Edited and Translated by John Kilcullen
John Buridan's dates of birth and death are
uncertain, but he is known to have been active in the University
of Paris between 1328 and 1358. He spent his whole working life as
a Master of Arts (unlike many other well-known medieval
philosophers, who were theologians). His works include several
works of logic and commentaries in question form on many of the
works of Aristotle. His questions on Aristotle's Ethics
break off at the beginning of Question 6 of Book X and may be his
last work.
The questions on Book X are concerned with two
main topics, freedom and happiness. The connection is that freedom
in one sense, namely “freedom of final ordination”, is to be
attributed to the activity that is the ultimate end of human life,
which is also happiness. Freedom of final ordination is not what
philosophers these days mean by free will. “Final ordination”
means ordering or directing toward an end (finis); freedom
of final ordination is characteristic of something that is an end
in itself and not a means ordered to some further end. We can
understand why this is called freedom by considering the
difference between free persons and slaves: free persons live for
themselves, slaves live for others.
Hence Aristotle's description of “the free” as that which
exists “for its own sake and not for the sake of another.” The act in which
happiness consists will be free with freedom of final ordination
since happiness is the final goal.
Besides “freedom of final ordination” there is
“freedom of opposition” (called by some later writers “freedom of
indifference” and by modern philosophers “freedom of the will”).
According to Buridan, freedom of opposition consists in being able
to choose at one moment to do something, at another moment not to
do it or to do the opposite, even if nothing else in the universe
changes besides the act of will. (Here Buridan seems to follow
Ockham; see Ockham's Opera theologica, vol. 4, p. 580.)
According to Buridan such freedom is found in the acts of the will
that he calls “acceptance” and “rejection” and in no other human
act (though other acts can be free with freedom of opposition
“consequently” —that is, they are free in the sense that they
result from free acts of acceptance or rejection). According to Buridan the
act in which the highest happiness consists, in which freedom of
final ordination is achieved, namely the direct intellectual
apprehension of God, is not free with freedom of opposition. (In holding that the
highest act is intellectual and that it is not free Buridan aligns
himself against Duns Scotus and with Thomas Aquinas.) Freedom of
opposition itself exists for the sake of freedom of final
ordination: acts that are free with freedom of opposition are for
the sake of the act that is free with freedom of final ordination,
and we have freedom of opposition so that we can withhold
acceptance or rejection until we investigate the appearances of
good or evil more carefully, so that our acts will be right and
bring us to our final goal.
The opening question of Book X is: Which is
freer, intellect or will? Buridan's initial answer is that they
must be equally free since they are the same entity. However, the
question needs refining. Though the terms “will” and “intellect”
stand for the same entity, the soul itself, they signify by
appellation or connote different actions. (Again Buridan seems to
follow Ockham; see Ockham's Opera theologica, vol. 1, p.
402 and vol. 2, p. 435 ff.) According to Buridan, intellect is the
soul qua able to
understand, will is the soul qua able to will —or more accurately, intellect is
the soul qua able to receive
an intellection, will is the soul qua able to receive a
volition. So the initial question becomes: Are we free more
because we can will than because we can understand? His answer is
that we are free in the sense of freedom of final ordination
because of an act of understanding, and we have freedom of
opposition in the will's acts of acceptance and rejection.
Buridan distinguishes between two senses of
happiness. In one sense it is the aggregate of all the good things
that a human being can possess (cf. Boethius, Consolation,
III, pr. 2), in another sense it is the best of these (just as
Aristotle says that a human being is intellect, meaning that that
is the best part). Even in the second sense of the term, though it
stands for the best, happiness connotes the presence of various
other goods: happiness in the second sense consists in the
intellectual apprehension of God, but if by miracle God gave that
apprehension without pleasure and with pain, it would not be
happiness because of lack of the pleasure connoted by the term. This is Buridan's
solution to the question debated in ancient times between Stoics
and Peripatetics whether virtue is sufficient by itself for
happiness: according to Buridan the best act of the best power
acting in accordance with virtue is happiness, but the presence of
some other goods is required before the term can be properly
applied.
He also resolves another ancient debate about
the “continuity of happiness”: Is it enough for happiness to
achieve the best in an instant, or must one engage in the best
activities continuously over a normal lifetime? Buridan answers
that “happiness” in the sense of the aggregate consists in the
aggregate of the happinesses of the different parts of the person
and of the person's life, and in the other sense it connotes the
achievement of these partial happinesses to a certain extent; thus
inferior goods are relevant to happiness in both senses of the
term. As Buridan admits, these solutions may seem verbal, but they
do have the virtue of sorting out a number of confusions. The
point of substance is that the best is so very good that it
outweighs the lack of other goods —a person who cannot properly be
called “happy” may nevertheless attain all that really matters.
(Compare Cicero, De finibus, V.xxx.
For more reading see CHLMP, VIII.32, “Free will
and free choice,” and IX.35, “Happiness: the perfection of man.”
See also, Edward J. Monahan, “Human Liberty and Free will
according to John Buridan,” Medieval Studies, 16 (1954),
pp. 72-86; James J. Walsh, “Is Buridan a sceptic about free
will?,” Vivarium, 2 (1964), pp. 50-61; J.J. Walsh,
“Buridan and Seneca,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 27
(1966), pp. 23-40.
The Latin text translated is taken from Pa as corrected from the manuscripts.
JaRa were collated for the whole work;
Mz was collated continuously from fol. 211 ra of Pa;
Er was collated continuously for questions 1 and 2 and for the
last part of question 5;
Pr was collated continuously for questions 3-5;
All the manuscripts were consulted for some places.
In the Latin text variants are enclosed in {}. Variants adopted
are marked with an asterisk and printed bold; many that would
probably be adopted in an edition of the text are not marked since
they make no difference to the translation.
Buridan, On Aristotle's Ethics, book 10, q. 1Consequenter {queritur circa decimum Ethicorum Ja} querenda sunt aliqua super decimum librum, in cuius primo tractatu agitur {agit Ja} de delectatione, de qua satis quesitum fuit super septimum librum. Ideo queredum est super secundum tratatum, in quo {in quo: ubi JaEr} Aristoteles inquirit in quo actu consistit {consistat Er} humana felicitas. Et quia dicit Aristoteles quod ipsa felicitas est operatio optime potentie secundum optimam eius {trs. JaEr} virtutem, ideo oportet inquirere que sit optima *{potentia /potentiarum JaEr\ et que sit optima RaJaEr} virtutum. Optima autem potentiarum ponitur ab omnibus vel {om. JaEr} intellectus vel voluntas. Ideo necesse est querere {inquerere Ja} de comparatione harum duarum potentiarum adinvicem. Et quia statim videtur quod illa potentia sit excellentior que est magis libera, ideo primo queritur utrum voluntas sit magis libera *{quam intellectus. |
Question 1: Whether the will is freer than the intellect?Next in order some questions must be asked on Book X. The first part is concerned with pleasure, about which there were enough questions asked on Book VII. We must therefore ask questions upon the second part, in which Aristotle asks: What act does human happiness consist in? And because he says that happiness is an activity of the best power in accordance with its best virtue, we must therefore ask what is the best power and what is the best virtue. But everyone asserts that the best power is either the intellect or the will. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire about the comparison of these two powers with one another. And since it is seen immediately that a power is more excellent if it is more free, we therefore ask first, Whether the will is freer than the intellect. |
| Arguitur quod voluntas sit magis libera add. JaRaEr}, quia semper dominus ea ratione qua dominus {ea... dominus: om. Ja} est liberior est {trs. Ja} *{sibi add. JaRa} {suo Er} subiecto {ea ratione qua dominus add. Ja}. Intellectus autem ad voluntatem comparatur sicut subiectus ad dominum. |
[Preliminary arguments]It is argued that the will is more free, because in every case a lord {ea ratione qua dominus: by virtue of the reason by which he is lord} is, qua lord, freer than his subject. The intellect, however, is compared to the will as subject to lord. |
| Quod patet primo quia deprecans subiectus est {om. Ra} ei quod {quem Er} deprecatur, et primo {quia... primo om. Ja} Ethicorum dicitur: "Etenim recte {etenim recte: ratione enim et Ja} *{etenim recte: recte enim et ZnEr} ad optima deprecatur ratio"; et non potest dici quod ratio habeat superiorem potentiam quam {qua Ja} deprecetur nisi voluntatem. | This is clear, first, because the one who {deprecans} urges is subject to the one urged, and in Ethics, Book I [1102 b16], he says: "For reason urges them aright and toward the best objects"; and it cannot be said that reason has any superior power that it urges except the will. |
| Secundo hoc patet quia intellectus est sicut consiliarius et voluntas sicut dominus habens in suis negociis consiliarios vel consiliarium {trs.321 Er} {vel consiliarium: om Ra}, quod patet in nostris consiliis et electionibus. Nam domini consilium petentis est sibi statuere finem {trs. Er} et consilium {et consilium: om Ra} petere per quem modum {et add. Ja} per *{et RaEr} que media possit illum {istum Er} finem {trs. Ja} adipisci, ut apparet {om. Ja} tertio {secundo Ja} huius *{Ethicorum RaJaEr}. Et ibidem *{etiam add. JaEr} manifestum est quod voluntas est ipsius finis: ergo {igitur Ja} {ideo Er} voluntas in hoc est {trs. 312 Ja} sicut dominus. Sed illo instituto *{illo instituto: iterum statuta RaJaEr} {si add. Ja} fine per determinationem voluntatis, dominus petit consilium quod fit et datur {fit et datur: fieri dicitur Er} per ratiocinationem intellectualem; quo consilio dato {trs. Ja} iterum domini est eligere per voluntatem hoc quod est per consilium *{per consilium: concilio RaJaEr} preiudicatum, et dicit *{et dicit: dicente RaJaEr} Aristoteles tertio huius *{Ethicorum RaJaEr}: "Et electio utique erit {erat Ra} {trs. Er} consiliabile desiderium". Ex {et Ra} consiliari enim iudicantes {iudices Er} desideramus secundum consilium. Iudicium autem est ipsius intellectus et {om. Ja} desiderium voluntatis. Ergo {om. Ja} {ideo Er} omnis voluntas in his est sicut dominus. | It is clear, second, because the intellect is like an adviser {consil-} and the will like a lord who has a council or advisers in his affairs. This is clear in our advisings {consil-} and {electio} choices. It is for the lord who seeks advice to appoint {statuere} the end and to seek advice on the manner and means of attaining {adipisci} the end, as is clear from Ethics, Book III. There it is also clear that the will is of the end; therefore in this respect the will is like a lord. Again, once the end has been appointed {statuere} by the will's decision, the lord seeks advice [consilium], which is made and given by intellectual reasoning; once the advice is given, again it is for the lord to choose, by will, what has been pre-judged {preiudicare} by advice. Aristotle says, Ethics, Book III [1113 a11], "Choice will be deliberate desire; for judging from deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation [consilium]". But judgment belongs to the intellect itself, desire to the will. Therefore every will is, in these matters, like a lord. |
