Buridan, on Aristotle's Ethics, book 10, q. 2QUERITUR SECUNDO {queritur secundo: deinde secundo queritur Ra} {queritur secundo: om. Ja} utrum anima producat in se actum volendi liberius quam actum {om. Er} intelligendi. Arguitur quod sic per rationes {rationis Ra} que in precedenti questione {fiebant vel add. Ra} arguebant *{arguebantur Ja} quod voluntas esset magis libera et domina quam intellectus, quoniam ille rationes non bene arguebant [Ra 8a] ad illam {om. Ja} questionem secundum sensum qui esset {est Ra} de virtute *{proprietate AuJaMuPbRaEr} [Mz=Pa] sermonis, sicut visum fuit, sed videntur arguere et habere {? Ra} suam efficaciam ad illum {istum Er} sensum quod anima magis debeat dici domina et libera {trs. 321 JaEr} ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas quam ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus. Sed hoc non videtur posse esse verum nisi ex eo quod ipsa anima liberius se habet {haberet Ra} in producendo actum {actus Ja} volendi secundum quem {quam Ra} dicitur voluntas quam in producendo actum {volendi... actum: om. Er} intelligendi secundum quem dicitur intellectus. *{Igitur illum actum volendi producit liberius add. JaRaEr} |
Question 2: Whether the soul produces in itself the act of willing more freely than the act of understanding?[Preliminary arguments]It is argued that it does, by means of the arguments used in the last Question to show that the will is more free and more lord than the intellect, since, as we saw, those arguments did not argue well to the question {secundum sensum qui esset de proprietate sermonis} in the meaning it has according to the proper sense of the words, but seem to argue and to have their force in the meaning that the soul should be called lord and free more {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will than {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect. But it seems that if this is true it must be because the soul itself is {se habere} freer in producing an act of willing, {secundum} with reference to which it is called "will", than in producing an act of understanding, {secundum} with reference to which it is called "intellect". Therefore it produces the act of willing more freely. |
| [Ja 323 va] Oppositum arguitur et {om. RaEr} {etiam Ja} proportionali modo per rationes que in precedenti {predicta Er} questione adducte fuerunt ad arguendum quod intellectus sit liberior voluntate. | The opposite is argued also, correspondingly, by means of the {ratio} arguments brought forward in the last Question {ad arguendum} to show that the intellect is freer than the will. |
| Ista questio aliam {aliqua Ra} {alia Ja} {aliquid Er} supponit et aliquid {om. Ra} aliud ultra {trs. Ra} {trs. 312 JaEr} querit. Supponit enim manifeste quod anima producit tam actum volendi quam *{actum add. JaRaEr} intelligendi, et supponit etiam quod utrumque recipit quia dicitur "in se". Deinde querit {om. Ra} {quia Ja} "Que *{quem RaEr} istorum {in solum Ja} {illorum Er} actuum {actum Ja} producit liberius vel recipit liberius?" in quo etiam videtur [??] {trs. Er} supponere quod utrumque producit libere vel recipit *{libere add. JaRaEr} si non debeat esse {om. Ja} abusiva comparatio. Quod ergo {igitur JaRaEr} anima humana sit receptiva illorum {suorum Er} actuum non dubitamus. Quod etiam sit activa illorum {eorum JaEr} credo, et hoc suppono; de hoc enim dixi in secunda questione tertii huius {libri RaEr} {om. Ja} quantum ad actum volendi et nolendi; quantum etiam *{autem JaRaEr} ad actum intelligendi dixi {de add. Ra} hoc supra secundum *{om. JaRaEr} De Anima et {om. Ja} in decima questione tertii *{secundi libri, et in decima questione tertii libri add. JaRaEr}. Hoc enim magis spectat determinare {trs. 312 JaRaEr} ad scientiam speculativam {trs. JaRaEr} quam ad istam. Sed adhuc, quia dictum est quod {quia Ra} liberius presupponit {supponit RaEr} libere, si non sit comparatio abusiva, {trs. Er} ideo videndum est de hoc primo {trs. 312 JaRaEr}, scilicet tam de {om. Er} producere quam de recipere. |
[Reply to the question]This question supposes some points and queries something further. It manifestly supposes that the soul produces both the act of willing and the act of understanding, and it supposes also that it receives both (because of the phrase "in itself"). Then it asks, Which of those acts does it produce more freely or receive more freely? In this it also seems to suppose that it produces both freely or receives them freely, if there should not be a {abusiva} faulty comparison. We do not doubt, then, that the human soul is receptive of those acts. I believe that it is also their active [principle], and I suppose this; for I have discussed this in respect of the act of willing and nilling in Question 2 of Book III of this work [fol. 37 v], and in respect of the act of understanding I have discussed it [in the Questions] upon De Anima, in Question 10 of the Book II and in Question 10 of Book III; to determine this belongs more to speculative science than to this one. But again, since it has been said that, if the comparison is not to be {abusiva} faulty, "more freely" presupposes "freely", we must therefore investigate this first, about both production and reception. |
| Sit ergo {igitur JaRaEr} dubitatio an anima humana {om. Ra} libere agat {agit JaRaEr} intellectionem et volitionem? Et videtur quod doctores et philosophi {trs.321 Er} distinguunt quantum ad hoc duplex libere agere {trs. Ra}: uno modo dicitur agens libere agere {trs. Ra} libertate finalis ordinationis, alio modo libertate oppositionis. | Let the doubt be, therefore, whether the human soul {agit} performs intellection and volition freely. And it seems that the learned and the philosophers distinguish, in relation to this matter, two kinds of acting freely: in one way an agent is said to act freely "by freedom of final ordination" [i.e to an end], in another way "by freedom of opposition". |
| Libertate finalis ordinationis dicitur agens libere agere {trs. JaRa} si agat {agit Ja} suiipsius gratia principali intentione, et serviliter si gratia alterius. Unde sic solus deus agit simpliciter et omnino {om. Ja} libere; omnia autem alia agentia in ordine ad ipsum {om. Ja} deum agunt serviliter, quia omnia que sunt *{et agunt et sunt et add. Ra} {sunt et add. Ja} agunt gratia ipsius dei; unde et nos debemus esse servi {ipsius add. Ra} dei. Deus autem quicquid {quod Ra} ad extra producit vel conservat ipse producit et conservat suiipsius gratia prima et principali intentione; omnia enim que sunt in ipsum deum finaliter ordinata sunt. Et tamen hoc {?homo Ra} non obstante agens particulare dicitur agere {agens Ja} libere si agat suiipsius {sui Ja} gratia {prima et principali intentione et add. Ra} magis principaliter quam gratia alicuius alterius finis particularis {finis particularis: om. Ra} qui non contineat {?contingit Ja} ipsum finaliter secundum naturalem finium {finem Ra} connexionem et ordinem. Hoc autem dico quia deus continet nos et omnia alia finaliter et secundum Aristotelem nos continemus omnia *{om. JaRa} alia inferiora, puta bruta, plantas et inanimata, finaliter {et secundum... finaliter: om. Er} secundum [Pa 205 va] talem *{naturalem AuMuPbJaRaEr} [Mz=Pa] finium connexionem et ordinem. De qua connexione dictum {locutum JaRaEr} est in fine duodecimi Metaphysice {Metaphysicorum Ja}. Licet ergo {igitur JaRaEr} agamus finaliter *{serviliter JaEr} in ordine ad {ipsum add. Er} deum quia principalius propter ipsum quam propter nos, tamen simpliciter {trs. Er} loquendo dicimur {? Ja} agere libere si principalius {principaliter Ra} *{agamus add. JaRaEr} propter nos {propter nos: om. Ja} quam propter {?preter Ja} aliquid *{aliud add. JaRaEr} preter {quam Ja} deum qui finaliter continet nos. Ita etiam {et Ra} si brutum agit principalius propter nos et propter deum {trs. 45312 Ja} quam propter se {seipsum Er} secundum naturalem finem *{finium JaRaEr} ordinatum *{ordinationem JaRaEr}, tunc brutum agit {om. Ra} serviliter {simpliciter Ra} {finaliter Ja} in ordine ad deum et ad nos. Tamen secundum suam naturam {trs. Ra} simpliciter loquendo dicitur {trs. 312 JaRaEr} libere agere hac {ac Ja} libertate si agat {agit Ja} propter se magis principaliter quam preter *{propter JaEr} nos et preter deum *{nos et preter deum: aliquid aliud preter deum et preter nos /trs. 45312 Ra\ /trs.2341 Er\ JaRaEr} [check MSS again] et preter illud aliud quod est finis eius secundum naturalem {? Ja} finium connexionem et ordinem, si aliquid aliud sit {est JaRaEr} tale. Et hunc modum libertatis ponit nobis {om. Ra} Aristoteles, prohemio Metaphysice, dicens {om. Er}, "Sed ut dicimus homo liber est {om. JaRaEr} qui suimet et non alterius causa {trs. Er} est, sic et hec sola libera est scientiarum", id est metaphysica, "inter humanas scientias; sola namque hec causa suimet {trs. JaRaEr} est". Et per metaphysicam intendo *{intelligit Er} theologiam {ut add. Ra} a "metha" quod est "trans" et "physis" *{quod est add. Ja} [Ja 323 vb] "natura", et "icos" *{quod est add. Ra} "scientia", quasi "scientia transcendens *{de transcendentalibus JaRaEr} naturam". |
[Freedom of Ordination to an End]By freedom of final ordination an agent is said to act freely if {principali intentione} by chief purpose it acts for its own sake and slavishly if it acts for the sake of another. Thus only God acts in this way simply and altogether freely, and all other agents, in {ordine} relation to God himself, act slavishly, because all things that exist and act both exist and act for God's sake; and thus we also should be slaves of God. But whatever God produces and conserves {ad extra} outside himself he produces and conserves, by primary and chief purpose, for his own sake, since {finaliter} the end to which all existing things are ordered is God himself. Yet, despite this, a particular agent is said to act freely if it acts for its own sake {magis principaliter} more chiefly than for the sake of any other particular end which does not contain it {finaliter} as its end {secundum} according to the natural connection and order of ends. (I say this because God contains {finaliter} as end us and all other things, and according to Aristotle we contain {finaliter} as end, according to the natural connection and order of ends, other lower things -- for example brute animals, plants and inanimate things. This connection has been spoken about at the end of Metaphysics, Book XII.) Therefore, although we act slavishly in relation to God (because more chiefly for his sake than for our own), simply speaking we are said to act freely if we act more chiefly for our own sake than for the sake of anything else except God, who contains us {finaliter} as end. Thus also if a brute animal acts more chiefly, according to the natural ordering of ends, for God's sake and for our sake than for itself, then the brute acts slavishly in relation to God and to us; yet in its nature, it is said simply speaking to act freely with this freedom if it acts for its own sake more chiefly than for the sake of anything else apart from us and God, and apart from any other that is (according to the natural connection and order of ends) its end, if anything else is such. Aristotle ascribes to us this kind of freedom in the preface to Metaphysics, where he says: "But just as we say that a man is free who exists for himself and not for another, so also this of all the sciences is alone free", i.e. Metaphysics, "among human sciences; for it alone exists for its own sake". (By "Metaphysics" he means theology, from "meta", which is "beyond" and "physis" which is "nature", and "icos", which is "science", as if to say: "the science of the things that are beyond nature".) |
| Sed libertate oppositionis agens dicitur libere *{agere add. JaRa} quia cum agit aliquid {trs. Ra} non {om. Ja} prenecessitatur {est propter necessitatem Ra} {est prenecessitatum Er} {prenecessitatum sunt Ja} ad agendum illud per quodcumque aliud {om. Ja} vel aliorum quorumcunque {quorum habet Ra} {quocumque Ja} concursum, sed omnibus entibus eodem modo se habentibus sicut se habent quando incipit agere preter {post Ra} ipsammet actionem et sic {et sic: secundo Mz} manentibus possibile est ipsum non agere aut forte oppositum agere {om. Ra}. An autem iste modus agendi libere {om. Ja} sit possibilis determinatum *{declaratum JaRaEr} est {sint Ra} {fuit JaEr} sufficienter quod sic in prima et in {om. JaEr} secunda questione *{questionibus JaRaMuEr} tertii {libri add. Ra}; et ibidem determinatum est quod hac libertate voluntas est libera et nulla alia potentia *{anime add. AuPbMuMzJaRaEr} {trs. Er} est *{om. AuPbMuMzJaRaEr} magis libera {est add. Er} quam voluntas {est add. Er}, et quod {om. Ra} velle et nolle {et nolle: om. RaJa} [AuMuMzPbEr=Pa], id est volitio et nolitio {et nolitio: om. Ra} [AuMuMzPbEr=Pa], sunt primi {id est... primi: om. Ja} actus quorum sumus domini secundum istum {illum Ra} modum libertatis et dominii; et omnia illa *{omnia illa: hec omnia JaRaEr}, sicut illic est {om. Ra} manifestum {trs. JaEr}, sunt ibidem {ibi JaEr} declarata *{et determinata add. JaRaEr} {trs. Er} ad sensum de quo nunc querimus, scilicet quod voluntas seu anima secundum quod dicitur voluntas *{libere add. JaRa} producit actum volendi vel nolendi libere {om. JaRa} {vel... libere: om. Er}, et {ut Ra} nullos {non Er} alios actus [Ra 9a] producit {? Ja} liberius hac {ac Ja} libertate oppositionis. Hec ergo {igitur JaRaEr} omnia supposita sunt *{supposita sunt: supponamus RaEr} tanquam vera. |
