In the 13th and 14th centuries, the beliefs and practices of the primitive Church were believed to be in some respects normative. I suppose this has always been believed by Christians, but at the end of the middle ages there was a sharp consciousness of the contrast between the primitive Church and the Church of modern times, and a widespread desire to return to the past in certain respects. Reformation and renovation were important medieval concepts: there was a general realisation that over time institutions decay, individuals contract bad habits (as well as good ones), that from time to time individuals and institutions need to be reformed. The foundation of monastic orders is a case in point: Christians seeking to reform their lives were invited to join a monastery and submit to a religious discipline, and the monasteries also from time to time needed reform. Monastic reform was sometimes advanced by the formation of monastic orders, federations of monasteries that would keep one another up to the mark. But the monastic orders also came to need reform, and this was done sometimes by the formation of a new order. By the late middle ages, it was commonly believed that all or most of the institutions of the Church needed reform, notably the Roman curia.
Many late medieval Christians regarded the Donation of Constantine as a special cause of corruption in the Church. That is, the combination of wealth and political power with religious authority was seen as corruption, or at least an occasion of corruption. Hence the various movements in favour of what was called apostolic poverty: one of the most prominent aspects of early Christianity, as late medieval Christians saw it, was the renunciation of worldly possessions. (Matthew 19:21: Jesus said to him, "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me." (I will quote from RSV). Acts 4:32: “Now the company of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and no one said that any of the things which he possessed was his own, but they had everything in common. … There was not a needy person among them, for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them, and brought the proceeds of what was sold and laid it at the apostles' feet; and distribution was made to each as any had need.”) I don’t think poverty looms large in the modern view of the early Church, but for the late middle ages it was salient. The best known instance of the return to apostolic poverty was the Franciscan order, of which Ockham was a member. The Franciscans renounced property not only as individual members of the Order, but also as an Order: the buildings, books etc. that the Order used used belonged to someone else, either to the donor or to the Pope. The Franciscans also renounced legal rights: they would not litigate. (1 Cor. 6:7, “To have lawsuits at all with one another is defeat for you. Why not rather suffer wrong? Why not rather be defrauded?”) However, the Franciscan Order itself soon departed from these ideals, and a movement for the reformation of the order, the “spiritual” Franciscans or “zealots”, developed in an attempt to restore the practice of true poverty within the Order.
Another feature of late medieval Christianity relevant as background to what I want to say about Ockham is the concern with “the last times”. Christians have always believed that they were living in the last times (1 Pet. 1:20, Heb. 1:2), but in the 13th and 14th centuries the sense of an impending end to history became very strong. This has nothing to do with chronology: it is sometimes said that as the year 1000 AD approached, people expected the end of the world. But I am talking now about the 13th century. The particular spur to “end of time” speculation was a book by Joachim of Fiore, who died in the year 1202. Joachim distinguished three ages, the ages of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the age of the Spirit soon to begin, after the defeat of the Anti-Christ. Many members of the Franciscan order speculated about the last times under the Joachim’s influence. They identified St Francis with the angel of Apoc. 14:6: “I saw another angel flying in midheaven, with an eternal gospel to proclaim to those who dwell on earth…”. Gerardo of Borgo San Donnino wrote an “Introduction to the Eternal Gospel” in which he claimed for the Franciscan Order the role of the “Order of the just”, which Joachim predicted would rule the Church in the third age. Opponents of the Franciscans joined in these speculations. For example, the secular master William of Saint Amour, wrote a pamphlet On The Dangers Of The Last Times, arguing that the new orders of mendicant Friars, including the Franciscans, with their claims to purer “spirituality”, were in fact harbingers of anti-Christ.
According to medieval speculations about the last times, just before the end the Church would be troubled by the anti-Christ. (Mark 13:22, “For false Christs and false prophets shall rise, and shall shew signs and wonders, to seduce, if it were possible, even the elect.” 1 Jn: 2:18, “Children, it is the last hour, and as you have heard that antichrist is coming, so now many antichrists have come. Therefore we know that it is the last hour”. See also 2 Thes. 2.) Some speculated that anti-Christ would be a pope or emperor, that is, that Christ’s great enemy would be a very powerful person, disguised perhaps as a holy person, a messenger from God, “to seduce, if possible, even the elect”.
Interpretations of Bible texts about the last times, ideas about the possibility of a pope as anti-Christ, about the corruption of the Church by wealth and political power, have been part of a traditional Protestant polemic against the Catholic Church. But they originate in the 13th and 14th centuries among orthodox Catholics. “End time” speculation has revived lately: as no doubt you know, there is “Left Behind” series of novels popular in the US, by LaHaye and Jenkins, and many “evangelicals” are among the strongest supporters of the State of Israel, on the basis of theories of the end times. (See "Christian Zionism", "Dispensationalism".)
Although he was a Franciscan, Ockham was an opponent of undisciplined “end of times” speculation. He defended the ideal of Franciscan Poverty against a pope, John XXII, attacked some versions of the doctrine that popes have “fullness of power”, and argued that John XXII and his successor Benedict XII were heretics and therefore not true popes, but he never suggested that his opponents were anti-Christs, and he criticised as rash and presumptuous, and near to heresy, attempts to predict the future or interpret the present on the basis of bible texts of obscure meaning—in fact, as I will explain later, he argues that we must accept that we are unable to arrive at the primary meaning of some bible texts.
But let me digress briefly, not irrelevantly, for a few words on Pierre Bayle. Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary on the Words of the Gospel, “Compel them to come in”, was the first really effective philosophical argument for religious toleration. One of his concerns was to convince the parties to the religious conflict of 17th century France that the adherents of the various faiths should credit one another with good faith, sincerity. To establish this he was led into the details of various religious controversies, to show that well-intentioned people could be convinced, or left unconvinced, by the arguments on either side.
Besides the various particular disagreements, e.g. over the eucharist, predestination, etc., there was a fundamental disagreement over how disagreements should be settled. In the English religious controversy of the 17th century (I’m thinking of such authors as Chillingworth, Taylor, Stillingfleet), this was called the controversy over “the rule of faith”. By what rule or criterion can a Christian decide what doctrines belong to the Christian faith? The Catholic answer was that the rule of faith was the Bible and the teaching of the Church. The Protestant answer was, by the Bible alone. Chillingworth, The religion of Protestants a safe way to salvation: “The Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants”. *p?
As Bayle shows, a strong case can be made for both views. The case for the Catholic position, that not only the Bible but also the teaching of the Church must be taken as normative, began with the question, how do you know which writings belong to the Bible? How did the various “books” of the Bible come to be selected and gathered into a single volume, while others were rejected (the apocrypha)? And the belief that everything in that volume is certainly true, how did that become current? Some Bible texts can be quoted in favour of the doctrine of inerrancy, but do they apply to all the material bound together as The Bible? And are Bible texts enough to prove that the Bible is indeed inerrant—if some writing claims inerrancy, why should we believe the claim? The answer Catholics expect to these questions is that the formation of the bible and the adoption of the doctrine that everything bound up in that volume must be regarded as true in every detail was the work of the Christian community, of the Church.[Note 1] So the Bible alone can’t be the rule of faith, since belief in the Bible rests on the teaching of the Church. As far as it goes the argument seems quite strong.
But it can be retorted, and 17th century Protestant controversialists did turn it back on their opponents. Corresponding to the question, How do you know that everything in the Bible is true, is the question, How do you know that the teaching of the Church cannot be mistaken? And if it is difficult to know which books belong to the canon of scripture and which are apocryphal, it is at least as difficult to know who belongs to the Church and which traditional beliefs are beliefs of the whole Christian community. In the early Christian centuries, by the first four General Councils of the Church, various groups of Christians were condemned as heretics and excluded from the official Church and from the territories of the Roman Empire, but perhaps wrongly. If the rule of faith is “the bible and the teaching of the Church”, which church is that? Is the relevant community that which consists of all who claim to be Christians, or only that which consists of “orthodox” Christians, i.e. of those who rightly reject the others as heretics? If of all who claim to be Christians, then the “highest common factor” of their beliefs perhaps will not amount to much. If of the “orthodox” only, then who are they? The criterion of belief “the Bible and the teaching of the Church”, turns out to be useless as a means of settling disagreements. No doubt the teaching of the true church, whichever that is, is true, but that does not help in deciding which teachings are true.