| *{Et iterum in eodem 3o manifestum est quod secundum voluntatem sumus domini actuum nostrorum; propter quod actus voluntarii et non nisi /om. Mz\ voluntarii /et... voluntarii: om. JaMuPb\ sunt /sicut AuRa\ nobis imputabiles, licet hec /hoc Mu\ /hii Er\ non /omnino Mz\ lateat intellectum add. AuPbMzRaJaErMu}. | And again, in the same Book III, it is clear that it is {secundum} according to will that we are lords of our actions; for this reason voluntary acts, and only voluntary acts, are imputable to us, though this is altogether unknown to intellect. |
| Et iterum, domini est precipere subditis suis. Voluntas autem precipit intellectui quod studeat quod speculetur; studeo enim quia volo, {et add. Er} cesso quia aliquid magis volo, ut {etiam Ja} {nunc Er} ire {om. Er} ad eccelsiam vel ad forum *{cenam RaJaEr}; et tunc *{nunc RaJaEr} studeo in metaphysicis {Metaphysica Ra} {Mathematica JaEr} {et add. RaEr} nunc in {om. Ja} morali philosophia vel in logica non nisi quia sic volo, iuxta illud "Sic volo, sic iubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas". | And again, it is for the lord to command his subjects. The will, however, commands the intellect to study, to {speculare} think; for I study because I will, I cease because I will something else instead, for instance to go to church or to dinner; and I study now metaphysics, now moral philosophy or logic, only because I so will, in accordance with the saying, "Thus I will, thus I command, let my will be the reason". |
| Iterum {item Ja}, cogi et posse cogi ab alio illiberum est et servile, non posse autem cogi liberum est *{om. JaEr}. Sed voluntas in actu suo cogi non potest; repugnat enim quod ad aliquid {hoc RaJaEr} cogar et quod {om. Ja} ipsum volo. Intellectus autem cogitur seu necessitatur ad studendum et {om. Ja} speculandum a voluntate; nam impedimentis {impeditis JaEr} extrinsecis remotis *{amotis RaJaEr}, nulla virtus mea potest resistere quin studeam si hoc {trs. Ja} efficaciter volo. | Again, to be compelled or compellable by another is unfree and servile, and not to be compellable is free. But the will cannot be compelled in its act, for to be compelled to something and to will it are {repugnat} incompatible. The intellect, however, is compelled or necessitated to study and {speculare} think by the will, for if external obstacles are removed, none of my powers can prevent me from studying if I effectively will it. |
| Iterum {item JaEr}, quod omnibus eodem modo se habentibus potest in {om. Ra} utrumque oppositorum, hoc est liberum; et quod non sic {trs. Er} potest sed necessitatur {ab alio add. RaJa} et ab {om. Er} alio {et... alio om. Ja} determinari, hoc est illiberum. Voluntas *{autem add. RaJaEr} et non intellectus sic potest {trs. Er} in utrumque oppositorum. Nam quamvis intellectus iudicaverit eundum esse ad ecclesiam, voluntas tamen hoc stante potest non velle ire, immo et velle non *{velle non: nolle RaJa} ire, sed {om. Er} ad tabernam. | Again, whatever has power for both opposites while everything {se habere} stays the same is free, and whatever does not have this power but is necessitated or determined by another is unfree. The will, however, and not the intellect, has power in this way for both opposites. For even if the intellect judges that one should go to church, the will can, nevertheless, while this judgment stands, not will to go -- indeed it can also {nolle} will not to go there but to the pub. |
| Iterum {item Ja}, prohemio Metaphysice [982 b26] decribit Aristoteles liberum esse *{liberum esse: liberum dicens /om. Ra\ liberum /esse JaEr\ est AuMuPbRaJaEr} quod {non add. Ja} "suimet et non alterius" {alius RaEr} gratia est. Ergo {igitur Ja} liberius est quod magis habet modum et rationem finis. Voluntas *{autem add. RaJaEr} est huiusmodi in respectu intellectus; semper enim velle sequitur intelligere *{tanquam actus naturaliter posterior et finalior aut /et Er\ etiam posterior, iuxta illam maximam sepe /om. Er\ ab Aristotele /positam add. Er\, quod posteriora generatione sunt priora perfectione add. JaEr} . | Again, in the preface to the Metaphysics [982 b26], Aristotle gives a description of "the free", saying that the free is that which exists "for its own sake and not for the sake of another". Therefore the more free is that which has to a greater extent the {modus} manner and {ratio} nature of an end. But the will is of this sort in respect of the intellect, for in every case willing follows understanding as an act naturally {posterior} later and more an end, or also later in accordance with Aristotle's frequent maxim that the later in generation is prior in perfection. |
| Item, illa potentia videtur in homine liberrima in cuius potestate est reddere hominem {trs. Er} liberum aut ipsum efficere servum. Sed hoc est voluntas. Quod {om. Er} probatur quia virtus et vicium, que sunt secundum voluntatem et appetitum, determinant servum et liberum, ut patet {videtur RaJa} {dicitur Er} primo Politice *{Politicorum RaJa}; non enim intellectus sed voluntas determinat hominem ad virtutem vel vicium, quod est experientia manifestum. Multos enim secundum intellectum et sapientiam excellentes videmus *{vidimus JaPr} iniustos et valde malos; immo demones secundum intellectum sunt ingeniosi valde, et tamen mali propter maliciam voluntatis. Alios {alias Ja} autem {enim Ja} secundum intellectum simplicos videmus *{vidimus RaJaPr} iustos et sanctos, propter bonitatem voluntatis. Ergo {ideo Er} voluntas est domina in reddendo hominem bonum aut malum, et per consequens liberum aut servum. | Again, that power seems freest in man which can render man free or make him a slave. But this is the will. This is proved, because virtue and vice, which are {secundum} a matter of will and appetite, determine slave and free, as appears in Politics, Book I [1255 a20?]; for it is not the intellect but the will that determines a man to virtue or vice. This is manifest from experience, for we have seen many who excel {secundum} in intellect and wisdom but are unjust and very bad; indeed, the demons are very gifted intellectually and yet bad because of wickedness of will. However, we have seen that others who are simple {secundum} in intellect are just and holy because of goodness of will. Will is therefore {domina} the lord in rendering a man good or bad and consequently free or slave. |
| Et omnis voluntas videtur habere dominium super intellectum etiam {et Er} quantum ad iudicium de principiis que debent intellectui esse {trs. JaEr} manifesta *{manifestissima RaJaErPr}, quia dicitur sexto huius *{Ethicorum RaJaEr} quod "malicia", scilicet voluntatis, "pervertit et mentiri facit circa practica principia" {trs. Ja} circa que virtus intentionem facit rectam. | And every will seems to have lordship over the intellect, even in respect of judgment of principles that should be most manifest to the intellect, because it is said in Ethics, Book VI [1144 a34], that "wickedness", that is, of will, "perverts us, and causes us to be deceived about practical principles", concerning which "virtue makes the intention right" [1144 a8]. |
| In {om. Er} oppositum arguitur quia secundum Aristotelem, Prohemio Metaphysice, liberum describitur quod "suimet et non alterius {alius Er} gratia est {om. Er}", et maxime talis est felicitas. Ergo {igitur JaEr} felicitas est maxime libera inter actus humanos. Ergo {igitur Ja} {ideo RaEr} sequitur quod inter potentias *{humanas add. JaErPr} illa est liberrima in cuius actu consistit humana felicitas. Sed (ut habetur 10 Ethicorum) ipsa consistit in opere sapientie {om. Ja}, que est habitus ipsius intellectus et noluntatis *{non voluntatis JaErPr} igitur {om. Ja} etc. | On the opposite side, it is argued that {secundum} according to Aristotle, in the preface to the Metaphysics [982 b25], the free is described as that which exists "for its own sake and not for the sake of another", and happiness is {maxime} chiefly such; therefore among human acts happiness is chiefly free. It follows, therefore, that of human powers the power in whose act human happiness consists is the freest. But (as {habetur} we read in Ethics, Book X [1177 a24]), it consists in the {opere} activity of wisdom, which is a habit of the intellect itself and not of the will; therefore, etc. |
| Item, sicut {in add. RaEr} arguendo ad aliam partem dicebatur, dominus liberior est subiecto; intellectus autem est sicut dominus, quoniam ordinare et determinare quid sit faciendum {aut add. Ra} *{et add. JaErPr} quid dimittendum pertinet ad dominum; intellectus autem determinat et ordinat {trs. 321 JaEr} quid sit volendum vel *{et quid RaJaEr} nolendum, quid sit {om. Er} fugiendum vel *{et quid JaEr} prosequendum, {et add. Er} quid sit {om. Er} amandum vel {aut Ra} odiendum {prosequendum Ja}, et non potest voluntas in illos {istos Er} actus sine determinatione *{predeterminatione RaJaErPr} {ipsius add. Ra} intellectus. Unde prohemio Metaphysice, "Sapientem ordinare oportet", scilicet per { om. Ja} sapientiam. | Again, as was said in arguing for the other side, a lord is freer than a subject. {autem} But the intellect is like a lord, since ordaining and determining what must be done and not done belongs to a lord, {autem} and the intellect ordains and determines what should be willed and nilled, what to flee and what to seek, what to love or hate, and the will {non potest in} has no power for those acts without the pre-determination of the intellect. Thus in the preface to the Metaphysics [982 a18]: "The wise man must order", namely through wisdom. |
| Item, tertio Politice *{Politicorum RaJa}: "Oportet leges recte positas {trs. Ja} esse dominans". Propter quod etiam {autem Ja} bene determinat {declaratur Aristoteles Ra} *{Aristoteles add. JaPr} primo Politice [Rhetoric, 1354 a30-5] quod "maxime convenit recte {ratione add. Pr} positas leges {trs. JaPr} quecunque {convenit quem Ra} contingit omnia determinare ipsas et {ipsas et: equam Ja} {ipsas et: tamquam Pr} *{ipsas et: et quam Er} {ipsas et: etiam quam Ra} paucissima {paucissimas Ja} committente {committere JaPr} iudicantibus {iudicibus Er} ", quia scilicet {igitur Ra} {om. Er} melius est dominium legum quam iudicum. Ergo {igitur JaErPr} in nobis potentia illa maxime dici potest dominus {domina Mz} *{dici potest dominus: debet poni domina /dicitur Ra\ AuMuPbRaJaErPr} cuius est leges [po]nere et illa non est voluntas sed intellectus, qui potest videre et discernere quid iustum *{et add. RaEr} quid iniustum, {et add. Er} quid bonum et {om. JaPr} quid malum. Unde *{in add. JaEr} tertio Poltice *{Politicorum JaPr} : "Qui quidem {quid Ra} iubet intellectum {trs. JaErPr} principari, iubere videtur {trs. JaErPr} principari dominum {om. Ra} *{Deum Zn?Ja} et leges *{non dicit igitur qui voluntas /voluntatem iubet (trs. Er) JaEr\ principari add. RaJaErPr}, immo ex hoc {eo RaJaErPr} intendit legem optime dominari {nominari Ja}, quia (ut dicit) "sine appetitu intellectus lex" est. | Again, in Politics, Book III [1282 b3]: "Rightly enacted laws must rule". On this account Aristotle also well determines in Politics, Book I [rather, Rhetoric, I.1, 1354 a30-5], that "it is most fitting that rightly enacted laws should determine everything that happens, entrusting as little as possible to the judges" -- {scilicet} that is, because rule by the laws is better than rule by judges. In ourselves, therefore, that power should chiefly be said to be lord to which it pertains to impose laws; that is not the will but the intellect, which can see and judge what is just, what unjust, what good and what bad. Thus in Politics, Book III [1287 a28]: "He who bids the intellect to rule, seems to bid God and the laws to rule". He does not say, therefore, "He who bids the will to rule..."; indeed, he believes that the law rules best because (as he says [1287 a32]) "the law is intellect without desire". |