[Freedom of Opposition]But by freedom of opposition an agent is said to act freely because, when it {agit} does something, it is not prenecessitated to do it by anything else or by any concurrence of other things, but with all other things (apart from the action itself) {se habere} being the same as they are when it begins to act and remaining thus, it is possible for it not to act or perhaps to do the opposite. Whether this manner of acting freely is possible has been determined sufficiently in the affirmative in Questions 1 and 2 of Book III [fol. 36 r]. There it was determined that the will is free with this freedom, and that no other power of the soul is more free than the will, and that to will and nill, i.e. volition and nolition, are the first acts of which we are lords {secundum} in this manner of freedom and lordship; and, as is clear there, all these things are there explained and determined in the sense of our present inquiry, namely that the will (or the soul {secundum quod dicitur} qua will) freely produces the act of willing or nilling, and that by this freedom of opposition it produces no other acts more freely. Let us therefore suppose all these things as true. |
| Sed restat magis *{?multa JaRaEr} dubitatio an hac libertate oppositionis *{anima add. JaRaEr} omnem actum producit libere quem dicitur producere ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas, vel non omnem {actum add. Ja} talem libere producit {om. Ra} {trs. Er} {producat Ja}? Et si non omnem, tunc est dubitatio fortior quos illorum libere producat et {non... et: om. Er} quos non. Et ad istas {om. Ra} dubitationes responsuros sufficienter {trs. Ra} necesse est distincte supponere *{specificare JaRaEr} multos diversos actus quos *{anime add. RaEr} attribuimus ei *{ea JaRaEr} ratione qua dicitur {esse add. Er} voluntas; etsi multi attribuuntur appetitui sensitivo secundum quod dicitur appetitus sensitivus {om. Er}, tamen proportionabiles *{etiam add. JaRaEr} attribuuntur voluntati secundum quod *{dicitur add. JaRaEr} voluntas; ideo proportionabiliter distinguuntur isti et illi. Distinctionem autem illorum {istorum Ra} actuum *{om. AuMuMzPbJaRaEr} accipias *{accipies MuMzJaRaEr} {accipientur AuPb} in decima {om. Er} quarta questione quarti libri. | But much doubt remains whether, by this freedom of opposition, the soul produces freely every act it is said to produce {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will or does not produce every such act freely; and if not every act, then there is a stronger doubt which of them it produces freely and which not. To answer these doubts sufficiently it is necessary to specify distinctly the many different acts we attribute to the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. Although many acts are attributed to the sensitive appetite qua sensitive appetite, yet there are also {proportionabiles} corresponding acts attributed to the will qua will; the two sets of acts are therefore distinguished correspondingly. You {accipies future indicative} will get their distinction in Question 14 of Book IV [fol. 83 rb]. |
| Pro quanto ergo {igitur JaRaEr} ibi dictum est, ponamus {om. Ja} quod primus actus attributus voluntati sit complacentia vel displicentia in obiecto, que consurgit ex apprehensione illius {istius Ja} obiecti sub ratione boni vel mali, convenientis vel disconvenientis; de quo *{actu add. JaRaEr} determinatum fuit {est JaRaEr} in {om. Ra} tertia questione tertii libri, quod voluntas non se habet ad istum {illum RaEr} actum libere {trs. 4123 JaRaEr}, nec est eius domina dominio et libertate oppositionis; et hoc ibi {ibidem Er} require *{requiris Ra}. |
[Acts attributed to the will]{pro quanto} In accordance with what was said there let us assert, then, that the first act attributed to the will is {complacentia} favour or {displicentia} disfavour towards the object, which arises from the apprehension of this object under the conception of good or bad, suitable or unsuitable. Concerning this act it was determined in Question 3 of Book III [fol. 41 v] that the will {se habere} is not free as regards that act and is not its lord by lordship and freedom of opposition; you may look for this there. |
| Deinde istum {illum Ra} actum complacentie vel displicentie sequitur aliquis *{aliquando alius JaRaEr} actus qui solet vocari acceptatio vel refutatio {trs. 4123 Ra}, et ille proprie loquendo dicitur volitio vel nolitio, quia quod {quid Ra} accepto hoc volo, et hoc {quid Ra} *{quod JaEr} refuto quod *{hoc JaRaEr} nolo *{et econtra add. RaEr}. Et ad istum actum sequitur statim {trs. JaRaEr} actualis prosecutio {productio Ra} vel fuga *{si illud sit apprehensum per modum prosequibilis vel fugibilis add. JaRaEr} et si non est *{sit JaRaEr} impedimentum. Et de illo {hoc Ra} {isto Ja} actu determinatum est in prima questione tertii libri et in tribus *{duabus JaRaEr} sequentibus quod {et JaEr} ad eius {illius RaEr} {istius Ja} actus productionem voluntas se habet libere et est domina eius dominio et libertatate oppositionis; et hoc etiam ibi requiratur {requirantur Ra}. | Then upon the act of {complacentia} favour or {displicentia} disfavour there sometimes follows another act which we are accustomed to call {acceptatio} acceptance or {refutatio} rejection, and this act properly speaking is called volition or nolition, because what I accept, I will, and what I reject, I nill, and vice versa. And upon this act there immediately follows actual {prosecutio} seeking or {fuga} avoidance, if it is apprehended as being able to be sought or avoided and if there is no obstacle. Concerning this act it has been determined in Question 1 of Book III [fol. 36 r] and in the two following Questions that the will {se habere} is free as regards the production of this act and is its lord by the lordship and freedom of opposition; and this also may be looked for there. |
| Tertio {secundo Ra} autem ex illo actu acceptationis, seu proprie dicte volitionis, sequitur amor necessario, et ex actu refutationis odium, vel forte illa acceptatio est formaliter amor et refutatio odium. Si autem {igitur JaRaEr} sit {sunt Er} idem in re *{in re: om. JaRaEr} acceptatio et amor, tunc sicut voluntas se habet {habere Ra} *{libere add. RaEr} ad acceptationem ita *{et add. JaRa} ad amorem; si vero {autem RaEr} amor sit passio consequens acceptationem seu volitionem distinctam *{distincta RaEr} {distinctum Ja} realiter ab ea, puto {puta Ja} quod necessario consequitur eam {tam Ja}, ita quod non est possible naturaliter voluntatem [Ja 324 ra] aliquid acceptare et non amare illud, vel refutare et non odire. Et ideo voluntas [Ra 9b] quia se habet primo {trs. 312 AuMuPbJaRaEr} [Mz=Pa] libere ad {sicut AuMuPbJa} [MzRaEr=Pa] velle et {ad add. Er} nolle, ideo etiam {om. JaPb} se habet {trs. Pb} consequenter libere vel *{ad AuMuMzPbJaRaEr} amare vel odire, sed non sic {trs. Ra} libere divisim quod possit acceptans non *{om. AuMuPbJaRaEr} [Mz=Pa] odire aut non amare, aut etiam quod {om. Pb} possit {posset Ra} refutans non {om. AuMuPbJaRa} [Mz=Pa] amare vel {aut JaRa} non odire. Et sic ad presens transeo {pertranseo Er} de amore, de quo plus post {trs. JaEr} dicetur {trs. Ra}. | And, third, from the act of acceptance, or, properly speaking, of volition, there necessarily follows love and from the act of rejection hate; or perhaps the acceptance is formally love and the rejection hate. If, therefore, acceptance and love are the same, then just as the will {se habere} is free as regards acceptance, so it is also to love; but if love is a passion following upon an acceptance or volition really distinct from it, I think that it follows it necessarily, so that it is not naturally possible for the will to accept something and not love it or to reject it and not hate it. And therefore, because the will {se habere} is disposed {primo} "first freely" to willing and nilling, therefore it {se habere consequenter libere} is also disposed "consequentially freely" to loving and hating, but {non sic libere divisim} not freely in separation so that it can, while accepting, hate or not love, or also that it can, while rejecting, love or not hate. And thus I pass on for the present from love, about which more will be said later. |
| Et *{sed JaAuMuPbRaEr} iterum ex dicta acceptatione vel {per Ja} refutatione, si cum acceptatione sit apprehensio acceptati *{accepti JaAuPbMu} per modum habendi {habiti Pb} et modum *{non JaRaMuEr} {nondum Mz} obtinendi *{obtenti MuPbMaEr} {obtendi Ja} {obtinendi change to obtenti Ra}, sequitur necessario {om. Er} desiderium, et si {om. Ja} sit apprehensio eius {om. Ja} {sit... eius: om. Er} per modum habiti et {non add. RaMu} obtenti {et obtenti: om. Er} [conjecture: "obtenti" and "habiti" mean the same], sequitur necessario delectatio; et sic etiam si {sic/sicut Ra} sit apprehensio {om. Er} refutati per modum habiti consurgit necessario tristitia, et si per modum habendi [conjecture: he means not that it should be had, but that it is about to be had--per modum habituri] et non habiti consurgit {necessario tristitia, et si per modum habendi et non habiti consurgit: om. Ra; tristitia, si autem per modum habendi consurgit added in margin} oppositum desiderii, cui non habemus nomen proprium {trs. JaRa} impositum. Ex quibus est {proprie Ra} concludendum {concluditur Ra} {trs. Ja} quod voluntas non se habet libere ad illos actus {ad illos actus: om. Ja}, scilicet delectationis et tristitie, nisi forte consequenter, scilicet inquantum se haberet libere ad illos {istos Ja} actus precedentes vel ad illum actum precedentem ad quos vel ad quem necessario {om. Ja} consequitur {sequitur Ra} huiusmodi delectatio vel *{et JaRa} tristitia. De his autem delectationibus et tristitiis determinatum est prius *{om. JaRaEr} multum in septimo libro, et ibi visum est in decima nona {decima nona: ultima Er} questione quod delectatio et tristitia non sunt idem quod {om. Ra} amor *{et odio add. Ra}, nec idem quod acceptatio et {vel Er} refutatio predicte {predicto Ja}, nec *{etiam add. JaRaEr} idem quod complacentia et {vel RaEr} displicentia, que sunt primi actus {anime add. Ra margin} attributi voluntati {trs. Ja} secundum quod dicitur voluntas. | But again, from {dicta} this acceptance or rejection, if together with acceptance there is an apprehension of the thing accepted {per modum habendi et non obtenti} as something to be had but not [yet] possessed, there necessarily follows desire; and if there is an apprehension of it as something {per modum habiti et obtenti} had and possessed, there necessarily follows {delectatio} pleasure. So also if there is an apprehension of the thing rejected as something {habiti} had, there necessarily arises {tristitia} sadness; and if as something [about] to be had but not [yet] had, there arises the opposite of desire, for which we have imposed no special name. From these points it must be inferred that the will is not {se habere} free as regards those acts, namely of pleasure and sadness, except perhaps "consequentially", namely in so far as it {se habere} is free as regards the preceding act or acts upon which such pleasure and sadness necessarily {consequitur} follow. Much was decided about these pleasures and sadnesses in Book VII, and it was seen there, in Question 19 [rather, Question 29, fol. 165 r], that pleasure and sadness are not the same as love and hate, and not the same as the acceptance and rejection referred to above, nor yet the same as the {complacentia} favour and {displicentia} disfavour that are the first acts attributed to the will {secundum quod dicitur} qua will. |
| Et notandum *{est etiam add. JaRa} {etiam add. Er} quod per predicta non intendo dicere quod non consequuntur *{sequuntur JaEr} delectationes et tristitie ad alios {istos Ja} actus voluntatis quantum ad {om. Ra} acceptationem vel refutationem - immo etiam {om. Ra} verum est quod ad simplicem complacentiam vel displicentiam {complacentiam ve displicentiam: apprehensionem intellectuale Er}, si cum ea sit apprehensio obiecti per modum presentis {?presencialiter vel ?presentis ?actus vel presencie Er} et habiti [conjecture: "presentis" and "habiti" and "obtenti" mean the same] consequitur {sequitur Ra} necessario delectatio ad complacentiam et tristitia ad displicentiam {trs. 321 Ja}. Et hoc potuit apparere {?appetere Ra} multotiens {?intellectus Ra} {om. Ja} in libris precedentibus. Nam in voluntario {?in add. Ja} mixto, licet obiectum acceptetur et non refutetur, tamen non solum ad acceptationem et presentiam actus {trs. RaEr} sequitur delectatio; immo etiam annexa est multa tristitia propter manentem {multam Er} displicentiam, licet sine refutatione. Et omnino obiecto apprehenso per modum presentis {presentialis Er} non abest {adest Er} ex toto delectatio nisi cesset complacentia nec {est add. Ra} tristitia nisi cesset {complacentia... cesset om. Er} displicentia. | It should be noted also that by the foregoing I do not mean to say that pleasures and sadnesses do not follow upon other acts of will in respect of acceptance or rejection -- rather, it is also true that upon simple {complacentia} favour and {displicentia} disfavour, if accompanied by an apprehension of the object {per modum presentis et habiti} as present and had, pleasure necessarily follows upon {complacentia} favour and sadness upon {displicentia} disfavour. This can be seen often in the preceding Books. For in the "mixed voluntary", although the object is accepted and not rejected, nevertheless not only pleasure follows upon the acceptance and the presence of the act, but much sadness is also annexed because of the remaining {displicentia} disfavour (though without rejection). And, {omnino} in general, when the object is apprehended {per modum presentis} as present, pleasure is not entirely absent unless {complacentia} favour ceases, nor sadness unless {displicentia} disfavour ceases. |
