Ockham, Opus nonaginta dierum (hereafter OND), in Opera politica, ed. H.S. Offler et al. (Manchester 1963), vols. 1, 2. There is a complete English translation by R.J. Kilcullen and J.R. Scott published in electronic form by Intelex and in print by Mellen Press (vol. 1, vol. 2). The following is the "Introduction" to that translation.
Saint Francis's desire to follow the life of Jesus made him go to great lengths to dissociate himself from power, property and legal rights of any kind. The witness to Christian humility that his small group gave was so attractive to his contemporaries that soon his fellowship became a large organisation entrusted by the Church with a preaching mission throughout Europe and beyond. By 1300 there were Franciscans in Beijing.
Expansion led to changes that sometimes threatened the ideals of humility and poverty. Within a century the Franciscan Order was offering opportunities for academic and ecclesiastical careers, and Franciscans became Masters in the universities, Bishops, Inquisitors and Popes. Some Franciscans became fund raisers to build a magnificent church at Assisi to celebrate Saint Francis's austere life; some accepted legacies and owned property. In some of their houses "poor brothers" ate ordinary food in the common dining room while the well-born or more important brothers shared another dining room with distinguished visitors.
A crisis came in the 1320s when Pope John XXII repudiated doctrines and practices by which the Franciscan Order had tried, through all the changes, to keep hold of St Francis's ideal of poverty. Almost the whole of the Order accepted Pope John's decisions except its "minister-general" (i.e. head), Michael of Cesena, and a few "Michaelists", one of whom was William of Ockham.
The waters of history have closed over Brother Michael and Pope John, but Ockham's writings against John XXII and his successors, Benedict XII and Clement VI, are still of great interest to students of religious and political thought. The first of these writings was The Work of Ninety Days, written, apparently in ninety days, some time in the early 1330s. It deals with poverty as a religious ideal; with natural rights, and particularly the natural right human beings had originally, and under certain circumstances still have, to use any thing; with property rights and other legal rights; with ideas of religious perfection; with heresy and heretics; with the life of Christ and his disciples and the early Christian community. It also touches incidentally on various questions of logic, philosophy and historiography. It is an impressive example of academic skill, learning and intelligence devoted to clarifying matters of importance in social and religious life.
Ockham sometimes writes scornfully of his adversary, who certainly displays no great skill in argument; see 49.57-60, 71.97-105, 109.169-72, 112.73-8.[Note 1] However it should be said in the Pope's favour that he did not merely exercise his authority but was willing to argue -- to give his reasons, to quote and answer objections against his decisions, to enter into debate as if on equal terms with his critics. The exchange between them is not easy for a modern reader to follow, but it is worth the effort, and the purpose of this annotated translation is to make it more accessible.
The Work of Ninety Days (hereafter OND) is an answer to an answer to an answer -- a critical commentary on a reply to an appeal against certain documents issued by Pope John XXII. Michael of Cesena had issued two "appeals" against documents in which John attacked Franciscan doctrine and practice, and John had replied to these appeals in another document known (from its opening words) as Quia vir reprobus. OND is a critical commentary on Quia vir reprobus. When Michael quarrelled with John and fled the papal court (located at the time not in Rome but in Avignon), William of Ockham, Bonagratia of Bergamo, Francis of Ascoli, and several other members of the Order went with him and joined in his campaign against the pope. OND is Ockham's response on behalf of this dissident group to Quia vir. Throughout OND Ockham refers to the dissident Franciscans as "the attackers", to John as "the attacked", and to Michael as "the appellant" (John refers to Michael as "this heretic"). Each chapter of OND comprises, first, a passage from Quia vir, then criticism of the passage, and finally comments "on the letter", that is, directly on the text of the passage (the words commented on are in italics). To see these features, read the short Chapter 44.
Readers will soon notice that the work is full of quotations and references to authorities. Since their quarrel is with a pope, "the attackers" wish to show that the consensus of the recognised authorities is on their side. Some quotations are from various books of the Bible, for example from Genesis, Deuteronomy, Isaias, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Acts, Romans, Corinthians. Others are from "the saints" or "Fathers of the Church" (i.e. Christian writers of antiquity or the early Middle Ages), including Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Jerome, Gregory, Bede and Bernard. Other quotations are from the Civil Law (i.e. the Roman Law), for example from the Digest or the Institutes (e.g. 2.27, 45.1-10). Other quotations are from the Canon Law (i.e. Church law); the references to Canon law are those that include the expressions "dist.", "q.", "Extra" (e.g. 1.54-64). Other quotations are from the "gloss" on the Bible or on the Law texts (i.e. the standard commentary customarily written between the lines and in the margins of copies of the Bible and the Law texts); see, for example, 2.169-74. Other quotations are from "the Philosopher" (i.e. Aristotle). Also, "for the sake of those who accept the sayings of Thomas", Ockham sometimes quotes Thomas Aquinas -- perhaps with some irony, since John XXII was a great admirer of Thomas Aquinas, whom he had recently "canonised" (i.e. declared to be a saint); see, for example, 5.201-.
Readers will also notice that there are many occurrences of "for", "since", "therefore" and other words of reasoning, and that the argument is often presented very formally by modern standards. For example, there may be an argument with "major" and "minor" premises (the minor often being introduced by "but"), then formal proof of the major and proof of the minor. For examples of these features, see 93.483-501. Such formality was customary in medieval academic writings.
OND is one of Ockham's "recitative" works (as distinguished from "assertive" works), so called because the author merely "recites" or reports what others say ("the attacked" and "the attackers", in this case) and does not make any philosophical or theological assertion in his own name. Indeed, sometimes he writes as if he is merely the person holding the pen writing what the others say (cf. 105.19-21). However, since Ockham himself was one of the attackers, the book presumably includes his own views. Occasionally he indicates that the attackers do not all hold the same view, but he does not tell us which view is his (cf. 94.327-332, 103.85-98, 106.66-114, 124.44, 124.96). From Professor Offler's notes in his edition of the Latin text of OND, it is clear that many of the arguments Ockham uses had been used already by other Michaelist writers such as Michael of Cesena himself and Bonagratia of Bergamo. Ockham presents OND not as itself an attack on John XXII, but as an objective, academic review of the arguments advanced on both sides of the controversy; see the "Prologue" and the "Epilogue".
The Work of Ninety Days has attracted the notice of historians of political thought mainly for its theory of property. It was written, however, to vindicate the Franciscan conception of poverty as a religious ideal. To understand it in its own terms we need to pay some attention to the religious context.
Christians believe that God became a human being and suffered execution like a criminal, by crucifixion. This belief makes humility a central virtue: if God humbled himself to such an extent, then those who love and seek to be like God must also humble themselves. As Paul wrote in his letter to the Philippians:
Have this mind among yourselves, which is yours in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross. (Philippians 2:5-8)[Note 2]
The reference to "the form of a servant" is reminiscent of the "suffering servant" passages in Isaias (Isaias 42:1-14, 49:1-6, 50:4-9, 52:13-53:12), quoted or referred to in the New Testament as prophesies concerning Christ (e.g. Matthew 12:17-21, Luke 22:37, Acts 8:30-5, 1 Peter 2:21-25).
One aspect of humility is poverty. Jesus himself was poor. He says of himself, "Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of Man [Jesus] has nowhere to lay his head" (Matthew 8:20). He also recommended the renunciation of property to those who wished to be especially his followers:
And behold, one came up to him [Jesus], saying, "Teacher, what good deed must I do, to have eternal life?" And he said to him, "...If you would enter life, keep the commandments." He said to him, "Which?" And Jesus said, "You shall not kill, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness, Honour your father and mother, and, You shall love your neighbour as yourself." The young man said to him, "All these I have observed; what do I still lack?" Jesus said to him, "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me." When the young man heard this he went away sorrowful; for he had great possessions. And Jesus said to his disciples, "Truly, I say to you, it will be hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God"... Then Peter said in reply, "Lo, we have left everything and followed you. What then shall we have?" Jesus said to them, "Truly, I say to you, in the new world, when the Son of man shall sit on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And every one who has left houses or brothers or sisters or father or mother or children or lands, for my name's sake, will receive a hundred-fold, and inherit eternal life." (Matthew 19:16-29)
The young man was already keeping the commandments ("All these I have observed"), but Jesus advised him what to do "if you would be perfect". "If you would. . ." implies that perfection is optional, a matter of free choice. Medieval theologians distinguished between commandments, which are not optional but binding on all Christians, and counsels, which are pieces of advice for those who choose to follow Jesus more perfectly. To act in accordance with the counsels is "supererogatory" -- that is, something that goes beyond strict duty. "Sell what you possess and give to the poor" is, then, not a commandment but a counsel. Peter says, speaking for all the Apostles, "We have left everything", which implies that the Apostles had followed this counsel.
If Christ and the Apostles were poor and Christ counselled poverty to his followers, then Christians wishing to be perfect will practice poverty. "The attackers" saw several reasons for voluntary poverty. First, it takes away the "cupidity" that is increased by ownership of "temporal" things (i.e. worldly things), which is an impediment to "charity" -- that is, love of God for his own sake and of other things for God's sake; see 76.116-170. Second, poverty keeps a person out of many "occasions of sin" -- that is, circumstances which makes sin more likely; see 76.198-228. Third, voluntary poverty increases the credibility of preachers of the Christian message, by making it clear that they do not preach for profit (like some modern tele-evangelists); see 23.379-388 and 102.198-237. Some "solicitude" (i.e. busy-ness) concerning temporal things is unavoidable, since human beings require food and shelter to stay alive (see 24.20-), but Christians who wish to practice poverty should avoid "superfluous" or unnecessary solicitude. Individual "lordship" (i.e. ownership) of the things one uses is unnecessary, since it is enough to have use of them no matter who owns them, and for the same reason ownership "in common" -- that is, ownership by the "college" (i.e. collective or group) one belongs to -- is also unnecessary. The brothers use things that others own. See 11.226-37, 11.365-384. For a brief summary of these arguments see 23.389-403. See also the passage Ockham quotes from Thomas Aquinas in 23.202-355.