| Item, ad hanc partem videntur esse Seneca et Tullius. In epistola {experientia Ra} enim {et Ja} "Tu me inquis" {nequis Ra} {tu me inquis: tu nequis JaEr} dicit Seneca "philosophie servias {serviens Ra} oportet, ut tibi {om. Ja} contingat vera libertas... Hoc enim ipsum philosophie servire libertas est" {om. Ra}. Philosophia autem ad intellectum spectat. Et *{iterum add. RaJaEr} in epistola "Quod {ad Er} maximum" dicit "Ad hanc," {hoc Ra} scilicet philosophiam *{sapientiam JaEr}, "te confer si vis salvus esse {trs. JaEr}, si {om. Ra} securus, si beatus, denique si vis esse, quod est maximum e{trs. Ja}, liber". Et subdit postquam: sapientia "sola {maxima Ja} libertas est... Si vis" inquit "tibi omnia {trs. Ja} {et add. Ra} subiicere {te add. Ra} subiice *{te add. JaEr} rationi; multos reges si ratio te rexerit". Similiter Tullius in De {om. Ra} Paradoxis [Paradoxon V] dicit omnes sapientes liberos esse, et omnes stultos servos {esse add. Er}. | Again, Seneca and Cicero seem to be on this side. In his letter "Tu me inquis" [Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, VIII.7], Seneca says: "You must serve philosophy, that true freedom may come to you... For to serve philosophy is itself freedom". But philosophy pertains to the intellect. And again in his letter "Quod maximum" [XXXVII.3] he says: "To this", namely wisdom, "betake yourself, if you wish to be safe, secure, happy, in short if you wish to be -- the main thing -- free". And he adds afterwards: "Wisdom alone is freedom. If you wish", he says, "to subject all things to you, subject yourself to reason; you will rule many if reason rules you". Similarly, Cicero in De Paradoxis [Paradoxa V.33] {"nisi sapientem liberum esse neminem"} says that all the wise are free and all the foolish slaves. |
| In ista questione distinguendum est de libertate {item add. Ja} {etc add. Er} et {etiam JaEr} de servitute {et add. Ja}, quia opponi videtur servum et liberum; et etiam *{primo RaJaEr} in diversis suppositis in quibus hoc est magis {om. Ra} manifestum. Secundo in eodem supposito, quod est magis ad propositum. |
[Reply to the question]In this question we must make distinctions concerning freedom, and also slavery, because slave and free seem to be opposites; and first in different {suppositis} individuals, in which this is more manifest, and second in the same individual, which is more to {propositum} our purpose. |
| In diversis suppositis dicuntur libertas et servitus {servi Ja} uno modo secundum corpora, {et add. Er} alio modo secundum divitias et exteriora bona, et {om. Ja} tertio modo secundum animam. | In different individuals freedom and slavery are spoken of in one way {secundum} in reference to bodies, in another way in reference to riches and external goods, and in a third way in reference to the soul. |
| De servitute et libertate corporali {om. Ja} loquitur Aristoteles primo Politice *{Politicorum Ja}, dicens: "Vult quidem igitur natura et corpora differentia facere que liberorum et servorum; hec quidem fortia {facere Ja} ad *{necessarium add. RaJaEr} vite *{om. JaEr} usum, hec autem recta et inutilia ad tales operationes, sed utilia ad civilem vitam". Hunc autem {enim Er} modum libertatis et servitutis dimitto, quia non est {om. Ja} ad {de Ja} propositum {proposito Ja} de felicitate neque de comparatione intellectus vel *{ad RaJaEr} voluntatem, quia sicut {sic Er} dicta corpora {trs. Er} servilia contingit habere animas liberas ita {om. RaJaEr} et corpora libera animas serviles, ut {prout RaJaEr} Aristoteles ibidem dicens {trs. Ja}: "Accidit autem et multotiens contrarium, hos {servos add. Er} quidem habere corpora {trs. JaEr} liberorum, hos autem animas {servorum add. Er}". Et hoc idem {om. JaEr} pulchre {? Ja} {pulcherrime Er} deducit Seneca in epistola "Claranum", ubi dicit sic: {dicit sic: om. Ra} {dicit sic: bene dicit Ja} {dicit sic: tandem dicit Er} "Claranus {clarius Ra} {clara nullius Ja} mihi videtur {trs. Ja} in exemplar *{exemplum JaRaEr} editus {redditus RaEr} {om. Ja} ut scire possemus non deformitate corporis fedari animum, sed pulchritudine anime corpus ornari". | Of bodily slavery and freedom Aristotle speaks in Politics, Book I [1254 b26]. He says: "Nature therefore wishes to make different bodies for freemen and for slaves, some strong for necessary use, others upright and useless for such activities but useful for political life". {dimitto} I set aside this mode of freedom and slavery, because it is not to our purpose concerning happiness nor to the comparison of the intellect to the will, because just as these slavish bodies can have free souls, so also free bodies can have slavish souls, as Aristotle says in the same place [1254 b32]: "Often the opposite happens, that some have the bodies of freemen and others the souls". Seneca brings out the same point nicely in his letter "Claranum" [LXVI.4], where he says: "Claranus seems to me to have been produced as an example, so that we might be able to know that the soul is not disfigured by the ugliness of the body, but the body adorned by the beauty of the soul". |
| Servitus autem secundum pecunias et exteriora bona et libertas dicuntur secundum abundantiam {superhabundantiam Er} et defectum necessariorum ad vitam, quemadmodum dicimus pauperes {om. Ra} oportere servire divitibus ut habeant vite {vita Er} necessaria. Et hec etiam non est libertas de qua ad presens intendimus, quia dictum fuit in primo libro quod in talibus bonis exterioribus non consistit humana felicitas. Immo neque {om. Ja} {est add. Er} proprie dicta libertas: quia sicut in predicta {prima Ra} epistola {?? Ra} habetur, "Omnia ista in que dominium casus {trs. JaEr} exercet servilia sunt {servilia sunt: servitia Ra}, pecunia et {om. Ja} corpus, et honores, imbecila {? Ja} fluida {? Ja} mortalia {mortua ac Ra} {ac add. Er} possessionis incerte". | {secundum} As a matter of money and external goods, however, slavery and freedom are spoken of {secundum} with reference to plenty or lack of things necessary to life, just as we say that the poor must "serve" the rich to get the necessaries of life. And this also is not the freedom {intendimus} we are studying at present, because it was said in Book I that human happiness does not consist in such external goods. {immo} Indeed, this is not properly called freedom, because, as we read in the above letter [LXVI.23]: "All those things over which chance exercises lordship are slavish -- money, body, honours -- weak, fluid, mortal, of uncertain possession". |
| Adhuc, secundum extrinsecam denominationem a progenitoribus dicuntur libertas sive {om. Er} nobilitas {om. Er} et servitus seu ignobilitas. Dicuntur enim vulgariter nobiles et liberi quia {quo Er} ex magnis et ingenuis procreati sunt, ignobiles autem [Ja 321vb] et tanquam serviles qui ex humiliori gente nati sunt ut communes, burgenses, mercatores, et rurales. Et certum est quod talis nobilitas et ingenuitas {et ingenuitas: om. Ra} si esset secundum denominationem intrinsecam esset {? Ja} multum honorabilis, aut etiam si essent {si essent: om. Er} illi *{om. RaJaEr} secundum similem anime dispositionem dispositioni *{eorum add. RaEr} {enim Ja} priorum a quibus contraxerunt talem denominationem {quoniam hoc add. RaJaEr} contraxerunt enim {om. RaJaEr} ab excellentibus {excellentioribus Ra} in divitiis et virtutibus. Unde {bene add. Er} dicit Aristoteles, tertio Politice *{Politicorum Ja}, [III.13, 1283 a37: "ingenuitas autem est virtus generis; IV.8, 1294 a20: ingenuitas enim est virtus et divitiae antiquae, "good birth is ancient virtue and wealth"] quod "ingenuitas est {et Ra} virtus *{generis add. JaRaEr} et *{iterum quod ingenuitas est virtus et add. JaRaEr} divitie antique". Qui ergo {igitur RaJaEr} ex ingenuis descendunt, si suos progenitores {in add. JaRaEr} [Ra 3b] secuti fuerint secundum virtutes, illi formaliter et proprie {et proprie: om. Ja} dicuntur nobiles et ingenui, et sunt (ceteris paribus) aliis {om. JaRa} prehonorandi, et *{immo JaRaEr} etiam quicumque ex tali ingenuo genere *{descendunt add. JaEr} {descendit add. Ra}, si non appareant in his *{eis JaRaEr} manifeste malicie, ipsi (ceteris paribus) sunt aliis in honoribus preponendi; quia sicut dicit Aristoteles "Verisimile est meliores {trs. 312 JaEr} *{verisimile est meliores: meliores verisimile RaZn} esse eos qui ex melioribus". Tamen sicut dicitur secundo Rhetorice [c. 15?], multi tales degenerant, non in sequentes virtutes {priorum add. Ra} progenitorum, et fiunt levioris {levis RaEr} valoris, immo valde *{mali add. JaRaEr} - raptores, homicide, tyranni. Quia sicut dicitur {dicit Ja} primo Rhetorice *{Politice JaRaEr}, "Sevissima est iniustitia habens arma"; et tamen tales {om. Ra} {adhuc add. Er} inter se {se add. Ja} nominant se adhuc {trs. Ra} {om. Er} nobiles {trs. Ra}, strenuos {et add. Ra} ingenuos {ingenuosos Ra} , et liberos, licet non vera sed mendaci nominatione *{denominatione JaRaEr}; aut etiam *{aut etiam: et sic etiam /et Ja\ JaRaEr} alii nominant eos aut {om. Ra} {et sic Ja} adulatione, aut quia non audent aliter dicere. Ideo manifestum est {om. Ra} quod talis libertas nihil {non Ja} est ad propositum {ad propositum: de proposito Ja} de felicitate. | Further, by extrinsic denomination freedom or nobility and slavery or non-nobility are ascribed {secundum} from ancestors. Men are commonly called nobles and freemen because they were begotten by the great and well born, and non-nobles and the servile those who were born of humbler folk, such as citizens, burgesses, merchants and country people. Certainly, if it were {secundum} a matter of intrinsic denomination, such nobility and good birth would be very honourable -- as they would be, also, if they were {secundum} a matter of a condition of soul like the condition of the ancestors from whom they have derived such denomination, since they derived it from some who excelled in riches and virtues. Thus Aristotle says, in Politics, Book III [1283 a37], "Good birth is virtue of family", and again [Book IV, 1294 a20], "Good birth is ancient virtue and wealth". Those, therefore, who are descended from the well born, if they follow their progenitors {secundum} in the virtues, are formally and properly called noble and well born, and (other things being equal) they should be honoured above others; indeed, even those who are descended from such a well-born family, if no manifest wickedness appears in them, should (other things being equal) be placed above others in honour: as Aristotle says, "Those with better ancestors are likely to be better". However, as is said in Rhetoric, Book II, many such persons {degenerant} lose their family character in not following the virtues of their ancestors and become of little worth, indeed very bad -- robbers, homicides, tyrants. As it is said in Politics, Book I [1253 a33], "Armed injustice is most savage". Yet among themselves such people still call themselves nobles, brave, well born and free, though by a description not true but mendacious; and others also call them thus either from adulation or because they do not dare say otherwise. It is therefore manifest that such freedom is nothing to our purpose concerning happiness. |