| Sed ulterius notandum *{est add. RaEr} quod illa {ista Ja} conclusio indiffinite {indiffinita Ja} {infinite Er} ponenda est, non universaliter, scilicet quod actum acceptationis vel refutationis voluntas libere producit libertate oppositionis quia cum hoc stat {quod add. Ja} ista {illa Er} [Pa 206 ra] conclusio {cum... conclusio: constat Ra} quod ad aliquem actum {refutationi vel add. Er} acceptationis, voluntas ut voluntas non se habet libere, immo ex precedente intellectuali apprehensione [Ra 10a] sequitur {de add. Er} necessario {necessaria Ra} acceptatio et volitio, et {om. Ra} impossibile est, stante huiusmodi apprehensione et iudicio, voluntatem iudicatum non velle {trs.231 Er}. Et hec conclusio declarata fuit in octava questione septimum libri, et eam {?ea Ja} ibi require {et... require: om. Er}. Apparet ergo {igitur JaRaEr} quod que in hoc loco {libro Ja} nunc {non Ra} *{om. JaEr} dicta sunt illa {om. Er} alibi sunt {alibi sunt: ab istis JaPbPr} {alibi sunt: ab illis AuMu} [ErMz=Pa] probata {trs. Er}, et hic {ita Ja} solum recapitulata. | But it should be noted, further, that this conclusion -- namely, that the will produces the act of acceptance or rejection freely, with freedom of opposition -- should be asserted indefinitely, not universally, because with this is consistent the conclusion that the will as will is not {se habere} free as regards some act of acceptance -- indeed, acceptance and volition follows necessarily from a preceding intellectual apprehension, and while this apprehension and judgment stand it is impossible for the will not to will the thing judged. This conclusion was explained in Question 8 of Book VII [fol. 145 rb]; look for it there. It appears, then, that the things said in this place have been proved elsewhere and are here only recapitulated. |
| Et sunt septem conclusiones de ipsa voluntate quantum ad libertatem oppositionis. Prima est quod voluntas est libera libertate oppositionis et {est... et om. Ja} quod nulla potentia est magis liber *{libera JaRa} hac {om. Er} libertate {oppositionis add. Er} quam voluntas. Secunda est quod voluntas libere producit {trs. Er} actum volendi vel nolendi, [Ja 324 rb] et nullum actum producit liberius quam actum volendi vel nolendi {et... nolendi: om. Er}. Tercia est quod voluntas non producit libere actus suos {trs. Ja} primos {trs. 231 RaEr} {om. Ja} que *{qui JaEr} sunt complacentia vel displicentia. Quarta est quod voluntas libere producit actum acceptationis vel refutationis. Quinta {conclusio add. JaRa} est {om. Ja} de actu amoris. Sexta *{conclusio add. JaEr} *{est add. RaEr} de actu delectationis vel {et Ja} tristitie. Septima est {om. Ja} quod ad aliquem actum acceptationis voluntas non libere se habet libertate oppositionis; ad quem autem se habet {habeat Er} libere et ad quem non, videndum est in septimo *{octava JaMuMzEr} [AuPbRa=Pa] questione octava *{septimi libri JaRaEr}. |
[Summary of discussion about acts attributed to will]There are seven conclusions about the will {quantum ad} in respect of freedom of opposition: The first is that the will is free by freedom of opposition and no power is more free by this freedom than the will is. The second is that the will freely produces the act of willing or nilling and produces no act more freely than the act of willing or nilling. The third is that the will does not produce its first acts freely, which are {complacentia} favour and {displicentia} disfavour. The fourth is that the will freely produces the act of acceptance or rejection. The fifth conclusion is about the act of love [see above, "And, third..."], the sixth conclusion is about the act of pleasure or sadness [see above, "But again..."]. The seventh is that the will is not freely {se habere} disposed with freedom of opposition in respect of some act of acceptance; toward which it is freely {se habere} disposed and which not must be seen in Question 8 of Book VII [fol. 144 v]. |
| Nunc {tunc Ja} {igitur add. JaRaEr} videndum est similiter {finaliter Ra} *{consimiliter JaEr} de ista {illa Er} libertate oppositionis quantum ad intellectum et actus sibi attributos ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, qui sunt simplices conceptus {de add. Ja} non complexi ex pluribus conceptibus, quos vocamus simplices apprehensiones, et *{om. JaRaPr} postea {post Ja} conceptus complexi. Multiplices sunt: {om. JaRaPr} {trs. Er} quidam sunt {enim JaRaErPr} complexi ex determinatione et determinabili, alii ex subiecto et predicato, affirmative vel negative, ut propositiones, alii ut *{om. JaRaPr} {videtur Er} iudicia {om. Er} assensiva *{affirmativa RaErPr} {assertiva Ja} quibus *{assentimus add. JaRaErPr} propositionibus tanquam veris et *{vel Er} dissentimus eis tanquam falsis; et adhuc circa propositiones sunt alii {? Ra} actus qui vocantur apparentie {om. Ra}, quibus propositio apparet {esse add. Ra} vera vel falsa cui tamen nondum assentimus vel {om. Er} dissentimus {om. Er}. Unde multotiens ad eandem conclusionem habemus rationes facientes nobis apparentiam quod sit vera et alias multas facientes nobis apparentiam quod sit {vera... sit: om. Er} falsa {et vera add. Er}, et tamen {om. Er} neutram partem adhuc assensive *{assertive JaRaErPr} iudicamus. Est autem iudicium fides *{vel add. JaEr} scientia {trs. Ra} vel opinio actualis ex quibus generantur {signatur Ra} fides, scientia vel {et RaEr} opinio habituales {habitualis JaRa}. Sunt etiam {autem Ra} alii actus intellectuales qui dicuntur discursus ex premissis ad conclusiones, et {vel Ja} inventiones mediorum et comparationes et abstractiones et {om. Ra} huiusmodi talia {om. Ja}. De quibus alibi {alii Ra} distinguendum {est add. Er} {pertractandum Ja} et perscrutandum est {om. RaEr}. |
[Acts attributed to the intellect]Now, therefore, we must similarly investigate this freedom of opposition in relation to the intellect and the acts attributed to it {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, which are simple concepts not composed of several concepts, which we call "simple apprehensions", and afterwards complex concepts. They [i.e. complex concepts] are multiple. Some are composed of determination and determinable, others of subject and predicate, either affirmatively or negatively (such as propositions), others [are] assertive judgments by which we assent to propositions as being true or dissent from them as being false. And again, concerning propositions there are other acts called "seemings", by which a proposition seems true or false, though we do not yet assent to it or dissent (thus we often have arguments to the same conclusion that make it seem to us to be true and many others that make it seem to us to be false, {et tamen} but we do not yet judge either side assertively); judgement, however, is actual faith or knowledge or opinion, from which are generated habitual faith or knowledge or opinion. There are also other intellectual acts which we call {discursus} arguing from premises to conclusion, and discovery of means [of proof], and comparisons and abstractions and the like. These must be distinguished and examined thoroughly elsewhere. |
| Quantum autem {om. Ra} ad propositum spectat, videtur *{breviter PrEr} *{pro add. JaRaEr} octava conclusio *{conclusione JaRaEr} tenenda *{tenendum est JaRaErPr} quod intellectus non se habet *{habeat JaRaEr} libere ad primos actus suos {trs. Er}, quia nec voluntas ad suos {ad suos: om. JaPr} ut dictum est; quod tamen magis videtur *{videretur AuJaPbMzPr} [MuRaEr=Pa] | As far as our purpose is concerned, however, (briefly) for an eighth conclusion we should hold that the intellect is not {se habere} free as regards its first acts, because the will is not to its, as has been said (which, however, should be seen more clearly). {meaning ?} |
| Sed [Ra 10b] est dubitatio magis {trs. RaPr} de aliis actibus, puta ponamus quod intellectus {quod intellectus: om. Ra, added in margin} est informatus pluribus conceptibus simplicibus et {tunc Er} potest ex eis formare {trs.312 Er} propositionem affirmativam et {om. Er} potest {vel Er} negativam, ut quod lapis *{homo Ja} est animal, et quod lapis *{homo Ja} non est animal. Et utramque potest formare non formando aliam, et potest ambas {om. Ra} formare et eas {ea Ra} simul conservare {trs. Ra} in se *{trs. 231 JaEr} formatas: an ergo {igitur RaJaEr} intellectus sic informatus pluribus *{simplicibus JaRaEr} conceptibus possit {potest JaRaEr} libere formare affirmationem {trs. Er} aut non formare, formare negationem aut non formare {aut add. Ra} formare unam solam aut ambas? Hoc autem determinare est difficile, quia parum exquisitum. |
[A doubt]But about the other acts [besides the first] there is more doubt. For example, let us suppose that the intellect is informed by several simple concepts and can form an affirmative proposition from them and can also form a negative -- for example, that "a man is an animal" and that "a man is not an animal". It can form either without forming the other and it can form both and conserve them, once formed, together in itself. Is the intellect, therefore, when it is thus informed by simple concepts, able freely to form an affirmation or not form it, form a negation or not form it, or form one only or both? To determine this question is difficult, since it has been little investigated. |
| Posset ergo {igitur JaRaEr} videri aliquibus quod intellectus in hoc {se Ra} habeat {habet Er} libertatem oppositionis ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, quia, licet [licet interlinear addition Ra] concessum fuerit quod voluntas michi precipiat {trs. Ja} studere in geometria {trs.231 Er} tamen non precipit michi {ei Er} seu {vel Er} intellectui {mihi Er} quod tales premissas formem vel premittam, quod illas {om. Ra} {ipsas Er} ordinem in prima figura vel *{in add. JaRaEr} secunda. Videretur {videtur RaEr} enim esse impedimentum *{et retardatio add. JaRaEr} processus et {in Ja} speculationis {?speculativis Ja} et retardatio *{et retardatio: om. RaEr} si in utroque {quolibet RaEr} talium actuum particularium {om. Er} oportet recurrere ad actum et determinationem voluntatis. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} dicendum est quod {om. Ja} intellectus ad hoc {trs. 231 JaRaEr} potest se {om. Er} determinare libere. | To some it could seem, therefore, that in this matter the intellect has freedom of opposition {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, because, although it has been conceded that the will may command me to study geometry, it does not command me or my intellect to form or lay down such-and-such premises or to arrange them in the first or second figure. For it would seem an obstacle and {retardatio} a drag on the {processus in speculativis} thinking process if in each such particular act one must go back to an act and determination of the will. It should be said, therefore, that in this respect the intellect can determine itself freely. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, si per actum voluntatis essent {esse Ja} tales determinationes in {?etiam Ja} processu [Ja 324 va] speculativo, tunc voluntas magis esset {trs. Er} domina habituum speculativorum {trs. 2341 Ja} quam intellectus, quod non videtur concedendum. | Again, if in the thinking process there were such determinations by act of will, then the will would be more the lord of thinking habits than the intellect, which it does not seem should be conceded. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, etiam sequeretur *{sequitur JaRa} quod in studio speculativo ita acquireretur {requiretur Ja} virtus et habitus proprius in voluntate sicut {et add. Er} in intellectu {sicut in intellectu: om. Ra}, quia sicut ex actibus intellectus acquiritur {requiretur Ja} habitus in intellectu, ita ex actibus {?habitibus Ja} voluntatis debet {?deberet Ja} habitus acquiri in voluntate; et hoc non dicitur {videtur Er}. | Again, it also follows that in {studio speculativo} speculative study a special virtue and habit would be acquired in the will just as there is in the intellect, because just as a habit is acquired in the intellect from acts of the intellect, so a habit should be acquired in the will from the acts of will; and we do not say this. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, antequam formarem {formem JaRa} illam propositionem mentalem, lapis *{homo Ja} est animal, vel lapis *{homo Ja} non est animal, ego non {om. Er} cognoveram illas {istas JaEr} propositiones. Cum ergo {igitur JaRaEr} voluntas non possit {trs. 231 RaEr} ferri in incognitum, impossiblile est quod voluntas per actum volendi determinet me {trs.45123 Er} ad formationem illius vel {om. Er} illius {om. Er} propositionis. | Again, before I formed the mental proposition "A man is an animal" or "A man is not an animal" I did not know those propositions. Therefore, since the will cannot be {ferri in} carried toward what is unknown, it is impossible for the will to determine me by an act of willing to form this or that proposition. |
