudicium sensuale dicitur actus sensualiter {sensibilior Mu} appetendi, et potentia illo {illa Mu} {isto Ja} actu appetens ut {non Ra} sic {ut sic: om. Ja} dicitur appetitus sensitivus. | {quantum ad} As to what has been supposed, then, we must see how the soul produces an act of willing. We suppose from what was said before that it does produce it. But to see how it does, we must notice and suppose that it produces it only when it is informed by {cognitio} knowledge of a willable thing {sub ratione} under the concept of good or apparent good, because everyone concedes that animal appetite, in so far as we distinguish it from natural appetite, is not {ferre in} carried to the unknown. Further, this knowledge must be intellectual, not merely sensitive, because this is the way we distinguish conceptually between the will and the [power of] sensitive {appetitum} desire and between an act of willing and an act of sensual {appetendi} desiring: namely, that an act of {appetendi} desiring in so far as it follows intellectual judgment is called an act of willing and the power {appetens} desiring this act is, as such, called will, and an act of {appetendi} desiring in so far as it follows sensual judgment is called an act of {appetendi} desiring sensually and the power {appetens} desiring by this act is, as such, called sensitive {appetitus} desire. |
| Hoc ergo {igitur JaRaPr} supposito, videndum est utrum illa intellectualis apprehensio {apprehendens Ra} illius {ipsius JaRaPr} volibilis aliquid operetur vel active vel passive in productione ipsius *{om. JaRaPr} volitionis. Et de hoc ego pono {? add. Ja} conclusiones faciliter *{faciles JaPb}. | Supposing this, then, we must see whether the intellectual apprehension of that willable thing {aliquid operetur} contributes anything, either actively or passively, in the production of a volition. Concerning this I assert easy conclusions. |
| Prima est {hoc add. Ja} quod illa intellectualis apprehensio {trs. Ra} operatur ad illam {istam JaPr} volitionem vel active vel passive. Quia cum {istum Mu} {Why "cum": how is this clause a premise?} supponamus animam {om. JaRaPrMu} [Ra in margin] agere illam {istam JaMuPr} volitionem {animam add. JaMuPr} et etiam recipere, {vel active... recipere: om. Pb} tamen {eum Pr} *{eam Er} illa apprehensio est dispositio anime sine qua non potest anima agere vel recipere illam {istam Ja} volitionem {trs.3412 Ra}, et sic necessario requisita et non potest dici quomodo {sic add. JaPr} sit necessario requisita nisi tanquam dispositio vel {seu JaRaPr} instrumentum agentis {patientis JaPr} ad agendum {patiendum JaPr} vel {seu etiam Ja} tanquam dispositio seu instrumentum {trs. 321 Ja} patientis {agentis JaPr} ad patiendum {agendum JaPr}. Non enim est {trs. Ra} dispositio requisita in anima {trs. 231 Ra} propter esse anime, quia anima potest esse sine illa; ergo {igitur RaPr} vel {nec Pr} propter pati vel {nec Pr} propter agere. Sed dispositio necessaria agentis ad {om. Ja} agendum {om. Ja} se habet active {trs. Pr} ad productionem effectus licet non principaliter sed active instrumentaliter seu dispositive. Et ita etiam se {si JaRaAuPb} habet {est JaRaAuPb} dispositio necessaria ad patiendum, scilicet *{tunc se habet JaRaAuPb} passive, dispositive, licet non principaliter. Ergo {igitur Ra}, etc. {Et ita... etc: om. Pr} | The first is that the intellectual apprehension {operetur ad} contributes to the volition either actively or passively. For since we suppose that the soul {agere} brings about the volition and also receives it, the apprehension is a disposition of the soul without which the soul cannot bring about or receive the volition, and thus it is necessarily required; and no one can say how it is thus necessarily required except as a disposition or instrument of the agent for acting or as a disposition or instrument of the patient for being acted on. (It is not a disposition required in the soul for the sake of the soul's being, because the soul can exist without it; therefore it must be either for the sake of being acted on or for the sake of acting.) But a necessary disposition of the agent for acting is related actively to the production of the effect, though it is active not principally but instrumentally or dispositively. And thus also, if it is a disposition necessary for being acted on, then it is related passively, dispositively, though not principally. Therefore, etc. |