Property is a legal right, a right claimed and defended in courts of law. In Franciscan thinking humility and poverty imply the renunciation of litigation and of all legally enforceable rights, and in general a peaceable and non-contentious way of living. Thus in the first letter to the Corinthians Paul rebukes the Corinthian Christians for taking one another to court:
When one of you has a grievance against a brother, does he dare go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints?...Can it be that there is no man among you wise enough to decide between members of the brotherhood, but brother goes to law against brother, and that before unbelievers? To have lawsuits at all with one other is a defeat for you. Why not rather suffer wrong? Why not rather be defrauded? (1 Corinthians, 6:1-7)
Similarly, in the "sermon on the mount" Jesus says:
Do not resist one who is evil. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if anyone would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Give to him who begs from you, and do not refuse him who would borrow from you (Matthew 5:39-42)
Ockham explains that acquiring wealth and defending it through litigation and resisting evil, if necessary by force, are not "illicit" (i.e. sinful), and Christ does not command, but only counsels, the generality of his followers to renounce ownership and litigation and "turn the other cheek" (see 114.23-41, 116.72-91.)
To clarify this he makes several distinctions:
* between Jesus' disciples (i.e. the generality of his followers) and the special group of the Apostles (i.e. the twelve who were Jesus' closest disciples and the leaders of the early Church);
* between observance in outward action and observance in "preparation of the mind" (i.e. readiness to act outwardly when the circumstances are appropriate); and
* between the negative counsels (e.g. not to strike back) and the affirmatives (e.g. to turn the other cheek).
According to Ockham, observance of the negative counsels in outward action was advised by Jesus to the disciples generally but commanded to the Apostles, and the Apostles vowed such observance, whereas the outward observance of the affirmative counsels was not commanded to any, and no one should vow such outward observance, but all of Jesus' followers should be mentally ready to act on these counsels in the appropriate circumstances. (See 114.145-55.) It would not be right for anyone to vow to observe the affirmatives in outward action, because in some circumstances such actions would be wrong (see 114.155-179). Thus not to litigate (a negative) was a strict obligation for the Apostles and not for the other disciples, but it is an ideal for all of Jesus' followers. The Franciscans, like the Apostles, undertook the strict obligation by vow.
"The attackers" and John XXII had contrasting pictures of the early Christian community. The attackers saw things as follows. Jesus as a human being was poor in the sense that he owned nothing, and after they were appointed as Apostles the twelve also owned nothing, either as individuals or as a group. In the early Church, after Jesus ascended into heaven and the Holy Spirit came at Pentecost, there was a distinction in the matter of owning property between the Christian community as a whole and the sub-community consisting of the twelve Apostles. The Christian community included individuals who owned property, some of whom were even rich, and those individuals could legitimately go to court to claim and defend their property (though not to litigate was the ideal). Also, the community as a whole had a common fund of money available to help needy members, a fund established when some individuals sold their property and gave the proceeds to the community; some members of the community might on occasion go to court to defend its common funds. The sub-community of the Apostles, on the other hand, owned nothing, either as individuals or as a body. Although they were the community's spiritual leaders -- indeed because they were its spiritual leaders -- it was not they who held the community's funds (though those funds were administered under their direction), and it was not they who went to court on the community's behalf. As individuals, and as a sub-community within the wider Christian community, the Apostles had no property and exercised no legal rights.
According to John XXII, in contrast, Jesus, not only as God but as a human being, was "lord" (i.e. both king and owner) of all temporal things (see 93.30-77); he was "poor and needy" only in the sense that he did not take advantage of his rights -- just as a king returning to his palace disguised as a poor man might be said to be poor and needy even though he owned everything (see 96.8-23). Likewise the Apostles were not poor in the sense of owning nothing -- various Bible texts show that they did own things, for example some of the Apostles owned houses (see 98.14-22); rather, they "left everything" in the sense that they gave up caring about and loving temporal things (see 12.1-10). When he sent them out to preach, Jesus commanded the Apostles to take nothing on the journey, but this was a temporary rule for the time of that journey only; afterwards they once again possessed property (see 102.1-27). After Jesus ascended into heaven and the Holy Spirit came, the Christian community at Jerusalem had common ownership of the things that its members had previously owned individually. The community "owned" these things in the same sense as the individuals had previously owned them (see 4.10-27), and this ownership was vested principally in the Apostles as the heads of the community (see 106.8-11). When these common things were distributed in accordance with need, each individual became individually owner of what he had been given (see 9.1-17). According to John, even in the Garden of Eden, before Eve was made, Adam had individual ownership of everything (see 26.1-12, 27.1-24).
In short, John was as determined to vindicate property at every turn as the Franciscans were to vindicate poverty. According to John, Adam had property, Jesus had property, the Apostles had property both as individuals and as the heads of the Christian community, the community owned common property in the ordinary sense of ownership, and when the community's things were distributed to the poor the poor became owners of what they had been given. For the attackers' rejection of these theses see 27.52-84, 93.790-946, 11.81-150, 4.292-325, 4.342-384 and 9.477-518.
To understand more fully how such disagreement had arisen we must make an historical detour.
First, some matters of organisation and terminology. The medieval Church was divided geographically into bishoprics and parishes; the hierarchy of pope, bishops and parish priests was its main structure. Alongside this structure, however, there were "orders" (i.e. organisations) of "religious" (i.e. monks, nuns or brothers). Religious lived in communities under a "Rule" which prescribed a life of some austerity separate from "the world". Since they lived under a Rule (in Latin, regula), religious were sometimes called "regulars". Religious orders were sometimes called "religions" -- meaning not a religion in the modern sense and something distinct from Christianity, but an organisation of Christians who had assumed special obligations (the word religio suggesting ligatio, a tie). Christians, both lay people and clergy, who were not "religious" were called "seculars", because they lived in "the world" (saeculum). Some seculars were lay people, others were clergy. Bishops and parish priests were usually secular clergy, though some parishes were staffed by religious and on some occasions a religious was made bishop or pope. The distinction between religious and seculars was not between those who did, and those who did not, care about religion in the modern sense, but between those who separated themselves from the world and those who tried to follow Jesus while living in the world among ordinary people. All religious took vows of poverty, chastity and obedience: that is, they vowed to own no property, to abstain from sex, and to obey the officials elected or appointed in accordance with the Rule of their Order. Secular clergy were bound to celibacy but not to poverty. They received income from their position and were entitled to keep part of it for themselves and to spend it as they wished; they could engage in certain money-earning occupations besides their clerical functions; they could inherit, acquire and bequeath money and other property just as lay people could.
The oldest bodies of religious were the monastic Orders of monks and nuns who followed the Rule written by St. Benedict (who died in 550). The Benedictine Rule set out detailed regulations for the daily life and governance of a monastic community.[Note 3] Originally each monastery was an independent community, but during the tenth and eleventh centuries "families" of monasteries were formed (e.g. the Cluniacs, Carthusians and Cistercians), whose members lived under the Benedictine Rule as modified by the customs of their monastic family.
From the middle of the eleventh century clergy associated with cathedrals and other churches, and other groups of clergy, sometimes formed religious communities of canons regular. They were not Benedictine monks, but priests living a common religious life under the Rule of St. Augustine, which was based in part on a letter from Augustine to the community of nuns to which his sister belonged and in part on other material dating from the fifth century.[Note 4]
During the thirteenth century new kinds of religious Orders were founded, the mendicant orders. The most famous were the Order of Friars Minor (fratres minores, "lesser brothers") or Franciscans, founded by St. Francis of Assisi (who died in 1226), and the Order of Preachers or Dominicans founded by St. Dominic (d. 1221). There were several other mendicant Orders, including the Augustinians and the Carmelites. The Franciscans lived under a Rule written by St. Francis, the Dominicans under a modified version of the Rule of St Augustine. The Rules of Sts. Benedict, Francis and Augustine are quoted or referred to in OND, for example at 9.615-46.[Note 5] The members of these new orders are usually referred to as "Friars" (from Latin fratres, "brothers"), and their houses were called not monasteries but "convents" (i.e. meeting places, from Latin conventus, "meeting") or, in case of the Dominicans, "priories".
The Orders of Friars differed from the monastic Orders chiefly in the emphasis they put on two things. The first was preaching. Whereas a Benedictine monk generally lived all his life enclosed in one monastery separated from the world, the Franciscans and Dominicans went out on foot two by two into the world on preaching journeys -- some travelled as far as China, though mostly they preached in the various countries of Europe.
The second was poverty. Monks were vowed to poverty, and individual monks therefore could not own property, but the monastery as a corporation might be quite wealthy, with extensive farm lands yielding saleable produce or rents. The Franciscans and Dominicans, on the other hand, were poor not only as individuals but also in the sense that the Order as a body owned little or nothing -- little in the case of the Dominicans, nothing at all the case of the Franciscans. They were called "mendicants" (from Latin mendicare, "to beg"), because they were supported not by lands, rents or tithes but by voluntary donations ("alms"), often collected by begging door-to-door.[Note 6]
The two chief mendicant Orders came into existence during the same period (between about 1206 and the 1220s), the Franciscans in Italy and the Dominicans in southern France. Their original inspiration was somewhat different, but both practised poverty and engaged in preaching. The more effective they tried to be in preaching, however, the more difficult it became to preserve poverty, since the preparation for preaching requires study and books and therefore leisure and shelter. The Dominicans felt the difficulty less since they practised the strictest poverty only while on preaching journeys and lived less poorly in their convents while they prepared for the next journey. (Compare John XXII's view that Christ's command "Do not possess gold or silver" etc. was a command only for the preaching journey, 102.1-27.) For the Franciscans the difficulty was acute, since they tried to live in the strictest poverty at all times, without owning food, clothing, books or shelter. Their solution -- always contentious, and the main point at issue in the Work of Ninety Days -- was to make use of food, clothing, shelter, etc., that remained the property of someone else.