In presenting this controversy over the rule of faith, Bayle’s point is that each side has better arguments against its opponents than it has in favour of its own position. So many theological questions turn out to be antinomies: the controversy between Jesuits and Jansenists, Calvinists and Arminians, over grace and free will is another example. The general point Bayle draws from these analyses is that it is quite possible for people who hold opposed views on fundamental religious questions to do so in good faith, since the balance of arguments is not decisive. People must follow their consciences, even though one or other of the various opposed views must be wrong. (Conscience, by the way, is another late medieval concept. Until the 13th century conscience was hardly ever mentioned, but from then on into the 17th century and later it was widely held that conscience binds, even when mistaken.) Bayle’s general argument for toleration is, in brief, this: If Christ really did command his true followers to compel belief, then, since all the opposing groups believe they are his true followers, they will persecute one another reciprocally. The fact that some are in fact not Christ’s true followers does not invalidate this argument: their consciences will tell them to conform to this alleged command, and even mistaken conscience binds— “An act done in consequence of a false persuasion is as good as if it had been done in consequence of a true persuasion”; “an act opposed to a false persuasion is as bad as an act opposed to a true persuasion” (Bayle, Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, “Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full” (Liberty Fund) p. 234). See "Bayle on the Rights of Conscience", and "Reciprocity arguments for toleration".But I won’t follow Bayle any further, I’ll end this digression and come back to Ockham. This controversy over the rule of faith, which of course was a major reformation controversy, begins in the 14th century as a debate between Ockham and Marsilius of Padua. There were some forerunners: for example there is a question by Duns Scotus on “the sufficiency of Sacred Scripture” (Ordinatio, Prol. Part 2, q. unica). But I don’t know of any earlier instance in which this question was explicitly stated and fully debated as it was by Marsilius and Ockham.
Marsilius of Padua wrote Defensor pacis (completed 1324) to refute the doctrine that the pope, as head of the Church, has “fullness of power”, a doctrine he saw as underlying the Church’s wealth and political power and as giving rise to bitter and bloody conflicts, especially in Italy. That the pope has fullness of power was an old doctrine. The phrase seems to have been used first in A.D. 446 by Pope Leo I. “Fullness of power” came to mean the whole of whatever power exists in the Church; “fullness” did not necessarily imply that the Church has all power of every kind, but whatever power is in the Church, the head of the Church has it preeminently. Thirteenth-century papal intervention “by fullness of power” at all levels in church affairs (for example, to compel bishops to permit Franciscans and other mendicants to work in their diocese) seems to have rested on the proposition that the pope could do or undo directly whatever could be done by any lower authority in the Church, such as a bishop.
However, during the 13th and 14th centuries some popes and theologians claimed that by fullness of power the pope could intervene even in secular politics. They made this claim because they were regarding governments in Christian communities as existing within the Church. From this point of view the work of secular government was something done by the head of the Church through the agency of the lay ruler. “The whole machine of the world is but one realm; there should therefore be but one ruler. The ruler of the whole realm of the world is Christ himself, whose vicar [i.e. substitute] is the pope”; Augustinus Triumphus, q. 22, a. 3, p. 131.[Note 2] On this view the Donation of Constantine was superfluous: even before Constantine gave political power to the popes, the popes had that power by divine right. Constantine merely acknowledged a superiority that already existed.
These claims to papal power were balanced by the doctrine that the clergy should not involve themselves in secular affairs. There was a generally accepted distinction between Church and State—more exactly, between the priesthood and the power of the emperor, each independent in its own sphere, though the priesthood has the higher function. The classic place for this doctrine is the canon Duo sunt (Gratian, Decretum, dist. 96, c. 10, Friedberg Corpus iuris canonici, vol. 1, col. 340), taken from a letter of Pope Gelasius I; hence it is often called the Gelasian theory of the relations of Church and State. The canon Te quidem (ibid. C. 11, q. 1, c. 29, col. 634), ascribed to Clement (Peter’s early successor as Bishop of Rome), says: “Christ does not wish today to appoint you judge or arbiter of secular cases, lest, being suffocated by the present cares of men, you be unable to devote yourself to the word of God”. The doctrine that the pope has authority over secular governments and the doctrine that the clergy must not be involved in secular affairs were reconciled by a distinction between administration and authority: the pope must avoid “being suffocated by the present cares of men”, so he should leave the administration of temporal matters to lay rulers, but he has full authority in such matters, he can give lay rulers authoritative directions when necessary. So there is still a distinction between Church and State, but the Church has authority over the state. This is the “fullness of power” that Marsilius set out to discredit.
According to Marsilius, a well-ordered community can have only one coercive government, and it cannot be in the hands of the clergy or be at their command. God does not want divine law to be enforced in this life, either by the Church or by the State. The State enforces “political laws”, i.e. laws made in view of earthly peace, and it does not do this as agent of the Church but as agent of the people. The Christian law is not enforced in this life by anyone: God enforces it by reward or punishment in the next life. In this life, the Christian law is a voluntarily accepted “rule of life”, and the clergy are teachers of those who voluntarily seek their advice on living. (For references and further explanations, see "Medieval Political Theory".)
Marsilius set out to prove that the Pope does not have “fullness of power” in any sense of the term. For this purpose he needed to discuss the question what writings should be taken as authoritative in theological questions. There were plenty of texts in papal documents proclaiming the pope’s fullness of power (in some sense). So Marsilius wants to exclude such texts as non-authoritative: Christians do not need to believe them. In Defensor pacis II.xix and xx he discusses the questions (1) What writings must a Christian regard as authoritative in religious matters, and (2) Who has the authority to determine the meaning of those writings where the meaning is doubtful? The basis of his answer to the first question is the proposition that “no one is obliged to believe or to acknowledge as absolutely true any writing in which there is a possibility of falsehood” (Marsilius, Defensor pacis, II.xix.4).[Note 3] Only the canonical scriptures are absolutely true, beyond possibility of falsehood (or as people would say these days, “inerrant”): papal decretals and the writings of theologians are fallible, and therefore need not be believed. This is the position later held by the Protestants.
On the second question, who has authority to determine the meaning of unclear passages in Scripture? Marsilius answers: only a general council of the Church has this authority. This was not the later Protestant position. Protestants did not reject the idea that a general council might be useful, but they did not give it decisive authority. In support of his answer Marsilius gives this argument (Defensor pacis, II.xix.2): Christ promised that he would be with the Church until the end of the world. Matthew 28:20, “I am with you always, even unto the end of the world”. This is a text that assumed great importance in late medieval thinking about the Church. Starting from this text, Marsilius argues that Christ cannot have left the Church without a means of settling doubts about the meaning of the Scriptures, and
since the general council truly represent by succession the congregation of the apostles and elders and the other believers [of the earliest times], it is certain that in the definition of doubtful meanings of Scripture, especially those wherein error would involve the danger of eternal damnation, the virtue of the Holy Spirit is present to the universal council, guiding its deliberations and revealing the truth.
The Holy Spirit, who guarantees the truth of the Scriptures, also guides the Council in interpreting the Scriptures:
It must be piously held that these interpretations [i.e. those adopted by Councils] were revealed to us by the same Spirit as were the Scriptures. … Christ would have handed down the law of eternal salvation in vain if he did not reveal to the believers its true meaning on points necessary for salvation, but instead allowed the majority of them to be in error regarding it, when they beg and invoke him for this true meaning.