| Secunda conclusio {est add. Ra} quod {om. Ra} possibile {impossibile Pr} est animam agere volitionem alicuius obiecti illo obiecto nihil agente. Ex quo sequitur quod obiectum volitum est non {trs. JaRaPr} principale activum volitionis. Conclusio patet quia pono *{pone JaRaPr} quod nullum vinum sit *{est JaRaPr} ita quod deus annihilet *{annihilavit RaPr} {annihilabit Ja} omnia vina, tunc *{tamen JaRaPr} possibile est quod ego nunc sitiens incipiam *{incipio JaRaPr}, nunc *{om. JaRaPr} velle vinum, et ita nunc agitur in me volitio vini: et tamen vinum [Ja 326 vb] nunc {trs. JaRaPr} in *{om. JaRaPr} me *{om. JaRaPr} nihil agit (quia {nihil agit quia: om. Pr} nihil est *{et cum */quod Au\ /quod add. Ra\ nihil est nihil agit add. JaRaPrAuMz}, quia agens agit secundum quod {est add. Pr} in actu). Conceditur tamen quod vinum egit {agit Ra} {trs. Ja} speciem suam in anima que reservata est in fantasia vel in memoria, aut ubi volueris in corpore vel in anima, ex qua {quo Ra} [Ra 17 a] sequitur {consequitur Ra} postea intentio *{intellectio JaRa} [Pa 208 va] et volitio obiecti {trs. 312 Ra}, et sub hac intentione (que est bene remota a propria locutione) dicimus obiecta intellecta vel volita agere {in add. Ra} intellectum et voluntatem intellectiones et volitiones. | A second conclusion is that it is possible for the soul to bring about a volition of some object with the object {agente} doing nothing. It follows from this that the willed object is not a principal active [cause] of volition. The conclusion is clear, for suppose no wine exists, so that God has annihilated all wine: nevertheless, if I am now thirsty, I can begin to wish for wine, and thus a volition of wine is brought about in me now; and yet wine {agere} does nothing now, because it is nothing, and what is nothing does nothing, because an agent acts according as it is in act. (It is conceded, however, that the wine has brought about its likeness {species} in the soul, a likeness {reservata} stored in the imagination or memory or wherever you like in the body or in the soul, from which intellection and volition of the object afterwards {sequitur} result; and under this {intentio} interpretation, which is quite remote from proper speech, we say that understood or willed objects bring about intellections and volitions in intellect and will.) |
| Tertia conclusio est quod illa {ista JaPr} apprehensio intellectualis operatur active ad {vel Ja} productionem volitionis. Hoc {quod Ra} probatur, quia determinatum est {om. Ja} in tertio De Anima quod appetibile movet appetitum ad appetendum, et primitus movet {movit Ra} intellectum ad intelligendum, et est illud appetibile ut dicit Aristoteles bonum vel apparens bonum. Quod enim primitus movet *{moveat JaRaPr} intellectum ad intelligendum apparet quia dicit Aristoteles quod movet appetitum eo quod sic [eo quod fit Ra in margin] intellectum {in intellectu Pr} vel imaginatum, et tamen, ut patet *{apparet JaRaPr} per precedentem conclusionem, illud appetibile non tunc agit secundum se sed solum secundum hanc intentionem, quia species [Ra in margin] reservata in sensu quam egit agit ad eius intentionem *{intellectionem JaPr}, et illa intellectio {intellectus Ra} consequitur *{consequenter JaRaPr} ad eius volitionem: et hoc est quod probare volumus {trs. JaRaPr}. Et hoc {om. Ja} confirmatur, quia dicit Aristoteles quod appetibile movet appetitum ad appetendum "eo quod sic intellectum vel imaginatum". Hoc *{autem add. JaRaPr} non esset nisi intellectio vel imaginatio operaretur ad hoc active {om. Ja}; movere enim est agere. | A third conclusion is that the intellectual apprehension contributes actively to the production of a volition. This is proved, because it has been determined in De Anima, Book III, that the desirable moves the appetite to desire, and first of all it moves the intellect to understand [433 a18-20], and this desirable thing is, as Aristotle says, "the good or apparent good" [433 a28]. It is clear that it first of all moves the intellect to understanding, because Aristotle says that it "moves" the appetite "because it is thus understood or imagined" [433 b12], and yet, as is clear from the last conclusion, the desirable thing does not then act {secundum se} in itself but only {secundum hanc intentionem} in this concept; for the {species} likeness {egit} it brought about {reservata} stored in the sense {agit ad} acts toward an intellection of it, and that intellection subsequently [acts] toward a volition of it, which is what we wish to prove. This is confirmed, because Aristotle says that "the desirable thing... moves" the appetite to desire "because it is thus understood or imagined"; but this would not be so unless an intellection or an imagining {operaretur ad} contributed to this actively, for to move is to act. |