| Sed ad oppositum posset alicui videri quod in hoc [in hoc: deleted Ra] intellectus non habet *{habeat JaRaEr} {in hoc add. Ra} dominium et libertatem sed voluntas, quia si {trs. Er} dicat *{dicas RaEr} {dicis Ja} mihi "Forma {mihi add. Er} unam propositionem {et add. Er} ex {de Ra} istis {hiis Er} terminis, homo et animal", constat quod obediendo tibi {obediendo tibi: om. Ja} [leaves space] in potestate voluntatis mee {mei Ja} {trs. Ja} et *{est RaEr} {om. Ja} formare {om. Ja} affirmativam, vel {et Ra} formare negativam. Si enim volo formare negativam {si... negativam om. Er}, formo eam {trs. Ra} et dico {dicam Ra} quod {om. Er} "Homo non est animal", et {sed Ra} si queratur {dicas Ra} *{queras Ja} {quereres Er} quare formavi illam {istam Ja} negativam falsam et non affirmativam, que est vera {que est vera: veram Ra}, ego non possum respondere nisi quia sic volui. Et si { et si: vel sic Er} volo studio {studeo Ra} *{studere JaEr} in geometria vel {et Ra} si volo {studeo add. Ra} in {geometria... in: om. Er} theologia et si incepi [Ra 11a] in geometria possum desistere sive {sic Er} statim post primam conclusionem sive etiam statim post maioris formationem, et {sive etiam... et: om. Er} transfero {transferre Er} me ad aliud, si volo, prout unusquisque videtur in se experiri. {et add. Er} Ideo videtur quod {om. Ra} {in add. JaRaEr} his et in quolibet eorum {alio Er} voluntas habet {habeat Ja} libertatem et dominium. | But, on the opposite side, it could seem to someone that in this matter the intellect does not have lordship and freedom but the will does. For if you say to me, "Form a proposition from the terms 'man' and 'animal'", it is certain that when I obey you it is in the power of my will to form either an affirmative or a negative. If I wish to form a negative, I form it and say that "a man is not an animal", and if you ask why I have formed that false negative and not the affirmative (which is true), I cannot answer except by saying, "Because I willed to do so". If I wish to study geometry, and if I wish to study theology, and if I begin in geometry, I can stop, either immediately after the first conclusion or even immediately after forming the major premise, and transfer myself to the other, if I wish, as everyone seems to experience in himself. It therefore seems that in these and in each of them the will has freedom and lordship. |
| Item, philosophia, et speculatio secundum philosophiam, mirabiles habent delectationes, ut dicitur *{habetur JaRaEr} decimo huius *{Ethicorum RaEr} [1177 a26], et non solum in fine sed in qualibet conclusione et quolibet processu. Delectationes autem ille {iste Ja} sunt actus ipsius {om. Er} voluntatis. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} per totum voluntas operatur et habet dominium. | Also, philosophy and {speculatio} philosophical thinking have marvelous {delectatio} pleasures, as we read in Book X of the Ethics [1177 a25], and not only in the end but in every conclusion and in every argument. But these pleasures are acts of the will itself. Therefore the will works and has lordship throughout. |
| Item, si in talibus intellectus {trs. 312 Ra} haberet dominium et non voluntas, sequeretur {sequitur Ja} quod intellectus per prius haberet libertatem {potestatem Ra} [aliter libertatem in margin] et dominium super actum suum {volendi Ra} {om. Ja} quam voluntas super suum, scilicet super actum volendi {quam... volendi om. Ra} [added in margin] *{quod est contra prius dicta /trs. Er\; dictum est enim quod anima nullum actum producit liberius /trs. Er\ quam actum volendi add. JaRaEr} aut nolendi, et quod illi non essent *{non essent: sunt JaRaEr} primi actus {om. Er} quorum sumus {? Ja} domini dominio et libertate oppositionis. Consequentia autem patet {apparet Ra}, quia oportet prius {trs. RaEr} intellectum iudicare de bonitate vel malitia {ipsius add. Ra} obiecti quam voluntas acceptet vel refutet - immo priusquam voluntas {acceptet... voluntas om. Ja} habeat in eo {trs. 231 RaEr} complacentiam {placentiam Ra} vel displicentiam. Et tamen illud iudicium, scilicet quod hoc {obiectum Er} est bonum vel {bonum vel: om. Ja} conveniens, cadit super {supra Ra} propositionem formatam. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} si intellectus in formatione {informatione Ja} propositionis habet libertatem oppositionis, ipse *{per add. JaRaEr} prius habet eam {om. Ra} quam voluntas super actum volitionis. | Also, if in such matters the intellect had lordship and not the will, it would follow that the intellect would have freedom and lordship over its act {per prius} before the will had over its (i.e. over the act of willing), which is against what was said before; for it was said that the soul produces no act more freely than the act of willing or nilling and that these are the first acts of which we are lords by lordship and freedom of opposition. The inference is clear, because it is necessary for the intellect to judge concerning the goodness or badness of the object before the will accepts or rejects -- indeed, before the will has {complacentia} favour or {displicentia} disfavour towards it. Yet that judgment, namely that this is good or suitable, bears on a formed proposition. If, therefore, in forming a proposition the intellect has freedom of opposition, it has it before the will has it over the act of volition. |
| Ad huius evidentiam notandum est quod anima {ewt libera add. Er} ad multos actus intellectuales se habet libere primo *{immo JaPbRa} [Mz=Pa] et ad multos {actus add. Ra} spirituales {intellectuales... multos: om. Er} *{sensuales AuJaPbRaMzMuEr} et corporales et exteriores secundum quod dictum est in tertio libro {trs. 34512 JaRaEr}. Cum enim voluntas producat libere {trs. JaRaEr} actum volendi omnis actus qui ab illa volitione procedit, et sine illa volitione non procederet, dici *{dicitur JaRaEr} videtur {om. JaRaEr} ex {om. Er} potestate {om. Er} et {a add. Er} libertate *{nostra add. JaRaEr} procedere *{libere add. JaRaEr}, ut studere, sedere, {trs. Er} *facere {om. JaRaEr}, stare {trs. RaEr}, ire ad scholas, secare ligna {lignum, ?studere questiones Ja}, etc. Verbi gratia, intellectus meus sententiat quod expedit {expediens est RaEr} {expediat Ja} michi facere domum, ex qua sententia voluntas vult quod ego [Ja 324 vb] faciam, non necessitata per illam sententiam ad volendum sed libere formans {formam Er} actum {actus Ja} volendi, sed *{licet JaEr} non posset illum {istum Ja} formare sine illa {ista Ja} sententia precedente [exat peccante deleted, precedente in margin Ra]{? Ja}. Et {om. JaEr} ex illo {isto Ja} velle sensus et appetitus sensitivus et membra mea cum securi *{cum securi: et securis JaRaEr} agunt ad faciendum illam {istam JaEr} domum, scilicet *{sensus JaRaEr} secando *{cognoscendo JaRaEr} ligna etc., et cum {tamen JaRa} appetitu sensitivo movendo membra que movent securim in *{om. JaRaEr} scindendo *{scindentem JaRaEr} ligna. Nos ergo {igitur JaRa} per hec omnia agentes, dicimur has omnes actiones libere producere -- non quia securis libere scindat; prenecessitata enim {om. Ja} est {trs. Ra} per membra; nec membra movent securim {per sensum add. Er} libere, quia prenecessitata sunt ad movendum per sensum et {ad Ra} {per sensum et: om. Ja} appetitum sensitivum; nec {sic Ja} iterum sensus ad movendum membra, nec {vel JaRaEr} appetitus sensitivus agunt libere, quia ad hoc prenecessitati {prenecessitata Ja} sunt per volitionem qua *{que JaRaEr} attribuitur voluntati secundum quod dicitur voluntas: quam volitionem voluntas {om. Ra} tam {non Ra} *{iam JaAuMuMzPbEr} {trs. Ja} producit libere quam *{quia JaRaMzAuMuPbEr} non necessitata per aliud {aliquid Ja} {aliquod Er} premium *{previum JaRaPrMzAu} [Mu=Pa] Sic ergo {igitur JaRaEr} libertatem {voluntatem Ja} et dominium super hec omnia attribuimus voluntati {volendi Ra}, et nulli {nulle Ra} {ulli Ja} potentie inferiori; quia hec omnia non sunt in potestate nostra secundum libertatem oppositionis nisi per {quia ad JaRaEr} volitionem supra *{super JaRaEr} quam primo habemus {trs. Ra} hanc libertatem, ad quam {ad quam: om. JaRa} omnia necessario consequuntur si non sit impedimentum, ita {et JaRaEr} quod sine {om. Er} illa volitione non consequerentur. |
[Solution of the doubt (conclusions 9-12)]To make this evident it must be noted that the soul is {se habere} free as regards many intellectual acts, indeed many sensual and bodily and external acts, in accordance with what was said in Book III. Since the will freely produces the act of willing, every act that proceeds from that volition and would not proceed without it is said to proceed freely from our power and freedom; for example, to study, to sit, to stand, to go to class, to cut wood, etc. For example, my intellect judges that it is useful for me to make a house; from this judgment the will wills me to make it -- not necessitated to willing by that judgment, but freely forming the act of willing, though it could not form it without the preceding judgment. From that act of willing, the sense and sense appetite and my limbs and the axe work to make the house -- the sense by knowing the wood, etc., and together with the sensitive appetite moving the limbs that move the axe cutting the wood. We ourselves, therefore, acting through all these, are said to produce all these actions freely: not because the axe cuts freely, for it is prenecessitated by my limbs; and my members do not move the axe freely, because they are prenecessitated to moving it by the sense and the sensitive appetite; nor again [does] the sense [freely act] to move my limbs, nor does the sensitive appetite act freely, because they are prenecessitated by the volition, which is attributed to the will {secundum quod} qua will; the will, {iam} however, produces this volition freely, because it is not necessitated by anything previous. Thus, therefore, we attribute freedom and lordship over all of these to the will and to no inferior power, because none of them is in our power {secundum} according to freedom of opposition except through the volition over which we first {primo} have this freedom; upon this volition, if there is no obstacle, everything necessarily follows, in such a way that without that volition they would not follow. |
| Istis ergo {igitur JaRaEr} prenotatis {notatis JaRaEr}, patet {apparet JaRaEr} quod dupliciter {om. Ja} aliquis actus est *{dicitur RaJaEr} {dupliciter add. Ja} [dupliciter added in margin, Ra] in potestate nostra {om. Ja} libera {trs. Ja}. Uno {primo Er} modo quia ipsum producimus per nullum {per nullum: ? Ja} [pro nunc? proprio?] tamen {?cum Ja} *{actum Er} previum [actum add. Ra margin] necessitati {prenecessitati Er} ad producendum ipsum quando ipsum producimus et hoc potest vocari liberum {om. Ra}[added Ra in margin] secundum {per Er} se; sic autem *{libere add. JaEr} producimus actum volendi vel nolendi. Alio modo quod *{quia RaEr} {om. Ja} ipse necessario non existente impedimento, sequitur ad illum actum nostrum secundum se liberum, ita *{et JaRaEr} quod sine eo non fieret, et talem actum {non add. Ja} {nos add. Er} possemus *{possumus JaRaEr} vocare liberum consecutive. Vel {nota Er} quidam vocant primum actum {trs. 231 JaRaEr} liberum *{libere AuJaMuMzPb} [RaEr=Pa] elicitum, quia voluntas producit {elicit Er} ipsum libere {et add. Ra} immediate, secundum autem vocant actum {om. Er} {trs. Ra} libere imperatum, quia voluntas iubet aliis potentiis nostris {trs. JaRaEr} quod illos actus exsequantur, ut quando {quod JaRaEr} voluntas iubet [om. Ra, in margin] ad *{quod JaRa} {ut Er} speculandum *{speculetur JaRaEr} intellectui {intellectum Ja} {trs. 312 JaRa} circa {om. Ja} tales *{talem JaRaEr} vel tales *{talem JaRaEr} scientias *{scientiam JaRaEr}; ex ea *{qua JaRaEr} iussione intellectus necessitatur ad speculandum, et speculatur si non sit impedimentum. Ita in virtuoso iubet voluntas appetitui sensitivo ut non acceptet delectabile ostensum sibi per sensum donec ratio viderit an sit honestum, deinde precipis *{precipit JaRaEr} intellectui quod consideret an illud delectabile sit honestum vel inhonestum; quo considerato iubet iterum appetitui sensitivo quod ipsum {illud JaRa} acceptet, vel quod {om. Ja} ipsum refutet {trs. Ra}. Postea iubet sensui et {seu Ra} appetitui sensitivo sive {seu Er} virtuti motive quod moveat membra ad exsecutionem exterioris *{exteriorum JaRa} voliti, ut {et Ja} ad intrandum balneum vel ad intrandum *{faciendum RaEr} domum {intrandum domum: ? Ja}, et sic de aliis. Et omnes ille {iste Ja} iussiones *{non add. JaRaEr} sunt *{nisi add. JaRaEr} necessitates *{necessitationes JaRa} illarum {istarum Ja} potentiarum ad operandum et {vel Ja} ad sic operandum {et... operandum: om. Er}, ad que anima eas {trs. Ja} necessitat per volitionem et actus suos alios {actus Ra} precedentes, si non sit impedimentum. | Now that we have noted these points, it is clear, therefore, that an act is said to be in our free power in two ways: in one way because we produce it without being necessitated by any previous act to produce it when we do produce it, and this can be called "free {secundum se} in itself" -- and thus we freely produce the act of willing or nilling; in another way because, if there is no obstacle, it follows necessarily upon that act of ours that is free {secundum se} in itself and would not happen without it; and such an act we can call "free {consecutive} consequentially". Or some call the first act "freely elicited", because the will freely produces it immediately, and they call the second act "freely commanded", because the will commands our other powers to carry out those acts, for example when the will commands the intellect to engage in {speculare} thought concerning such or such a science: by that command the intellect is necessitated to engage in {speculare} thought and does so if there is no obstacle. Thus in a virtuous man the will {iubere} commands the sensitive appetite not to accept something pleasurable shown to it by the sense until reason sees whether it is {honestum} virtuous, then it {precipere} instructs the intellect to consider whether this pleasurable thing is virtuous or not virtuous; when that has been considered, it again {iubet} commands the sensitive appetite to accept it or to reject it. Afterwards it commands the sense and the sensitive appetite or the motive power to move the limbs to carry out the outward acts willed, for example to go into a bath or to make a house, and so on. And all these {iussiones} commands are only {necessitationes} necessitatings of the powers to act and to act in a certain way, to which, if there is no obstacle, the soul necessitates them through the volition and its other preceding acts. |