Christ’s promise to be with the Church always guarantees that he will not allow the majority of Christians assembled in a council and praying for guidance to be misled. But for what Marsilius describes as “writings which arise from the human contrivance of an individual or a partial group” there is no such guarantee: as experience shows, individuals and partial groups often fall into error, and no writing that may contain errors has to be believed.
In effect, Marsilius has prescribed a “rule of faith”, namely, the Bible as interpreted by a majority in a General Council that represents the Christian community. Note that he does not give a council the power to invent new doctrines: its function is to interpret the Bible, which is the only source of doctrine.
On this basis, Marsilius goes on to reject the propositions that that Christ made Peter head of the Church, that Peter was in Rome, that the Bishop of Rome is Peter’s successor, that the Bishop of Rome and other Bishops have authority from Christ over the rest of the clergy, that the clergy have coercive power to enforce religious law—none of these propositions can be proved from Scripture and no authentic general council has interpreted Scripture in this way. In Marsilius’s view the Church hierarchy is a human construct. Any coercive authority the hierarchy has over clergy and people comes entirely by delegation from the secular ruler, who is the community’s only head with coercive power (he is the “Defender of the Peace” of the book’s title). And any power the secular ruler may have given, he can take away or regulate. It is not surprising that Queen Elizabeth’s government had Marsilius’s book translated into English. When Richard Hooker, in Book VIII of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, finally came to justify the constitution of the Church of England, his arguments are drawn from Marsilius.
This brings me to Ockham. I will be summarizing from Ockham’s Dialogus, in which Ockham himself does not appear: it is a dialogue between a Master and a theology Student about the matters in dispute among Christians at the time; the Student asks “what do the learned say about so and so” and the Master replies, some say this, some say that, without endorsing any opinion. I should warn you that I will be attributing to Ockham some of the opinions the Master expounds in this non-committal way. I don’t think there is much difficulty in recognizing which views are Ockham’s. (For a general account see "Ockham’s Political Writings”.)
As I have mentioned, some expected that the anti-Christ might turn out to be a pope. Ockham did not enter into this speculation, but he did believe that the current pope, John XXII, was a heretic. The idea that a pope could be a heretic was not new. One of the canons, dist. 40, c. 6, Si papa (Friedberg, vol. 1, col. 146), says: “No mortal shall presume to rebuke [the pope’s] faults… unless he is found to stray from the faith” (tr. Tierney, Crisis of Church and State, p. 124). To heresy, canonists added serious sin as a reason for deposing a pope. Ockham says he has
read in chronicles about twenty seven men called Roman bishops, after the Church was endowed with temporal riches [i.e. after the donation of Constantine], who were entangled in the greatest crimes, public and notorious, after they were appointed to the papacy or in the appointment to the papacy: that is, who were involved in the crime of heresy, idolatry, usurpation, favouring heretical wickedness, blasphemy, fornication, and many other enormous crimes. (Work of Ninety Days, c. 124, p. 844.)
That is, there had been 27 popes who should have been deposed. In Ockham's opinion two of the most famous medieval popes, Innocent III and Innocent IV, were heretics.
Ockham spent the last 20 years of his life campaigning to get John XXII and his successors Benedict XII and Clement VI deposed as heretics or supporters of heresy. His campaign failed—these men are still listed in the catalogue of popes. In the course of this campaign he had to deal with the question, what power does a true pope (i.e. one who is not a heretic) have within the Church? John XXII was not a true pope, but many thought he was, so he could de facto exercise the powers of a true pope, so for Ockham it was important to consider what those powers were. Are the powers of a true pope so great that the Church cannot defend itself if that pope falls into heresy? There is little point in saying that a pope who becomes a heretic or notorious sinner can be deposed if the pope has so much power that no one can call him to account.
So, like Marsilius, Ockham was drawn into a discussion of the doctrine that a pope has “fullness of power”. Unlike Marsilius, he does not reject it in every sense; rather, he wants to return to the earlier sense, in which the pope has "fullness" of power in the sense that he has preeminently any power found within the Church, understood as a specifically religious organisation. In Ockham’s view, the Church does have a head appointed by Christ (originally Peter, and then Peter’s successors, the bishops of Rome), and the head does have paramount authority, but normally, according to Ockham, only in spiritual matters (that is, matters that are specific to the Christian religion). In temporal matters also, according to Ockham, the head of the Church does have an occasional or exceptional role, when there is something necessary to the welfare of the Christian community, for example, something essential to its survival, and lay Christians fail to take the necessary action. (See 3.1 Dial., 1.16-17.) To give a modern example, it might be appropriate for religious leaders to organize relief if some part of the Christian community was hit by a natural disaster. (This is an application of the Aristotelian notion of equity, the doctrine that rules may have unforeseen exceptions, since no rule can envisage every future situation: however carefully institutions are designed, there may be cases in which people may rightly do what is not normally part of their role. The pope may need to intervene in secular matters in exceptional cases, the secular ruler may need to intervene in religious matters in exceptional cases.) Even in spiritual matters, according to Ockham, the pope’s power is limited—for example, he cannot require acts of supererogation. The Gospel law is a law of freedom, freedom that is from any burdens as onerous as those imposed by the old law. (See 3.1 Dial., 1.5-9.) So the “fullness of power” that Ockham attributes to the pope falls well short of “fullness” in the obvious sense. Against Marsilius, Ockham maintains that the pope is by Christ’s appointment of Peter, head of the Church with the powers of a head, but these powers are in various ways limited.
According to Ockham, a pope cannot create new articles of faith. The head of the Church has the power to proclaim the faith and to settle disputes, but he must arrive at his views by ordinary theological reasoning (drawing his premises from the five categories listed shortly), and he must get it right. A pope speaking as a private theologian can be wrong without being a heretic, but if, speaking as pope, and purporting to impose orthodoxy on others, he tries to impose something that is in fact not part of the faith, then he is ipso facto a heretic and no longer pope. What makes a person a heretic is not just holding a heresy, but holding a heresy pertinaciously, without readiness to be corrected. A pope who tries to impose an heretical doctrine is obviously not ready to be corrected. This was Ockham’s accusation against John XXII, that he was trying to impose his errors on the Church.
In 1 Dial. 2.2-5, 16-17, Ockham discussed an opinion similar to that of Marsilius, and in 3.1 Dial. 3 he develops that discussion. In the earlier text Ockham had distinguished five kinds of truths that Catholics must not deny, and five corresponding kinds of “pestiferous errors”. The things Catholics must not deny are,
(1) Anything contained in the Bible, either explicitly or by necessary implication.(1 Dial. 2.5. For context and analysis of the argument, with links to text and translation, see “Analysis Of The Argument,1 Dialogus 1-5”. See also 3.1 Dial. 3.4, and for analysis of the argument context “Analysis Of The Argument, 3.1 Dialogus”)(2) Anything handed down, outside the canonical scriptures, from the Apostles.
(3) Factual information in chronicles, histories, etc., that are worthy of trust.
(4) Anything necessarily implied by the Bible together with tradition, or by the Bible or tradition together with trustworthy factual sources.
(5) New undoubted revelations made by God to the Church.
The last category, new revelations, might be empty; Ockham does not know of any instance of a truth divinely revealed to the Church after the time of the Apostles. It must be admitted, however, that God has the power to reveal new truths, and if some new truth is undoubtedly revealed by God then a Catholic cannot reject it. The revelation must be undoubted: it must be proven, by miracle, to be a message from God, just as the revelations made through Christ during his lifetime were attested by Christ’s miracles.