| Quarta conclusio est quod illa apprehensio intellectualis non operatur ad illam {istam JaPr} volitionem passive. Quod sic declaratur, quia intellectio illa {ista JaPr} {trs. RaPr} nec {non Ra} est principale activum volitionis nec *{principale add. JaRaPr} passivum, quia voluntas (prout omnes concedunt) est principale passivum et receptivum volitionis, et voluntas non est illa apprehensio, sed *{est add. JaRaPr} ipsa anima. Et similiter ipsa anima {om. Ra} est magis principale activum volitionis quam illa {ipsa JaPr} intentio *{intellectio JaRaPr}. Aliter oporteret *{oportet JaRa} dicere quod illa intentio *{intellectio JaRaPr} se haberet nobilius et liberius in producendo illam {istam JaPr} volitionem quam anima, quod est absurdum. | A fourth conclusion is that the intellectual apprehension does not {operatur ad} contribute to the volition passively. This is explained as follows. The intellection is not a {principale activum volitionis} principal active [cause] of volition, nor a principal passive [cause], because the will, as all concede, is the principal passive and receptive [cause] of the volition, and the will is not that apprehension but is the soul itself. Similarly the soul itself is more the principal active [cause] of volition than the intellection; otherwise one must say that the intellection {se haberet} would be disposed more nobly and more freely in producing the volition than the soul, which is absurd. |
| Item {iterum Ra} {om. Pr}, quia imaginandum est quod {quia Ja} sicut anima nutritiva [Ra in margin] agit nutritionem [Ra in margin] per calorem naturalem, sic anima illam *{om. JaRaPr} volitionem per illam {istam Ja} intensionem *{intellectionem JaRa}. Calor autem ille {iste JaPr} non est principale nutriens {?movens Ra}, sed anima, et calor est dispositio necessaria anime ad agendum nutritionem. Ita ergo {igitur JaRaPr} intelligere debemus quod intentio *{intellectio JaRa} non est principale agens volitionem sed anima, et intentio *{intellectio JaRa} est illa {trs. Ra} dispositio {om. Pr} necessaria {volicio add. Pr} anime {om. Ra} ad agendum volitionem. Hoc supposito *{premisso JaRaPr}, conclusio posita {proposita Ra} declaratur sic {trs. JaRaPr}. Si {illa add. Ra} *{ista add. JaPr} apprehensio intellectualis operaretur *{operatur RaJaPr} passive ad volitionem ita *{scilicet add. JaRaPr} quod esset dispositio anime ad recipiendum volitionem, sequeretur *{sequitur JaRaPr} quod omnino {omne Ja} idem et *{om. JaRaPr} secundum idem et {om. Ra} respectu eiusdem esset agens et passum, quod Aristoteles negat in multis locis. Unde quinto {om. Pr} {?conclusio Ra} et {om. Pr} nono Metaphysice {et quinto add. Pr} {trs. 312 Ra} {trs. 3421 Ja} describitur potentia [Ra 17 b] activa quod *{ipsa add. JaRaPr} est principium motus {movendi Ra} et *{vel JaRaPr} mutationis in alterum *{altero JaRaPr} aut inquantum alterum, et potentia passiva ab altero aut inquantum alterum {et... alterum om. Ra} et hanc {hac Pr} veritatem specificare est speculative philosophie. *{sed add. JaRaPr} Consequentia patet, quia tam active quam passive ad eandem volitionem se haberet anima eadem existens, et secundum illam {istam JaPr} apprehensionem eandem existentem. | Again, because it must be {imaginandum} supposed that just as the nutritive soul brings about nutrition by means of natural heat, so the soul brings about volition by means of the intellection. But not the heat but the soul is the principal nutrient [cause], and the heat is a disposition the soul needs to bring about nutrition. So, therefore, we should understand that not the intellection but the soul is the principal agent in bringing about volition, and the intellection is a disposition the soul needs to bring about volition. Supposing this, the conclusion asserted is explained as follows. If the intellectual apprehension contributes passively to volition, that is, so that it was a disposition of the soul for receiving the volition, it follows that something altogether the same and {secundum} in accordance with the same and {respectu} in respect of the same would be both agent and patient, which Aristotle denies in many places. Thus in Metaphysics, Books V and IX, an active power is described as being the {principium} principle of motion or change in another (or in so far as it is other), and passive power [as being the principle of change] by another (or in so far as it is another); it belongs to speculative philosophy to specify this truth. But the inference is clear, because the soul, remaining the same, {se haberet} would be disposed both actively and passively to the same volition and in accordance with an apprehension remaining the same. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, quia entis in potentia est pati *{ut sic add. JaRaAuPbMuPr} et entis in actu est agere videtur rationabile. quia anima humana que secundum se est in {om. Ja} pura {om. Ra} [aliter pura potentia Ra in margin] potentia ad omnes dispositiones incorporeas possibiles homini inesse, et sicut tabula in qua nihil {in qua nihil: om. JaRaPr}, etc., sit secundum {per Ra} seipsam et non per aliam dispositionem actualem *{actuantem eam JaRaAuMuPr} passiva et receptiva omnium predictarum dispositionum incorporearum {intellectualem Pb}, et quod {om. Pb} {per JaPrMu} [RaErMzAu=Pa; retain quod] ipsa ut {om. Mz} *{per hoc quod JaRaErPrAuPbMu} est actuata aliquibus dispositionibus sit innata agere alias dispositiones consequentes. Ergo {ideo Ra} {igitur JaPr} videtur mihi {trs. JaPr} quod anima per intellectionem qua est informata {trs. JaRaPr} agit volitionem, et per suam naturam precise {agit eam add. Ja} recipit eam {et per... recipit: om. Ra} {et per suam naturam precipue recipit eam add. Ra in margin}. | Again, it seems reasonable because it pertains to a being in potency, as such, {pati} to be acted on, and it pertains to a being in act to act. Because the human soul, which in itself is in pure potency toward all incorporeal dispositions that can exist in man and is like a tablet upon which nothing is written, is, in itself (and not by means of another disposition {actuantem} actuating it) passive and receptive of all these incorporeal dispositions, and {quod} because it is itself, by being {actuata} actuated by certain dispositions, {innata} capable of {agere} bringing about other resulting dispositions, therefore it seems to me that the soul brings about a volition by means of the intellection by which it is informed and receives it through its nature {precise} alone. |
| Tunc sequitur quinta conclusio: quod anima agit volitionem [et... volitionem Ra margin] {per hoc et add. Pb} ea ratione qua {om. Ra} dicitur intellectus, quia agit volitionem {ea... volitionem: om. Er} per hoc {hec Ra} et *{quod JaPrMu} {ac Ra} ea ratione qua informatur *{informata est JaRaPr} intellectione illa {ista JaPr} {ita Mu}, ut [Pa 208 vb] [Ja 327 ra] dictum est; sed ea ratione qua informata est intellectione dicitur intellectus. Ergo {igitur JaRa}, etc. | Then a fifth conclusion follows: that the soul brings about volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, because it brings about volition {per hoc quod [=quia] ea ratione qua informatus est} through this [i.e. through intellect], because [it does so] qua informed by that intellection, as has been said, but {ea ratione qua informatus est} qua informed by intellection it is called intellect. Therefore, etc. |
| Sexta conclusio *{est add. JaRaPr} quod *{etiam add. RaPr} {et add. Ja} anima {quod add. Pr} agit volitionem ea ratione qua *{ipsa add. JaPr} dicitur voluntas quia (sicut dictum est *{prius add. JaRaPr}) illi actus (scilicet complacentia et {om. Ja} displicentia {trs. Ra}, acceptatio et refutatio, *{sive add. JaRaPr} volitio et nolitio, amplius amor, odium, delectatio, tristitia, {et add. Pr} desiderium, etc.) sunt actus ipsius anime ut dicitur voluntas, ita quod anima ea ratione qua informata est aliquo illorum {istorum JaRa} dicitur voluntas. Hoc supposito *{suppono RaMzErAu} {hoc supposito: om. JaPrMu}, postea etiam {hoc add. Pb} suppono {supposito JaPr} {supposicio Mu} ex *{prius add. JaRaPr} determinatis {predeterminatis AuRaMz} {?determinatio Ja} quod complacentia et {om. Ja} displicentia sunt actus priores in {om. Ra} voluntate *{trs. 231 JaRaPr} naturaliter quam acceptatio et {vel Ja} refutatio, que proprie dicuntur volitiones, et si aliquando fuerint *{om. JaRaAuMuPr} {sint Pb} simul {om. Pb} tempore {vel fiant simul add. Pb} *{fiant add. JaRaAuMuPr} {improprie add. Pr} in voluntate complacentia in bono apprehensio et acceptatio, tamen hoc non obstat quin {complacentia add. Ra} sit prior naturaliter et necessario secundum