The main wish of Francis of Assisi was to imitate as closely as possible the life of Jesus and his disciples as described in the Gospel. "When God gave me some friars, there was no one to tell me what I should do; but the Most High himself made it clear to me that I must live the life of the Gospel. I had this written down briefly and simply and his holiness the Pope confirmed it for me".[Note 7] One thing that struck Francis about the life of Jesus described in the Gospel was its poverty, which Francis and his early companions set out to imitate: "Those who embraced this life gave everything they had to the poor. They were satisfied with one habit [i.e. outer garment] which was patched inside and outside, and a cord, and trousers. We refused to have anything more".[Note 8] After renouncing his family's wealth, Francis lived as an itinerant, repairing church buildings, earning or begging his bread. Others at the time had the same idea that following Christ meant poverty and a humble life, and Francis was soon joined by a number of companions.
Another thing that struck him about the life of Jesus and the disciples was that their compassion for poor and humble folk was expressed by preaching "the good news": this was an expression of compassion since poor people hungered and thirsted not only for food and drink but for spiritual goods. Francis and his companions began to preach the good news not only in churches but wherever and whenever anyone would listen. They applied to themselves the directions Jesus gave to the twelve Apostles, and again to the seventy-two disciples, when he sent them out to preach: "Take nothing for your journey, no staff, nor bag, nor bread, nor money" (Luke 9:3); "Carry no purse, no bag, no sandals" (Luke 10:4); "Take no gold, nor silver, nor copper in your belts, nor sandals, nor a staff; for the labourer deserves his food" (Matthew 10:9-10). They took the last words to authorise begging. They took the words "Take no gold" etc. as a complete prohibition on handling money. They went out "two by two" (Mark 6:7), in bare feet, and worked or begged for their food, not for money to buy it.
The first Franciscans slept in caves and abandoned buildings. When a peasant wanted a hut they were using, Francis and his companions simply moved out and left it to him. As he wrote in his Rule, "No matter where they are, in hermitages or elsewhere, the brothers must be careful not to claim ownership of any place or try to hold it against someone else".[Note 9] They tried to live according to the Gospel taken literally. Francis told the brother who made breakfast not to soak the beans overnight, because Jesus said "Take no thought for the morrow".[Note 10] He did not want the brothers to possess books, even prayer books, since possession and learning lead to pride: "After you have a Psalter you will want and hanker after a breviary; after you have a breviary you will sit in an armchair like a great prelate, saying to your brother, 'Bring me the breviary'".[Note 11] He wanted his Order to be called "of lesser brothers" (fratres minores) because he wanted them to be regarded as subordinate and insignificant ("ut sint minores").
For Dominic preaching was from beginning the main purpose of his Order and mendicancy was primarily a means to effective preaching. Dominic was a priest of a cathedral in Spain, living a "common life" with the other cathedral clergy as "canons regular" under the Rule of St. Augustine (see above, p. 11). On a journey in 1206 through southern France, Dominic and his bishop met a Cistercian abbot and his party who were travelling around, in a rather grand style, on horseback, trying without much success to convert the Albigensian heretics, who were numerous in that region. The bishop urged the Cistercians to change their approach: "Go forth in humility to do and to teach according to example of the loving Master, to travel on foot without gold and silver, following the practice the Apostles".[Note 12] This advice was a clear allusion to the gospel texts on the Apostles' preaching journey (quoted above, p. 14). Dominic and his bishop joined the Cistercians in carrying out this plan. This led eventually (about 1215) to the formation of the Order of Preachers, based at first at Toulouse. The Dominicans were from the beginning priests, and from the beginning they were students and scholars, believing that effective preaching to the Albigenses required philosophical and theological training. On preaching tours they went barefoot and without money, but between journeys they prayed and studied, not in caves and sheds like the first Franciscans, but in houses that the Order owned. From the beginning Dominican communities owned books and used money (though not on preaching journeys). Individual brothers were allowed to spend the community's money, and they were allowed to keep books for long-term personal use (though the community owned them).
Thus Dominican poverty did not altogether exclude community ownership. But the Dominican communities did not own much. At an early date they gave up ownership of rent-yielding properties, farms and tithes, and owned only the houses they actually lived in. In Italy Dominic had visited the Franciscans and had seen how they trusted in God's providence from day to day, without trying to secure a store of the necessities of life. Dominic exhorted his brothers to beg for their food not only when on preaching journeys but also while living in their convents and not to go out begging until the larder was nearly empty -- until there was only enough for one day. (Later, however, when it was found that uncertainty about the necessities of life was disruptive of prayer and study, each house was allowed to hold in store up to one year's supply.) But between preaching journeys prayer and study took precedence over the practice of poverty, which was not allowed to prejudice preparation for effective preaching. For the Dominicans poverty was both a way of imitating Christ and also a means to an end -- by relieving the brothers of the burden of administering property it freed them for the prayer and study necessary for preaching, and it made their preaching more effective by reducing the gap between themselves and the people to whom they preached and by removing the suspicion that they preached for gain. When the means got in the way of the end -- when poverty might hinder effectiveness in preaching, for example by reducing opportunities for study -- poverty gave way.
Although the preaching of Francis and his first companions was perhaps at first an imitation of the action of Jesus and his disciples rather than an "instrumental" activity, increasingly the Order became concerned to make its preaching effective. Especially after an influx of educated recruits from the universities, many of whom were priests, the Franciscans, like the Dominicans, sought opportunities for study, preaching, hearing confessions and other priestly functions, and therefore sought suitable buildings and opportunities for study. Bishops and parish priests were sometimes unwilling to allow the Franciscans to carry on priestly functions in their districts, and the Franciscans sometimes asked the pope for letters overriding the opposition of the local clergy. Francis, who had relinquished leadership of his Order, became uneasy at these developments. Near the end of his life he wrote a "Testament" to recall the brothers to the ideals of poverty and humility:
If I were as wise as Solomon and met the poorest priests of the world, I would still refuse to preach against their will in the parishes in which they live... [The first members of the Order] gave everything to the poor... we were only too glad to find shelter in abandoned churches. We made no claim to learning and were submitted to everyone. I worked with my own hands... When we receive no recompense for our work, we can turn to God's table and beg alms from door to door... The friars must be very careful not to accept churches or poor dwellings for themselves, or anything else built for them, unless they are in harmony with the poverty which we have promised in the Rule; and they should occupy these places only as strangers and pilgrims. In virtue of obedience, I strictly forbid the friars, wherever they may be, to petition the Roman Curia, either personally or through an intermediary, for a papal brief [i.e. letter]... even in order to preach... If they are not welcome somewhere, they should flee to another country where they can lead a life of penance, with God's blessing...
In these words there is an assumption of authority ("In virtue of obedience, I strictly forbid..."), although he had resigned from the leadership of his Order and knew that he could not add to the Rule the pope had approved. Even so, he tried to bind his brothers to read his Testament:
The friars should not say, This [i.e. the Testament] is another Rule... The Minister General and all the other ministers and custodes [officials] are bound in virtue of obedience not to add anything to these words or subtract from them. They should always have this writing with them as well as the Rule and at the chapters [i.e. meetings] they hold, when the Rule is read, they should read these words also.[Note 13]
A few years later, in 1230, at the request of the Order, Pope Gregory IX issued a document (a "constitution", "bull", or "decretal") named (as all such documents were) by its opening words, Quo elongati, which determined that Francis had no authority to impose his "Testament" "in virtue of obedience". Quo elongati also endorsed the idea that the Franciscans have the use of things that others own (see above, p. 6); it determined that the brothers could have no property, either individually or as a group but could use things belonging to others. (Ockham several times refers to this passage: see for example 32.234.) Gregory also ruled that if donors wished to give money (which the Rule forbade the brothers to accept either directly or "through interposed persons"), they could give it, not to the brothers, but to a "spiritual friend", who would act as the donor's agent, spending the money on the donor's behalf on the brothers' needs, holding for their future needs any money left over. Thus the Franciscans, like the Dominicans, could use property and even money gifts to further their preaching work without infringing the provisions of the Rule that forbade ownership and the handling of money.
Even during Francis's lifetime, bishops and parish priests often objected to the Friars' entering their districts to preach, hear confessions, say mass and carry on other priestly activities. They objected partly out of self-interest, since their income depended largely on provision of services, but partly also because they believed that a pastor should know his flock and the flock should have a single pastor. The Franciscan Order sometimes obtained letters from the pope overriding the opposition of the local clergy -- Francis criticised this practice in his Testament (see above, p. 16), but it continued; indeed, in 1281 Pope Martin IV issued a letter in general terms empowering the Friars to carry on their ministry even without the consent of the local bishop or parish priest. Disputes over this matter -- and especially over the incidental question whether parishioners who had confessed to a friar must also confess the same sins to their parish priest -- continued into the next century, beyond Ockham's lifetime.
Meanwhile conflict arose in the great centre of learning, the University of Paris, between the secular "masters" (i.e. teachers) and the mendicants over the number of schools they should respectively have in theology. Universities were a relatively recent enterprise of the secular clergy. In many European cities there had been for a long time schools for teaching Latin, logic and various other subjects including theology. The Schools were businesses; the secular clergy were entitled to carry on certain paid occupations alongside the clerical duties, and teaching was one such occupation. In Paris the establishment and conduct of the schools was controlled by the Chancellor of the cathedral acting for the bishop. In the early years of the 13th century the masters formed a trade association or union, which they called a "university" (at the time "university" and "college" could mean any body of people), to represent their interests in dealing with the Chancellor and with the citizens of the town. Similar unions for similar purposes were formed in other centres of teaching and learning, such as Oxford. The universities did not themselves enrol or teach students -- each school continued to be taught by its master and his "bachelors" (i.e. assistants); the university regulated the calendar, curriculum and teaching methods, and in particular it tried to control the licensing of new masters and new schools. To enforce its demands it sometimes called a suspension of classes, in other words a strike.