| [Pa 203v iii] Adhuc autem *{om. JaRaEr} aliter tangendo {tengendo Ra} {blank space Ja} animam Aristoteles distinguit primo Politice libertatem et servitutem: scilicet quia alia naturalis, alia violenta. Est enim servitus naturalis, robur *{robustas JaRaEr} corporis cum parva anime industria. Tales enim non sunt digni primi esse *{primi esse: preesse JaRaEr} in regimine et in *{om. JaRaEr} ordinatione rei publice; tales igitur {ergo Ja} dignum est servire, et eis magis est expediens *{magis est expediens: expediens magis JaRaEr} quam dominari et {ad Ra} {vel Ja} regere. Nam (sicut dicitur *{habetur JaRa} sexto Ethicorum) "corpori forti sine visione moto {? Ja} accidit {accipit Er} falli fortius". Liberi autem naturaliter et digni regimine sunt ingeniosi et sensati {?sensativi/sensatum Ja} et habentes (ut dicit Aristotles) corpora "recta et inutilia ad tales operationes", puta mechanicas, "sed utilia ad civilem vitam". De istis autem {igitur RaJaEr } {ut add. Ja} dicit Aristoteles primo Politice, "Principans autem {om. Er} et subiectum natura propter salutem: quod quidem enim potest mente providere {previdere Er} principans *{natura add. RaZnEr} et natura dominans {trs. RaZnEr} {et natura dominans: nulla? et dominans ?nature/naturaliter Ja}, quod autem prestat *{potest hec JaRaEr} corpore *{facere add. JaRaEr} subiectum est {et Er} natura et servum". Secundum autem violentiam servi dicuntur coacti contra voluntates {voluntatem Ra} eorum, ut captivitati *{captivati JaRaEr} et {aut Ra} incarcerati, aut etiam qui {que Ra} ex legibus sunt {om. Ra} aliquibus aliis corporaliter obligati {trs. Er} et non possunt, neque filii eorum, sub pena corporis a *{se ab illorum /ipsorum Er\ RaEr} domino {eorum add. Ja} separari. Liberi autem correspondentes huiusmodi servis {sunt add. Er} qui non sunt sic {non sunt sic: sic non Ja} {trs. 312 Ra} coacti vel aliis obligati. | Further, in another way, touching the soul, Aristotle, in Politics, Book I [1253 b30, and chapters. 5 and 6], distinguished freedom and slavery: namely, because one is natural, another violent. For there is a natural slavery: strength of body with little {industria} intelligence of soul. Such persons are not worthy to rule in the government and ordering of the commonwealth; it is therefore worthy that they should be slaves, and that is more beneficial for them than to dominate and rule, for as we read in Ethics, Book VI [1144 b12], "A strong body moving blindly may be deceived more strongly". But naturally free persons worthy of government are {ingeniosi} able and intelligent, with bodies "upright and useless for such activities", for example {mechanicas} manual work, "but useful for political life". Of these, therefore, Aristotle says, in Politics, Book I [1252 a30], "Natural ruler and subject are for the sake of safety: for that which can foresee by mind is by nature the ruler and by nature lord, but what can do these things by body is subject by nature and a slave". As a matter of violence, however, those are called slaves who are compelled against their wills, such as captives and prisoners, or, as well, those who are by the laws bound bodily to some other persons and cannot (or their children) separate from their lord without bodily penalty. The free men corresponding to such slaves are those who are not in this way compelled or bound to others. |
| Manifestum est ergo {igitur Ra} quod libertas et servitus naturales sunt honeste et iuste et in {igitur Ja} policia optima et nobilissima {policia optima et nobilissima: optima potentia aut nobilissima Ja} {trs. 2341 Ra} expedientes: sed tamen libertas est honesta *{valde honestior JaRa} et {ac Ra} nobilior servitute sicut anima nobilior est {trs. JaRa} corpore. Libertas autem *{et servitus add. JaRa} secundum legem et violentam {violentem Ra} actionem {coactionem Ra} nihil habet {om. Ra} {trs. Ja} pulchri, nihil {vel Ra} [Ra 4A] honesti, nihil {vel Ra} amoris. Unde {dicit add. Er} Aristoteles {in add. Ra} primo Politice: "Expediens [Pa 203v iv] est servo amicitia {trs. JaRa} et domino adinvicem, his qui naturaliter *{natura JaRa} tales dignificantur. His autem que {qui Ra} non secundum hunc modum, sed secundum legem et violentiam passis, contrarium". Propter quod etiam talis nobilitas vel libertas *{omnino add. JaRa} dimittenda est, nihil enim *{est add. JaRa} ad felicitatem; de servo {ea RaEr} enim dicitur [Ja 322ra] septimo Politice, "neque {nec Ra} enim servo inquantum servus uti venerabile". | It is clear, therefore, that natural freedom and slavery are {honestus} respectable, just and expedient in the best and noblest city, {sed tamen} though freedom is much more respectable and noble than slavery, just as the soul is nobler than the body. But freedom and slavery {secundum} as a matter of law and violent compulsion have nothing of beauty or respectability or love. Thus Aristotle, in Politics, Book I [1255 b12]: "Friendship with one another is beneficial to slave and master -- to those qualified as such by nature; to those who are slaves not in this manner but {secundum} as a matter of law and violence {passis} done to them, the opposite". Accordingly, such nobility or freedom must also be altogether dismissed, for it is irrelevant to happiness; for of the slave it is said in Politics, Book VII [1325 a26], "To use a slave as slave is not honourable". |
| Adhuc ad predictorum modorum oppositorum similitudinem *{ad predictorum modorum oppositorum similitudinem: ex /quod Ja\ predicto primo Politicorum JaRaEr} alie distinctiones sumuntur {trs. JaRaEr} libertatum {libertatis RaEr} et servitutum {servitutis RaEr}. Propter quod est {om. Ra} notandum {trs. Ja} quod liberum prima intentione dicitur quod est et agit sui ipsius gratia et alia propter ipsum {et alia propter ipsum: om. Ra} prima intentione, et non gratia alterius, prout dicitur liberum. Servum autem ut servum dicitur quod {dicitur quod: om. Ra} est vel operatur gratia alterius, ut habetur prohemio {primo Ra} Metaphysice. {et add. Ja} Ideo quantum aliquis *{aliquid JaRa} est *{vel agit add. JaRa} prima intentione sui ipsius gratia *{et alia propter ipsum, tamen */tantum JaEr\ habet de libertate et quantum est vel operatur gratia alicuius /trs. Ja\ prima intentione add. JaRa}, tantum participat de modo virtutis *{servitutis JaRa}; et est idem servum et liberum respectu diversorum, ut comites et duces {divites Ra} servi dicerentur *{respectu add. JaRa} regis, et liberi respectu subditorum suorum {om. Ra}. Et nos homines sumus {om. Ra} servi dei, et sumus domini et liberi *{in ordine add. JaRa} ad animalia bruta, ad *{et JaRa} plantas, ad *{et JaRa} inanimata. Utimur enim ipsis {eis JaRa} propter nos, ut habetur secundo De Anima, et quia supernaturali ordine "deterius" sive indignius "est gratia melioris", prout determinat Aristoteles, septimo Politice *{Politicorum JaRa}. Ideo dicit ipse in primo libro quod secundum nunc dictum modum libertatis et servitutis semper in omni genere *{communione AuPbMuJaRaEr} [Mz=Pa] dicitur liberum {et liberum est dicitur Ja} {trs. Ra} quod melius est et dignius {dignius et melius Ra} {trs. 4231 Ja}, et alia respecta *{respectu JaEr} {gratia Ra} huiusmodi *{huius Ja} {cuius Ra} dicuntur servilia et {vel Ra} subdita *{subiecta JaRa}. Tamen huic modo alter modus dominationis {denominationis Ra} et servitutis erroneus invenitur et innaturalis {trs. 231 Ra} opponi, scilicet prout deterius et indignius assumunt aliquando {om. Ra} sibi {sic Ra} dominium super melius et dignius, prout hoc contingit in transgressionibus potentiarum *{pollitiarum Ra} que {et Ra} propter inordinationem non merentur dici potentie *{politie RaEr}, sed transgressiones potentiarum *{politiarum Er}, que enumerantur ab Aristotele tres opposite tribus rectis politiis, scilicet tyrannis opponitur *{opposita JaRa} regno, oligarchia {alorgarchia Ja} {polligarchia Ra} opponitur *{opposita JaRa} aristocrachie, et democrachia opponitur *{opposita JaRa} timocrachie. In his {enim add. Ra} naturaliter servi fiunt violenti *{violentia JaRa} et preter naturam domini et liberi {trs. 321 Ja}, et econtra. Sumuntur ergo {igitur Ja} isti modo duo {trs. JaRa} libertatum et servitutum ex divisione dominii {om. Ra} seu principatus in recte {ratione JaRa} et naturaliter {naturalis Ra} ordinatum et in distorte et innaturaliter deordinatum. | Further, other distinctions of kinds of freedom and slavery are taken from Politics, Book I. Accordingly, it should be noted that "free by first purpose" {prima intentione} is {dicitur} applied to that which by first purpose exists and acts for its own sake and others for its sake, and not for the sake of another (so far as it is called "free"). However "slave" as such is applied to that which exists or acts for another's sake, as we read in the preface to the Metaphysics [983 b25]. Therefore, so far as something exists or acts by first purpose for its own sake and other things for its sake, to that extent it has freedom: and so far as it exists or acts by first purpose for the sake of another, to that extent it shares in the mode of slavery. The same thing is slave and free in respect of different things; for example, counts and dukes would be called slaves in respect of the king and free in respect of their own subjects. We men are God's slaves, and we are lords and free men in {ordine} relation to brute animals and plants and inanimate things, for we use them for our sakes, as we read in De Anima, Book II [415 b20?; see Politics, I.8, 1256 b15], and because by supernatural {ordine} ordering "the worse" or less worthy "is for the sake of the better", as Aristotle determines in Politics, Book VII [1333 a22]. Therefore he says in Book I [1254 b18-20?] that {secundum} in the mode of freedom and slavery just spoken of, in every community what is better and more worthy is called free, and other things in respect of this are called slavish and subject. However, in opposition to this mode of lordship and slavery there is another that is erroneous and unnatural, namely when the worse and less worthy sometimes take to themselves lordship over the better and more worthy, as happens in the perversions of the constitutions, which, because of lack of order, do not deserve to be called constitutions but perversions of constitutions. They are enumerated by Aristotle, three opposed to the three right constitutions, namely tyranny (opposed to kingship), oligarchy (opposed to aristocracy), and democracy (opposed to timocracy). In these [regimes] those who are naturally slaves become by violence and against nature lords and freemen, and vice versa. These two modes of freedom and slavery are taken, therefore, from the division of lordship or rulership into rightly and naturally ordered, and perverted and unnaturally disordered. |