ordinem nature. In his autem que sunt sic {trs. JaRa} essentialiter ordinata, in omnibus *{anima JaRaPr} prius est causa posterioris *{posteriorum JaPr}. Et ideo, sicut anima per {in Ja} apprehensionem {ostensione Ja} boni facit in se complacentiam in illo {? add. Ra} bono, sic ipsa {illa Pr} per illam apprehensionem et illam complacentiam simul facit actum consequentem, scilicet volitionem. Ergo {igitur JaRa} anima agit volitionem {ergo... volitionem: om. Pr} secundum quod est informata *{et add. JaRaPr} illa apprehensione {?apprehenso Ja} et illa complacentia. Sed ut [est add. Ra margin] informata apprehensione dicitur intellectus, et ut informata complacentia [Sed... complacentia om. Ra, in margin] dicitur appetitus et voluntas. Ergo {igitur JaRa} {ideo Pr} anima agit volitionem *{et add. JaRaPr} ut dicitur intellectus, et ut dicitur voluntas. | A sixth conclusion is that, as well, the soul brings about volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, because, as was said before, those acts (namely {complacentia} favour and disfavour, acceptance and rejection or volition and nolition, also love, hate, pleasure, sadness, desire, etc.) are acts of the soul itself {ut dicitur} qua will, so that the soul {ea ratione qua informatus est} qua informed by one of these is called will. I suppose this. And after that I suppose also from points already determined that {complacentia} favour and disfavour are {priores} acts in the will by nature prior to acceptance and rejection, which are properly called volitions. (If favour toward an apprehended good and acceptance sometimes come to exist in the will at the same time, this is no reason why it [i.e. favour] should not be naturally and necessarily prior according to the order of nature.) But among the things thus essentially ordered in the soul, the prior is the cause of the posterior. Therefore, just as by the apprehension of the good the soul makes in itself {complacentia} favour toward that good, so by the apprehension and the {complacentia} favour together it makes the resulting act, namely the volition. The soul therefore brings about the volition as informed both by the apprehension and by the {complacentia} favour. But as formed by the apprehension it is called intellect, and as informed by {complacentia} favour it is called appetite and will. Therefore the soul brings about the volition both as it is called intellect and as it is called will. |
| Septima conclusio est quod anima se habet passive ad volitionem ea ratione qua dicitur *{voluntas, non ea ratione qua dicitur add. JaRaPr} intellectus. Nam dicitur intellectus non *{trs. 231 JaRaPr} *{intellectus add. JaRa} ex eo quod agit intellectione {sensatione Ra [margin: aliter intellectione}, nec sensus *{sensus add. Ja} ex eo quod agit sensationem {nec... sensationem om. Ra} (tunc enim obiectum sensibile vel intelligibile aut species eius dicerentur *{diceretur JaRaPr} sensus aut intellectus *{trs. 321 Ja}[aut intellectus: Ra in margin]), sed *{dicitur intellectus add. JaRaPr} {trs. Pr} ex eo quod habet in se vel recipit *{trs. 3412 JaRaPr} intellectionem secundum quam *{secundum quam: qua JaRaPr} formaliter [Ra in margin] [Ra 19 a] intelligit, et sic de {om. Ja} sensu {om. Ja} ad sensationem; ergo {igitur Ra} {ideo JaPr} proportionabiliter voluntas *{non add. JaRaPr} dicitur voluntas {om. Ja} *{ex eo quod agit volitionem vel complacentiam vel delectationem /trs. 321 Ja\ vel huiusmodi /vel huiusmodi: om. Ja\, immo add. JaRa} ex eo quod habet vel {om. Ja} recipit in se huiusmodi actus, et ex *{om. JaRaPr} hoc quod *{om. JaPr} est passive eam sic *{eam sic: om. JaRaPr} se habere ad illos {istos Ja}. Unde oportet sic {om. Ra} *{hic JaPr} subtiliter imaginari et scrupulose. Licet enim voluntas concedatur agere volitionem ea ratione [ea ratione: Ra in margin] qua dicitur voluntas, tamen non dicitur voluntas ex eo quod agit volitionem, sed ex eo quod habet {agat Pr} in se complacentiam que est actus attributus anime ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas, per quem agit volitionem. Immo etiam {et Ra} intellectus {trs. RaPr} non dicitur intellectus ex eo quod agit intellectionem {om. Ra} *{aliquid JaPr} (hoc enim accidit), sed ex hoc *{eo JaRaPr} quod habet in se intellectionem. Differt igitur dicere quod voluntas agit volitionem ea ratione qua dicitur {om. Ja} voluntas et dicere quod voluntas dicitur voluntas ex eo quod agit volitionem. Prima enim {ergo Ja} {igitur Pr} est {om. Ra} vera et {om. Ra} secunda {vero add. Ra} falsa. Dico {quod add. Ra} {om. Ja} prima est vera quia voluntas agit volitionem per complacentiam per quam habet *{habere AuMuMzJaRaPbPr} {dicitur add. Au} in se {in se: om. Mz} quod *{om. AuMuMzJaRaPbPr} dicitur {trs 312 RaPr} voluntas. Sed secunda est falsa quia ipsa habens in se complacentiam iam per {om. Ja} hoc {om. Ja} dicitur voluntas, licet nihil ageret; *{et add. JaPr} quia etiam {quia etiam: igitur Ra} si voluntas ageret *{et add. RaPr} complacentiam et volitionem et non {om. Pr} reciperet aliquam earum, nunquam ex hoc diceretur voluntas. | A seventh conclusion is that the soul is {se habere} passive as regards volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, not {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect. The intellect is not called "intellect" because it brings about intellection nor sense "sense" because it brings about sensation (for then the sensible or intelligible object or its {species} likeness would be called intellect or sense); rather, it is called intellect because it has or receives in itself the intellection {secundum} by which it formally understands, and similarly sense in respect of sensation; therefore, correspondingly, the will is not called "will" because it brings about volition or {delectatio} pleasure or {complacentia} favour or the like, but rather because it has or receives such acts in itself, and this is to be {se habere} passive as regards them. And thus it is necessary here {imaginari} to form our picture with subtlety and care. Though we grant that the will brings about volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, nevertheless it is not called will because it brings about volition, but because it has in itself {complacentia} favour, which is an act attributed to the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will by which it brings about volition. Indeed the intellect also is not called "intellect" because it brings about something (for this is accidental), but because it has the intellection in itself. There is a difference, therefore, between saying that the will brings about volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will and saying that the will is called will because it brings about volition, for the first is true and the second false. I say the first is true, because the will brings about volition through {complacentia} favour, through having which in itself it is called will. The second is false, because having {complacentia} favour in itself it is for this reason already called will, even if it brings about nothing; and because, also, if the will brought about both {complacentia} favour and volition and did not receive either of them, it would never because of this be called will. |
| Octava conclusio ponitur quod voluntas se habet libere in {ad Ra} recipiendo volitionem libertate oppositionis, quia omnibus eodem modo stantibus {se habentibus Er}, scilicet intellectu *{informato add. RaEr} illa apprehensione et voluntate informata illa {ista JaPr} complacentia, tamen *{tunc JaPrMz} possibile est quod voluntas recipiat ab eis volitionem, et possibile est quod non recipiat. | An eighth conclusion is asserted, that in receiving a volition the will is {se habere} free by freedom of opposition, because with everything remaining the same (i.e., with the intellect remaining informed by this apprehension and the will by this {complacentia} favour), it is then possible that the will should receive a volition from them, and possible that it should not. |
| Nona conclusio est quod intellectus et voluntas simul ille *{iste JaRaPr} informatus apprehensione et ista *{illa JaRa} informata complacentia se habent {habeat Ra} libere in producendo volitionem libertate oppositionis. Quia sic se habentes et omnibus aliis eodem modo se habentibus, possunt producere, et possunt [Pa 209 ra] non producere [et... producere: Ra in margin]: neuter {om. Ja} tamen sine animo *{alio JaRaPr}, i.e. anima [i.e. anima: Ra in margin] simul *{om. JaRaPr} libere potest producere {trs. Ja} volitionem per illam {istam JaPr} apprehensionem et complacentiam *{simul et add. JaRaPr}; non per complacentiam sine apprehensione *{trs. 321 JaRaPr}, nec per apprehensionem sine complacentia *{trs. 321 JaRaPr}. Tu queres unde anima habet {trs. Ra} istam libertatem? Ego credo quod [Ja 327 rb] illam *{istam JaRaPr} {libertatem add. Pr} habet essentialiter et formaliter {et formaliter: om. Au} ex