In connection with category (1), the Bible, Ockham digresses to make the point that we cannot expect to understand the literal meaning of everything in the Bible. (See 3.1 Dial., 3.14.) There may be passages that will at some time be properly understood by some people, but may not be understandable to others or at other times. Not everything in the Bible is for everybody always. For example, consider 2 Thessalonians 2:3-7:
That day will not come, unless the rebellion comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of perdition, who opposes and exalts himself against every so-called god or object of worship, so that he takes his seat in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God. Do you not remember that when I was still with you I told you this? And you know what is restraining him now so that he may be revealed in his time. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who now restrains it will do so until he is out of the way.
This is the comment made on this by Augustine, City of God, XX.xix:
As for the words, ‘And you know what is now restraining him’ -- that is, you know what delay or cause of delay there is, ‘so that he may be revealed when his time comes’ -- since he said that they knew, he would not say it openly. And therefore we who do not know what they knew are eager but unable to arrive, even with an effort, at what the Apostle meant, especially because what he added makes this meaning more obscure. For what is (2 Thess. 2:7-8), ‘For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only let him who now holds him, hold until he is taken out of the way and then the lawless one will be revealed’? I confess myself completely ignorant of what he has said.
Ockham quotes Augustine, and comments:
They can not be absolved of foolish rashness who, from mystical senses of divine scripture alone – which they can not infer by evident argument from other places in scripture and can not demonstrate by inviolable argument and have not been assured of them by certain, particular and miraculous revelation – dare to predict any future contingents, or are not afraid to affirm when future events will come about which have been predicted in sacred literature without any specification of time… For such rash men, near to heretical wickedness, believing themselves able to arrive at the primary meaning of everything contained in the sacred scriptures, do not imitate the humility of the blessed Augustine who, though he was learned in the scriptures above other men, admits that he does not understand everything that he reads most carefully in the scriptures. (3.1 Dial., 3.19.)
Hence Ockham’s rejection of the elaborate “end times” speculations of the followers of Joachim of Fiore.[Note 4]
So what is in the Bible is sometimes not clear to us, though it may be clear to others at some time. But when we can be sure that we have understood the meaning the author intended, then a Christian must believe it, or become a heretic.
An item in category (2)--truths revealed by Christ to the Apostles and passed down to us, though not in the Bible--must also be believed, if we can be sure that it has come down through the Apostles and that we have understood its meaning. The Apostles have a special place in the Christian story: Jesus imparted his revelation to them, and made sure that they understood his meaning. So they have a special place as interpreters of Christ’s words as recorded in the New Testament. And, in addition, if we know that some teaching comes down from the Apostles, then Christians cannot deny its truth it even if it is not included in the Bible—it must be taken as something revealed to the Apostles by Christ, and if Christ revealed something Christians cannot deny it, just as they could not deny an undoubted new revelation from God. That the category of things revealed by Christ but not written in the Bible is not empty is suggested by John 21:25, last verse: “But there are also many other things which Jesus did; were every one of them to be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be written”, and also by 2 Thes. 2.15: “So then, brethren, stand firm and hold to the traditions which you were taught by us, either by word of mouth or by letter”. Some things were taught by word of mouth. What things have come down in this way is a matter of historical research.
Category (3) is perhaps a surprise: Why must Christians believe things found in chronicles and histories that are not part of the Bible? Ockham does not classify things in category (3) as Catholic truths, or truths of faith, in the strict sense, and the corresponding errors, though “pestiferous”, are not heresies in the strict sense. Nevertheless he holds that it would be wrong for a Christian, without some specific good reason, to reject the testimony as to Christian history of some person claiming to speak from personal experience whom there is no reason to suspect of intending to deceive. Try to imagine what it would be like if it were permissible for a Christian to deny non-Biblical histories without reason. What could be known about the history of the Church? And what could be known about the history of the Bible? If a Christian may, without reason, reject all information about the canon of scripture, or about the readings found in biblical manuscripts, or the judgments of translators, would it be possible for Christians to live by the Bible? A Christian’s beliefs must rest in part on the assurances of people who are assumed to be honest and knowledgeable, though they are not infallible.
Clearly, Ockham’s list of truths a Christian must believe goes beyond “the Bible alone”. But it is not wide open. These five kinds of propositions do not include everything that can be found in the authoritative statements of popes and councils or in the writings of approved theologians. Ockham did not believe that popes and councils are ever infallible, still less theologians, even those who have gained special approval as doctors of the Church. (He is probably thinking not only of “modern” doctors, such as Thomas Aquinas, but of the ancient doctors, such as Gregory and Augustine.) Christians are not obliged to believe everything they read in papal and conciliar documents and prestigious theological books. There is plenty of room within the Christian Church for differences of opinion. The only way to settle such a difference is to go back to the Bible, Apostolic tradition, histories worthy of belief, new revelations (if there are any).
To identify things in Ockham’s second category, truths that have been handed down, outside the canonical scriptures, from the Apostles, requires historical research. But according to Ockham, there is another way besides historical research--or perhaps I should say, more accurately, that the research may not need to retrace the whole history of Christian belief since the time of the Apostles. Ockham interprets Matthew 28:20, “I am with you all days, even unto the end of the world”, as Marsilius did, as a promise that error will never prevail in the Church. According to Ockham, “I am with you all days” implies that if historical research shows that, at some period, Christians all held that some proposition is a truth of faith, then it is a truth of faith--even if we cannot find any basis for it in the Bible, and even if we cannot trace the historical documents through which this belief was handed down from the Apostles, or any evidence of a new post-apostolic revelation, we can be sure that it is indeed a truth of faith that came to the Church in one or other of these three ways, though we don’t know which.[Note 5]
Let us look again at the third category, chronicles and histories worthy of belief. As I just remarked, Ockham does not regard truths in category (3) as Catholic truths in the strict sense. The difference between category (3) and categories (1) and (2) can be formulated in terms of the legal doctrine of presumption. According to medieval lawyers, a presumption may be so strong as to exclude proof to the contrary, or it may not exclude proof to the contrary. We might call presumption of the first kind “conclusive”, the second “defeasible”. According to Ockham, we owe to generally credible historical sources a presumption of the second kind. If we have some particular reason for doubting or disbelieving something we read in a generally credible history, then we do no wrong to reject or doubt it. Contrast this with the authority of the Bible: no Christian can ever doubt or reject the truth of something contained in the Bible, no matter what arguments there may be against it.
The same idea of “defeasible presumption” applies to official statements by popes and councils. Popes and councils are, on Ockham’s view, not infallible, so their teachings may be wrong. However, anyone who does not know that a papal or conciliar statement is wrong ought to presume in its favour, but not with such a strong presumption as to exclude evidence to the contrary. Anyone who knows that the statement is wrong (e.g. someone who knows that the statement is inconsistent with something in the Bible), can attack the papal or conciliar statement, and those who have presumed in its favour ought to listen to what they say, and defend them against anyone who tries to stop them from saying it, until it becomes clear that they are mistaken. (If they are mistaken, that does not mean that they are heretics: to be a heretic, you have to be wrong, and also pertinacious; if they put their views forward without pertinacity then they are not heretics.)
Another relevant distinction is between matters of fact and matters of inference or interpretation (a distinction Ockham treated as unproblematic). If a credible person makes a statement on a matter of fact that falls within their personal experience, then (unless there is some specfic reason) it is wrong not to believe them—there is a presumption that what they are saying is true. Similarly, if a credible person says that they have personally been told something by another credible person on a matter of fact within that person’s experience, then we ought to believe it. But on the other hand if someone makes a statement that depends on some chain of inference, some more or less complex process of reasoning, then there is no presumption that what they say is true (or at best a weak presumption). This is because a well-intentioned and truthful person, who would not deliberately tell a lie, might well make a mistake in reasoning. Thus a person who ought to be believed on a matter of fact may have no claim to our belief on a matter of theological theory. See 3.1 Dial. 3.6, 3.7; 3.23, 3.24.