| Adhuc ultimo notat {om. Er} Aristoteles {ponit add. Er} *{aliam add. JaRaEr} divisionem libertatis seu dominii vel principatus. Est enim dominium {om. Ja} despoticum et est dominium regale. Dominium despoticum dicitur super {?hoc inter/breviter Ja} ea que non habent potestatem vel industriam {vel industriam: om. Ra} resistendi [Ra 4B] vel {seu JaRa} obviandi voluntati seu impetui dominantis. Sic enim dominamur super {?brutis Ja} inanimata et plantas, et super domos et agros, et etiam super {etiam super: ?breviter quod Ja} {trs. Ra} bruta, {nam add. Er} cum arte vel {?de Ja} {etiam cum add. Er} potentia naturali {?corporea Ra} {corporali Er} possumus {nobis add. Ja} ea {om. Ra} *{nobis add. Er} subiugare {nobis add. Ra}, et etiam {om. JaRaEr} super homines {etiam add. JaRaEr} secundum {super Ra} violentiam *{violentam JaRaEr} dominationem, de qua {tantum add. Ja} dictum est ante {trs. 312 RaEr} {om. Ja}. Dominium autem regale et libertas regalis est super ea que habunt potestatem et industriam resistendi vel {et JaEr} obviandi {vel obviandi: om. Ra} voluntati vel *{et JaRaEr} impetui dominantis {dominanti Ja}, sed non conantur obviare neque {nec Ja} volunt; immo ad subiiciendum *{subiectionem JaRaEr} {et add. Ra} inclinantur, quia experientia {experientiam Ra} sciunt vel {om. Ra} {et add. Er} ex bona persuasione vel ex *{vel ex: et JaRaEr} assuefactione {assuetudine JaRa} habent industriam quod bonum sit eis {ei Ra} subici et melius {et melius: om. Ra} quam quod non subiciantur {subiciuntur Ra}, quoniam sicut {om. Er} dicitur octavo huius *{Ethicorum JaRaEr}, regis dominatio est "ad subiectos {trs.231 Er} in superabundantia beneficii; benefaciunt {om. Ra} {benefacit Er} enim subditis et curam habent ipsorum et *{ut JaRaZnEr} bene operantur *{operentur JaEr}". Quo tamen non obstante [Ja 322rb] rex agit sui ipsius gratia {? add. Ja}, intentione principali {trs. JaRaEr}, scilicet ut virtute iustitie interius perficiatur eius anima {animus}, et exterius sibi {? add. Ja} {om. Er} tribuatur {tribuantur sibi Er} honor et gloria; "quibus {om. Er} autem {om. Er} non sufficiunt {? Ja} {sufficientia Er} hec, illi {isti JaRaZn} sunt *{fiunt JaRaEr} tyranni", prout {quod Ja} bene dicit Aristoteles quinto huius *{Ethicorum JaRaEr}. | Further, finally, Aristotle notes another division of freedom or lordship or rulership. There is despotic lordship, and there is royal lordship. Lordship is called despotic when it is over things which do not have the power or {industria} intelligence to resist or {obviare} obstruct the will or impulse of the ruler. We rule thus over inanimate things and plants, over houses and fields, and even over brute animals when by art or physical power we are able to subjugate them to us, and also over men {secundum} by the violent lordship we spoke of earlier. Royal lordship, however, and royal freedom is over things that have the power and {industria} intelligence to resist or obstruct the will and impulse of the ruler but do not try to obstruct or wish to do so; indeed, they are inclined to subjection, because by experience they know, or by good persuasion and custom they have an {industria} understanding, that it is good for them to be subjected, better than not to be subjected, since (as is said in Ethics, Book VIII [1161 a12]), the rule of a king "is of superabundant benefit to his subjects, for kings benefit their subjects and take care of them so that they act well". Nevertheless, despite this, a king acts for his own sake {principali intentione} by chief purpose, namely so that his soul may be inwardly perfected by the virtue of justice and so that outwardly honour and glory may be paid to him. "Those whom these things do not satisfy become tyrants", as Aristotle well says in Ethics, Book V [1134 b8]. |
| Sic ergo {igitur RaEr}, recolligendo, positi sunt novem modi libertatis aut servitutis, quorum multi si non sunt suppositaliter distincti, distinguntur tamen aliqualiter {tamen aliqualiter: om. Ra} secundum diversas rationes. | To recapitulate, then, nine modes have been put forward of freedom and slavery, many of which, if they are not {suppositionaliter distincti} distinct in what they refer to, are nevertheless somehow distinguished {secundum} by different {ratio} concepts. |
| Primus enim modus consistit {consistet Ra} in bona et subtili {trs. 321 Ja} complexione corporis *{disponente ad sensuum vivacitatem, et modus servitutis consistit in complexione corporis add. JaRa} et *{om. JaRaEr} magis compacta et dura, reddente corpora fortia ad necessarium usum, ineptiora tamen ad mentis operationem {aptitudinem JaRaEr}, iuxta illud secundo *{secundi JaRa} De Anima, "Molles carne {sunt add. Er} apti {aptos vero Ra} mente {dicimus add. Ra} duri {dicitur Ra} vero inepti" {etc. add. Ra}. {duri... inepti: om. Er} | The first mode [of freedom] consists in a good and subtle composition of body disposing to liveliness of sensation, and the mode of slavery consists in a composition of body that is more compact and hard, making bodies strong for necessary use but unsuitable for activity of mind, in accordance with the text of De Anima, Book II [421 a25], "Those whose flesh is soft are mentally capable, while those whose flesh is hard are incapable". |
| Secundus autem modus consistit in abundantia vel {et JaEr} defectu pecuniarum et {vel Ra} bonorum pecunia mensurabilium {?mensuratum JaRa} . | The second mode consists in abundance or lack of money or of goods measurable in money. |
| Tertius autem modus {om. Ra} consistit in extrinseca denominatione ab antiquis progenitoribus. | The third mode consists in an extrinsic denomination from ancient ancestors. |
| Quartus {tertius Ja} autem {om. Ja} modus, prout {?scilicet add. Ja} addit supra {super Ja} primum {primam Ra}, consistit in mentis discretione vel indiscretione {vel indiscretione: om. RaEr}, prudentia vel {aut Ra} imprudentia. | The fourth mode, so far as it adds something above the first, consists in mental {discretio} perceptiveness or imperceptiveness, prudence or imprudence. |
| Quintus etiam *{om. JaRaEr} consistit in violentia. Violentans enim {om. Er} dicitur {secundum add. Er} liberum, et violentatum {dicitur add. Ra} servum. | The fifth consists in violence, for one who violates is called free and the one violated a slave. |
| Sextus modus *{libertatis add. JaRaEr} consistit in essendo melius et {om. JaRaEr} dignius et principalius. | The sixth mode of freedom consists in being better and more worthy and more {principalius} principal [i.e. ruler-like]. |
| Septimus {modus add. Ja} consistit in transgressione a recto {? Ja} et naturali ordine. | The seventh consists in transgression from the right and natural order. |
| Octavus modus libertatis et servitutis {libertatis et servitutis om. Er} consistit in subiectum non {? add. Ja} posse obviare {ordinare Ja} voluntati {potestati Er} et *{vel JaRa} impetui dominanis, et in {om. Er} dominum necessitare subiectum sine *{sive AuPbMuMzRaEr} {om. Ja} necessitate violenta sive naturali {trs.321 Er}. | The eighth mode of freedom and slavery consists in the subject's inability to obstruct the will or impulse of the lord and in the lord's necessitating the subject by a necessity either violent or natural. |
| Nonus autem modus libertatis et servitutis {libertatis et servitutis: om. JaEr} addit supra octavum *{sextum AuPbMuMzJaRaEr} quod subiectum sit innatum obviare [Ra 5A] voluntati {om. Ja} et preceptis dominatis. | And the ninth mode of freedom and slavery adds above the sixth that the subject is capable {innata} of obstructing the will and the commands of the lord. |
| Sed quia intellectus et voluntas de quibus questio formabatur sunt in eodem supposito, nunc restat dicendum {trs. 321 JaRaEr} [before dicendum JaEr have q para.] de libertate et servitute in eodem supposito. Et comparabimus primo animam ad corpus, secundo partem superiorem anime, scilicet rationalem, ad partem anime *{om. JaRaEr} inferiorem, scilicet ad *{om. JaRaEr} sensualem, et {in Er} tertio intellectum ad voluntatem. | But since the intellect and will, about which the question was formulated, are in the same individual, it remains now to speak of freedom and slavery in the same individual. We will compare first soul to body, second the superior part of the soul, namely the rational, to the inferior part of the soul, namely the sensual, and third the intellect to the will. |
| De prima comparatione sequenda est determinatio Aristotelis {om. Ja}, primo Politice *{Politicorum JaRa}, dicentis: "Anima {non Er} quidem corpori {corpus Er} principatur dominio despotico" {principatur dominio despotico: d blank dispotico principia Ra} {principatur dominio despotico: principatu Ja} {principatur dominio despotico: dominatur despotico principatu Er}. Corpus enim {autem JaEr} non innatum est {trs. RaEr} resistere anime. Moveo enim {non... enim: om. Ja} pedes si volo, etiam *{aut JaRaEr} manus et *{aut JaRaEr} caput {trs. 321 Ja} aut linguam, etc., prout unumquodque membrum *{membrorum JaRa} innatum est {trs. Ra} moveri, et non potest aliquod eorum michi {om. Er} resistere si non sit egrum {equum Ra} vel si *{om. JaRaEr} non sit {om. Ja} extrinsecum impedimentum; {tamen add. Ra} in quo casu {? Ra} anima {? add. Ja} {iam add. Er} non haberet iam {om. JaRaEr} super {supra JaRa} illud membrum dominium inquantum {esset add. Ra} sic est {om. Ra} {esset Er} impedimentum *{?impeditum JaRaEr}. | [1] Concerning the first comparison one should follow Aristotle's judgment, in Politics, Book I [1254 b3]. He says: "The soul rules the body with a despotic rule". For the body is not capable {innatum} of resisting the soul; I move my feet if I will, or my hands or head or tongue, etc., as each member is capable {innatum} of being moved, and none of them can resist me, if it is not sick or if there is no external obstacle (in which case the soul would not have lordship over that member in so far as it was thus impeded). |
| De secunda autem {etiam Er} comparatione dicitur quod *{pars add. JaRaEr} superior dominatur super inferiorem partem *{om. JaRaEr} dominio regali, et quod {om. Ra} hoc intendit Aristoteles, primo Politice *{Politicorum JaRa}, cum dicit {dicitur Ja}, intellectum principari "appetitui politico" principatu {trs. Ra} "et regali". Dicit {dicitur RaEr} {intellectum... dicit om. Ra} enim quod per intellectum intendit Aristoteles {trs. Ra} totam partem superiorem, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem, et per appetitum totam inferiorem, scilicet sensum et appetitum sensitivum. Et ideo de dominio anime super corpus et intellectus super appetitum subdit statim Aristoteles, manifestum esse quod sit {sicut Er} "secundum naturam {et add. JaRa} {est add. Er} expediens {expedient Ra} corpori {om. Ra} passibili *{om. JaRaEr} regi ab anima {trs. 231 Ja}, et parti {passibili et Ra} *{passionali parti id est JaEr} sensuali "ab intellectu et parte rationem habente". Cum enim copulatio proprie debeat copulare inter diversa, videtur quod Aristoteles cum diceret "et parte rationem habente" intendebat voluntatem, que {cum Ra} dicitur rationem habere non {? Ra} quia ratiocinetur {suppositive add. Ja}, sed {om. Ja} presuppositive {presupposite Ra}, quia non fertur voluntas [Ja 322vA] nisi {nec Ra} in illud quod preiudicatum est ratione. Quod autem semper *{om. JaRaEr} pars sensualis sit innata adversari et obviare {obviari Ra} rationi, dictum fuit {est JaRaEr} in primo huius satis. *{et add. RaJaEr} Dictum est *{nunc add. Ja} autem {dictum est autem: nunc autem dictum est RaEr} quod ille {iste Ja} nonus modus libertatis, scilicet {om. Ra} regalis, supponit sextum modum, et hoc est {bene Ra} verum {om. Er} in proposito {bene add. Er}, quia omnes concedunt partem intellectualem esse sensuali naturaliter {esse add. JaRa} meliorem et {om. JaRa} digniorem {om. Er} et {om. Er} [Pa 204riv] excellentiorem virtute et operatione; et quia dictum est quod pars sensualis {ad add. Ja} innata est adversari rationi, contingit aliquando ex defectu partis {rationalis seu add. Ra} intellectualis et pravitate {preiudicio Ja} sensualis quod {et Ra} intellectualis succumbit et {quod pars add. Ra} {quod add. Ja} *{pars add. Er} sensualis dominatur super intellectualem. Cum ergo {igitur RaEr} pars intellectualis dominatur et {quod add. Ra} {quod pars add. Ja} sensualis permittit {? Ra} se duci {seduci Ra} {ducit Ja} ratione {? Ra} et inclinatur ad obediendum rationi, tunc est huiusmodi *{in homine JaRaEr} principatus regalis, ordinatus naturalis, rectus {rationis add. JaRa} [ErPr=Pa] [Ra 5B] et optimus; et talis est {om. Ja} principatus in omni homine virtuoso et non nisi in eo. Quando autem est econtra, tunc est principatus innaturalis, perversus et valde malus, et {om. Ra} est talis in omni {om. Er} homine vitioso. Cum ergo {igitur JaRa} dictum sit {?servitur Ra} {?fuerit Ja} in nono {octo Ra} Ethicorum {qui add. Ra} quod homo maxime est {trs. JaRa} intellectus, et simpliciter a parte intellectus *{intellectuali