se, ita quod ipsamet {ipsa Ja} {trs.34512 Ja} est illa {ipsa Ra} {om. Pr} libertas et habet eam, sicut et suam essentiam, ab ipso deo primo active et finaliter. Illa {ista Pr} autem libertate est innata producere in se actum volendi per illas *{illam RaPr} complacentiam et apprehensionem *{trs. 321 JaRaPr} dispositive, non tamen est {trs. Ja} per eas {ea Ra} necessitatur *{necessitata ErMuMz[etc]} {innata Ra} [necessitata in margin] ad producendum. | A ninth conclusion is that in producing a volition the intellect and will together, the former informed by the apprehension and the latter by the {complacentia} favour, are {se habere} free, by freedom of opposition. For {se habere} being in that state and with everything else remaining the same, they can produce, and they can not produce -- neither, however, [can produce] without the other: that is, the soul can freely produce the volition by the apprehension and {complacentia} favour together, and not by the apprehension without the {complacentia} favour and not by the {complacentia} favour without the apprehension. You will ask, Where does the soul get this freedom from? I believe that it has it essentially and formally from itself, so that it is itself that freedom and has it, as it has its essence, from God himself {primo} primarily, actively, and as end. But by that freedom it is {innata} capable of producing in itself an act of willing by means of the apprehension and {complacentia} favour dispositively, but it is not necessitated by them to produce it. |
| Ergo {igitur JaRaPr} tandem apparet {trs. JaPr} quod voluntas ea ratione qua {dicitur add. Ra} voluntas producit libere volitionem, non tamen {om. Pr} tanquam [Ra in margin] totale productivum, et similiter intellectus {ab add. Ra} ea ratione qua {dicitur add. Pr} intellectus. Anima autem ea ratione qua dicitur simul *{trs. JaRaPr} intellectus per apprehensionem et voluntas per complacentiam producit libere volitionem tanquam producens totale, non excludendo tamen dei {om. Ra} communem influentiam. | It therefore appears, at last, that the will, {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will, produces the volition freely, though not as total producer, and similarly the intellect {ea ratione qua} qua intellect; but the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua both intellect (through apprehension) and will (through {complacentia} favour) at once, freely produces the volition as total producer, not excluding the common influence of God. |
| Et ita dictum est {om. JaPr} quod a principio in questione supponebatur. Nunc dicendum est {om. Ra} formaliter de quesito. De quo hec {om. Pr} decima conclusio videtur mihi {om. Ra} {? add. Ja} ponenda, quod si sit in hoc aliqua comparatio, anima liberius se habet in producendo volitionem ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus quam ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Dico "si sit in hoc aliqua comparatio" quia non videtur in hoc comparatio quo ad libertatem oppositionis, sed *{bene add. JaRa} quo ad libertatem {oppositionis... libertatem: om. Pr} principalitatis et finalis ordinationis. Si enim apprehensio se habeat principalius in producendo volitionem quam illa complacentia, tunc anima principalius et per consequens liberius producit illam *{om. JaRaPr} volitionem ea ratione qua intellectus quam ea ratione {om. JaPr} qua voluntas. Sed ita est. Ergo {igitur JaRaPr}, etc. Minor probatur quia anima per apprehensionem dirigit totum quod sequitur, et dirigens est principalius directo, et quia apprehensio ad complacentiam comparatur sicut {quia Pr} agens primarium ad *{agens add. JaRaPr} secundarium. Per apprehensionem enim agitur complacentia et per hec ambo volitio, ut dictum {predictum Ra} est. Agens autem primarium ceteris paribus principalius se habet in producendo effectum quam agens secundarium. Magis enim influit {igitur add. Ra} *{etc. add. JaRaPr}, ut dicit {ille add. Ra} {iste add. Pr} auctor de causis {trs. 2341 Ra} ["Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis": S. Thomae de Aquino Super librum de causis expositio, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Louvain, 1954), p. 4), et magis movet, ut dicitur viii Physicorum, et quia illa complacentia reputatur parve efficacie et nobilitatis. Omnes autem apprehensionem illam {trs. Pr} que dicit *{ostendit JaRaPr} quid sit agendum et quomodo, et quid dimittendum, que {qui Ja} est {iam add. Ra} actus prudentie, reputant magne efficacie et nobilitatis. Tali {talis Ra} autem magis {est add. Ra} attribuenda est {? Ra} libertas finalis ordinationis; igitur, etc. |