| Secundum hoc {Secundum hoc: sic Ra} ergo {igitur JaRaEr} {trs. Ja} ponatur nona conclusio, quod anima libere producit multos actus {trs. Ra} intellectuales, quos tamen ipsa producit [Ra 12a] ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, quia non solum dicimur producere libere {trs. 312 RaJaEr} actus *{libere elicitos sive add. JaRa} {elicitos add. Er} secundum se liberos -- immo etiam actus libere imperatos seu consecutive liberos {immo... liberos om. Ja}, ut dictum est, sed actus quos intellectus producit ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus sunt sepe actus liberi *{libere RaJaEr} a voluntate imperati {liberati Ja}. Verbi gratia, [Ja 325 ra] studium et {ut Ja} speculatio geometrica attribuuntur {sunt attributa JaRaEr} intellectui secundum quod intellectus, et tamen illos {actus add. Er} exercemus aliquando {trs. Er} per electionem et {per electionem et: secundum Er} volitionem, ut si in {om. Er} nobis querimus anne {aut Ra} {an JaEr} ibimus ad prandium vel ante studebimus modicum et speculabimur {speculemur Ra} *{modicum add. Ja} in geometria; {et add. Er} iudicato quod sit studendum, voluntas acceptat {acceptabie Er} et volumus studere; ad quam volitionem cum non sumus *{simus JaRa} impediti, necessario sequitur {trs. JaRaEr} quod studebimus et speculabimur {?speculemur Ja} {in geometria: add. Er}. | {secundum} In accordance with this, then, let us assert a ninth conclusion: that the soul freely produces many intellectual acts, but produces them {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect. For we are said to produce freely not only acts freely elicited or free {secundum se} in themselves, but also acts that are freely commanded or free {consecutive} consequentially, as has been said; but the acts that the intellect produces {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect are often acts freely commanded by the will. For example, study and geometrical {speculare} thinking are attributed to the intellect {secundum quod} qua intellect, and yet we sometimes perform those by choice and volition, for example if we inquire in ourselves whether we will go to dinner or first study a little and {speculare} think a little in geometry. When we judge that we should study, the will accepts and we will to study; upon this volition, since we are not obstructed, it follows necessarily that we will study and {speculare} think. |
| Decima conclusio ponitur quod anima producens libere illos {om. Er} actus {suos add. Er} intellectuales imperatos non producit eos libere secundum quod dicitur intellectus solum, sed etiam secundum quod dicitur voluntas, ita quod libertas in producendo eos {om. Ra} attribuitur anime non solum ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, sed etiam ea ratione qua {om. Ja} dicitur voluntas. Quia anima producens illam {istam Ja} speculationem ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus est {in hoc add. Ra} prenecessitata per volitionem {intellectum Ja} que non debetur {? Ra} anime secundum quod dicitur intellectus. Prout autem prenecessitata est non dicitur libere {om. Ja} agere. Non ergo {igitur JaEr} dicetur {om. Ja} *{dicitur Er} libere agere {non... agere: om. Ra} ea ratione qua producit illam {istam Ja} speculationem, sed ea ratione qua imperat illam {istam Ja} productionem. Imperat autem eam per volitionem que attribuitur anime ea ratione qua dicitur voluntas. Ergo {igitur Ra} libertas in producendo {anime add. Ja} illam {istam Ja} speculationem anime attribuitur *{anime attribuitur: attribuendum */attribuenda Er\ est anime RaEr} ut [anime ut ? in Ra margin] dicitur voluntas {anime... voluntas: ista ratione ut dicitur voluntas Ja} | A tenth conclusion is asserted, that when the soul freely produces those commanded intellectual acts, it does not produce them freely {secundum quod} qua intellect only but also qua will, so that freedom in producing them is attributed to the soul not only {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect but also {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. For when the soul produces that {speculare} thought {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect it is in this prenecessitated by a volition, which is not due to the soul qua intellect. So far as it is prenecessitated, however, it is not said to act freely. It is therefore not said to act freely {ea ratione qua producit} qua producing that {speculare} thought, but {ea ratione qua imperat} qua commanding that production. But it commands it by volition, which is attributed to the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. Therefore freedom in producing that {speculare} thought must be attributed to the soul {ut dicitur} as it is called will. |
| Undecima conclusio {est seu add. Ra} ponitur quod omnino {aliquando add. Er} similem actum speculationis producimus aliquando {om. Er} libere aliquando non libere. Dico libere {Dico libere: om. Ra} ut in casu predicto, quia per liberum imperium voluntatis. *{sed add. JaRaEr} Dico non libere quia sine tali imperio seu {sive Er} actu voluntatis {trs. 3421 Ra}, posito *{ponendo JaRaEr} casu *{casum JaRaEr} quod Sortes expergefactus a sompno surgat *{surgit RaEr} {om. Ja} et occurat *{occurit JaRaEr} aspectui *{conspectui JaRaEr} suo liber geometrie, et propter consuetudinem {om. Er} legit in eo et studet et speculatur, possibile est quod in isto {illo Er} processu {casu Ra} nullus est actus libere {om. Er} secundum se {trs. 231 JaRa} elicitus *{scilicet add. JaRaEr} quin potentia *{immediate producens eum add. JaRaEr} sit predeterminata et prenecessitata ad producendum eum {om. Ra}, supposito quod non interveniat impedimentum. Nam ille {iste Ja} non libere expergiscitur, sed necessitate naturali, aut forte {om. Ja} violente *{violenta JaRaEr}, et {om. Ra} cum surgat {cum surgat: consurgit JaRa} et vadit non oportet quod ille *{om. JaRaEr} libere hoc {trs. Ja} faciat, quia sic {om. Ra} surgeret {surget Ra} {consurgeret Ja} aut iret {? Ra} canis quem nichil [between lines in Er] dicimus facere libere, vel puer nondum habens usum rationis; nec ipse {om. Er} ex libertate {?necessitate Er} arbitrii {ipse add. Er} inveniret liberos *{librum JaRaEr} ibi positos *{positum JaRaEr}, sed [Ra 12b] quia ibi positi {positus JaRa} erant {erat Ja} preter eius {huius Ja} intentionem, et {om. Ja} si consequenter {? Ja} videat *{et add. JaRa} legat et studeat in eo, non est necesse ad hoc facere quod ipse preconsideret si est legendum vel preiudicet si est *{si est: om. JaRaEr} legendum, tunc *{esse JaRaEr} nec per consequens quod voluntate preacceptet tunc *{esse JaRaEr} legendum. Satis enim sine {om. Ra} hoc determinatus est {om. Ra} {satis... est: om. Er} ad legendum ex obiecti presentia et {ex add. Ja} assuetudine {assuetudinem Ra} legendi istud {et studendi Ra} *{om. Ja}. Sed tu queres utrum ergo *{om. JaRaEr} illa lectio vel speculatio est voluntaria. Et *{om. JaRaEr} ego respondeo primo quod non dicitur proprie {trs. Er} involuntaria {voluntaria RaMuAu}, {et... involuntaria: om. Pb} quia {que Ra} non est contra voluntatem, nec est propriissime voluntaria, quia nichil operatur tunc {trs. Ra} ad hoc imperium voluntatis, scilicet actus volitionis {scilicet actus volitionis add. Ja}. Sed dicitur communiter *{conjecture: consequenter} {consequenter or communiter JaPrMu} [AuErPbRa=Pa; cf. fol. cxlv] [Mz has cor] {trs. Ja} voluntaria {om. Ja} vel quia assuetudo studendi vel {et Ra} speculandi ad hoc operatur et {operatur et: om. Ja} determinat, que quidem assuetudo fuit acquisita per actus voluntarios, aut {vel JaRaEr} quia si intellectus potuisset *{posuisset JaRaEr} querere *{questionem JaRaEr} an esset ibi {ita Er} studendum vel *{et JaRaEr} speculandum, tunc {trs. 312 Ra} sententiasset quod sic {om. Ra}, et tunc voluntas hoc acceptasset *{imperasset JaRaEr} {trs. JaRa}. | An eleventh conclusion is asserted, that we produce an altogether similar act of {speculare} thinking sometimes freely, sometimes not freely: I say freely, as in the case above, because by a free command of the will, but I say not freely because without such a command or act of the will. Suppose the following case: Socrates, waking from sleep, gets up and a book of geometry meets his gaze, and out of habit he reads in it and studies and {speculare} thinks. It is possible that in this {processus} sequence there is no act that is {secundum se} in itself freely elicited {quin} but that the power immediately producing it is predetermined and prenecessitated to producing it if no obstacle intervenes. For he does not wake up freely but by natural (or perhaps violent) necessity. And when he gets up and walks he need not do so freely, for a dog, which we say does nothing freely, or a boy, who does not yet have the use of reason, would in the same way get up or walk. And he does not find the book placed there by free choice, but because it was put there apart from his intention. And if he subsequently sees it and reads and studies in it, to do this he need not first consider whether to read, or first judge that it should be read, nor, consequently, must he first accept by [an act of] will that it should be read, for without this [act] he is sufficiently determined to read by the object's presence and his habit of reading. But you ask whether this reading or {speculare} thinking is voluntary? I answer, first, that it is not properly said to be involuntary, because it is not against his will, and it is not in the most proper sense voluntary, because a command of the will, i.e. an act of volition, on this occasion {nichil operatur ad hoc} contributes nothing to the action; but it is said to be {communiter or consequenter} "consequentially" voluntary either because the habit of studying or {speculare} thinking determines him to this and the habit was acquired by voluntary acts, or because, if his intellect had posed the question whether he should then study and {speculare} think, then he would have {sententiasset} judged that he should and then the will would have commanded it. |
| Similter etiam conclusio patet, quia {om. Ra} intemperatus aliquando presente obiecto {om. Ra} {trs. Er} statim per sensum et passionem et habitum consuetudinalem intemperate *{intemperantie JaRaEr} sine [om. Ra, in margin] previa intellectuali consideratione determinatus currit ad actum [Ja 325 rb] sicut *{una add. JaRa} bestia et agit intemperate {et agit intemperate add. Ra} *{et aliquando ex electione et consideratione intellectuali querit obiectum et inveniens et /etiam JaEr\ agit intemperate add. JaEr} [Ra in margin]. Non obstante tamen {om. Ja} hoc, ille {hoc ille: hee due Er} operationes que secundum passionem *{passiones JaRa} et {secundum add. Er} sensum fiunt {? Ja} non cooperante volitione proprie dicta sunt nobis culpabiles et *{trs.231 Er} imputabiles [Pa 215a] tanquam quodammodo voluntarie, eodemmodo quo determinavimus in tertio libro. | Likewise, also, the conclusion is clear because sometimes an intemperate person, when the object is present, immediately runs to the act, determined through sense and passion and accustomed habit of intemperance without previous intellectual consideration, like a beast, and acts intemperately (and sometimes from choice and intellectual consideration he seeks the object and, finding it, also acts intemperately). Yet despite this, activities that come about {secundum} from the passions and sense without the cooperation of the will are, properly speaking, culpable and imputable to us as being in some way voluntary, in the way we determined in Book III. |
| Item, si sine actu volitionis dicamus nihil fieri libere {trs. Er} secundum predictam {dictam Er} libertatem oppositionis, sequitur quod tu non {om. Er} formasti libere primam propositionem quam tu formasti, quia non concurrebat ad hoc volitio, sicut dicebamus prius; et tamen talem tu potes *{modo /omnino Er\ voluntarie et libere add. JaRaEr} formare; ergo {igitur JaRaEr} etc. | Also, if we say that without an act of volition nothing is done freely {secundum} with the freedom of opposition referred to earlier, it follows that you did not form freely the first proposition you formed, because volition did not concur in that, as we said before; and yet you can now form such proposition voluntarily and freely; therefore, etc. |