JaRaEr} recipere debet denominationem, ideo homo {ideo homo add. Ja} simpliciter dicitur {om. Ra} {trs. Ja} verus sui ipsius {igitur add. Ja} dominus, et videtur {om. Er} liber, si in eo ratio {trs. 312 JaRa} dominatur super sensum; econtra {om. Er} autem si intellectus succumbit et servit sensui, dicitur vere servus. Et ad istam {illam Er} intentionem procedunt plures auctoritates phisicorum *{philosophorum AuMuMzPbJaRa}, scilicet Aristotelis, primo Politicorum, dicentis {om. JaRaEr} quod virtus et vitium *{malicia JaRaEr} determinant servum et liberum, et nobiles et ignobiles, et Tullii, in *{De add. JaRaEr} Paradoxis, dicentis omnes sapientes liberos esse {trs. Ra} et omnes stultos {esse add. Ra in margin} servos, et intendit omnes sapientes esse bonos et *{virtuosos et add. RaEr} nullos esse malos nisi stultos, iuxta illud tertii {tertio Ja} huius *{Ethicorum JaRaEr}, "Ignorat autem omnis malus". Idem intendit Seneca, Epistola {om. JaRa} "Iterum *{tu michi" add. JaRaEr} [Epistola XLIV, p. 288] Ad Lucillium, dicens allegando Platonem {blank added in Ja} "Plato ait neminem {? Ra} regem {rege Ja} non ex servis {hiis Er} esse oriundum, neminem {om. Er} non {om. Ja} {neque Er} servum {trs. RaZn} {non add. Er} ex regibus; omnia ista longa varietas miscuit et sursum deorsum que {quia Ra} {quod Ja} {om. Zn} fortuna versavit {vexavit Er}". Et {om. Ra} tunc querit "Quis {igitur add. JaEr} est {igitur add. Ra} generosus?", id est liber et {vel Ja} nobilis, et respondet "Ad {om. Ra} virtutem bene a natura compositus. Hoc {hic Ra} unum est intuendum" {?intendendum Ra} {trs. JaRaZnEr}. Et subdit: "Animus facit [Pa 204va] nobilem, cui ex quacunque conditione supra fortunam licet surgere" {suggere Ra}. Econtra autem homo vitiis {trs. RaEr} efficitur servus {trs. RaEr} ut ipse dicit *{in add. JaRaEr} epistola "Libenter" {bene Er}: [Epistola XLVII, p. 310] "Alius *{enim add. JaRaEr} libidini servit, alius avaritie *{ambitione JaRaEr}, alius ambitioni *{avaritie JaRaEr}, omnes timori". Hoc etiam {enim Ra} {et Ja} dicit ille {iste Ja} communis versus, "Nobilitas sola est animum que moribus ornat". | [2] Concerning the second comparison it is said that the superior part rules over the inferior by royal lordship, and this is what Aristotle {intendit} means, in Politics, Book I [1254 b4], when he says that the intellect rules the appetite "with a constitutional and royal rule". For it is said that by "intellect" Aristotle {intendit} means the whole superior part, namely intellect and will, and by "appetite" the whole inferior part, namely sense and sensitive appetite. Aristotle therefore immediately adds, concerning the lordship of soul over body and intellect over appetite, that clearly "it is according to nature and beneficial for the body to be ruled by the soul and the passional", i.e. the sensual, "part by the intellect and the part that has reason". Since properly speaking a conjunction should join different things, it seems that when Aristotle said "and the part that has reason" he meant the will, which is said to have reason not because it reasons but "presuppositively", because will is {fertur} carried only to what has been pre-judged by reason. That the sensual part is capable {innata} of opposing and obstructing the reason was sufficiently explained in Book I of this work. But it has just been said that the ninth mode of freedom, namely the royal, presupposes the sixth mode, which is true in the present case, because everyone grants that the intellectual part is naturally better and more worthy and more excellent in virtue and activity than the sensual; and because it has been said that the sensual part is capable {innata} of opposing reason, it sometimes happens, from a defect of the intellectual part and the wickedness of the sensual, that the intellectual part succumbs and the sensual part rules over the intellectual. Therefore, when the intellectual part rules and the sensual permits itself to be led by reason and inclines to obey reason, then there exists in a man a rulership that is royal, ordered, natural, right and best; and such is the rulership in every virtuous man and in none but him. But when the opposite is the case, then the rulership is unnatural, perverse and very bad, and it is such in every vicious man. Therefore, since it was said in Ethics, Book IX [1166 a17], that a man is {maxime} chiefly his intellect and should receive his denomination simply from the intellectual part, a man is therefore said simply to be his own true lord and seems to be free if in him reason rules over sense; but if, on the contrary, the intellect succumbs and is slave to the sense, he is said truly to be a slave. And many texts of philosophers run in accordance with this {intentio} doctrine, that is Aristotle's, when he says in Politics, Book I [1255 a20?], that virtue and wickedness determine slave and free and noble and non-noble, and Cicero's, in De Paradoxis, when he says that all the wise are free and all the stupid slaves (he {intendit} means that all the wise are good and that none are bad except the stupid, in accordance with the text "But every bad man is ignorant", Ethics, Book III [1110 b27]). Seneca {intendit} holds the same in the letter to Lucilius "Iterum tu mihi" [XLIV.4], when he says, quoting Plato: "Plato says that no king has arisen except from among slaves and no slave except from among kings: long vicissitude has mixed all things and Fortune has turned them upside down". Then he asks, "Who, then, is well-born?", that is, free and noble, and answers, "He who is by nature well put together for virtue. This is the one thing to be considered". He adds: "The soul makes us noble; it can rise above fortune from any condition whatever". On the other hand, a man is made a slave by his vices, as he says in his letter "Libenter" [XLVII.17]: "One is a slave to lust, another to ambition, another to avarice, all to fear". The common verse also says this: "Nobility alone is that which adorns the soul with virtues". |
| Aliqui oblocuti sunt in me quia sepius ad proposita mea tot auctoritates adduco: sed *{cum JaRaEr} auctoritates *{auctoritas JaRaEr} non demonstrent *{demonstret JaRa}. Et ego dicam *{dico JaRaEr} quod illum modum procedendi non dimittam *{specialiter add. JaRa} in moralibus, quia plus est credendum antiquis doctoribus et famosis {et famosis: om. Ja} in moribus {moralibus Er} quam rationibus novis supervenientibus et non exquisitis. Nam tales doctores (ut dicitur sexto huius), "Propter habere experientia *{experientiam JaEr} visum { ?visis Ra} {?visu Ja} vident principia". Et iterum ubi ille auctoritates {trs.231 Er} ponuntur ibi {om. Ra} *{per add. JaRaEr} auctoritates probantur et {etiam Er} demonstantur; ideo qui {que Ra} propositorum {? Ja} demonstrationes {demonstrantes Ja} habere {hec Ja} cupiunt recurrere {ire Er} possunt ad loca allegationum si vellint. Non ergo {igitur JaRaEr} puto frustra adducere eas {trs. 312 Ra}. | (Some have criticised me because I very often bring forward for my purposes so many authoritative texts, since an authority does not demonstrate. I say that I will not give up this way of arguing, especially in morals, because more credence should be given to ancient and famous teachers in morals than to arguments {superveniens} newly discovered and not {exquisitis} thoroughly investigated, for (as is said in Book VI of this work [1143 b12]), "because they have insight from experience", such teachers "see the principles". And again, proof and demonstration is given where those texts are put forward; those who desire to have demonstrations of the things proposed can therefore go back to the context of the quotations if they wish. I therefore do not think it pointless to adduce them.) |
| Nunc ergo {igitur Ra} restat dicere de comparatione [Ra 6a] intellectus et voluntatis, de qua a principio querebatur. Et ego {igitur Ra} suppono ex dictis prius {trs. Er} in tertia questione sexti libri, et in tertio De Anima, quod in homine intellectus {trs. 312 Ra} et voluntas sunt eadem res, immo *{ita JaRaEr} quod {est add. Ja} {etiam add. Er} voluntas est intellectus {trs. 321 RaEr}, et intellectus est voluntas *{intellectus est voluntas: voluntas intellectus RaEr}. [Ja 322vb] Ex qua suppositione ego infero hac *{istam JaRaEr} primam conclusionem, quod neque {nec Ra} voluntas est liberalior {liberior JaRa} intellectu neque {nec Ra} intellectus liberior {om. Ra} voluntate, quia sequeretur quod voluntas esset liberior {nobilior Ja} voluntate *{vel intellectus /liberior add. Er\ intellectu add. JaEr}, quod non conceditur. Consequentia tamen {om. JaRa} {autem Er} patet per syllogismum expositorium, arguendo sic: Intellectus est liberior voluntate; et {ideo add. Ja} intellectus est voluntas; ergo voluntas est liberior voluntate {om. Ra}. Similiter {sequitur quod Ja} {etiam neque add. Er} voluntas est liberior intellectu; et illa voluntas est ille *{om. JaRa} intellectus; ergo {igitur Ra} {? Ja} intellectus est liberior intellectu. Et {om. Ra} {et... et: om. Er} eodem modo {enim add. Er} arguitur de nobilitate et {om. Ra} de {om. Ja} principalitate {principatu Ja} et {om. JaRa} de potestate et de {potestate et de: om. Ra} causalitate et {om. Ja} de prioritate {?peccare Ra} {de potestate add. Ra} et universaliter de omnibus comparationibus {? Ja} {operationibus Er} et {aut Er} relationibus quibus non contingit idem {? Ja} comparare vel referre {idem add. Ra} ad seipsum. Si enim imposssibile est idem seipso {ipso Er} esse {om. Ra} prius et *{vel RaEr} posterius, nobilius et *{vel RaEr} ignobilius, vel quod {om. RaEr} idem esset {esse Er} causa {causam Er} sui ipsius et *{aut RaEr} effectus, concludetur quod impossibiles *{impossibile RaEr} {idem seipso... impossibiles: om. Ja} *{est add. RaEr} intellectu *{intellectum RaEr} nobiliorem esse {trs. JaEr} voluntatem {voluntati JaRa} *{voluntate Er}, vel ignobiliorem, priorem {priorum Ra} vel posteriorem {posteriorum Ra}, causam *{esse add. JaRaEr} eius vel causatum *{etiam add. JaRaEr} vel econtra. Similiter {etiam Ja} ex eadem radice sequitur quod omnes tales copulative {copulationes Ja} sunt {essent Ra} impossibiles: intellectus Sortis intelligit et voluntas eius non intelligit, voluntas eius {Sortis Er} vult et intellectus eius non vult, voluntas eius est ceca et intellectus eius {om. Ja} non est cecus {ceca Ja}, intellectus eius {om. Er} est sapientia vel prudentia {trs. 321 JaRaEr} habituatus et non voluntas, et sic de aliis talibus. | [3] Now, therefore, it remains to speak of the comparison of intellect and will, which was the original question. And I suppose, from what was said in Question 3 of Book VI [fol. 118 r], and in De Anima, Book III, that intellect and will in man are the same entity, so that the intellect is the will and the will the intellect. From this supposition I infer this first conclusion, that the will is not freer than the intellect, and the intellect is not freer than the will, because it would follow that the will would be freer than the will or the intellect freer than the intellect, which is not conceded. The inference is clear by means of an expository syllogism, arguing thus: The intellect is freer than the will, and the intellect is the will, therefore the will is freer than the will. Similarly: The will is freer than the intellect, and the will is the intellect, therefore the intellect is freer than the intellect. And similar arguments are made concerning nobility and {principalitas} being principal, power, causality, priority, and in general all comparisons and relations in which it is not possible for the one thing to be compared with or related to itself. If it is impossible for the one thing to be prior or posterior to itself, or more noble or more ignoble, or that the same thing should be its own cause or its own effect, it follows that it is impossible for the intellect to be nobler than the will, or ignobler, prior or posterior, its cause or its effect, or vice versa. Similarly, from the same root it follows that all such {copulatio} conjunctives as the following are impossible: Socrates' intellect understands and his will does not understand; his will wills and his intellect does not will; his will is blind and his intellect is not blind; his intellect is habituated by wisdom or prudence and his will not; and so of others of the kind. |
