The "two-state solution" and other options:

Articles online relating to Israel and Palestine

(2008-2009)

Selected  by John Kilcullen



Soon after inauguration the Obama administration committed itself to pressing for a "two state" solution (Clinton, Emanuel, Biden), thereby taking sides in a disagreement about possible futures for the territory of former British mandated  Palestine.  

The Likud party, which has many American supporters, have from the beginning of the party's existence aimed at a single Jewish state embracing ideally the whole of ancient Israel at its widest supposed extent, or, more practically, the whole of mandated Palestine (i.e. that part of Eretz Yisrael that has not become part of Jordan, Lebanon or Syria). See the first plank of the original platform of the Likud party: "between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty". Their hope has been that if they hold the "Occupied Territories" (which they call "Disputed Territories")  for long enough, those territories will eventually fall to Israel. (Israel was strongly advised to abandon this goal by the Secretary of State in the George H.W. Bush administration; see Baker.)

Some members of Likud, led by Ariel Sharon, came to believe that the goal was unattainable, that Israel would never be able to establish its sovereignty over the whole of former mandated Palestine. The main reason for this change of sentiment was what was called the "demographic problem", i.e. the fecundity of the Arab population, not only in the Occupied Territories but also within Israel itself. (See Speyer, Oren, Cobban.) Zionism sought to build a democratic Jewish state. Israel cannot be both democratic and Jewish if too high a proportion of its residents are non-Jewish. It must either (1) become a multicultural state, or (2) withhold voting rights from non-Jews, or (3) treat predominiantly non-Jewish areas as Bantustans, or (4) engage in massive ethnic cleansing ("population transfer") to remove non-Jews from the area of former mandated Palestine, or (5) restrict the borders of Israel to the predominantly Jewish areas and allow other areas to rule themselves. The dissident members of Likud favoured the last option.  

In 2005 Sharon and his followers split from Likud and formed Kadima. Sharon sought to define Israel's borders unilaterally, without negotiation with the Palestinians, beginning with the withdrawal from Gaza (see Shavit's interview with Weissglas). However, Sharon's successor, Olmert, and his minister, Tzipi Livni, on the urging of the US, did engage in negotations with the Palestinians (the Annapolis negotiations), and on 13 September 2008, Olmert in a private meeting offered Mahmoud Abbas a definition of Israel's boundaries--what might be described as another "generous offer". (On Ehud Barak's July 2000 "generous offer"--according to some neither Barak's nor generous nor an offer--see Agha and Malley, Morris, Barak et al.). But by the time he made this offer Olmert's government was in caretaker mode pending an election, and nothing came of the proposal.  

The election resulted in the formation of a coalition government (31 March 2009) led by the Likud leader, Binyamin Netanyahu, who had been the chief opponent within Likud of Sharon's acceptance of restricted borders for Israel. On proposals for a Palestinian state Netanyahu had been clear: "Not today, not tomorrow, not ever" (12 May, 2002). 

the variations on Israel’s requirements for recognition now add up to three. The other two are recognition of Israel’s right to exist and formal recognition of Israel as a state.... [Israel] keeps raising the ante in order to block any dialogue whatsoever. (Touval)
Netanyahu's  Bar Ilan speech added a fourth requirement, that this right be recognised as "historic", not related merely to the Shoah but also to the fact that the Jews have lived in the region since ancient times. In fact the demand for recognition of the Jews' right to establish a Jewish state in Palestine based on their ancient connection with the land was part of the Zionist thinking  from the beginning.

It seems that "not ever" is still Netanyahu's view. As a negotiator he is a "master maneuverer"; very likely he will follow the advice given by Bret Stephens, "there’s no end to the 'progress' you can offer -- if, you may tell yourself, only in the spirit of Zeno’s paradox" (presumably the paradox of the arrow)

Since the formation of his government the Obama administration has been pressing him to accept a settlement freeze and to begin negotiation toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Under US pressure Netanyahu has reluctantly endorsed the eventual formation of a Palestinian state, subject to certain conditions (see SMH editorial): the Palestinians must recognise Israel as the state of the Jewish people (which implies some second class status for Arab Israelis), they must recognise Israel's "historic" right to exist (which implies that the process beginning from the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations mandate was right and just), Palestine must be demilitarised, and Jerusalem united must be the capital of Israel. Netanyahu's father (a deep influence on him--see Goldberg) has explained:  “He does not support it [a Palestinian state]. He supports such conditions that they [the Palestinians] will never accept it. That’s what I heard from him. I didn’t propose these conditions, he did. They will never accept these conditions. Not one of them.” (See Karon.)

There are various other positions (see above). Those who sympathise strongly with the Palestinians advocate a single multi-cultural (or bi-national) state embracing the whole of mandated Palestine, with equal rights for all, including both Jews and Arabs.(See Alexander, Woollacott.) Against this, those who advocate a “two state solution” argue that--for a long time, at least--Jews and Arabs will not be able to live together within the one state, since the politics of a single state would be riven by conflict between the two communities (see Gorenberg). According to Mearsheimer and Walt, there are only four possibilities, namely two states, one bi-national state, ethnic cleansing, or apartheid, and of these the two state option is the only one that is practicable. (See also Shimon Peres here and here -- "We have to get rid of the territories".) 

Commentators whose sympathies are with Likud urge another option in various versions: the Jordanian solution (Benny Morris, reported Goldstein, Bar-Zohar), the Jordanian/Egyptian option (Brownback), the “no state solution”, i.e. no state of Palestine (Pipes), or the15 minute state, i.e. a state of Palestine briefly, on the way to absorption in Jordan and Egypt (Abrams). Why would Jordan and Egypt want to get involved? For an attempt to answer that question see  Brownback. The "Jordanian option" goes back to the prime ministerships of Golda Meir and Shimon Peres; see Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall (Penguin, 2000), pp. 310-3, 429-38, 443-48.

Agha and Malley have pointed out that Palestinians displaced in 1948 from the area now established as the state of Israel are more interested in the return of refugees to their family homes than in the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. How the refugees might be reconciled is the subject of an article by Mead. See also Atran.  \

Other suggestions: a unilateral declaration of Palestinian indepedence; the Mofaz plan;  dissolve the Palestinian Authority and let the Israelis sort out the situation, or mount another "intifada" pressing for a single multiethnic state (see also here); concentrate onpractical improvements to the life of Palestinians in the West Bank; PM Fayyad's plan to get ready for statehood; offering EU membership to both Israel and Palestine.


See The US demand for a settlement freeze

See Israel, Palestine and the US


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