There is a perhaps subtle point to be noted here: what the early Christian writers believed to be the Apostle’s understanding of certain words of Christ is matter of fact, even though a person’s interpretation of a text is a matter of inference. In general, if a credible person reports that someone else interprets a text in a certain way, then the report should be believed—not that that interpretation should be believed, but we must believe that the person to whom it is credibly attributed held that interpretation. (If we must also presume that they understood the text, then we must also accept the interpretation.)
So much for Ockham’s views on the “rule of faith”. You can see that he was maintaining a version of the position Catholics maintained in Reformation times against Protestants, that the Bible alone is not the rule of faith, but the Bible in conjunction with Apostolic tradition, i.e. teachings handed down from the Apostles, and from Christ, but not through the Bible. But Ockham differs from that of later Catholics (and from many of his own contemporaries) in his rejection of the claim of papal and conciliar infallibility: Christ’s promise “I am with you all days” was made to the Church as a whole, and it guarantees only that the Church as a whole will not fall into error. "What is promised to the whole and not to any part ought not to be attributed to any part, even to a more principal part". Christ's promise does not guarantee that the Church acting through some representative organ (pope of council) cannot err, since such an error could be corrected by some individual Christian. But it guarantees that a belief on a matter of faith must be true if at any time (in any “day”) it is held by every Christian, or is proclaimed as Catholic truth by some and not challenged by any. Christ’s promise guarantees that it will never happen, even for a short time, that every last Christian accepts falsehood as Catholic truth. God will if necessary work a miracle to prevent that from happening. (See my paper, “Ockham and Infallibility”.) According to each of the theories of inerrancy or infallibility there may be a need for miraculous intervention: the inerrancy of the Bible means that if (say) Matthew is about to write something erroneous, God will somehow prevent him from doing so; according to modern papal infallibility theories, if the pope is about to define an error, God will somehow prevent him from doing so. In Ockham's theory concerning the Church, the point of intervention comes much later in the process, and intervention will be less frequent: if the last Orthodox Catholic, perhaps an illiterate lay person in some remote place, is about to accept error as Catholic truth, God will somehow keep that person from error and move him or her to speak out publicly in a way that will eventually come to the attention of people throughout the Church.
Marsilius set out to prove that the pope does not have fullness of power. But he went further, and argued that the papacy was a merely human instition: Christ never appointed Peter head of the Church, Peter never was in Rome, the Bishops of Rome are not Peter's successors. In Defensor pacis II.xxvii Marsilius reports some arguments often used to support the doctrine that Christ appointed Peter head of the Church, and then in the next chapter answers them. In 3.1 Dial. 4 Ockham quotes the arguments and Marsilius’s answers, and then answers the answers. The main arguments are drawn from several New Testament texts.
John 21:15-17, where Christ said to Peter, “Feed my lambs… Feed my sheep”.Matthew 16:18-19: “You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”
Luke 22:32, where Christ said to Peter: “But I have prayed for you, Peter, that your own faith may not fail; and you, when once you have turned back, strengthen your brothers.”
Ockham agrees that the last text does not establish that Peter was head. But he defends the usual Catholic interpretation of the other two texts.
In discussing Marsilius's arguments, Ockham tries to sort out the various gospel texts in which Christ (a)promises or (b)confers some power in the Church. For example, in Mt. 16:19 Christ promises that he will give Peter the keys ("I will give", future tense); in Mt. 18:18 he promises the keys to all the Apostles (“whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven”); in Jn. 20:23 (“If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven”) these promises are fulfilled and the keys are actually conferred all the Apostles including Peter--Christ gives the keys to all of them directly, not through Peter. (These three texts use somewhat different language, but medieval theologians related them all to what they called “the power of the keys”). According to Ockham, there were other powers that Christ gave directly to all the Apostles, e.g. in Mt. 28:19 and parallels, “teach all nations, baptizing them” etc.—this was said to them all. Later Paul was made and apostle directly by Christ, not through Peter. In respect of the powers that Christ gave directly to all the apostles, Ockham agreed with Marsilius (and with St Jerome) that the Apostles were Peter’s equals.
Nevertheless, Christ gave Peter something that, in the nature of things, the Apostles could not all have, namely headship.[Note 6] Headship was promised to Peter in Matthew 16:18-19: “You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church”;[Note 7] and it was actually given to Peter in John 21:15-17, “Feed my lambs, feed my sheep”. Peter was appointed as shepherd over all of Christ’s sheep, including the other Apostles. Marsilius objects, “To feed sheep is [merely] to strengthen believers lest they fail, to provide subjects with earthly assistance, if it is necessary, to offer examples of virtues, to resist opponents of the faith, and to correct sinners”. Ockham answers that a shepherd also has real authority over the sheep. He quotes a passage from Ezechiel 34:4, addressed to the shepherds of Israel: “the strayed you have not brought back, the lost you have not sought”. Sheep sometimes need to be sought and brought back, which implies some sort of authority.
In appointing Peter as his vicar, Christ did not give Peter all the power Christ had (a vicar never has all the principal’s power, according to Ockham); for example Peter could not have instituted new sacraments. In discussing the Pope’s “fullness of power” Ockham had sought to limit in many ways the power of the head of the Church. However, by “feed my sheep” Christ did give Peter supreme power on earth, within those limits, over the Church on earth. Even after he had made Peter general shepherd, Christ continued to act directly in the Church, not only while he was still on earth, but even after his ascension into heaven. Thus Paul was appointed an Apostle not through Peter, but directly by Christ.
Besides refuting the arguments in favour of Peter’s headship, Marsilius had made a number of objections, which Ockham tries to answer.
(1) 1 Cor. 3:11: “For no other foundation can any one lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ”. Ockham replies that Christ alone was the primary foundation of the Church, but all the Apostles were also foundation stones, Revelations 21:14, “The wall of the city has twelve foundations …the names of the Apostles.”
There is a certain primary and principal foundation of the Church without which no Church can be founded. And that foundation is God alone, or Christ. There is another secondary foundation of the Church, without which the Church could be founded, yet without which it has not in fact been founded, and that foundation is neither God alone nor Peter alone; rather, in this way all the Apostles were the foundations of the Church, although among them blessed Peter was in a certain manner the more principal and universal foundation.
Peter remained a mere mortal, and was not the Church’s secondary foundation in all that he said or did. He did not act as foundation when he sinned or wavered in the faith and did things for which Paul rightly rebuked him (Gal. 2:11). The vicarious head of the Church is not sinless or infallible, but when he sins or errs he does not act as head..
(2) Marsilius drew another objection from Matthew 23:8-10:
But you are not to be called rabbi, for you have one teacher, and you are all brethren. And call no man your father on earth, for you have one Father, who is in heaven. Neither be called masters, for you have one master, Christ.
Similarly in Luke 22:24-7:
A dispute also arose among them, which of them was to be regarded as the greatest. And he said to them, “The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and those in authority over them are called benefactors. But not so with you; rather let the greatest among you become as the youngest, and the leader as one who serves. Cf. Mat. 20:25-7.
According to Ockham, these passages do not forbid Christians to hold positions of leadership in the Church, or to be called teacher (doctor), or father, or master.
For in 1 Tim. 2:7 the Apostle says, “I, a teacher of the gentiles, am telling the truth, I am not lying.” If a teacher, however, also a master (whence also in 2 Tim. 1:11 he says, “I am a herald and an apostle and a teacher [magister, master] of the gentiles.” And in the same letter (1 Tim. 1:2) he calls Timothy his beloved son: if Timothy was his son, however, he regarded himself as his father. And he writes to him in 1 Tim. 5:1, “Do not speak harshly to an older man, but speak to him as to a father.” We gather from these words that Timothy was permitted to call older men fathers, and yet Christ says [Matt. 23:9], “Call no one your father on earth.” And blessed John says in 1 John 2:[1, 28], “I write to you little children …And now little children abide in him.” We gather from these words that those to whom blessed John was writing were permitted to call him father. In effect, therefore, the Apostles called themselves masters and rabbis, something that they would not have done if Christ had prohibited them from calling themselves by such names… At that time, therefore, Christ did not enjoin complete equality on the Apostles for future times. (3.1 Dial., 4.7)
What Matthew 23:8-10, “do not be called Rabbi”, means is made clear by the verses following: “He who is greatest among you shall be your servant; whoever exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted” (Matthew 23:11-12).