| Sed tunc est dubitatio quia non solum intellectus est idem quod voluntas {quod voluntas: om. Ja} : immo etiam {et Ja} in homine est idem {trs. 3412 JaRaEr} quod sensus sive potentia sensitiva, et idem quod appetitus vel {sive JaRa} {seu Er} potentia appetitiva, quia ponimus {volumus JaRa} quod {quia Er} eadem potentia *{anima JaRaEr} in homine est {et add. Ja} potentia intellectiva et {om. JaRaEr} sensitiva et vegetativa. Quomodo ergo {igitur JaRaEr} possumus predicata contradictoria attribuere intellectui *{vel voluntati add. JaRa} {voluntate vel intellectu Er} et sensui sive {seu JaRaEr} appetitui sensitivo ut {et Ra} quod ille {iste Ja} *{ille illi RaEr} adversatur et obviat rationi *{om. JaRaEr} quod {quia Er} semper ratio ad optima deprecatur et {om. Ra} non sensus vel {et Er} appetitus sed aliquando ad pessima; {et add. Er} quod pars superior, scilicet intellectualis est nobilior parte sensuali et dominatur ei domino regali. Hec omnia videntur contradicere {? add. Ra} predictis. |
[A doubt]But then there is a doubt, because not only is the intellect the same as the will: in man it is indeed also the same as the sense or sensitive power and the same as the appetite or appetitive power, because we assert that in man the same soul is the intellective power and the sensitive and the vegetative. How, then, can we attribute contradictory predicates to intellect or will and to sense or sensitive appetite? -- for example, that the one opposes and obstructs the other, that reason always "urges... towards the best objects" and not sense or appetite (which urge sometimes towards the worst), that the superior part, namely the intellectual, is nobler than the sensual part and rules it by a royal rule. All these seem to contradict the foregoing. |
| Et ego respondeo quod hec {om. Ra} omnia consonant si assignentur illi sensus secundum quos hec omnia dicuntur a sapientibus et ponuntur, et si distinguantur modi diversi [Pa 204vb] quibus utimur istis nominibus intellectus vel {et Ra} potentia intellectiva, sensus vel potentia sensitiva, et sic de aliis huiusmodi {om. Ja}. Dicam ergo {igitur JaRaEr} quod omnem intellectum humanum vocamus potentiam intellectivam quia potest intelligere, vel nos ipso [Ra 6b] tanquam receptivo intellectionis, et eodem modo voluntatem vocamus potentiam volitivam quia ipse *{ipsa JaRaPr} {om. Er} potest velle, vel nos ipsa tanquam receptivo *{receptiva JaRaErPr} volitionis, et similiter {? add. Ja} {secundum add. Pr} sensum vocamus potentiam sensitivam {trs. Ra} quia potest sentire, vel nos ipso tanquam receptivo sensationis et appetitum {vocamus potentiam appetitvam add. Er} quia {que Ja} {qui Pr} potest appetere, vel nos eo tanquam receptivo appetitionis. Si autem {si add. Ra} aliquid sit {om. Ra} activum intellectionis vel volitionis humane {?habere Ra} aut sensationis vel appetitionis {tanquam receptivo appetitionis. Si autem aliquid sit activum intellectionis vel volitionis humane aut sensationis vel appetitionis: tanquam receptivo intellectionis, et eodem modo voluntate vocamus quia ipsa potest velle vel nos ipsa tanquam receptivo volitionis add. [repeated from above] Ja} quod non recipiat in se huiusmodi appetitionem *{intellectionem JaRaPr} vel volitionem sensationem vel intellectionem *{appetitionem JaRaPr}, {Si... vel intellectionem: quia magis recipit in se huiusmodi intellectionem vel volitionem sensalitme vel appetionem secundum ? ? vocamus intellectum humanum vel voluntatem humanum sensum vel appetitum sensitivum et quod non recipit intellectionem add. Er} hoc non vocamus intellectum humanum vel voluntatem humanam, hoc non vocamus sensum vel appetitum sensitivum. Hoc ego *{igitur JaRaPr} suppono {hoc... suppono: Et igitur hoc ego suppono Er} ex quid nominis et si aliquis {aliquid Ra} {quis Er} vult illis nominibus {illis nominibus: om. Ra} alias significationes attribuere dicat *{ipse JaRaPr} consequenter sibiipsi *{om. JaRa} {sibi ErPr}. Et {sic enim Ra} *{sic Ja} {non enim Er} non {om. Er} accipimus {accepimus Ra} hic {om. Ra} intellectum et voluntatem et *{om. JaRaErPr} sensum et appetitum pro actibus intellegendi et sentiendi, etc. {om. Ja}, nec {vel Ja} intellectum accipimus pro habitu principiorum; ille enim non sunt prime {descripte Ra} significationes {om. Er} seu {om. Er} acceptiones {seu ? add. Er} illorum nominum. |
[Solution of the doubt]I answer that all these things are in harmony, if the meanings are assigned {secundum} in which all these things are said and asserted by the wise and if we distinguish the different ways in which we use the {nomina} words "intellect" or "intellective power", "sense" or "sensitive power" (and similarly with others of this kind). {dicam} I will say, therefore, [1] that in every case we call the human intellect an "intellective" power because it can understand, or we can understand by it, as receptive of intellection; and in the same way we call the will a "volitive" power because it can will, or we can will by it, as receptive of volition; and similarly we call the sense a "sensitive" power because it can sense, or we can sense by it, as receptive of sensation, and we call the appetite the "appetitive" power because it can desire, or we can desire by it, as receptive of appetition. But if something is [an] active [principle] of human intellection, volition, sensation or appetition that does not receive in itself such intellection, volition, sensation or appetition, we do not call this human intellect or human will, we do not call this sense or sensitive appetite. I therefore suppose this from the meanings of the terms, and if anyone wishes to attribute other meanings to these words, let him speak {consequenter} consistently. (Thus we do not here take "intellect", "will", "sense" and "appetite" for acts of understanding and sensing, etc., nor do we take "intellect" for the habit of principles; for these are not prime meanings or usages of those words.) |
| Secundo ego {om. Ja} dicam quod differentia est inter intellectionem et volitionem ex una parte et sensationem et sensibilem *{?sensualem JaEr} appetitionem ex altera parte, quoniam intellectio et {vel Ja} volitio non recipiuntur in corpore seu in {om. JaRa} {in corpore... in: sub Er} organo corporeo tanquam in subiecto de cuius potentia egrediantur, sed *{sic add. RaEr} recipiuntur in sola anima humana; [Ja 323ra] ideo nec illi actus extenduntur extensione corporis. Sic enim intelligimus {intelligendum est RaEr} illud {hoc JaRaEr} quod solemus dicere, puta {om. Ja} quod intellectus et voluntas non utuntur in suis actibus, scilicet intelligendi et volendi {trs.321 Ja}, organis corporeis {?corporis Ja}. Sensatio vero {autem JaRaEr} et {om. Ra} sensibilis {sensualis Er} appetitio recipiuntur in composito *{coniuncto JaRaEr} ex anima et corpore tanquam in subiecto de cuius potentia egrediuntur et secundum corpus et secundum {om. Ra} animam. Ergo {ideo etiam JaRaEr} illi actus secundum *{om. RaEr} {illi actus secundum: om. Ja} extensionem *{extensione RaEr} organi corporei extenduntur, et hoc amplius explanavi super librum De Anima. Et ex his videtur *{iam add. JaRaEr} sequi quod intellectus et voluntas non est precise nisi ipsa anima, sensus autem et appetitus sensitivus est compositum *{compositus JaRaEr} ex anima et organo corporeo. Tamen, quia illa *{in hac JaRaEr} compositione anima est pars valde {trs. Ra} principalis *{principalior RaEr}, ideo quandoque sensum et *{vel JaRaEr} appetitum sensitivum licet {uti et Ra} accipere pro *{ipsa add. JaRaEr} anima ita quod nomen solum {nomen solum: sensus Er} supponit {supponat RaEr} {trs. Ja} pro {ipsa add. Er} anima {trs. 2341 Ra}, appellando tamen organum. Et ut distinguamus inter has duas acceptiones, nos {om. Er} possemus {possumus Er} ad placitum vocare sensum in una *{prima JaRaEr} acceptione sensum totalem, et in secunda sensum {secundum JaRa} partialem et sic etiam de appetitu. Tunc ergo {om. Ja} {igitur RaEr} intellectus et voluntas essent idem quod {et Ra} sensus vel {et Ja} appetitus [Ra 7a] partialis, et non essent idem quod sensus vel {et Ja} appetitus totalis. Prout ergo {igitur JaRaEr} non sunt idem non est mirum si de his {eis JaEr} vere {om. Ra} dicantur {?ponantur Er} predicata contradictoria, sed prout sunt idem, nunquam. Immo {ut add. Ja} sic dicam quod sensus intelligit et intellectus sentit, scilicet tanquam sentiens partiale, nec intellectus dominatur super {supra Ra} sensum nisi sensus dominetur super {supra Ra} seipsum, nec sensus adversatur intellectui nisi intellectus est liberior vel nobilior sensu *{est liberior vel nobilior sensu: adversetur sibi ipsius, nec intellectus est nobilior sensu vel liberior, nec sensus intellectu JaRaEr}. | [2] I will say, second, that there is a difference between intellection and volition on the one hand and sensation and sensual appetition on the other, since intellection and volition are not received in the body or in a bodily organ as in a subject from whose power they proceed but are received in that way in the human soul alone; those acts are therefore not extended by the extension of the body. This is what we mean when we customarily say that in their acts of understanding and willing intellect and will do not use bodily organs. But sensation and sensible appetite are received in the composite of soul and body, as in the subject from whose power they proceed, {secundum} from both body and soul; those acts are therefore extended {secundum} by the extension of the bodily organ; I have explained this more fully [in the Questions] on De Anima. From these points it seems now to follow that the intellect and will is nothing except {precise} precisely the soul itself, but sense and sensitive appetite is a composite of soul and bodily organ. However, because in this composite the soul is much the more principal part, it is therefore permitted sometimes to take "sense" or "sensitive appetite" for the soul, so that the name stands only for the soul but {appellando} signifying the organ by appellation. To distinguish these two meanings, we can (if we please) call sense in the first meaning "total sense" and in the second meaning "partial sense", and similarly with appetite. Then intellect and will would be identical with "partial" sense or appetite and would not be identical with the "total" sense or appetite. In so far as they are not identical, therefore, it is not surprising if contradictory predicates are said of them; but [this] never [happens] in so far as they are the same. As such [i.e. as the same], indeed, I will say that sense understands and intellect senses, namely as partial sense, and intellect does not rule over sense (unless sense rules over itself), and sense is not opposed to intellect (unless intellect is opposed to itself), and intellect is not nobler than sense or freer, nor sense than intellect. |