[Formal answer to the question]And thus what was supposed from the beginning of the question has been stated. Now we must speak formally of {quesito} the matter under investigation. About this it seems to me that this tenth conclusion should be asserted, that if there is a comparison in this matter, the soul {liberius se habet} is freer in producing the volition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect than qua will. I say "if there is a comparison in this matter" because in this matter there does not seem to be a comparison {quo ad} in respect of freedom of opposition, but {bene} indeed there is one in respect of freedom of {principalitas} "being principal" and of final ordination. For if the apprehension is {se habere principalius} more principal in producing the volition than the {complacentia} favour is, then the soul more principally, and consequently more freely, produces the volition {ea ratione qua [dicitur]} qua intellect than {ea ratione qua [dicitur]} qua will. But this is the case. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved, [1] because the soul by apprehension directs the whole that follows, and, since it directs, it is more principal than what is directed; and [2] because the apprehension is to the {complacentia} favour as primary to secondary agent (for through the apprehension the {complacentia} favour is brought about and through both of these the volition, as has been said), but the primary agent, other things being equal, {principalius se habere} is more principal in producing the effect than the secondary agent, for it "influences [its effect] more [than the universal second cause does]", as the author of Liber de Causis says, and it moves more, as is said in Physics VIII [257 b17]. And [3] because the {complacentia} favour is regarded as being of little efficacy and nobility, but the apprehension that shows what is to be done, and how, and what {dimittere} is to be left undone, which is the act of prudence, everyone regards as being of great efficacy and nobility; and freedom of final ordination is more to be attributed to something like that; therefore, etc. |
| Si autem tu dicas quod voluntas ea ratione qua voluntas se habet libere ad volitionem tam active quam passive [quam passive: Ra in margin], intellectus autem ea {om. JaPr} ratione qua intellectus non nisi active, igitur voluntas liberius ea ratione, etc. *{qua voluntas add. JaPr}: Ego {et JaPr} dico *{quod add. JaRaPr} si hoc concedatur, non est contra conclusionem positam, quia illa non erat nisi de producere, et cum hoc *{cum hoc: tamen Ja} non oportet concedere hoc {?hec Ra} {hic JaPr} quod tu nunc {non JaPr} [nunc Ja in margin] concludis, quia libertas non proprie dicitur libertas ex passibilitate {passione Ra} *{passivitate JaPr} sed ex activitate. Libertas enim proprie dicta significat vel connotat principalitatem et dominium; agens autem ea {om. JaPr} ratione qua {ea ratione qua: ? Ra} agens dominatur super passum et nunquam passum {et nunquam passum: om. Ja} ea ratione qua passum super agens {etc add. Ra}. | But if you say that will, {ea ratione qua [dicitur]} qua will, is {se habere} disposed toward volition freely both actively and passively, but the intellect {ea ratione qua [dicitur]} qua intellect only actively, therefore the will is freer {ea ratione etc.} qua will, I say that if this is granted, it is not against the conclusion asserted, because that was only about production. Nevertheless, one must not grant what you now conclude, because freedom is not properly called freedom from passivity, but from activity. Freedom properly so called signifies or connotes being principal, and lordship; but the agent, {ea ratione qua agens} qua active, dominates over the passive, and never the passive {ea ratione qua passum} qua passive over the active. |
| Rationes que fiebant in principio questionis solvuntur manifeste ex dictis. Hec ergo {igitur JaRaPr} dicta sunt in his tribus questionibus de libertate vel servitute hominum et potentiarum suarum. |
[Reply to preliminary arguments]The arguments advanced at the beginning of the Question are clearly solved by what has been said. These things, then, have been said in these three Questions about the freedom or servitude of men and of their powers. |
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