A Christian leader should have a humble and unassuming style, Ockham says:
Christ was not intending to impose on them an equality that excluded the superiority of rulership, at least at some future time, but, exhorting them to humility, he imposed on them a complete equality which excluded all superiority of pride, of unjust, harsh and tyrannical power, just as the wise man in Ecclesiasticus 32:1 grants superiority to a ruler and enjoins a certain equality when he says, “Have they made you a ruler? Do not exalt yourself. Be among them as one of them.” In Ecclesiasticus 3:20 he also recommends to one who is greater not only equality but even a certain inferiority, when he says, “The greater you are the more you must humble yourself in everything.” For humility implies a certain inferiority. So too by his own example Christ, who though greater presented himself as lesser, recommended to those who are greater not only equality but even a certain lowliness, when he said in Luke 22:26-7, “The greatest of you must become like the lesser, and the leader like one who serves. For who is greater, the one who is at the table or the one who serves? Is it not the one at the table? But I am among you as one who serves.” Christ did not, therefore, in Matthew 20, Luke 22 or Matthew 23 forbid the Apostles all superiority of rulership but, to lead them towards humility, he took away from them any unjust and illicit superiority and a haughty and iniquitous way of ruling. (3.1 Dial., 4.20)Christ wanted his words there [do not be called Rabbi] to be understood of a supreme and first rabbi and master, that is, so that no one except God or Christ would be thought of as first and supreme rabbi, father and master of the faithful. For Christ did not want any of the faithful not to regard as father the one who begot him or to refuse to call him father, but he wanted them to consider God as superior to their father in the flesh and as their higher and principal father. It seems that the same thing should be said, in proportion, of rabbi and master. To make this clear it is said that it should be known that it is often the custom of scripture to deny something of someone which is not suitable to him primarily and principally or par excellence, although it may be said of him secondarily and not principally [[add seu?]] or par excellence. For he spoke thus to the Apostles in Matthew 10:19-20, “When they hand you over do not worry about how you are to speak or what you are to say, …For it is not you who speak but the Spirit of your Father speaking through you”, that is primarily and principally, although secondarily it was they who spoke, as being moved by a principal. Christ also spoke in this way in Luke 18:19, as we read, “No one is good but God alone”, that is, essentially and primarily, and yet the good angels, the blessed in heaven, and all the just are good. Thus it is said in the present case that in those words Christ only meant that God and Christ, and no other, should be considered principally and, as it were, par excellence, as father, rabbi and master. (3.1 Dial., 4.6)
Notice that Ockham is prepared to say that Christ and the Bible do not always say exactly and literally what they mean.
That argument and ones like it are similar to that argument on which certain heretics base themselves when they say that it is not permissible to swear for any reason because of the fact that in Matthew 5:24 Christ says, “But I say to you. Do not swear at all.” Just as those people have said that because of that precept of Christ no one is permitted to swear under any circumstances, so in the same way the holders of this opinion seem to say that it should not be granted in any way, because of those words by which he seems to enjoin equality on them, that Christ established any one apostle as superior to the others. But just as in some cases it is permissible to swear, notwithstanding the above words of Christ about swearing, so it is permissible to be called rabbi, master and father, notwithstanding those words of Christ by which he seems to impose a certain equality on the faithful. (3.1 Dial., 4.7)
Even apart from the fact that what seems to be the literal meaning to someone not attuned to biblical usage is not really the literal meaning, Christ and the Bible writers do not always say exactly what they mean. Biblical statements have to be taken with their exceptions.
The Apostle says, “Children, obey your parents in all things” (Colossians 3:20); “Slaves, obey your lords in the flesh in all things” (Colossians 3:22); “Slaves, obey your lords in the flesh with all fear and trembling” (Ephesians 6:5); “As the Church is subject to Christ, so also are women to men in all things” (Ephesians 5:24); and “Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection” (1 Timothy 2:11). In these general statements, and in countless others found in sacred Scripture, the general words should not be taken generally with no exception. In many things children are not bound to obey their parents, since they are not slaves but free, or wives their husbands, since they are not maidservants but are judged to be entitled to equality in many things (Extra, De divortiis, c. Gaudemus), and slaves are not bound to obey their masters in all things without any exception.
Breviloquium II.14 (A Short Discourse on the Tyrannical Government… Usurped by Some Called Highest Pontiffs, tr. Kilcullen, Cambridge UP, p. 47)
Similarly, although Ockham holds that Christ provided that the Church should have a single head, he entertained the possibility that the Church might be able to modify its structure, at least for a time in special circumstances. See 3.1 Dial. 2, chs. 20-29 .
But for the sake of necessity it is permissible to act against a divine commandment, even one that is explicit, in things not evil in themselves but evil only because they are prohibited. (ch. 20).
From necessity or utility they can do something contrary to an ordinance of his — that is, against his words and deeds according to what at first they seem to express, though not against his intention; for he means that in his words, where he ordains or does something the opposite of which is not at all opposed to the natural law and he does not make explicit that necessity and utility should by no means be excepted, urgent necessity and evident utility are excepted. (ch. 22).
If, however, they are purely positive commandments, a case of necessity and utility should be excepted in the same way in one as in another, unless it can be especially gathered from the Scriptures that in some such commandment a case of necessity and utility should not be excepted. (ch. 24). ]
So far as I have presented it the debate between Ockham and Marsilius has been about the interpretation of various Bible texts. But Ockham also appeals to tradition. You will remember his theory that Matthew 28:20, “I am with you all days”, guarantees that anything that is accepted as Catholic truth by all Catholics of any “day” must be true. Anything accepted at all times since the Apostles has this guarantee many times over.
Master ... What has been believed from the times of the apostles until our own time by prelates and doctors of the Church succeeding one another in a continuous series and by the peoples subject to them should be held firmly by all Catholics….[To support this premise, he quotes Augustine, from Decretum, dist. 11, c. 9, Palam.] Even according to our opponents [i.e. Marsilius], the universal Church cannot err, therefore what the universal Church has thought and does think should be held firmly. … But the prelates of the Church from the apostles themselves to these times, with the peoples subject to them, have held and thought that Peter was superior to the other apostles. Pope Anacletus held this (as quoted above), and he could not have been ignorant of the truth in this matter. Also blessed Pope Clement, a disciple of the apostles, thought the same; as we read in dist, 80, c. In illis, he said, “Among the apostles themselves the appointment was not equal, but one was above all,” and none other than Peter. Eusebius of Caesarea also thought this. Because he was steeped in the teachings, traditions and writings of those who were disciples of the apostles and of those educated by those disciples, he was not ignorant of what preceding [generations] thought, and it must in no way be presumed that he knowingly taught falsehood; none of the prelates of the Church or doctors afterwards contradicted him, and consequently by being silent they all consented to him. … But it seems far from all likelihood that those men - most careful students of the canonical Scriptures of histories of chronicles, of records of deeds, of the customs and tradition of the universal Church - did not know what the apostles and their disciples thought concerning something so necessary to the whole Church of Christ, and it must by no means be presumed about them that they knowingly taught falsehood; it must therefore be held that the above assertion came down to them from the apostles themselves through chronicles and histories worthy of belief, some of which we perhaps do not have, and through the tradition and custom of the universal Church continued down to them. All other prelates and doctors of the Church from the time of blessed Sylvester down to our own times have held the above assertion, as could be shown in many ways. And Catholic peoples have agreed with the above prelates and doctors in the same assertion, because no Catholic people has been found to contradict them. Therefore this assertion must be attributed to the universal Church and consequently must be held firmly.Student Perhaps some will say that not all Christian peoples have thought this. It is said that the Greeks, who were Christians and Catholics before the Romans, do not hold this, and so not all Christian peoples have believed this down to our own times.