| Sed tu queres {quereres Ra} an igitur {sic Er} intellectus est {om. Er} nobilior quam {an Ra} sensus totalis? Possum dicere quod non, quia corpus subiectum anime non diminuit de perfectione anime -- immo compositum ex anima et corpore videtur esse melius et perfectius quam ipsa anima circumscripto corpore, sicut {prout Er} Aristoteles dicit {trs. Er} primo huius quod felicitas humana *{om. JaRaEr} connumerata {cum mune'ta Ra} {cum add. Ja} [Pa 205ra] minimo bonorum redditur eligibilior. Quomodo autem intelligendum sit quod {quando Er} intellectus est {sit Er} multo nobilior {et add. Ra} potentia sensu *{quam sensus RaEr} {vel sensus Ja} vel *{et JaRaEr} voluntas quam appetitus sensitivus dicetur post. | But you will ask, "Then is intellect nobler than total sense"? I can say that it is not, because the body, which is subject to the soul, does not diminish the perfection of the soul -- rather, the composite of soul and body seems to be better and more perfect than soul itself apart from body -- just as Aristotle says, Ethics, Book I [1097 b18], that if happiness were counted together with the least of goods it would be made more desirable. I will say later how it may be understood that the intellect is a much nobler power than the sense and the will than the sensitive appetite. |
| Revertor ergo {igitur JaEr} ad comparationem intellectus et voluntatis, et pono secundum premissam suppositionem istam {?om. JaEr} secundam conclusionem {istam add. Ja} copulativam, quod {et add. Er} intellectus est liber {?liberior Ja} et voluntas est liber *{libera JaRaEr}, et eque liberi {liber Ja} sunt hic et illa {ista Ja}. Si enim ambo sunt {trs. JaRaEr} liberi oportet quod sint {sunt Ra} eque liberi, ex quo dictum est {trs. Er} quod neutrum est liberius altero. Quod ergo {igitur RaEr} uterque sit liber probatur *{probo JaRaEr} sic. Omnes concedunt in homines *{homine JaRaEr} liberum arbitrium. Tamen aliqui {trs. Ja} dicunt ipsum {liberum arbitrium Ja} {tamen... ipsum om. Er} esse liberum {dicunt ipsum esse liberum: arbitrium dicunt liberum Ra} ex libertate intellectus, aliqui ex libertate voluntatis, et {om. Er} aliqui ex libertate utriusque, et *{sic add. JaRaEr} omnes sunt concordes vel quod *{trs. JaRaEr} intellectus est liber vel voluntas est libera, vel ambo. Sed si intellectus est {esset Ra} liber sequitur voluntatem esse liberam et econverso, per {propter Er} syllogismum expositorium *{ut dictum fuit add. JaRaEr}. Ergo {igitur JaRaEr} necesse est concedere utriusque libertatem {concedere utriusque libertatem: esse libertate utriusque Ra}; sunt ergo {igitur JaRaEr} ambo {trs. Ja} liberi et eque liberi. | I return, then, to the comparison of intellect and will, and I assert, in accordance with the supposition laid down above, this second conjunctive conclusion, that the intellect is free and the will is free, and both are equally free. For if both are free, it is necessary that they are equally free, since it has been said above that neither is freer than the other. That each is free, therefore, I prove as follows. Everyone grants free choice {liberum arbitrium} in man. Some, however, say that choice is free {ex} because of the freedom of the intellect, others because of the freedom of the will, and others because of the freedom of both; and thus all are in agreement that either the intellect is free or the will is free, or both. But if the intellect is free it follows that the will is free, and vice versa, by the expository syllogism (as has been said). It is necessary, therefore, to grant the freedom of both; they are therefore both free, and equally free. |
| Item {iterum Ra}, dictum est quod intellectus est ipsa anima et voluntas etiam ipsa anima, et sic *{om. JaEr} {etiam Ra} est dictum {trs. JaRaEr} etiam {om. Ra} quod *{ipsa add. JaRa} anima {ipsa add. Er} est libera {trs. Ja} {et add. Er} in respectu corporis; {et add. Er} principatur enim {om. Er} corpori principatu {principatui Ja} despotico {? Ja}; ergo et {ergo et: quod Ra} *{ergo et: igitur JaEr} intellectus est {om. JaRa} liber et voluntas {est add. Er} libera. | Again, it has been said that the intellect is the soul itself and the will also is the soul itself, and it has also been said that the soul itself is free in respect of the body, for it rules the body with despotic rulership. Therefore the intellect is free and the will is free. |
| Sed dicte conclusiones non solvunt *{sunt AuMuJaRaEr} {om. Mz} {solvunt Mu in margin} que dubitabantur. Propter quod {? Ra} sciendum est quod licet intellectus et voluntas {trs.321 Er} sint *{idem scilicet add. JaRaEr} eadem anima, tamen nomina differunt secundum rationem; nam illa {ista Er} [Ja 323rb] anima dicitur intellectus ex eo quod intelligit vel potest intelligere recipiendo in se intellectionem, et eadem anima dicitur voluntas ex eo quod {quia Er} vult {? Ra} vel potest velle recipiendo in se volitionem; et *{om. JaRaEr} ideo quecunque attribuntur anime {sub add. Er} ea ratione qua intelligit [Ra 7b] vel innata est intelligere, illa attribuuntur sibi {ex add. Er} ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus, et quecunque attribuuntur sibi ea ratione qua {dicitur... qua: om. Er} vult vel innata est {innata est: potest Er} velle, illa {om. Er} attribuuntur sibi {sub add. Er} ea ratione qua dicitur {intellectus... dicitur: om. Ra} voluntas. {et sic de aliis add. Er} Principalia enim predicata attributa {om. Ra} anime ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus sunt {principalia... sunt om. Er} {sicut add. Er} intelligere vel posse intelligere, et attributa ei {sibi Er} *{ea JaRaEr} ratione qua dicitur voluntas sunt velle vel posse velle (scilicet {om. Er} posse intelligere et {vel Er} posse velle ea ratione qua dicitur intellectus et {vel Ra} voluntas in potentia {? Ja}, intelligere autem {om. Er} et velle ea ratione qua dicitur {voluntas add. Ra} intellectus *{in actu add. JaRaEr} et voluntas in actu). Quando ergo {igitur JaEr} {quod Ra} dicimus {dicitur Ra} quod intellectus {om. Ra} intelligit sed non vult, et econverso {econtra Ra} quod {om. Ja} voluntas vult {om. Ra} sed non intelligit, aut etiam quod intellectus potest intelligere sed non velle, et {om. Ra} {quod add. Er} voluntas econverso {eque Ra} {om. Er} potest velle sed {et Ja} non intelligere, immo est ceca, nos non debemus intelligere tales propositiones secundum sensum quem facerent de proprietate {virtute Er} sermonis, quia {quomodo Ja} ille {ipse Ja} essent {sunt Er} {om. Ra} false, sicut {secundum Er} {ut Ra} {quod JaEr} dictum est, sed propter breviloquium nos ponimus tales propositiones loco altarum *{aliarum JaRaEr} propositionum reduplicativarum vel causalium, scilicet intellectus {? add. Ja} potest intelligere sed non *{potest add. JaRa} velle, id est anima intellectus dicitur {trs. JaRaEr} quia potest intelligere, sed non quia potest velle; vel dicitur {intellectus quia potest intelligere, sed non quia potest velle vel dicitur add. Ra} intellectus secundum quod potest intelligere *{i.e. add. RaJa} ea ratione qua potest intelligere, sed *{et JaRa} non ea ratione qua potest velle. Et ita *{ista Ja} voluntas potest velle sed {et JaEr} non potest {om. Er} intelligere, id est {id est: quia Er} anima {id est anima: et Ra} dicitur voluntas ea ratione qua *{ea ratione qua: quia JaRa} potest velle, non ea ratione qua *{ea ratione qua: quia JaRa} potest intelligere, et sic *{et sic: vel ea ratione qua potest velle, non ea ratione /om. Ra\ qua potest intelligere, et similiter JaRa} suo modo de velle et intelligere quantum ad intellectum et voluntatem {trs. 321 Ra} in actu. |
[Doubts remain]But these conclusions are not the points that were doubted. Accordingly, it must be known that although intellect and will are the one thing, namely the soul, nevertheless the names differ {secundum rationem} according to concept. For the soul is called intellect because it understands, or can understand, by receiving an intellection in itself, and the same soul is called will because it wills, or can will, by receiving a volition in itself; therefore whatever characteristics are attributed to the soul {ea ratione qua intelligit} qua understanding, or capable {innata est} of understanding, are attributed to it {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect, and whatever are attributed to it {ea ratione qua vult} qua willing, or {innata est} capable of willing, are attributed to it {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will. For the chief predicates attributed to the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect are to understand or be capable of understanding, and [the chief predicates] attributed to the soul {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua will are to will or be capable of willing (namely, to be capable of understanding or willing {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect and will in potency, but to understand and to will {ea ratione qua dicitur} qua intellect in act and will in act). When, therefore, we say that intellect understands but does not will, and conversely that the will wills but does not understand, or also that the intellect can understand but cannot will, and conversely that the will can will but cannot understand (indeed, is blind), we should not understand such propositions in the sense they would make {de proprietate sermonis} if taken literally, because they would be false, as has been said, but for brevity we put such propositions in place of other reduplicative or causal propositions, namely: "The intellect can understand but cannot will", i.e. "The soul is called 'intellect' because it can understand, but not because it can will", or "It is called 'intellect' {secundum quod} in so far as it can understand", i.e. {ea ratione qua potest} "qua capable of understanding and not {ea ratione qua potest} qua capable of willing". And this: "The will can will but cannot understand", i.e. "The soul is called 'will' because it can will, and not because it can understand", or {ea ratione qua potest} "qua capable of willing, not {ea ratione qua potest} qua capable of understanding"; and similarly {suo modo} mutatis mutandis of "will" and "understand" in respect of intellect and will in act. |
| Illa {ista Er} ergo {igitur JaRa} {est Er} questio que a principio mota fuit, scilicet utrum voluntas sit magis libera quam intellectus, soluta fuit {est JaRaEr} secundum sensum {secundum add. Ra} quem facit secundum *{de JaRaEr} virtutem *{virtute JaRaEr} sermonis. Sed restat *{restant JaRa} {scilicet add. Ja} dubitatio *{dubia JaRa} si loco alterius questionis formetur, scilicet reduplicative vel causalis. Verbi gratia iste {ille Er} questiones sunt dubie: utrum anime magis conveniat libertas vel *{et JaRaEr} dominium secundum actum volendi quam {volendi quam: vel Ra} secundum actum intelligendi? vel {om. Ja} utrum habeat gubernationem et {vel Er} principatum {?universaliter add. Ra} super corpus {trs. Ra} et appetitum sensitivum magis per actum volendi quam per actum intelligendi, et utrum liberius producat {producit Er} vel recipiat actum volendi {vel actum nolendi add. Ra} quam actum intelligendi; et omnino utrum actus volendi sit nobilior et liberior quam actus intelligendi. Hec igitur consequenter inquirentur {inquirantur Ra} {queratur Ja} etc. *{fiat igitur questio secunda add. Ja} {?sit questio secunda add. Ra} {et add. Er} | The question moved at the beginning, namely whether the
will is freer than the intellect, has therefore been solved
{secundum} in the sense it makes {de virtute sermonis} taken
literally. But doubts remain if it is formulated in place of
another question, namely reduplicative or causal. For
example these questions are doubtful: Whether freedom and
lordship more befits the soul {secundum} according to the
act of willing than according to the act of understanding;
whether it has government and rulership over the body and
the sensitive appetite more by an act of willing than by an
act of understanding; and whether it produces or receives an
act of willing more freely than an act of understanding; and
in general {omnino} whether the act of willing is nobler and
freer than the act of understanding. These, therefore,
{inquirentur, future indicative} will be inquired into
{consequenter} subsequently. Let the second question, then,
be -- |
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