| Nunc {tunc Ra} duodecimam conclusionem {trs. JaRaEr} pono talem: quia {quod JaEr} intellectus humanus nullum actum intelligendi producit {habeat Ra} libere tamquam actum secundum se libere elicitum, licet bene tamquam *{actum liberum add. JaRa} {actum add. Er} imperatum. Hanc conclusionem nescirem evidenter probare *{demonstrare JaRaEr}, sed opinor eam ex {om. Ra} debili persuasione: quia *{om. Er} nec contra eam habeo rationem difficilem. Persuadetur autem hoc *{conclusio JaRaEr} sic. Nullam talem ponimus {trs. JaRaEr} libertatem in inanimatis {animatis JaRa} in plantis et in brutis, sed solum in naturis intellectualibus; et {sed Ja} tamen videmus {om. Ra} {trs. Ja} carnem *{canem RaEr} {om. Ja} posse in effectus {effectum Ja} contrarios {contrarium Ja}, ut {om. Ja} modo *{sedere modo add. JaRaEr} ambulare *{et ambulare add. RaEr} modo ad dextram, modo ad sinistram {modo ad dexteram... sinsitram om. Ja}, modo antecedere, modo retrocedere {reverti JaRaEr}, ac si tales {talis Ra} actus libere produceret {producere Ra}. Dicimus tamen eum nullum talium {om. Ra} {talem Ja} libere operari {talem add. Ra}, sed in his omnibus et singulis esse prenecessitatum {necessitatum Ja} ex concurrentibus circumstantiis, scilicet vel ex obiectis *{extra add. RaEr} {?externe Ja} [Ra 13a] apparentibus {?asserentibus Ja} vel ex speciebus in fantasia reservatis aliter et aliter se sensui communi reputantibus *{representantibus RaEr} {representantur Ja} et *{ex add. JaRaEr} commotionibus {commotione Ja} sanguinis et spirituum, per potentiam vegetativam {trs. JaRaEr}, autem {et Ja} {at Er} etiam ex virtutibus celestibus [celestibus added in margin Ra] et aliis nobis ignotis *{ad add. JaRaEr} huiusmodi actuum diversorum alternationes {huius add. Ja} operantibus et determinantibus. Et quia tales causas determinantes *{canem add. JaRaEr} ad illas {istas JaEr} diversas operationes et {vel Er} oppositas assignare nescimus, putamus prima facie quod sic {om. Ra} agat {agit Ra} libere, scilicet *{om. JaEr} quia {quasi Er} sibi *{sic JaRaEr} placet {placeat Er} {et add. Ra} *{ei add. JaEr}, sicut dicimus *{diceremus JaRaEr} {haec add. Ja} de nobis. Hec omnia primo supponimus *{supponamus JaRaEr}. Secundo etiam suppono quod ex dictis *{predictis JaRa} aliqui sumpserunt *{sibi add. JaRaEr} opinionem quod ita in nobis omnia {om. Ra} [in margin] {om. Ja} provenirent {preveniret Ra} {perveniret Ja} ex predeterminationibus *{determinationibus JaEr} sicut et in brutis, quia sicut {om. Ra} de cane dicimus *{diximus RaEr}, sic et {om. Ja} de nobis dicere possumus *{possemus JaRa}. Et ad huiusmodi {huius Ra} opinionis reprobationem {improbationem Er} parvas rationes habemus, nisi ex fide nostra {om. Er} catholica, et quia si *{sic JaRaEr} essemus in omnibus actibus nostris {trs. JaRaEr} necessario predeterminati {trs. Er} *{propter quod add. JaRaEr} illi non essent nobis imputabiles ad meritum vel demeritum, quod non solum fidei nostre, sed etiam scientiis et principiis moralibus repugnat *{oppugnare videtur JaRaEr}. Ideo illam {illa Ra} {ista Ja} libertatem {libertate Ra} nobis non {om. Er} attribuimus plusquam brutis, nisi ad salvandum quod {et Ja} bene vel male, meritorie vel demeritorie, et *{nobis add. JaRaEr} imputabiliter agamus. | I now assert a twelfth conclusion, as follows: that the human intellect produces no act of understanding freely as an act {secundum se} in itself freely elicited, though indeed [it may produce such an act] as a "free commanded" act. I do not know how to demonstrate this conclusion evidently; I hold it as an opinion because of a {debilis} weak persuasion and have no difficult argument against it. The conclusion is argued for persuasively as follows. We assert no such freedom in inanimate things and plants and brutes but only in intellectual natures, and yet we see that a dog has power to produce opposite effects, for example now sitting, now walking, walking now to the right, now to the left, now forward, now back again, as if it produced such acts freely. Yet we say that it does none of such acts freely but in each and every one has been prenecessitated by the conjunction of circumstances, namely either by objects appearing externally or by images kept in the imagination represented in various ways to the common sense, and by the movements of the blood and spirits caused by the vegetative power, and also by the powers of celestial bodies and other things unknown to us, {operare} effecting and determining an alternation of different acts. Because we do not know how to assign such causes determining the dog to the different and opposite actions, we think, at first glance, that it acts in that way freely because it pleases it to do so, just as we would say of ourselves. Let us first suppose all these things. Second, I also suppose that from the above some have taken up the opinion that all things come about in us from predeterminations just as in brutes, for we could say of ourselves just what we have said of the dog. To disprove this opinion we have slight arguments, except from our Catholic faith, and because if it were true we would be necessarily predetermined in all our acts and consequently they would not be imputable to us for merit or demerit, which seems to conflict not only with our faith but also with the sciences and principles of morals. Therefore we attribute this freedom to ourselves more than to brutes only to save the fact that we act well or ill, meritoriously or demeritoriously, and imputably to us. |
| Cum ergo {om. Ra} {igitur JaEr} non cuilibet potentie anime {om. Er} nostre libertatem hanc attribuamus, immo nec voluntati secundum omnes actus eius, videtur quod solum illi potentie et solum secundum illos actus attribuenda est hec libertas *{quod add. JaRaEr} sufficiat ad salvandum predicta. Sed {ad salvandum predicta add. Er} sufficit si {quod Er} anime nostre solum secundum acceptationes et refutationes attribuamus hanc {illam Ja} {nostram Er} libertatem. Ergo {igitur Ja} solum secundum predictos actus debemus illi {ei JaEr} attribuere {hanc... attribuere: om. Ra} illam {istam Ja} libertatem oppositionis {opinionis Ja}, et non intellectui nec {neque JaRa} [Ja 325 va] etiam {om. Er} voluntati secundum alios {nullos Er} actus. | Since, then, we do not attribute this freedom to every power of our soul, and indeed not to the will in all its acts, it seems that just enough freedom should be attributed only to that power, and only {secundum} in those acts, as is sufficient to save the above. But it is enough if we attribute this freedom to our soul only {secundum} in acceptances and refusals. Therefore it is only {secundum} in those acts that we should attribute freedom of opposition to it, and not to the intellect, nor even to the will in its other acts. |
| Item, alii *{aliqui JaRaEr} arguunt quod intellectui potius quam voluntati {quam voluntati: om. JaRaEr} debemus hanc libertatem oppositionis {om. Er} attribuere {quam voluntati add. JaRaEr} propter hoc, quod intellectus est anime nostra {mee RaEr} potentia nobilissima. Et ego per illud medium {non add. Ra} possem *{possum JaRaEr} arguere oppositum, quia non attribuimus voluntati hanc libertatem oppositionis secundum eius actum nobilissimum, ergo {igitur JaRaEr} nec propter nobilitatem potentie oportet quod eam {ea Ra} attribuamus nobilissime potentie. {trs. Er} Antecedens patet, quia nobilissimus esset {est Ra} {? Ja} actus voluntatis {trs. JaRaEr} secundum quod *{quam JaRa} [actus... quod in Ra margin] vellet vel *{et JaRaEr} amaret deum sibi ostensum perfecte et firmiter sub ratione summe bonitatis {voluntatis Ra} quacunque malicia carentis vel defectu, et tamen ad talem actum esset necessitata {?necessitato Ja} et non libere produceret cum {eum RaEr} libertate [Pa 215 rb] oppositionis, sicut dictum fuit {om. Ja} in octava questione septimi libri. | Again, some argue that we should attribute this freedom of opposition to the intellect rather than to the will, because the intellect is the most noble power of our soul. But through that means [of proof] I can argue the opposite: we do not attribute this freedom of opposition to the will {secundum} in its most noble act, therefore neither is it necessary to attribute it to the most noble power because of the nobility of the power. The premise is clear, because the noblest act of will would be that {secundum} in which it willed and loved God when shown to it perfectly and firmly under the concept of the highest goodness, free from every evil or defect; yet it would be necessitated to such an act and would not produce it freely by freedom of opposition, as was said in Question 8 of Book VII [fol. 145 rb]. |
| Item, deo primo attribuitur {trs. JaRaEr} libertas oppositionis, non tamen secundum intellectum ea ratione qua dicitur {om. Ra} intellectus, quia necessario intelligit omnia [Ra 14a] presentia, preterita et futura, et quocunquemodo *{quomodocunque JaRa} {quomodo Er} se habent [or habet] {habeat Ra} {habet vel Ja} habebunt et {vel JaRa} habuerunt. Sed attribuitur *{sic add. RaEr} secundum voluntatem in comparatione {in comparatione: om. Ra} ad alia in creando [in creando: Ra margin] ea {om. Ra} vel in *{om. JaEr} conservando {vel in conservando add. Ra} aut in volendo ea [aut in volendo ea: in margin Ra] creare vel non creare, conservare, vel non conservare [conservare, vel non conservare: in margin Ra]. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} verisimile est *{quod ita /sic Er\ add. JaRaEr} dicendum *{sit add. JaRa} {est add. Er} ita {sicut Ra} {om. JaEr} de nobis nisi quod in eo *{in eo: deo JaRaEr} est necessitas per suam essentiam semper intelligere; nobis autem non, sed ex precedentibus necessitamur {prenecessitamur Ra} ad intelligendum quando {cum RaEr} intelligimus. | Also, freedom of opposition is attributed first to God, but not according to intellect {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, because he understands necessarily all things, present, past and future, whatever {se habere} their state is, will be or has been; but it is attributed {secundum} according to his will in {comparatio} relation to other things, in creating or preserving them, or in willing to create or not create, preserve or not preserve them. It is likely, then, that the same should be said of us, except that God is necessitated by his essence always to understand but we are not (though from what has been said above we are necessitated to understand when we do understand). |
| Tunc ergo *{om. JaRaEr} possunt solvi rationes que contra istam conclusionem fuerunt {sunt Ja} *{prius add. JaRaEr} adducte. Ad primam ergo respondeo {ergo respondeo: ego JaRa} {ergo respondeo: om. Er} concedendo *{concedo JaRaEr} quod cum ex voluntate ego {om. JaRaEr} studeo {om. Ra} {studio Ja} in geometria, non oportet quod in cuiuslibet propositionis formatione et ordinatione huius post illam {aliam Ja} {istam Er}, vel in qua figura, etiam concurrat {? Ja} actus novus {trs. RaEr} volitionis, nec inde *{tamen JaRaEr} intellectus format et ordinat eas libere ea ratione qua {dicitur add. Er} intellectus sed predeterminatus aut ex habitu et {aut ex Er} consuetudine, aut ex habitudine illarum {istarum JaEr} propositionum adinvicem, vel quia sic contingit *{occurrit JaRaEr} ex fantasia aut {vel JaEr} sompniis {sompnus Ra} {somp?? Ja} aut alia {ex alia Ra} {ex aliqua alia Er} {aliis Ja} huiusmodi circumstantia {circumstantiis Ja}, sicut {sic Ra} cytharista non deliberat de quocunque *{quolibet RaEr} {quacunque Ja} actu {om. Ja} {percussionis add. RaEr} {percussionem Ja} chorde {cordis Ja} nec canis de quocunque *{quolibet RaEr} passu quandocunque *{quando JaRaEr} ambulabit {ambulat Ra} {ambulant Ja}, etc. {om. JaRa}; sepe tamen possunt intervenire {trs.3241 Er} multe {multi Ra} electiones. Et ex his {autem add. Ra} nunc *{et add. JaRaEr} prius dictis {patet add. Ra} faciliter potest {om. Ra} qui vult solvere alias rationes. | Then the arguments can be solved which were earlier advanced against this conclusion. To the first I concede that when by will I study geometry, a new act of volition need not also concur in the forming of each proposition and in the ordering of one after another or in a certain figure; neither, however, does the intellect {ea ratione qua intellectus} qua intellect form and order them freely. It is predetermined either by habit and custom or by the relationship of those propositions to one another, or because thus it occurs to him from imagination or dreams or some other such circumstance, just as a lutenist does not deliberate every time he plucks a string or a dog about every step when he walks. It can often happen, however, that many choices come into it. From these points now and others made earlier anyone who wishes can easily solve the other arguments. |
| Cum autem dictum {dicendum Ja} {breviter add. Pr} sit {trs. JaRaErPr} de agere libere, ego expedio me breviter {trs. 312 JaRaEr} de libere pati {trs. JaRaEr}, ponendo decimamtertiam conclusionem {trs. Er} quod quecunque *{quemcunque AuMuMzPbJaRaEr} actum voluntas producit primo {trs. AuMuPbRaEr} {om. Ja} libere, illum {istum Ja} etiam {sibi Ra} recipit libere, quia illum {istum Ja} accipit {agit Er} in se {trs. 2341 Ra} et illum {istum Ja} {om. Er} {etiam add. Er} recipit a se, et sic quo {om. Ra} ad illum {istum JaEr} actum est idem agere et pati, producere et recipere. Tamen {?cum JaRa} potius attribuitur voluntati libertas in hoc {homine Ra} {trs.231 Er} ea ratione qua agens quam ea ratione qua patiens, quia libertas dicit dominium, et agens dicitur dominari super passum, ea ratione qua agens {qua agens: om. Ra} ubi differunt. Ideo etiam ubi non differunt debet {potius Ra} potentie libertas {libertatis Ja} magis {trs. Er} attribui ratione {om. Ja} quam *{qua JaRaEr} agens quam ratione qua patiens *{passum JaRa}. Actus autem libere imperatos {imperati JaRaEr} non oportet omnes {om. Ra} recipi in agente, sed forte recipiuntur {recipiunt Ja} extra in lapidibus et {in add. Ra} lignis, et non {om. Er} oportet passivis attribuere libertatem {libertate Ra}. | But since acting freely has been discussed, I will hasten briefly over freely {pati} undergoing, asserting a thirteenth conclusion, that whatever act the will produces first freely it also receives freely, because it accepts it into itself and it receives it from itself, and thus {quo ad} in respect of that act action and passion, production and reception, are the same. However, in this matter freedom is attributed to the will {ea ratione qua agens} qua agent rather than {ea ratione qua patiens} qua patient, because freedom suggests lordship, and the agent {ea ratione qua agens} qua agent is said to dominate over what is passive, where they differ; therefore also where they do not differ, freedom should be attributed to the power {ratione qua} qua agent rather than {ratione qua} qua passive. However, acts freely commanded need not all be received in the agent but may be received externally in stones and wood, and it is not necessary to attribute freedom to passives. |