Master This answer is attacked by others. While the Greeks were Catholics they agreed in this, following the teaching of Catholic doctors. We do not read, and it does not seem probable that before they divided from the Roman Church the people of the Greeks did not follow the teaching of Catholic Greek doctors, and their doctors taught the above assertion publicly and left it in writings. For Eusebius of Caesarea, who was a Greek and expert in the writings of all the Greek doctors (as is limpidly clear from the Ecclesiastical History which he wrote), taught this and wrote it, as is clear from what was said above. While the Greeks were Catholics, therefore, they held the above opinion. Their errors after they divided themselves from the Roman Church are in no way an obstacle to the above argument; it must therefore be held, following the Latins, that Peter was superior to all the others.
Student Some might perhaps answer the above argument in another way, by saying that although all the Christian peoples agreed with their prelates and doctors in that assertion, not all from among the people did, and the truth of faith can be preserved in a few of the people; therefore the above argument does not succeed.
Master That answer is refuted by this, that according to the Apostle, in Romans chapter 8, “With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation,” namely, when the faith is endangered. It would not have been enough, therefore, for some few of the people to have held the contrary assertion in their hearts, if it were Catholic, unless they had also confessed it with their mouths, publicly contradicting those who were in error. Since, therefore, we do not read that, from the times of the apostles and their disciples up to the time of our fathers, any, even a few, from the Christian peoples, publicly contradicted the assertion we have been speaking of, it must be held that this assertion should be ascribed to the universal Church. But the universal Church cannot at any time, even for a short time, err against the faith and in matters of right belonging to the faith or to good morals (though according to some it can err in matters of fact, namely in regarding someone as pope or as a good man, though he is not, and in similar matters). The above assertion must therefore be believed firmly.(3.1 Dial. 4.22)
Eusebius of Caesarea died c. 341. Clement and Anacletus were among the earliest leaders of the Christian Church in Rome. (See “Pope St. Clement I”).
Here is another statement of the argument from the traditional interpretation of the NT texts. This time the argument does not depend on Matthew 28:20, “I am with you all days”, but on the premise that we ought to believe trustworthy people on matters of fact:
Master… Men worthy of trust rising above all objection should be believed in matters that, either in effect or in so many words, they assert (1) they have known immediately or (2) have learnt through others whom they were bound to believe, or are said as being known by themselves in one or other of those ways. For even if such things known in such a way can pertain to matters of knowledge, yet they can also pertain in some way to matters of fact, or at least the knowledge by which they are asserted to be known can be reckoned among those things that are matters of fact. [In other words, though an interpretation of a text is a matter of inference, a report to the effect that certain people interpreted the text in a certain way is a matter of fact.] In matters of fact, however, men worthy of trust should be believed, as was proved in chapter 22 of [book] 3 of this [tractate]. For otherwise they would not be considered veracious and worthy of trust, which would not be without irreverence worthy of condemnation. But men worthy of trust rising above all objection assert in effect that they have learnt, and not through reasoning or study or meditation but immediately or from others whom they were bound to believe [i.e. whom they had no reason to mistrust on a matter of fact], that those words of Christ, “You are Peter”, etc., ought to be understood so that they mean that primacy over the Apostles and all the other faithful was given or committed to blessed Peter by Christ. For many highly approved men worthy of trust, who were disciples of the Apostles or were instructed in sacred letters by the disciples of the Apostles, have expressly asserted that meaning of those words of Christ. It seems to lack all probability, however, that virtuous and learned men, skilled investigators of the sacred scriptures, lived with blessed Peter and the other Apostles and their disciples and did not learn from them the true meaning of those words of Christ, especially since a true understanding of them was necessary for the whole Church of Christ to know whom the faithful were bound to obey as a prelate or prelates and whom they were not bound to obey as the highest prelate appointed by Christ. For sheep are not beyond danger if they do not know whom they should follow as their true shepherd. It seems much more improbable, however, that such men, disciples of the Apostles or their disciples, taught a false understanding of those words of Christ. And so the faithful ought to hold that the true meaning of those words of Christ is the one that the disciples of the Apostles and those taught by them firmly asserted, because they did not receive that meaning only by reasoning, merely inferring it from the words themselves, but they received it from the Apostles who carefully taught them their true meaning as necessary for the whole Church of God. And they said it, therefore, not as something known to them by way of knowledge or reasoning but as something expressed and taught to them by the Apostles, whom they were bound to believe because the Apostles most certainly knew the true meaning of those words. For this reason, to say that approved men worthy of trust, disciples of the Apostles or taught by those disciples, taught a false meaning of those words, is to say not that they were deceived by fallacious reasoning but that they knowingly lied, because they knowingly declared a meaning contrary to that which they learnt from the Apostles. This is not devoid of irreverence and should be detested as blasphemy. (3.1 Dial. 4.14)
So the argument is: The Apostles knew what Christ meant by the words recorded in the Gospels appointing Peter as head (Christ would have made sure that they understood him correctly on such a vital point), and their disciples knew what the Apostles thought Christ meant, so the interpretation of the Apostles’ disciples should be accepted. I think you will agree that this is a strong argument—if it can be shown that a New Testament text, perhaps otherwise of uncertain meaning, was interpreted in a certain way by writers who must have known how the Apostles interpreted it, then that interpretation is authentic.
Unfortunately for Ockham’s argument, the texts from the earliest Christian writers on whom he relies, Anacletus and Clement, the men who were disciples of the Apostles and who cannot be supposed to have lied, were in fact lies—lies told not by Anacletus and Clement, but by some unknown person who wrote this material and falsely attributed it to them. Ockham’s quotations from Clement and Anacletus are drawn from perhaps the most plausible and most influential of medieval forgeries, the collection now known as the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals. See “Projekt Pseudoisidor", and an article in Wikipedia. See also article by Seckel.
The Pseudo-Isidorian decretals are now believed to
have been put together, with deliberate intention to deceive,
somewhere in northern
Medieval scholars in theology and in every field were sometimes misled by inauthentic writings. Some of these writings seem to have been produced with the deliberate intention to mislead. Some were accidentally misattributed. Some may have been literary exercises that were later mistaken for authentic works (perhaps the correspondence between Seneca and St Paul falls into this category). Some may have been draft documents produced by some apprentice official that somehow got into circulation and were mistaken for official documents (this may explain the decretal Eger cui lenia, attributed to Pope Innocent IV, which Ockham took as showing that Innocent IV was a heretic). The Church was concerned to distinguish between the authentic and the apocryphal (see Gratian, Decretum, dist. 15, c. 3, Sancta Romana ecclesia, Friedberg, vol. 1, col. 36). Medieval canon lawyers and scholars tried to authenticate material they wanted to rely on, and some misattributions or forgeries were eventually detected (e.g. Thomas Aquinas and his Greek expert William of Moerbeke recognized the Liber de causis, earlier attributed to Aristotle, as material taken from the neo-Platonist, Proclus.) But other false material escaped detection during the middle ages. For example, a neo-platonic author of great authority throughout the middle ages was Dionysios the Areopagite—a convert Paul had made when he addressed the men of Athens (Acts 17:34); these days he goes under the name Pseudo-Dionysios. (This Dionysios was also the reputed founder of the Abbey of St Denis in Paris: Abelard got into trouble with the monks for questioning whether St Paul’s convert had really founded their monastery.)