The conviction that effective preaching required education led the mendicant Orders to enter the universities, at first as students of the existing secular masters. Their purpose was to seek further education for their members and to recruit useful new members among the other students and the masters. They made many recruits, and some who were masters handed their schools over to their Order. Thus the mendicant orders came to have schools of theology in Paris, Oxford and other universities and Friars became masters. At first the secular masters welcomed the Friars as students and relations were harmonious. But after a number of the schools had passed into the possession of the new Orders, the secular masters in Paris began to feel that their businesses were threatened, and when the mendicant masters refused to close their schools when the University went on strike, the secular masters felt that their organisation was being undermined. Whereas the pope had previously supported the University at crucial points in its disagreements with the Chancellor, in this disagreement the pope supported the Friars against the secular masters.[Note 14] The dispute over university affairs prompted the secular masters to become involved also in the dispute between mendicants and secular parish clergy.
These conflicts were reflected in University disputations and writings. Spokesmen for the seculars (including William of St Amour, Gerard of Abbeville, and later Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines) criticised the mendicant way of life (for example, they criticised them for wandering around, for not doing manual labour, and for competing for alms with the involuntary poor, who had no other way of living), and they emphasised the rights of bishops and parish priests, which they argued could not be overridden even by the pope. They argued that Christ had established bishops when he appointed the twelve Apostles and parish priests when he sent out the seventy-two disciples (Luke 10:1); what Christ himself had established, no human authority could abolish or undermine. Spokesmen for the mendicants (including the Dominican Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscan Bonaventure) defended their way of life and argued that their preaching activities were justified by the fact that the pope had authorised them. Some of the mendicants, including Bonaventure and some members of the Augustinian Order, emphasised the pope's "fullness of power", which they took to mean that the pope was (under Christ) the source of all authority within the Church, able, if he chose, to authorise anyone to perform any function anywhere in the Church.[Note 15]
Since these disagreements between mendicants and seculars lie behind the dispute between Pope John XXII and the Franciscans, we must look more closely at two matters, the notion of "perfection" and the relation between ownership and use of things. And since John XXII seems to have been influenced at some points by the ideas of Thomas Aquinas and other Dominicans, we must also notice some differences between the Franciscan Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas.
The distinction between counsels of perfection and commandments binding on all is illustrated by Christ's advice to the rich young man (see above, p. 5). The young man was already keeping the commandments, and this was enough to "enter life"; but Jesus said, "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess", etc. -- perfection being optional, not commanded. Those who followed this advice and vowed poverty, chastity and obedience, were, according to the mendicants, in a "state of perfection". Does this mean, the seculars asked, that religious are perfect? And what of bishops (who were in most cases not members of religious Orders) -- are religious more perfect than bishops? According to the seculars, every "prelate" (a term that applied to everyone with the care of souls, including pope, bishops, and parish priests) is in a state of perfection; persons of greater perfection should be appointed to take care of souls, since it is their task to perfect others, whereas religious who do not have such responsibility are not in a state of perfection.[Note 16]
In reply mendicant theologians drew a distinction between being "perfect" and being in a "state of perfection". Bishops are, or ought to be, perfect, in the sense that no one except a Christian of mature virtue capable of leading others to perfection should ever be appointed bishop (and since humility is one of the Christian virtues, no one should ever seek to be appointed bishop). Religious, on the other hand, are in a "state of perfection", not in the sense that they are already perfect, but in the sense that they have committed themselves by vow to live under some approved Rule designed to lead them to perfection. The term "state" implies persistence through time; a vow gives a guarantee of persistence in the effort toward perfection and thereby puts a person into a state. Commitment to persist is essential: "No one who puts his hand to the plough and looks back is fit for the Kingdom of God" (Luke 9:62 -- Ockham quotes this text in many places, e.g. 9.356-365, 17.52-65). According to Thomas Aquinas, a bishop's "espousal" to his flock -- his commitment never to leave them and to defend their faith if necessary at the risk of his life -- is equivalent to a vow, and therefore bishops are also in a state of perfection, but other secular clergy, being free to resign from their clerical occupation, are not. Each religious order is a "school of perfection": entrants come in at different levels and aspire to different degrees of perfection, and there are different exercises, laid down in the different Rules.
According to Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, being perfect is essentially a matter of loving God. Those who are not in a state of perfection, as defined above, may nevertheless be perfect, in so far as they love God. Thus secular parish clergy, though they are not in a state of perfection, may be perfect -- indeed wealthy and married lay people may be perfect. Ockham repeats these views. (See 109.113-137, 18.44-81, 76.300-353, 108.27-37.)
The distinction between commandments and counsels is made problematic, however, by the "great and first commandment":
You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. (Matthew 22:37).
If perfection consists in love of God and we are commanded to love God with all our hearts, then it seems that perfection is not optional but commanded. In reply Thomas Aquinas in effect denies that we are commanded to love God perfectly: the commanded degree of love of God is "to love nothing more than him [God], or against him, or equally with him" (Summa theologiae 2-2, q. 184, a. 3, ad 2). (By something "against" God, Thomas meant something forbidden by one of the other commandments, e.g. not to steal, kill, commit adultery, etc.; such acts are against God because he has commanded that they not be done.) Thus it is possible, without failing to fulfil the great commandment, to love other things in addition to God (for example, knowledge, other human beings) without desiring these things precisely as ways to God or as participations in the divinity, as long as we do not love them equally with God or against God. The degree of love required by the great commandment is thus not the highest possible. The counsels of perfection are items of advice to be followed to develop the higher degrees of love of God, which are higher degrees of perfection.
Similarly Bonaventure held that perfection is a matter of love of God and that there are degrees of love of God that go beyond what is commanded:
The root, form, purpose, fulfilment and "bond of perfection" is love... Now this love may exist in a threefold state. The first and lower consists in the observance of the commandments of the Law; the second and intermediate, in the fulfilment of the spiritual counsels; the third and supreme in the enjoyment of eternal delights...The second stage is a perfection of supererogation [i.e. going beyond strict duty], and it is the object of this passage in Matthew: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor"...The intermediate state... differs from the first as counsel does from command. But these two, indeed, the counsels as well as the commands, tend toward the fulfilment and observance of... love (Defense of the Mendicants , pp. 37-38).
Thus both Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure hold that perfection consists in love of God ("charity"), that love of God in some degree, but not in the highest degree, is commanded, that the counsels of perfection are directed toward a higher degree of love of God beyond what is commanded, and that the counsels are therefore counsels and not commandments. When John XXII repeats the views of Thomas Aquinas on this subject (see 76.8-10), Ockham does not disagree. See 76.109-115 and 76.300-315.
However, Bonaventure and Ockham make an association that Thomas does not make between perfection and difficulty:
"Perfection" also is used in three senses. That is perfect by nature which consists in an act both difficult and excellent... That is perfect through circumstances which consists in an act difficult and adorned with favourable conditions... That is perfect in itself which consists in an act both difficult and proceeding from the highest charity. (Bonaventure, Defense, p. 14.)
To an Aristotelian, this idea might seem problematic: according to Aristotle, a virtuous person does good acts readily, without difficulty, with pleasure (see Nicomachean Ethics, II.3). But perhaps Bonaventure could say that when he speaks of a difficult act, he means an act that would be difficult to a person who lacked virtue. Ockham says that the acts in question are "difficult to corrupt nature and to men following their passions" (76.353).
To sum up the mendicants' answer to the seculars on this topic: Being perfect is a matter of loving God. Being in a state of perfection is a matter of being committed by vow to living in an Order which practices an austere way of life -- difficult (though not impracticable) to sinful human beings, more difficult in some Orders and less so in others -- designed to develop higher degrees of love of God. Secular clergy and lay people, including married people, including kings and rich men, may be perfect but (except for bishops) are not in a state of perfection. Religious may well be imperfect, but they are in a state of perfection.
Bonaventure's Defense of the Mendicants, like OND, was an answer to an answer to an answer.[Note 17] It was a reply to Gerard of Abbeville's Against an Adversary of Christian Perfection, which was a reply to the Franciscan Thomas of York's reply to a work by the secular master William of St Amour attacking the mendicants. Gerard sought to defend the secular clergy against what he saw as a claim to superiority that the Franciscans based especially on their owning nothing, individually or as a group.
According to Gerard, the goods of the Church are the property of God and not of any human being, and therefore not of the clergy -- the secular clergy are living a common life without property of their own, since they are using God's things. He argues, however, that the Franciscan claim to be using things that are the property of other human beings (the donors, or the pope) cannot be true in the case of things consumed by use (food, for example), because according to the law ownership and use cannot be separated in consumables. Then, as Bonaventure asks (Defense, p. 241), how can Gerard consistently say that the secular clergy use consumables that are the property of God? Gerard had forestalled that objection by referring to Matthew 25:34-40, in which God says that whoever has given to "one of the least of these my brethren" has given to God himself -- consumption by the clergy is thus (by virtue of the mystical unity of the Church) an instance of God's own use of his own property. The Franciscans, on the other hand, say that the things they use are the property of other human beings, and consequently they cannot invoke that text. (See Gerard, pp. 133-4.)
Later in his book Gerard repeats the point that the law does not allow separation of "lordship" (dominium, in this context ownership) from use in the case of consumables:
According to human laws, in those things which pass away through use, use is not divided from possession, just as the use of money is not divided (i.e. from lordship), or of oil, corn or wine. Thus when they are given by mutuum such things pass into the lordship of the receiver: for of these things there occurs not commodatum but mutuum, because from being mine the thing becomes yours and thus passes into your lordship. How much more does lordship pass through gift [i.e. than loan]! How absurdly, therefore, do you assert that those things were "given" to the Apostles for use and not for possession, when they pass away through use, and possession or lordship cannot be separated from use! Otherwise, also, the lordship of those things would be altogether fruitless.[Note 18]
Roman law recognised two kinds of loan: the first is commodatum, which is a loan in which the thing lent remains the property of the lender, to whom the identical thing should be returned at the end of the loan; the other is mutuum, which is a loan in which ownership is transferred, without payment (since it is a loan, not a sale), with an equivalent thing or set of things to be returned to the lender at the end of the loan. Commodatum is appropriate when the thing can be used without being destroyed, but if consumables are loaned for consumption, so that the identical item cannot be returned, the loan must be mutuum, that is, to lend consumables is to transfer ownership. Those who consume must own what they consume; it is not possible (lawfully) to consume what belongs to another, as the Franciscans claimed to do.