| Post hoc *{hec JaRa} dicendum est de libertate finalis ordinationis tam quantum {quo Er} ad intellectum quam quantum {quo Er} ad voluntatem. Et pono decimamquartam conclusionem quod tam intellectus quam voluntas sunt liberi {libere Ra}, et libere producunt actus suos intelligendi {om. Er} et {om. Er} volendi {et nolendi add. Er}, quia actuales species *{speculationes JaRaEr} et habitus speculativi {speculandi Er} inde {om. Er} generati sunt {fuerint Er} principali intentione propter ipsum {om. Ra} intellectum perficiendum [Ra 14a] et non principaliori [Ja 325 vb] intentione propter aliud quam *{nisi JaRaEr} propter deum. Actus etiam {?autem Ra} prudentie et actus virtutum moralium et ipse virtutes morales principali intentione et *{om. JaRaEr} secundum principalem *{naturalem JaRaEr} finem *{finium JaRaEr} ordinati *{ordinationem RaEr} {om. Ja} sunt vel {est add. Er} propter habitus speculativos (de qua habitudine dictum est in ultima questione sexti *{libri add. JaRaEr}), qui iterum {?item JaRa} habitus speculativi {speculandi Ja} ordinantur in animam, ut dictum *{est add. JaRaEr}, vel *{etiam add. JaRaEr} *{statim add. JaEr} propter voluntatem {? Ja} perficiendam, vel *{om. JaRaEr} etiam *{et JaRaEr} propter intellectum practicum perficiendum. Sic etiam *{enim JaRaEr} dictum est in secundo huius quod virtutes morales, et scientiam {scientias Er} de {om. Er} his *{eis JaRa} {om. Er} querimus ut boni fiamus. |
[Freedom of Final Ordination]After this we must speak of the freedom of final ordination, in respect of both intellect and will. I assert a fourteenth conclusion, that both intellect and will are free and freely produce their acts of understanding and willing, because the actual {speculare} thoughts and the {speculare} thinking habits thence generated are {principali intentione} by chief purpose for the sake of perfecting the intellect itself and are not {principaliori intentione} by chiefer purpose for the sake of anything else except God. And the act of prudence and the acts of the moral virtues and the moral virtues themselves are, {principali intentione} by chief purpose according to the natural ordination of ends, either for the sake of {speculare} thinking habits (we have spoken about this relationship in the last Question of Book VI [fol. 139 rb]) -- and these habits of thinking are again ordered to the soul, as has been said -- or else they are immediately for perfecting the will and perfecting the practical intellect (for it was said in Book II that we seek the moral virtues and knowledge of them to become good). |
| Decimaquinta conclusio est {hoc add. Ra} quod intellectus et voluntas non omnes actus suos intelligendi et volendi producunt libere ac *{hac JaRaEr} libertate - immo multos serviliter {?servi Ra} et miscere *{misere JaRaEr} secundum *{scilicet JaRaEr} omnes actus {trs. Ja} suos *{om. JaRaEr} viciosos, quia isti {actus Ja} non perficiunt intellectum nec {aut RaEr} {et Ja} voluntatem, sed inficiunt. Ideo manifestum [Pa 215 va] est {om. Ra} quod illi non ordinantur finaliter {trs.312 Er} ad intellectum et voluntatem {et voluntatem: om. Ja} secundum naturalem finium ordinationem. Absurdum enim esset dicere quod illud quod mihi est {esset PbRa} disconveniens {trs.231 Ra} {conveniens Ja} *{turpe add. AuPbMuJaRaEr} [Mz=Pa] et nocivum sit gratia mei, et in me naturaliter *{finaliter JaRaEr} ordinatum naturali ordine *{ordinatione JaEr} finium; immo *{ideo RaEr} {igitur Ja} manifestum est {om. JaRa} quod sic {?sit RaJa} intellectus et voluntas non {sit add. Ja} suiipsius gratia agunt principali intentione, sed gratia naturalium *{om. JaRaEr} delectionum sensualium {?sensitivum Ra} *{naturalibus add. JaRaEr} suis {?sue Ra} perfectionibus contrariarum. | A fifteenth conclusion is that the intellect and will do not produce all their acts of understanding and willing freely with freedom of final ordination -- indeed they produce many of them slavishly and miserably, namely all vicious acts, because these do not perfect the intellect or the will but corrupt them. It is therefore clear that they are not, according to the natural ordering of ends, ordered to the intellect and the will {finaliter} as end. It would be absurd to say that something that is unsuitable to me and wicked and harmful is by the natural ordering of ends for my sake and ordered to me {finaliter} as end. It is therefore clear that in this way the intellect and will do not act {principali intentione} by chief purpose for their own sake, but for the sake of sensual pleasures contrary to their natural perfections. |
| Et {om. JaRa} ideo secundum {om. Ja} istam intentionem valde bene procedunt [in margin Ra] ille {om. Ja} auctoritates omnes *{om. JaRaEr} philosophorum prius allegate. Unde {om. Er} *{verbi gratia JaRa} Seneca {om. Ja} dicit {om. Ja} "philosophie servire *{trs. JaRaEr} vera *{om. JaRaEr} libertas est" {om. Ra}. Hoc sic intelligo {intendo Ra} non quod intellectus sit ad *{ipsam add. JaRaEr} philosophiam servus, sed tunc quod *{trs. JaRaEr} homo est vere liber quando ad *{om. JaRaEr} philosophiam *{om. JaRaEr} *{omnes alii /ille Er\ add. JaRaEr} vires et operationes anime et corporis ordinantur finaliter {ordinaliter Ja} *{ad hoc add. RaEr}, adeo *{om. JaRa} quod intellectus expedite valeat speculari et quod sic serviunt intellectui speculativo *{speculativi JaRaEr}, et hoc est verum, quia sic intellectus est vere {vero Ra} {verus est Er} dominus et liber *{et homo /hoc Ja\ maxime intellectus est /trs. JaEr\ add. JaRaEr} sicut alias dictum est. Dicit etiam {enim Ra} Seneca quod sapientia sola libertas {libertatis Ja} est *{id est add. JaRa} per eam et eius [Ra in margin] opus {trs. JaRaEr} maxime homo {trs. Ra} est {trs. 213 Ja} liber, scilicet plus quam per {om. Ja} *{aliquam add. JaEr} aliam virtutem {trs. Ja} ipsius vel per {om. JaEr} alium actum. Secundum hanc etiam {om. Ra} sententiam manifestum est {om. Ra} illud quod {etiam add. Ra} dicit Tullius, sapientes omnes {trs. JaRaEr} liberos esse et omnes stultos servos esse *{om. JaRaEr}, et quod Aristoteles dicit {om. JaRa}, virtutes *{virtus JaRaEr} et malicie *{malicia RaEr} determinant servum et liberum. Et quod Seneca de pravis; alius enim libidini servit, alius ambitioni, etc. {om. Ja}, et hoc etiam {om. Ja} dictum est in alia questione. | The previously cited texts of the philosophers are therefore {valde} quite {bene procedunt} valid under this interpretation. For example, Seneca says, "To serve philosophy is freedom": I understand this not as saying that the intellect is the slave of philosophy itself, but that man is truly free when all the other powers and actions of soul and body are {finaliter} ordered to the end that the intellect can {speculare} think {expedite} without encumbrance, and that in this way they serve the speculative intellect; and this is true, because in this way the intellect is truly lord and free, and a man is chiefly his intellect, as was said elsewhere [Ethics, Book IX, 1166 a17]. Seneca also says that "wisdom alone is freedom" -- that is, it is chiefly through it and its work that a man is free, that is, more than through any other of his powers or any other act. According to this opinion Cicero's statement that all the wise are free and all the foolish are slaves is also clear; also, Aristotle's statement that virtue and wickedness determine slavery and freedom [Politics, Book I, 1255 a20?], and Seneca's statement about the wicked, that "one is a slave to lust, another to ambition", etc. And this was also said in the other Question. |
| Ultimo, dictis *{predictis RaEr} suppositis, dicendum est directe de quesito proprio *{primo JaRaEr} de libertate oppositionis, et pono decimamsextam conclusionem {trs. JaRaEr} quod {om. Er} anima liberius producit actum volendi quam actum intelligendi, quia actum volendi primo et immediate {producimus add. Er} *{libere add. RaEr} tanquam secundum se libere elicitum; actum autem intelligendi non {om. Er} producimus libere nisi consecutive tanquam liber imperatum, et ideo actum intelligendi libere {trs. 312 JaRa} producimus {nisi... producimus om. Er} propter libere producere {productione Ja} actum volendi per quem illum {illam Ra} {istum Ja} imperamus, et propter *{quod add. JaRa} unumquodque tale, et illud magis {et illud magis om. Er} [Post. Anal. 72 a28: propter quod unumquodque est illud magis est]. |
[Direct answer to the main questionsFinally, supposing what has been said, we must speak directly of the first topic of inquiry, {de} about freedom of opposition. I assert a sixteenth conclusion, that the soul produces an act of willing more freely than an act of understanding. For we produce the act of willing first and immediately freely, as {secundum se} in itself freely elicited, but we do not produce an act of understanding freely except {consecutive} consequentially, as free commanded; and therefore we produce the act of understanding freely because of the free production of the act of willing through which we command it, and {et propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis} {see Posterior Analytics I.2, 72 a28: "For the cause of an attribute's inherence in a subject always itself inheres in the subject more firmly than that attribute", Oxford translation} "that on account of which anything is such [is such] also, and more [so]". |
| Deinde de libertate finalis ordinationis ponitur {ponam Ja} decimaseptima {decimamseptimam Ja} conclusio {conclusionem Ja} quod quantum ad aliquos actus volendi et intelligendi {volendi Ja}, voluntas liberius producit actum volendi quam intellectus actum intelligendi, et quantum ad aliquos est *{om. JaRaEr} econverso; *{et add. JaRaEr} similiter {om. Ja} etiam {om. Ja} quantum ad actus intelligendi inter se, intellectus unum producit liberius {trs. RaEr} quam alterum, et sic de voluntate quantum ad actus volendi. Hoc statim patet, quia illos {istos actus Ja} liberius {trs. Ra} producimus quorum gratia alios producimus finaliter [Ra in margin]{trs. JaRa} {trs.312 Er} secundum rectam et naturalem finium ordinationem. Sed omnes actus nostros inferiores tam volendi quam intelligendi debemus finaliter ordinare ad contemplandum et amandum deum [Ra in margin], qui quidem amor et contemplatio sunt actus {om. Ra} intelligendi vel {et Er} volendi, vel formaliter vel connexive. Item {iterum Ra}, si volo speculari, volitio illa finaliter ordinatur {trs. JaRaEr} ad speculationem; unde prudentia et virtutes [Ja 326 ra] morales sibi connexe que sunt habitus intellectus speculativi *{om. Ja} *{/et add. Ja\ voluntas /voluntatis Ja\ sunt gratia sapientie que /qui Ja\ est habitus intellectus speculativi add. JaRa}. {que...speculativi: sunt gratia huius et intellectus speculativi Er} Hoc fuit ex {de Ja} intentione Aristotelis, declaratum in ultima questione sexti *{libri add. JaRaEr}. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} actus volendi bene {om. Er} ordinantur finaliter ad actus intelligendi; et e contra consilium, quod est actus intellectus, finaliter ordinatur {trs. RaEr} ad electionem, que est {actus add. Er} voluntatis. Et {om. Ja} intellectus sententiat hoc esse melius et eligibilius, non ut in sententia illa {ista Ja} sit *{om. JaRaEr} status *{sistamus JaRaEr}, sed ut illud acceptemus et volitione imperemus exsecutionem *{prosecutionem JaRaEr}. Ergo {igitur illa JaRaEr} sententia est finaliter gratia volitionis, {nobiliorum Er} licet non tanquam gratia finis ultimati. | Next is asserted, {de} about freedom of final ordination, a seventeenth conclusion, that {quantum ad} with respect to some acts of willing and understanding the will produces an act of willing more freely than the intellect produces an act of understanding, and with respect to some it is the reverse; and similarly, with respect to the acts of understanding among themselves, the intellect also produces one more freely than another, and similarly of the will with respect to acts of willing. This is immediately clear, because we produce an act more freely if we produce other acts for its sake {finaliter} as end {secundum} according to the right and natural ordering of ends. But all our inferior acts, both of willing and of understanding, we should order {finaliter} to the end of contemplating and loving God; this love and contemplation are themselves acts of understanding or willing, either formally or by connection. Also, if I will to {speculare} think, that volition is ordered finally to {speculare} thinking; thus prudence and the moral virtues connected with it, which are habits of the intellect and will, are for the sake of wisdom, which is a habit of the speculative intellect. This was in accordance with Aristotle's thinking, explained in the last Question of Book VI [fol. 139 rb]. Therefore the act of will is indeed ordered to the act of understanding {finaliter} as end; and, by contrast, {consilium} taking advice, which is an act of the intellect, is ordered to choice {finaliter} as its end, choice being an act of the will. The intellect {sententiat} judges that something is better and more worthy of choice, not so that we may come to a stand in that {sententia} judgment, but so that we may accept it and by a volition command performance; that judgment is therefore for the sake of the volition {finaliter} as its end, though not as last end. |
| Sed questio restat difficilior, quam actum anima producit liberrime {liberiorem Ja} {trs. RaEr} hac libertate finalis ordinationis {ordinis Ra}: an scilicet actum voluntatis aut actum intellectus? Et certum esse debet {trs. Ra} quod inter omnes actus quos anima nostra producit, ipsa liberius *{liberrime JaRaEr} hac libertate producit illum {istum Ja} qui est aliorum optimus et perfectissimus; illum enim maxime producit suiipsius gratia quia illo maxime perficitur, et ille etiam {? Ra} maxime est finis aliorum, sive sit {est Ja} actus voluntatis sive sit *{om. JaEr} actus intellectus, quia semper naturali ordine "deterius", id est {id est: et Ra} minus bonum, "est gratia melioris", ut dicitur septimo {?primo Ja} Politice *{Politicorum JaRa} [1333 a22]; quod est quia naturali ordine semper ordinata in finem sunt bona propter finem esse bonum, et propter *{quod add. Ja} unumquoque *{unumquodque JaRa} tale et illud magis. | But a more difficult question remains: Which act does the soul produce most freely by this freedom of final ordination, the act of will or the act of intellect? It should be certain that among all the acts our soul produces, it produces most freely with this freedom the act that is best and most perfect of all. For it produces it most of all for its own sake, because it [the act] perfects it [the soul] most of all; and that act (whether it is an act of will or an act of intellect) is also most of all the end of others, because in every case by natural order "the worse", that is, less good, "is for the sake of the better", as is said in Book VII of the Politics [1333 a22] -- this is because always by natural order the things ordered to the end are good because of the goodness of the end, and {et propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis} "that on account of which anything is such [is such] also, and more [so]". |