Some of the pseudo material went back quite a long way, for example, the Recognitions of Clement (see English translation; article). The Recognitions of Clement were referred to (with some suspicion) by Eusebius of Caesarea and translated into Latin by Rufinus (who also translated Eusebius), so they must have been written some time earlier. Eusebius died c. 341.
The Donation of Constantine was a forgery, included in the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals but composed earlier and also circulated separately. It is sometimes said that its inauthenticity was first recognised by Lorenzo Valla (see his critique of the document). This is not true; there were medieval authors who rejected the Donation as apocryphal, and one of them was Ockham. The only extant manuscript of Ockham’s Breviloquium (Short Discourse) breaks off just after the beginning of an argument to prove that the Donation is apocryphal, so we don’t know Ockham’s reasons. Others during the middle ages also did not regard the Donation as authentic, though most accepted it as authentic. It is now believed to have been written some time during the 8th century.
Now two questions I would like to leave you with: How do we know that the texts of Anacletus and Clement that Ockham quotes are not authentic? And—to return to Bayle’s questioning—how do you know that the New Testament writings are authentic? What is the basis of the distinction between canonical scripture and apocrypha? The initial answer is that we know “at second hand”—in categorizing the Pseudo-Isidorian collection as a deliberate falsification I am relying on the opinion of scholars who have studied the subject, to whom I give the benefit of the presumption that they know what they say they know and that they mean to tell the truth. But how do they know? How did scholars decide that these documents are inauthentic? Partly on the basis of what they thought likely to be true. For example, one of the texts from Clement in the Pseudo-Isidorian collection says that Peter established primates, archbishop and bishops in places where the pagans had had hierarchs of similar rank: to some modern scholars it has seemed implausible that Peter would have followed pagan precedent, so this counts against the authenticity of the text. But obviously it is dangerous to judge the authenticity of an ancient document by whether it seems sensible to us. Sometimes the argument has been linguistic: the Donation of Constantine uses the term “satraps” for Constantine’s officials, which sounds anomalous. As such anomalies or implausibilities accumulate, the balance begins to tip against authenticity. Another basis is the manuscript tradition: if some document is extant only in MSS the earliest of which all date from the 9th century and all come from a certain region, then it may be inferred that it was written sometime about then in that region. But this is not decisive. Apart from the difficulties of dating MSS and determining provenance, there is always the possibility that there may have been some earlier MS, now lost, from which the earliest extant MSS were derived: to conclude that the document did not exist before the 9th century is an argument from silence.In short, the inauthenticity of the collection is an hypothesis: when we consider the likelihood, as it seems to us, of the content, and consider the character of the language of the document, and the manuscript tradition, we may come to the conclusion that some hypothesis of forgery (or misattribution or mistake about intentions etc.) is more likely than the hypothesis of authenticity, or vice versa; but the conclusion is never more than hypothesis, resting on a balance of probabilities. A balance of probabilities is clearly not enough to justify a sharp line between texts that cannot be mistaken in any detail, and texts that are apocryphal or without authority.
My own opinion is that no man should be regarded as God, and no individual, institution or book should be believed to be an infallible source of messages from God. Such beliefs give divine authority to merely fallible and human opinions (which may be interesting, worth considering and even, often, true--but not unfailingly true). Against the various doctrines of inerrancy and infallibility I recommend falliblism. See my essay, "The Ethics of Belief".Return to Home Page
Note 1. Augustine, “Against The Epistle Of Manichaeus Called Fundamental”, c. 5: “But should you meet with a person not yet believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I do not believe? For my part, I should not believe the gospel except as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church”. Ockham explains that Augustine's statement does not imply that the authority of pope or any other Church organ is superior to that of the gospel. The Church has more authority than the gospels "not because there is anything doubtful about the Gospel, but because the whole is greater than its part"--the gospel writers were members of the Church. From the greater authority of the whole it cannot be inferred that the authority of one part is greater than that of another part, for example that the authority of the pope is greater than that of the gospel writers; there is nothing doubtful about the gospels, and they are in fact of greater authority than the pope and canon law, as popes themselves have said; Contra Benedictum, 257.24-8, 260.21-261.9; 1 Dial. 1.4.
Note 2. There was a generally accepted doctrine that the Church has authority only over Christians. “For what have I to do to judge them that are without? Do not you judge them that are within? For them that are without, God will judge” (1 Corinthians 5:12-13). This text was usually taken to imply that the Church has no jurisdiction over non-Christians (“them that are without”, i.e., outside the Church). So when Augustinus Triumphus says that “the whole machine of the world is but one realm”, it is possible that he means “of the Christian world”. But he probably did not. The world over which Christ rules is the whole world. So the logic of the argument leads to the conclusion that papal fullness of power includes authority over government even in non-Christian parts of the world.
Note 3. Marsilius was perhaps following Augustine. Ockham: “According to him [Augustine] if any falsehood, even the slightest, were to be found in the divine scriptures, trust should not be put in them. Whence, in his first letter to Jerome, as found in dist. 9, Si ad scripturas [c.7, col.17], he says: ‘If even falsehoods in accordance with duty [i.e. morally justified lies, if such are possible] are admitted in the holy scriptures, what authority will remain in them?’, as if to say, none. If it is not necessary, therefore, to believe a general council, the highest pontiffs and any doctors at all on every matter, it follows that trust should not necessarily be put in them in any matter.” (3.1 Dial. 3.4; the quotation is from Augustine letter 28, c. 3)
Note 4. In accordance with this attitude, Ockham refers to the possible future in very cautious terms: "It can not be known by any pilgrim [i.e. person still on earth], except one God has revealed it to, whether the multitude of catholics will come to as small a number [in the time of anti-Christ] as there was in the time of Noah, the times of the Patriarchs and under the old law, and whether Saracens or other unbelievers will occupy all the lands of Christians and believers. For to decide something in such matters is rashly to predict future events. ... And so some people say that if the Saracens or other unbelievers invade Christianity it will be rash for Christians to presume that they are to be protected by divine power...And therefore they grant, as you said before, that it should not be believed that unbelievers will ever occupy the whole of Christianity; nor should it be believed that they will not occupy the whole of Christianity; for neither [of these alternatives] is certain except to God and anyone to whom God has revealed it... And they say that it can not be known from divine scripture or the teaching of the universal church whether something similar will happen or will not happen before the times of anti-Christ." (1 Dial. 5.34) Unlike many others at the time, Ockham did not assume that Europe was permanently Christian.
Note 5.From the 12th century onwards Medieval Europe borrowed a good deal from the Islamic world. Besides the Koran, Sunni Muslims recognize as authoritative certain traditions that record sayings of Mohammad (traditions with a carefully documented descent)--cf. the Catholic doctrine that some truths of faith are not in the Bible but have been transmitted by tradition. One of the sayings of Mohammad is: “My community will never agree upon error”. This is taken to mean that religious beliefs universally held by Muslims (or at least, Muslim scholars) must be true. (See Encarta.) Was the late medieval interpretation of Matthew 28:20 influenced by this Muslim idea?Note 6. Ockham was quite ready to contemplate collective leadership: the papacy might be “put into commission” so that several popes would hold office together, 3.1 Dial. 2.25: but this option was not applicable to the college of the Apostles, since they were to disperse and go out on missionary journeys.
Note 7. Ockham
does
not think that "I will build my Church", taken literally as the
words sound, prove that Peter was to be made head of the Church,
since the Church was also built on the other Apostles. See 3.1
Dial. 4.13.
However, if the text is taken as the Apostles' disciples took it,
it means that Peter was made head. See later.
In 3.1 Dial. 4.13 Ockham goes on to quote ps-Clement, "There
are many words in the divine scriptures which can be dragged to
the sense that anyone invents for himself", but this should not be
done--the meaning of scripture texts should be learnt from those
who express the authentic tradition.
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