The legal doctrine that in the case of consumables there can be no separation between ownership and use is illustrated by the following passage from Justinian on the kindred notion of usufruct ("use" in Roman law being a limited form of usufruct):
Usufruct is the right to use and enjoy the things of another, their substance remaining unimpaired... Usufruct is separated from ownership and arises in a variety of ways. Suppose that someone bequeaths a usufruct to another, his heir will have bare ownership and the legatee will have the usufruct: conversely, if he bequeaths land with the reservation of a usufruct, the legatee will have bare ownership and the heir will have the usufruct...But, so that ownership might not be wholly useless by reason of a permanently detaching usufruct,[Note 19] it was decided that usufruct may be extinguished in various ways and revert to the ownership. A usufruct can exist not only over land and buildings but also in slaves, animals and other things, except those which are consumed by use -- these do not admit of usufruct either by natural reason or by civil law; they include wine, oil, corn, and clothing. Coined money is like these, because in its very use, by frequent exchange, it is in a way extinguished. [Cf. OND, 2.241.] But for reasons of convenience, a senatus consultum ruled that the usufruct of money can be established provided that the heir is given effective security in respect of it...The Senate did not indeed create usufruct of such things (for it could not) but created quasi-usufruct through a security... And once a usufruct has ended, it reverts to the ownership, and from that time the lord of the bare ownership begins to have full power over the thing.[Note 20]
The reasoning behind "for it could not" is that if something is impossible by natural law the authority of the Senate cannot make it possible. Compare the following passage from the Digest:
This senatus consultum did not bring it about that there might, strictly speaking, be a usufruct of money, as natural reason cannot be altered by the authority of the Senate; but with the introduction of the above safeguard, quasi-usufruct was initiated.[Note 21]
Whatever may be true, then, of enduring things such as buildings, it is legally and rationally impossible that the Franciscans should use food and other consumables that remain the property of someone else.
Bonaventure's answer to this objection is as follows:
We should understand that since four things are to be considered in temporal goods -- ownership, possession, usufruct, and simple use -- and since the life of mortals is possible without the first three but necessarily requires the fourth, no profession may ever be made that renounces entirely the simple use of temporal goods. But that profession which implies the willing vow to follow Christ to the extremities of poverty most fittingly calls for renunciation of dominion [dominium, ownership] over everything whatsoever, and must be content with the limited use of things belonging to others and conceded to it....
But if perchance someone tries to oppose this reasoning by claiming that there is a warning in civil law that use cannot be separated perpetually from dominion, we will answer that this principle of civil law has no application here, since the law pronounces such a decree lest dominion become useless, and hence be nothing but an empty word. Now, to retain this kind of dominion over things while the use of such things is conceded to the poor is not useless, since it is meritorious for the Father of the poor [i.e. the pope], and opportune for the profession of the sons who are serving Christ [i.e. the Franciscans]. Neither is there any obstacle in the fact objected by our adversary that, in the case of things consumed through use, dominion is not distinct from use: the same occurs, for instance, when a son receives from his father a sum of money, and makes use of it, without having dominion over it for a single instant.[Note 22]
The reference for the example of the son is to Digest, 50.1.17.93, p. 962. Bonaventure goes on to argue that since the pope is not limited by the Roman law, the fact that the law texts do not admit usufruct of consumables is in any case not a decisive objection.
John XXII's objection to the Franciscan claim to use consumables that they do not own is exactly the same as Gerard's (see 39.1-5), and Ockham's answer includes Bonaventure's example of the son of the family, together with several similar examples from Bonagratia of Bergamo and Francis of Ascoli. The point of these examples is to show that even according to the laws certain people who cannot acquire ownership (sons, slaves, monks, etc.) can nevertheless use consumable things. See 4.279-80.
Thomas and Bonaventure were on the same side in the controversy with the secular masters, and they agreed against the older monastic Orders that an Order was more perfect if it did not have any considerable wealth as a community. However, there was some disagreement between them about whether a higher degree of poverty implies a higher degree of perfection (cf. 11.151-9). The Franciscans argued that the highest degree of perfection presupposed the most rigorous practice of poverty -- that is, their own, since they were vowed to absolute non-ownership not only as individuals but as an Order.
Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, thought that the particular practices followed in a religious Order should be evaluated by reference to the particular purpose for which the Order existed. The common purpose of all Orders was to increase their members' love of God, but in subordination to that general purpose each Order had its own specific purpose (preaching, in the case of the Dominicans), and he claims (contentiously) that the higher the specific purpose the higher the state of perfection of the Order. In his view preaching is a very exalted purpose, and the form of poverty best for that purpose is not absolute poverty but the more moderate poverty practiced by the Dominicans -- taking some thought for the morrow, keeping some store of necessary things, making some use of money. A degree of poverty greater than that would impede the work of preaching by impeding prayer and study. Here is part of his discussion of the question "Whether having something in common diminishes religious perfection":
If one considers poverty in relation to the specific ends of religious orders,... each order will be more perfect in respect of poverty the more it practises a poverty more proportionate to its end...It is appropriate for those whose purpose is to hand on to others the fruits of contemplation [i.e. preachers] to have a life most of all freed from external solicitudes. This happens when the few things necessary for living, obtained at a fitting time [i.e. in time to prevent disruptive crises], are kept.... [A means] does not become better to the extent that it is a greater means, but in so far as it is better adapted to the end -- as a doctor does not heal more so far as he gives more medicine, but in so far as the medicine is more appropriate to the disease. Therefore it is not necessary that a religious order is more perfect the greater its poverty, but the more its poverty is appropriate to the end, common and specific.[Note 23]
In answer to an objection from Jesus' words, "Be not solicitous for the morrow" Thomas quotes Augustine:
If they be urged from the Gospel to lay nothing by for the morrow, they answer, Then why did the Lord himself have a purse, where he laid by the money collected?[Note 24]
To this question Bonaventure had an answer, also drawn from Augustine, namely that Jesus had a purse to demonstrate that, although not to use money is better, to use it is not a sin -- in some actions Jesus did not demonstrate perfection but, out of merciful condescension to the weak, showed that less perfect actions may be legitimate.[Note 25] Ockham made no use of the idea of condescension; his answer was that Christ did not have ownership of the purse or its contents, but only use -- see 94.211-279.[Note 26]
Another matter on which Thomas Aquinas argued for Dominican practice and against Franciscan practice related to the question whether the members of an Order sin mortally if they disobey their Rule. Thomas says that it is better to promise not "the Rule", but "to live according to the Rule", and even better to promise "obedience according to the Rule" -- so that the promise will be broken only by disobedience to precepts (i.e. commandments) included in the Rule, while acts contrary to counsels and exhortations contained in the rule will be only venial sins. Better still is the Dominican practice: "In another religious Order, namely the Order of Friars Preachers, such a transgression or omission does not, of its kind, incur any fault, either mortal or venial, but only an obligation to undergo the penalty assigned";[Note 27] that is, the rule says "either do this, or do that (the penalty)", and is obeyed in either case. There was at the time among the Franciscans -- or at least among their critics -- an opinion that the Franciscan vow obliged them, under pain of mortal sin, to carry out, as if it were a precept, every Gospel counsel and every piece of advice or exhortation contained in their Rule. In another place Thomas says that if one were obliged by the vow to obey everything in the Rule, the religious state would set a snare of mortal sin.[Note 28]
Another point of difference was over the Gospel command not to carry money: "Do not possess gold or silver, or money in your belts" (Matthew 10:9). The Franciscans applied this command to themselves at all times. According to Thomas the words can be taken, as Augustine suggests, not as a command, but rather as a permission -- that is, as permitting them to go preaching without gold and silver and other supplies, intending to accept support from those to whom they preached. Or they can be taken, as Chrysostom suggests, as a command Jesus gave his disciples in relation to the particular preaching mission to the Jews on which he was sending them; on this interpretation preachers going on other preaching journeys would not be bound by these commands. Thus when Paul preached to the Corinthians without taking anything from them, but supporting himself or being supported by other churches (1 Cor. 9:12-15, 2. Cor. 11:7-8), his action was, on the first interpretation, supererogatory, and, on the second interpretation, not contrary to a command that was not meant to apply to every preaching journey.[Note 29] John XXII seems to combine both interpretations in his remarks on the command not to carry gold or silver; see 102.1-27.
Thomas Aquinas also endorsed the doctrine (see above, p. 24) that in consumables ownership and use cannot be separated, though he did so in a discussion of the legitimacy of usury, not in reference to the Franciscan Rule: "There are some things of which the use is the consumption of the thing, as we consume wine in using it for drinking...Whence in such things the use of the thing should not be reckoned [in calculating the value of a loan] separately from the thing itself, but to whomever the use is granted the thing is thereby granted".[Note 30]
The Franciscan and Dominican orders were akin, they were sometimes allies, generally they were on good terms. However, there are some signs that there was tension. Like Thomas Aquinas, many Dominicans resisted the Franciscan claim that the Franciscan Order attained the highest summit of evangelical perfection, and some Dominicans argued that the Franciscan way of life was in some respects open to serious objection.[Note 31] John was not trained as a theologian but had become a reader of Thomas Aquinas; Thomas's objections to Franciscan ideas had some influence over him.
Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas both died in 1274. In 1279, after consulting the leaders of the Franciscan Order, Pope Nicholas III issued a document named by its opening words, "Exiit qui seminat". Its purpose was to defend the Franciscan Order against its critics (the secular masters and perhaps the Dominicans), especially against those who said that its Rule was "impossible to observe". It did this mainly by "clarifying" the Rule at certain points, in line with the clarifications already made by Gregory IX in Quo elongati (see above, p. 17). Among its main points were the following:
(1) Does the vow that the brothers take when they join the Order "to observe the holy Gospel" oblige them to put into practice all the counsels of perfection contained in Gospel? The answer is that this is a vow to observe the Gospel as Christ intended it, taking precepts (i.e. commandments) as precepts and counsels as counsels. Similarly in vowing to follow the Rule, they undertake to follow it as Francis intended it to be followed, taking notice of the difference between advice and precept. They are obliged to observe "only those Gospel counsels that are expressed in the Rule by way of precept or prohibition, or under equivalent words".
(2) According to Gregory IX, the Franciscans, both as individuals and as an Order, own nothing but have the use of things owned by others. Against the objection that to give someone the use of consumables is to give them ownership, Nicholas repeats (with a slight refinement) Bonaventure's answer (see above, p. 27). Since this objection was also made by John XXII, Ockham frequently quotes or refers to the relevant passages of Exiit and to a similar passage in the later constitution Exivi. See 32.56-163 and 32.246-265.
(3) Whereas the Rule forbids the brothers to "receive" money even through "an interposed person", Gregory IX provided in Quo elongati that a donor could give money through an agent -- such an agent is interposed in giving, not in receiving, being the agent of the donor, not of the Brothers. Bonaventure defended this arrangement: "It is perfectly absurd to assume that a rich man would not be free to make alms as he wished, either personally or by delegation"; Bonaventure, Defense, p. 248. In Exiit Nicholas provides in some detail that the brothers may themselves suggest the delegates and may suggest substitutes for the original agents.
(4) Nicholas exhorts the brothers to practice "moderate use": "There is granted to the brothers a moderate use of things necessary both to the sustenance of life and the performance of the duties of their state." The definition of "moderate" is left to the discretion of the Order's officials:
Let the Ministers and Custodians manage this with discretion according to the requirements of persons and places, since concerning such matters the quality of persons, the variety of times, the conditions of places, and some other circumstances may sometimes require provision to be made more, or less, or otherwise. Nevertheless, let them do those things in such a way that holy poverty always shines forth in them and in their actions. (Exiit qui seminat)
See complete translation of Exiit qui seminat
Even while Francis was alive there were disagreements within the Franciscan Order about the practice of poverty. Francis himself was uneasy about the compromises that were made with the original strict austerity, and those who collected stories about his doings and sayings were attempting to recall the Order to its original standards. Soon after he became Minister-General in 1257, Bonaventure issued a letter to the Order in which he himself criticised the brothers for not living up to the ideals of the Order:
When I ask why the splendour of our Order is somehow obscured, I think of the multiplicity of affairs through which money -- above all else hostile to the poverty of the Order -- is avidly sought, incautiously received and more incautiously handled. I think of the laziness of certain brothers... I think of the wanderings of very many who, burdening those among whom they pass for their bodily comfort, do not leave behind them examples for life, but rather a stumbling-block for souls. I think of the insistent begging, because of which every traveller shrinks from an encounter with the brothers, fearing to meet them as if they were bandits. I think of the sumptuous and curious construction of buildings... I think of the multiplication of familiarities which our Rule forbids... I think of the imprudence in appointment to offices... I think of a greedy invasion of burials and wills, not without great disturbance of the clergy and especially of parish priests. I think of the frequent and expensive change of places... I think of the greatness of expenditures... Although many are to be found who are not culpable in any of the above, nevertheless this curse involves all, unless those who do these things are resisted by those who do not.[Note 32]
After Bonaventure's death (1274) the opponents of laxity came to be seen as a party within the Order. They are usually referred to as zealots or Spirituals, while the majority of the Order are referred to as Conventuals. The zealots wore short, patched habits, refusing to wear habits of the style which Conventual superiors tried to impose; this peculiarity of dress symbolised a wider opposition to trends within the order. Many Spirituals (and many of the Conventuals also) were influenced by the ideas of Joachim of Fiore. Joachim (who died in 1202, just before the beginnings of the Franciscan Order) had tried to derive from the Bible, especially from the Apocalypse, a scheme of Church history past and future. According to this scheme, the Church was in the sixth subdivision of the second age, during which two orders of spiritual monks would arise -- the Franciscans and Dominicans took this as a reference to themselves -- who would spiritualise the Church, in the face of persecution from the "carnal" forces in the Church, including a pope who would be an anti-Christ. The zealots saw a realisation of Joachim's prediction in the persecutions they were subjected to -- bullied and harassed and in some cases thrown into prison where some died. In the south of France Spirituals within the Order and laypeople associated with them revered Peter John Olivi, who was correspondingly suspect to the authorities of the Order, who investigated his writings on several occasions. Olivi was an exponent of Joachism[Note 33] and also an opponent of laxity within the Order. He held that the Franciscans' vow bound them not only to non-ownership but also to "poor use". Although his account of poor use was very moderate,[Note 34] his doctrine implied that there was a standard of poverty from which the superiors of the Order could not give a dispensation, since something vowed is a matter of conscience, not subject to human jurisdiction. According to Olivi, not even the pope could give a dispensation from the vow of poverty.[Note 35]
Efforts by Pope Clement V to heal the dispute led to a new papal document, Exivi de Paradiso (1312). Clement repeats and re-affirms key points from Exiit qui seminat (Ockham refers to one of the passages in which he does so -- see 32.246-57) and goes on to deal with the various points in dispute between the two sections of the Order. Clement recites some of the complaints made by the Spirituals (for example, that "at times of harvest or vintage, by begging or buying from elsewhere, so copiously are grain and wine collected by the brothers and stored in cellars and granaries that they can pass their lives through the rest of the year without begging"), though he notes that the community, and especially the superiors of the Order, say that such abuses seldom happen and are punished when they do. The various points in controversy are decided in a spirit of compromise. For example, Clement points out that the Rule itself prescribes cheapness of clothing, but says that cheapness is relative to the custom and condition of the country, and he leaves it to the superiors of the Order to decide what constitutes cheapness. The brothers are not to have granaries or cellars, "except when it would be very credible from prior experience that they could not otherwise find the necessities of life", and this also is left to the judgment of superiors.
See complete translation of Exivi de Paradiso.
The conflicts between Spirituals and Conventuals[Note 36] do not figure in OND. These conflicts took place mainly in France and Italy, and it seems that the English province was not involved. Unlike many other Franciscans, Ockham shows no interest in Joachism. However, his actions against the Spirituals led John XXII into conflict with Michael of Cesena. In attempting to eradicate the Spiritual party John became critical of the doctrine of poverty set forth in Exiit -- that is, the doctrine that the Franciscans owned nothing but used things (including consumables) that remained the property of others. This doctrine was held not only by the Spirituals but by the whole Franciscan Order, and the purpose of OND is to defend it.
Pope Clement V and the then Minister General of the Franciscan Order both died in 1314. After a gap of two years Jacques Duèse was elected pope, taking the name John XXII, and Michael of Cesena was elected Minister General of the Order. John and Michael were both determined to impose obedience on the Spirituals and to put an end to the existence of a party within the Order. Even before the election of the new pope, Spirituals in the south of France had appealed against the Conventual party to the papacy, and there were disturbances among the Franciscans in Italy.
In 1317 the pope issued the bull Quorumdam exigit, in which he reaffirmed the decision of Clement V in Exivi that the style of the habit and the keeping of stores in granaries and cellars were at the discretion of the superiors of the Order, and called on members of the Order to obey their superiors. "Great is poverty, but chastity [integritas] is greater, and obedience greatest...For the first rules over things, the second over the flesh, and the third over the mind and soul" (an echo of Thomas Aquinas, Summa, 2-2, q. 186, a. 9). Michael summoned some of the Spirituals, read them the bull, and asked them whether they would obey the pope. Twenty-five refused and Michael handed them over to the Inquisition. On May 7 1318 four of them were burned in the marketplace at Marseilles.[Note 37]
Meanwhile the pope had initiated another inquiry into the writings of Peter John Olivi, as a result of which he came to believe that one of the doctrines fundamental to the whole of the Franciscan Order, namely that it was possible and meritorious to own nothing but use and consume things belonging to others, was an obstacle to the condemnation of heresies he believed had their source in Olivi's works. In 1321 a disagreement between a Dominican and a Franciscan arose in the work of the Inquisition at Narbonne over the proposition that Christ and the Apostles had nothing, individually or in common. The question was referred to the pope and a discussion was held at a consistory (i.e. a meeting of the pope with cardinals and other advisers). At the end of Exiit Nicholas III had prohibited glosses and disputations on his document. To open up the discussion of the doctrine of poverty, the pope issued Quia nonnunquam (March, 1322), which rescinded that prohibition.
Bonagratia of Bergamo, the Order's procurator (agent) at the papal court, issued an appeal against Quia nonnunquam, and at its chapter-general at Perugia the leaders of the Franciscan Order called for the reinstatement of the prohibition against disputation about Exiit. They also issued two encyclicals (circulars) in defence of Exiit, suggesting that since its doctrine had already been accepted by the whole church it could not now be changed. In reply to these objections the pope issued Ad conditorem canonum (December, 1322), in which he asserted his right to rescind decisions of his predecessors and rescinded another of the provisions of Exiit, namely that things given to the Franciscan Order would become the property of the papacy -- from now on the Franciscans would be the owners of these things, whether they liked it or not. Ad conditorem canonum also contained sharp criticisms of Franciscan ideas and practices: that despite their claim to perfect poverty, the Franciscans were as much concerned for material possessions as the Dominicans were, that it is impossible to have the use of consumables without having the ownership also, and that use without a right to use would be unjust and therefore incompatible with perfection. Bonagratia of Bergamo issued an appeal against Ad conditorem canonum also, as a result of which the pope issued another version of the document in which he modified some of its provisions and strengthened some of its arguments. Bonagratia's appeal contains many of the arguments presented in OND.[Note 38]
See complete translation of the second version of Ad conditorem canonum.