| Et tunc {om. Ja} iterum restat questio quis sit dignior et {aut Ra} melior, an optimus [Ra 15a] actus intellectus {voluntatis Er} aut {vel Ra} optimus actus voluntatis {intellectus Er}? {aut optimus actus voluntatis: om. Ja} Et ista {illa Er} post tractabitur. Sed ut tandem possit {posset Ra} directe {trs. Ja} apparere veritas de quesito principali, ego pono *{ponam Ja} duas ultimas {? JaRa} conclusiones {trs. Ja}. Una *{est add. JaRaEr} scilicet *{decimaoctava add. JaRaEr} quod libertas oppositionis ordinatur finaliter ad libertatem finalis ordinationis. Ista conclusio sic deducitur. Certum est quod {sepe nobis add. Er} aliquod {aliquid Ra} {om. Ja} sepe {om. Er} apparet nobis [Ra in margin] {om. Er} {aliquid add. Ja} bonum {trs. Ra} quod non est bonum [quod non est bonum: Ra in margin], et malum quod non est malum; et sepe etiam aliquid [Ra in margin] apparet nobis bonum {trs. 3214 Ja} quod est simpliciter bonum, et malum quod {est add. JaRa} simpliciter malum. {quod non est bonum... malum: quod est simpliciter malum, et bonum apparet nobis malum Er} Et ideo non *{nec JaRaEr} esset {est Er} nobis {om. Ra} bonum acceptare omne quod apparet nobis bonum, nec *{etiam add. RaEr} omne tale non acceptare. {quod apparet nobis bonum nec etiam omne tale non acceptare add. Er} Libertas igitur oppositionis, ut dictum fuit in tertia questione tertii *{libri add. JaRaEr}, non ideo *{adhuc JaRa [ad hoc]Er} est nobis {trs. Ra} data {trs. 312 Ja} quod non acceptemus apparens bonum, nec ad hoc etiam {trs. 312 Ra} quod deacceptemus *{acceptemus JaRaMzPbMuAu} apparens malum *{om. AuMzMuJaRa} [Pb=Pa] quod *{quia AuMzMuRa} apparet {quod apparet: om. Pb}, {apparens bonum... apparet: om. Er} quia {quod Er} sic ad nostrum malum {trs. JaRaEr} esset nobis data quia {scilicet Er} ad non acceptandum aliquando acceptanda {acceptando Ja}, vel ad acceptandum {ad acceptandum: om. Ja} aliquando [Ja adds a space] {acceptanda ad add. Ja} non {om. Ra} acceptanda. Sed sic ad bonum nostrum nobis data est ut {et Ra} de eo quod non est firmiter et clare iudicatum esse simpliciter bonum vel simpliciter malum, differamus acceptationem vel refutationem {refutamus Ja} {refutemus Mz} [AuPbRa=Pa] donec ad nostram possibilitatem inquisiverimus an illud apparens bonum vel malum sit {trs.321 Er} simpliciter bonum vel {aut JaEr} simpliciter {om. Er} malum {trs. Ra}, ut {et Ra} finaliter acceptemus simpliciter bonum et non simpliciter *{om. JaRa} malum et {non... et: om. Er} refutemus simpliciter malum et non bonum. Modo ultra cum intellectus inquirit et iudicat de simpliciter bono quod sit {om. Ra} simpliciter bonum et voluntas illud acceptat, tunc tam intellectus quam voluntas hoc {hec Ra} {sic Er} agunt propter se et *{sui add. JaRaEr} ipsorum {ipsius Ja} gratia. Hoc *{hec RaEr} enim ut sic ordinatur *{ordinantur RaEr} ad *{in JaRaEr} perfectionem intellectus et voluntatis, ut dicebatur prius {trs. JaRaEr}. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} intellectus et voluntas sic agunt libere libertate *{finalis ordinationis [Ra in margin]. Igitur sic manifestum est quod libertas add. JaRaEr} oppositionis que *{om. JaRaEr} data est nobis finaliter ut tam secundum intellectum quam secundum voluntatem agamus libere {om. Ja} libertate finalis ordinationis, scilicet laudabiliter et bene ad nostram salutem et perfectionem. Et hoc {hec Ra} volebamus probare. | And again the question remains, Which is worthier and better, the best act of intellect or the best act of will? This question will be discussed afterwards. But so that {tandem} at last the truth can directly appear concerning the {de quesito principali} question at the beginning, I will assert the last two conclusions. One, namely the eighteenth, is that freedom of opposition is ordered to the freedom of final ordination {finaliter} as its end. This conclusion is deduced as follows. It is certain that often something seems good to us that is not good, and bad that is not bad; and often, also, something seems good to us that is simply good, and bad that is simply bad. It would therefore not be good for us to accept everything that seems good to us, or not to accept everything such. Freedom of opposition, therefore, as was said in the Question 3 of Book III [fol. 62, (rather, 42) v, "alia ratio"], has not been given to us so that we should not accept the seeming good, nor also so that we should accept what seems because it seems, because in that way it would be given to our hurt -- sometimes we would not accept what we should accept and sometimes we would accept what we should not accept. Rather, it has been given to us for our good in this way, that if something is not firmly and clearly judged to be simply good or simply bad, we should defer acceptance or rejection until we have investigated {ad nostram possibilitatem} to the best of our ability whether the seeming good or bad is simply good or simply bad, so that we may {finaliter} finally accept the simply good and not the bad and reject the simply bad and not the good. Moreover, when the intellect inquires and judges of the simply good that it is simply good and the will accepts it, then these things are done by both intellect and will on their own account and for their own sakes, for these things are, {ut sic} as such, ordered to the perfection of the intellect and the will, as was said before. The intellect and the will therefore act in that way freely with the freedom of final ordination. Thus, therefore, it is manifest that the purpose for which freedom of opposition has been given to us is that, both {secundum} according to intellect and {secundum} according to will, we should act freely with the freedom of final ordination, that is praiseworthily and well, to our salvation and perfection. And this is what we wished to prove. |
| Item {iterum Ja}, ad acceptationem finalis boni {et add. Er} perfecte et firmiter ostensi sub ratione pure bonitatis {et add. Ja?Ra} non se habet voluntas libere {trs. Ja} libertate oppositionis, sicut dictum fuit in sexta *{octava JaRaEr} questione septimi *{libri add. JaRaEr}, sed se habet ad eam {eamdem Er} libere {om. Ra} libertate finalis ordinationis, ut predictum {dictum Er} est {om. Ra}. Et tamen ad claram {talem Ra} ostensionem [Ja 326 rb] illius finalis boni {trs. JaRaEr} et ad ipsius sic *{ostensi add. JaRaEr} acceptationem vel {seu Ja} volitionem ordinantur finaliter omnes aliorum acceptationes et ostensiones, {trs.321 Er} et consilia et electiones circa que habemus libertatem oppositionis. Ergo {igitur RaErPr} manifestum est quod omnes actus nostri liberi libertate oppositionis et ipsa libertas {Ergo... ipsa: om. Ja} oppositionis {trs. Ra} sunt gratia actus liberi libertate finalis ordinationis, *{et propter ipsam libertatem finalis ordinationis add. JaRaMuMzPbAuErPr} scilicet ut *{sic add. RaAuEr} [MuPbMzJaPr=Pa] sumus *{simus RaPrAuMzEr} liberi. | Also, the will is not {se habere libere} disposed freely by freedom of opposition to the acceptance of the {finalis} ultimate good perfectly and firmly shown under the concept of pure goodness, as was said in Question 8 of Book VII [fol. 145 rb], but is {se habere libere} disposed to it freely by freedom of final ordination, as was said above. But {finaliter} the end to which all the other acceptances, showings, advisings and choices about which we have freedom of opposition are ordered is the clear showing of that {finalis} ultimate good and the acceptance or volition of it thus shown. It is therefore clear that all of our acts that are free with the freedom of opposition, and freedom of opposition itself, are for the sake of an act that is free with the freedom of final ordination, and for the sake of freedom of final ordination itself -- that is, so that we may be free in that way. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, secundum summum bonum humanum quod est hominis *{humana JaRaEr} felicitas est summa hominis {trs. Ja} libertas finalis ordinationis et ad illam finaliter ordinantur {trs. JaEr} omnia alia {om. RaEr} bona humana, ut dictum est in primo libro, et {om. Ra} libertas oppositionis non est illa felicitas, quia illa libertas oppositionis {trs. Ja} {et add. Ja} {non... oppositionis: om. Er} est nobis innata, et non ipsa felicitas. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} ad libertatem {felicitatem Er} finalis ordinationis ordinatur finaliter libertas oppositionis. [Pa 208 ra] | Also, the highest human freedom of final ordination is {secundum} in accordance with the highest human good, which is human happiness, and all other human goods are ordered to it {finaliter} as their end, as was said in Book I. Freedom of opposition is not that happiness, because freedom of opposition is {innata} inborn in us and happiness itself is not. Therefore freedom of opposition is ordered finally to the freedom of final ordination. |
| Ultima conclusio ponitur quod si optimus actus intelligendi quem producit intellectus noster sit nobilior et melior quam optimus actus volendi quem voluntas nostra {trs. JaRaEr} producit, {trs.312 Er} tunc simpliciter loquendo intellectus noster liberius producit actum {actus Ja} { simpliciter... producit: om. Er} intelligendi quam voluntas nostra {ad add. Ja} {voluntas nostraom. Er} actum volendi {intelligendi Ra}, et econtra. Ista conclusio patet ex precedenti {precedente JaRaEr}, quia in comparando {com+space Ja} libertates que sit maior et nobilior *{potentior JaRaEr} libertas, non oportet attendere ad aliquam libertatem oppositionis tanquam ad maiorem, sed semper ad libertatem finalis ordinationis, cum dictum sit quod omnis libertas oppositionis est propter libertatem finalis ordinationis et propter *{quod add. JaEr} unumquodque tale, et illud magis. {tale... magis: etc Er} Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} {et add. Er} hec libertas est magis libertas quam libertas oppositionis {om. Ra} et anima nostra dicitur magis libera ex {om. Ra} ea {om. Er} ratione qua dicitur libera hac libertate quam libertate {ea ratione JaRa} qua dicitur libera {libera hac... libera: om. Er} libertate oppositionis. Sed constat quod anima in producendo actus suos liberos diceretur {dicitur Er} magis *{maxime JaRaEr} libera libertate finalis ordinationis in {om. Ja} producendo optimum actum, sive sit actus intelligendi, sive sit *{om. RaEr} actus {om. Ra} volendi. Ergo {igitur Er} *{om. JaRa}, etc. *{om. JaRa} | The last conclusion is asserted, that if the best act of understanding that our intellect produces is nobler and better than the best act of willing that our will produces, then simply speaking our intellect produces the act of understanding more freely than our will produces the act of willing, and vice versa. This conclusion is clear from the foregoing, because in comparing freedoms [to decide] which is greater and stronger freedom, we need not attend to any freedom of opposition as if it might be greater, but rather always to freedom of final ordination, since it has been said that every freedom of opposition is for the sake of freedom of final ordination, and {et propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis} "that on account of which anything is such [is such] also, and more [so]". Therefore this freedom [of final ordination] is more freedom than freedom of opposition is, and our soul is said to be more free {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua free by this freedom than {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua free by freedom of opposition. But it is certain that in producing its free acts the soul would be said to be {maxime} most of all free by freedom of final ordination in producing its best act, whether that is an act of understanding or an act of willing. |
| Manifestum est autem {trs. Er} quod hec ultima conclusio est conditionalis et reducenda est ad cathegoricam conclusionem {aliam Er} determinativam {om. Er} finaliter {trs. Ra} questionis {om. Er} per determinationem illius {istius JaRa} questionis: utrum actus optimus {trs. JaRaEr} quem producit anima nostra sit actus intelligendi vel actus volendi, de qua postea dicetur. | It is clear, however, that this last conclusion is conditional and must be reduced to a categorical conclusion {finaliter} finally determinative of the question by the determining of this question: Whether the best act that our soul produces is an act of understanding or an act of willing? This will be discussed afterwards. |
| Rationes autem que in precedenti {precedente Ra} questione {trs. JaPr} fuerunt adducte de libertate tam pro parte intellectus quam *{pro parte add. JaErPr} voluntatis possunt solvi per precedentes {determinatas RaEr} {per precedentes: ? Ja} distinctiones de libertate et conclusiones, vel {om. Ra} solventur ex aliis questionibus {conclusionibus MuRa} [ErPr=Pa] sequentibus. | The arguments about freedom brought forward in the preceding Question, both on the side of the intellect and on that of the will, can be solved by the above distinctions concerning freedom and by the conclusions, or they will be solved by other Questions following. |
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