The US demand for a settlement freeze:

Articles online relating to Israel and Palestine

(2008-2009)

Selected/Collected  by John Kilcullen



Soon after inauguration the Obama administration committed itself to pressing for a "two state" solution. As a first step in that direction, the US demanded an end to Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank. Secretary Clinton during Mr Netanyahu's 18 May visit to Washington said: "We want to see a stop to settlement construction, additions, natural growth - any kind of settlement activity". This was in line with the 2001 report of George Mitchell, whom President Obama had appointed as special envoy for peace in the Middle East. (On the history of the US government's position on  settlements see Steven Rosen.)

The apparently uncompromising character of the demand and the apparent impossibility of Netanyahu's acceptance of it (Stratfor) led to speculation that perhaps the US government was trying  to force Netanyahu out of office (Laura Rosen, Tisdall), or picking a quarrel with Israel to improve the image of the US in the Arab world (see Froomkin, Weisberg, Halevi). But the more widely accepted view (e.g. Ignatius, Indyk) was that the US administration expected Netanyahu to accept the freeze and that it would then ask the Arab side to respond with concessions of their own and thus get the peace process moving again. The framework of this process seemed to be the "road map" of the Quartet (Alpher), which the Israeli government apparently accepted as binding while they rejected the "Annapolis process" (Lieberman).

The first Israeli reaction to the settlement freeze demand was to try to give priority to the Iran nuclear issue and postpone any attempt to solve the Palestine problem (Times, Yglesias, Walt, Pinkas, Karon). Secretary Clinton responded by making a linkage between the two issues: "For Israel to get the kind of strong support it is looking for vis-a-vis Iran, it can't stay on the sidelines with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts. They go hand in hand". (This was not a threat to do nothing about Iran until Israel acted on Palestine.) Others made another linkage: unless Iran is reined in, it will be able to disrupt negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (Eran and Landau). Both points seem true: the two issues do indeed go "hand in hand".  But neither should be made dependent on the other (Walt, Freedland).

Another Israeli reaction to the freeze demand was press for a retraction or a compromise (although Secretary Clinton had said "any kind of settlement activity", seeming to rule out compromise).  It was argued that there was already an agreement between the US and Israel permitting some settlement activity (Abrams, Weissglass), that a freeze on "natural growth" would mean that "no one can marry and no one can have children and no one can add a room to the house" (Peretz -- against this see Gorenberg). Perhaps there could be a freeze with some exceptions, or for a limited period of time, or some other deal. Freund argued that without continued settlement expansion the Palestinians have no motive to make any deal. Others suggested that the freeze demand meant that the Arab side did not need to do anything except wait for Israel to cave in (Diehl). Elliott Abrams argued that natural growth of settlements does not restrict the possibilities remaining to the Palestinians, and that the absolute demand would eventually be compromised, which would damage the Palestinians: "The United States will call whatever compromise Mitchell reaches a “settlement freeze” and will then turn the pressure on Abbas to go back to the table — forcing him to eat his words. Either he, too, will have to call any partial moratorium a real freeze, returning to the table while Hamas happily explains that he has once again given away Palestinian rights — or he’ll have to refuse to negotiate, which would anger Obama. Lose-lose."   

At the time of writing, various sources report that the freeze demand is indeed going to be compromised: see reports in Guardian, Ha'aretz. A compromise would be a victory for Netanyahu and a defeat for the Obama administration. According to President Obama, at his Washington meeting of with Netanyahu on 18 May:  
"... I told Prime Minister Netanyahu ... that each party has obligations under the road map," Obama continued. "On the Israeli side those obligations include stopping settlements. They include making sure that there is a viable potential Palestinian state. On the Palestinian side it's going to be important and necessary to continue to take the security steps on the West Bank that President Abbas has already begun to take, working with General Dayton. We've seen great progress in terms of security in the West Bank.  Those security steps need to continue because Israel has to have some confidence that security in the West Bank is in place in order for us to advance this process."  (Laura Rosen)
If the rumors of compromise turn out to be true, the process will now resume without Israeli compliance with the first stage of the road map.

The settlement freeze and a Palestinian state were among the topics of  three major speeches, President Obama's Cairo speech, 4 June, PM Netanyahu's speech at Bar Ilan, 14 June, and his speech at the National Defence College graduation ceremony, 3 August. Netanyahu's speech of 14 June amounted to a rejection of the settlement freeze demand:

Netanyahu has refused to play. He has rejected not only the settlements issue but also the basic concepts behind the peace process that the United States has been pushing for a generation. He has rejected land for peace and, in some ways, the principle of full Palestinian sovereignty. Rather than giving Obama what he wanted, Netanyahu is taking things off the table. Netanyahu has said his piece. Now Obama must decide what, if anything, he is going to do about it. He has few choices other than to persuade Netanyahu to back off, sanction Israel or let it slide. (Stratfor)


See The "two-state solution" and other options
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