The proposition questioned by the Inquisition at Narbonne was that Christ and the Apostles "had nothing", and the Perugia chapter-general had claimed that Jesus and the Apostles had never had more than simple factual use of any thing. In Cum inter nonnullos (November, 1323) the pope condemned both of these propositions. Whether this bull contradicted Exiit has been disputed.[Note 39] Exiit did not actually say that Christ and the Apostles had only simple factual use and Cum inter does not actually say that Christ and the Apostles had legal ownership. However, Cum inter does attribute to them rights to sell, exchange, etc., which amount to or presuppose ownership. The attackers in OND argued that there was indeed a contradiction: see 85.23-72 and 123.325-394.
See complete translation of Cum inter nonnullos.
In connection with an originally separate dispute between Ludwig of Bavaria and the pope, Ludwig's chancery in May 1324 published what is known as the Sachsenhausen appeal,[Note 40] which contained an argument (apparently contributed by certain unknown Franciscans) to the effect that the pope had become a heretic by contradicting the doctrine defined by his predecessors that Christ and the Apostles had only simple factual use. In Quia quorundam (November, 1324) the pope replied, defending his power to change decisions of his predecessors and arguing that in any case his predecessors had not defined the doctrine that Christ and the Apostles had only simple factual use and had not said that the Franciscans could have only simple factual use.
See complete translation of Quia quorundam.
For several years after this there was an appearance of peace between the pope and Michael of Cesena, but in April 1328 they quarrelled openly, and on May 26, 1328 Michael, accompanied by several Franciscans including William of Ockham, fled from the papal court at Avignon and joined Ludwig of Bavaria, at that time in Italy. From Pisa Michael issued a long and a short "Appeal" (September and December, 1328), which Ockham and others also signed, which criticised three of the documents mentioned above, namely Ad conditorem, Cum inter nonnullos and Quia quorundam. The Pisan appeals are the appeals referred to in OND.[Note 41] In reply to Michael, Pope John issued Quia vir reprobus (November, 1329), on which OND is a critical commentary. Another of the Michaelist group, Francis of Ascoli, wrote against Quia vir in 1330; Ockham wrote OND in great haste (in ninety days) some time in 1332, 1333 or 1334, drawing on the earlier works of other members of his group, writing perhaps with their active help.
See complete translation of Quia vir reprobus.
OND and the many writings Ockham and the other Michaelists continued to publish against John XXII had no effect. John was never deposed and the Catholic Church today still counts him as one of the successors of St Peter. On the other hand, John's decretals on Franciscan poverty seem to have had little effect on the thinking of the Franciscan Order -- even those who submitted to John's authority found ways of salvaging the traditional theory of Franciscan poverty.[Note 42] The Spiritual party was destroyed or dispersed, but in the next century a "reformed" branch arose within the Franciscan Order, the "Observants", who practiced a more austere life than the Conventuals, from whom they were eventually separated so as to form two distinct Franciscan Orders. Saintly members of the Observant branch were distinguished by their zeal as inquisitors against their own spiritual kindred, the heretical remnants of the earlier Spiritual party.[Note 43]
OND is a commentary on Quia vir like Thomas Aquinas's commentaries on various works of Aristotle. Ockham repeats the whole of John's text, divides and sub-divides each section to show the structure of John's argument, and then comments on each part of the text. (For an example of the divisions and sub-divisions see 2.38-61; in the course of OND Ockham provides an analysis of the whole of John's text.) Ockham occasionally criticises John for omitting or truncating passages from Michael's appeals (see 80.13-); in contrast, the repetition in OND of the whole text of Quia vir gives the reader some assurance that nothing in it will be evaded.
By means of anticipations and cross-references Ockham makes sure that the structure of OND itself will not be too much determined by the rather rambling structure of Quia vir. In Chapter 2 he clarifies the meaning of some of the main terms he will need to use in the course of the work, so that he can refer to them briefly later. These include various terms related to use ("use", "use of fact", "use of right", "right of using", "simple user", "consumable by use" -- "simple use of fact" is explained later, at 6.269-71 and 32.305-323), "lordship" (dominium), "ownership" (proprietas), the possessive pronouns "mine", "his", etc., and the verb "to have". Other key terms discussed in other parts of the work include "right" (ius), "justice", and "permission" (licentia). In the 1350s, on the occasion of renewed controversy between mendicants and seculars, Richard FitzRalph's On the Saviour's Poverty included interesting analyses of some of these concepts, and John Wyclif's treatises on dominium are in the same tradition.
Quia vir reprobus is John's answer to Michael's appeal against three constitutions, namely Ad conditorem, Cum inter and Quia quorundam. Let us survey the content of OND as it relates to these three constitutions.[Note 44]
The most important question arising out of the first of these documents is whether someone can use something consumed by use that is owned by someone else. (John had repeated the point made by Gerard of Abbeville, Thomas Aquinas and many other people, following the Roman law, that to give a consumable for consumption, e.g. by mutuum, is to give ownership -- see above, p. 25.) Ockham dissolves the confusion resulting from misapplication of the legal doctrine that no one can be granted "use" or "usufruct" in a consumable by pointing out that "use" in the sense of "consume" is not the "use" which the law texts say cannot be granted of consumables (see 2.99-154, 37.26-124). He points out that there are many examples of lawful consumption of things owned by someone else (see 4.255-286).
But how can it be just to consume without ownership or other legal right? The answer is that the owner's permission can make it just. But John has put the following dilemma: Does someone who has a permission to use, use justly, or unjustly, or neither? -- not neither, because every human act must be either just or unjust, and if justly, then the user must have a right. Ockham's solution is that they do have a right, but not a legal right. It is true that every human act must be just or unjust -- in a certain sense of the word "just", but not in a sense in which "just" implies "with a legal right". For an act to be just in the relevant sense (equivalent to morally right), it is enough if the user has a moral right to perform it. (On the senses of "just" see 62.140-150, and on legal and moral rights see 65.34-89 -- as the note to that passage explains, I take it that "natural rights" are what we may call "moral rights".) The Franciscans have renounced legal rights but not the natural or moral right to use things, which no one can renounce. Normally the natural right is "tied" by the owner's legal right, but it can be untied by the owner's permission. Permission makes consumption morally just by untying a natural right. This is the argument of Chapter 65.
Ockham's conception of a legal right is borrowed from the lawyers.[Note 45] His most general conception of a right is of what we would call a claim-right: a right is something a person should not be deprived of without fault on his part or good reason in terms of the common good, and, if he is deprived in any other way, he can seek redress in a human court (see 3.395-400, 61.55-69). He does not define right generally as a licit power -- not all but only some kinds of rights are licit powers, for example the right of using (see 61.46-50). Ownership is a particular legal right that implies the exclusion of others from use or control of the thing except with the owner's consent (see 26.31-41, 27.52-70). Another term used in some contexts for ownership is "lordship" or "civil lordship" ("lordship" has other meanings besides the one in which it is equivalent to ownership -- see 2.262). According to Ockham (and it was the general opinion of theologians before John XXII), although Adam and Eve had lordship (dominium) in some senses of the word, originally there was no ownership (proprietas) -- by nature every human being originally had a right to use any thing (see 27.80-3). But after mankind fell into sin, the institution of property was for good reasons established by "pact", i.e. by human custom and law. There is a moral duty to observe such pacts (65.46-69), so the original natural right to use anything is now "tied" and cannot rightly issue into act, except in situations of extreme necessity (i.e. when there is imminent danger of death). Permission to use a thing is not needed in a situation of extreme necessity, since the "pact" establishing property never applied to such a situation (see 65.204-6 -- though at 3.409-10 Ockham refers to a "permission of natural law"). But even outside any situation of extreme necessity, the natural right to use a thing can be untied by the owner's permission (see 65.197-251). There are various kinds of permissions. Some establish a legal right even against the person who gives the permission, some (e.g. privileges) establish a legal right against others but not against the giver, some establish no legally enforceable right at all. (On the various kinds of permissions see 3.395-416, 61.89-94, 64.18-25, 65.69-75.) Permission of the last kind is enough to "untie" the natural right to use, and that is the kind of permission the Franciscans have from the owners of the things they use: they have no legally enforceable rights but can use someone else's thing by the untied natural right.
According to Ockham's account ownership exists by human law, and the extent of the legal rights of owners therefore depends on what precisely the law provides. "Civil" or "worldly" lordship (i.e. ownership) has two senses, one broad or loose, the other strict -- or rather, there is a strict sense and other broader senses. ("Strict" and "broad" may be confusing, since it is civil lordship in the strict sense that implies the broadest powers.) In the strict sense (civil lordship "full", "free" and "absolute"), it means the right to claim and defend possession of the thing in a court of law and to use it in any morally legitimate way (see 2.389-397). In fact, Ockham says, the law seldom allows an owner such broad powers of use -- perhaps it would be reasonable if the law never allowed use restricted only by morality (see 2.408-11). In the broad sense in which the clergy have civil lordship over Church property the owner's rights of use are very much narrower. Church property is owned fundamentally by the whole Christian community, and by the clergy as the heads of the community (see 2.338-88). But neither the community nor the clergy can use Church property except for specified purposes -- Church property should be used only to provide churches and things used in worship, to support the clergy (even if they have private means), and to support the laity if their own means fail. See 2.423-432, 4.342-384, 4.545-74, 76.473-499, 77.407-438. Ockham seems to think that this kind of limited ownership was an invention of the early Christian community (see 11.456-474).
Concerning the second of the three constitutions (in which John had condemned the doctrine that Christ and the apostles had had no property) Ockham argues against John's extreme claim that Christ was a temporal king and owner of all property (see Chapter 93). Ockham argues at length that Christ was not a temporal king at all and had no ownership or other legal rights. He argues also that the Apostles, once they were appointed to the Apostolate (see 98.284-95), renounced all ownership and other legal rights. The discussion of Cum inter touches on many of the topics surveyed earlier in this introduction -- see the sections above on "Ownership and poverty among the early Christians" and "Counsels of perfection, states of perfection, being perfect".
In relation to the third document (in which John defended his power to change decisions of his predecessors) there is a complex disagreement about "the keys of knowledge and power" in the Church. Jesus had given Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven, symbolising his authority in the Church. Some said -- noting that Peter was given "keys", plural -- that one key was power and the other was knowledge. The critics John replied to in Quia quorundam (i.e. the authors of part of the Sachsenhausen appeal -- see above, p. 38) had said that no pope could change decisions made by his predecessors "by the key of knowledge", though he could change decisions made by the key of power. Against this John argued that no authoritative decision is made by the key of knowledge alone, but only by the key of power guided by knowledge. Michael pointed out that John's language suggests that he does not regard knowledge as a key of the Church at all (see 120.1-14); in his reply John confirms this interpretation by arguing that knowledge is not a key of the Church (see 121.1-40). Ockham distances himself from any dispute about what counts as a key (see 123.138-). Whatever the keys are, he maintains, both knowledge and power are involved in every authoritative papal decision. Such decisions are irrevocable if they are about what is to be believed about matters of faith and morals, revocable if they are about what is to be done in matters morally indifferent in their kind (see 123.185-189). Ockham argues that John did claim the power to revoke his predecessors' definitions in matters of faith and morals (123.32-57), that his predecessors had authoritatively taught that Christ and the Apostles had no property, that this is a matter of faith and morals, and that John had revoked this teaching and fallen into heresy (123.222). In the last chapter of the book Ockham argues that John himself is a heretic. Although it is possible for someone to hold a heresy without being a heretic, namely if he holds it without being "pertinacious" (124.16-40), there are many indications that John is pertinacious and therefore a heretic (124.146-302).
Ockham was a highly intelligent man and practiced in logic, yet according to a number of modern scholars his argument was a failure. Richard Tuck, for example, endorses Gordon Leff's remark that "Ockham was fighting on the pope's ground; and although he contested every position he was still accepting the pope's doctrine and the pope's arguments as the basis for his own replies".[Note 46] Tuck goes on to describe Ockham's claim that there is a ius to use that is not dominium as "desperate and unconvincing".[Note 47] According to Annabel Brett, "Ockham in the end has no clear reply to the pope, for he has failed to isolate a potestas licita which would be a power to perform acts which are licit in the sense of consistent with right reason, but not strictly just".[Note 48] [Postscript 2007: Annabel Brett's discussion of OND]
With the complete work now available in English, readers can more easily make their own judgment of the effectiveness of Ockham's argument. It seems to me that the confusions were on John XXII's side. Far from fighting on the pope's ground and accepting the pope's arguments as the basis of his own (as Leff suggests), Ockham exposes John's confusions and rejects the basic assumptions of his argument. John's basic mistake is to narrow the use of such terms as "use", "right" and "just" to the meanings they had for lawyers. Ockham effectively destroys John's arguments by pointing out that this narrowing is arbitrary. He shows clearly that there can be a natural (as we would say a "moral"[Note 49]) right to use something that is legally the property of another person even when the use consists in consumption. There is indeed a sense of ius, namely the natural right to use, that is not dominium in the relevant sense, i.e. property: whether it is dominium in another sense is another question, irrelevant to the evaluation of OND. This ius is a potestas licita and its exercise is just, not in the sense of the exercise of a legal right but in the sense of the exercise of a moral right.
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Note 1. That is, chapter 49, lines 57-60, etc. in the Latin text. Passages referred to in this way can be found in the English translation by looking to the numbers at the end of each paragraph, which indicate the corresponding point in the Latin text.
Note 2. For the Bible translation used see the Bibliography. The Bibliography will give publishing details for all works referred to in these notes.
Note 3. For a translation of the Rule of St Benedict, see The Rule of St Benedict, tr. Justin McCann (London, 1952).
Note 4. For a translation of the Rule of St. Augustine see http://www.geocities.com/Athens/1534/ ruleaug.html.
Note 5. For a translation of the Franciscan Rule see Habig.
Note 6. For more on the Orders of monks, canons and mendicants see Lawrence (for title and publishing details see Bibliography).On the early history of the Dominicans, see Hinnebusch. On the early history of the Franciscans, see Moorman.
Note 7. "Testament", in Habig, p. 68
Note 9. "Rule of 1221", in Habig, p. 38.
Note 12. Hinnebusch, vol. 1, p. 146.
Note 14. For a translation of a letter issued by the seculars to put their side of the dispute, see Thorndike, pp. 56-64.
Note 15. For an analysis of the debate, especially in relation to "ecclesiology" (i.e. the theory of the structure or constitution of the Church), see Congar; there is a chronological summary on pp. 44-52. For Bonaventure's view of the power of the pope, see Tierney, Infallibility, pp. 82-93.
Note 16. On the debate over the concept of the state of perfection see Schleyer.
Note 17. For an account of Bonaventure's Defense see Leff, vol. 1, pp. 84-97.
Note 19. Compare this with the last sentence in the quotation from Gerard above: "Otherwise the lordship of those things would be altogether fruitless".
Note 20. Justinian, Institutes, II.4, pp. 87-88; translation modified, emphasis added.
Note 21. Justinian, Digest, 7.5.2.1, p. 239; emphasis added.
Note 23. Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 188, a. 7, c. and ad 1.
Note 25. On this "condescension" see Bonaventure, Defense, pp. 10-17.
Note 26. Marsilius of Padua also rejected Bonaventure's suggestion that Christ had property in the purse out of condescension; see Defensor Pacis, II.xiii.37, p. 213.
Note 27. Summa, 2-2, q. 186, a. 9, ad 1.
Note 29. Summa, 2-2, 185, a. 6, ad 2
Note 30. Ibid., q. 78, a. 1.
Note 31. See Burr, pp. 148-155.
Note 32. Bonaventure, Opera, vol. viii, pp. 471-2.
Note 33. See Burr, pp. 172-183
Note 36. For studies of this part of Franciscan history see Douie, Lambert, Leff, pp. 51-166, and Burr.
Note 38. For an analysis see Douie, pp. 157-160. For the Latin text see Bonagratia in the bibliography.
Note 39. See Lambert, Franciscan Poverty, pp. 235-9, Miethke, pp. 392-8.
Note 40. At about this time Marsilius of Padua also criticised John's views on poverty; see his Defensor Pacis, II.xii-xiv, p. 187 ff, which traverses many of the same issues as OND. After distinguishing between counsels and commands and between various senses of the key words (lordship, property, right, etc.) in a way similar to Ockham's, he argues that the owner's consent is enough to make it lawful to consume another's property (II.xiii.8, p. 200), that voluntary poverty is a distinct virtue not identical with charity (II.xiii.18, p. 203), that the highest degree of poverty is to vow to own nothing either individually or in common and to have only what is enough for the current day (II.xiii.22, p. 204), that this is the highest state of perfection in which impediments to virtue are most of all removed (II.xiii.23-27, pp. 205-8, and that Christ and the apostles lived in such poverty (II.xiii.33, p. 210). (In II.xiii.34 Gewirth's translation says that Christ "had private property"; the Latin is habuisse in proprio, which means "had individually", without any necessary implication of dominium). In all of this Marsilius was usuing many of the usual mendicant arguments (some drawn perhaps from Thomas Aquinas, but others from Franciscan sources) to defend the Franciscan doctrine against John XXII. He has an original way of dealing with the Bible texts that say that Christ had a purse etc., which Bonaventure (following Augustine) had interpreted as acts of condescension; according to Marsilius perfect poverty does not exclude keeping what you have but do not at present need with the intention of giving it to anyone who is needier (II.xiii.28, p. 208). He makes a number of other apparently original points. He argues that it makes sense for an owner who hands over a consumable to a poor religious to retain ownership until the thing is actually consumed to prevent its being stolen by someone else (II.xiv.20, pp. 227-30; cf. OND 12.108-10). He argues that it is not incompatible with poverty to draw daily sustenance from an enduring endowment one does not own or entirely control (II.xiv.9, p. 220). Marsilius does not (as Thomas Aquinas did, above, p. 21) attribute a state of perfection to bishops as such; if they wish to be in a state of perfection, as they should, they must practise voluntary poverty, which is of course incompatible with rulership; see II.xi, pp. 181-186. Whereas according to the Franciscans ownership of the things the Franciscans used was vested either in the donors or in the pope, according to Marsilius it was vested either in the donors or in the legislator (II.xiv.8, p. 219). (According to Ockham it belongs primarily to the community of believers, normally represented by the clergy, OND 2.338-88.)
Note 41. On these and other documents issued by Michael see Dolcini, pp. 11-13.
Note 42. See for example Douie, p. 205, Lambert, "Franciscan Crisis", pp. 139-40. Later Dominican and Jesuit writers also discounted John's arguments -- -see "The Origin of Property", n. 54 and following.
Note 44. Either before reading OND or afterwards it would be a good idea to read Quia vir reprobus without Ockham's commentary (John should be allowed to speak for himself without constant adverse comment from Ockham!), and also the other papal documents referred to in this introduction. Quia vir and the other documents are available in translation at
Note 45. See Tierney, Natural Rights.
Note 46. Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages (Manchester, 1967), vol. 1, p. 250, quoted Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge, 1979), p. 23.
Note 49. See OND, notes 61, 62. See also note 56, which discusses a possible inconsistency relating to this point.
Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, ed. J. Martin (Brepols, 1972).
The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version. . . An Ecumenical Edition (Collins, 1973).
Bonagratia of Bergamo: Oliger, L., "Frater Bonagratia de Bergamo et eius tractatus de Christi et Apostolorum paupertate", in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 22 (1929), pp. 292-335, 487-511.
Bonaventure, Defense of the Mendicants, translated José de Vinck (Paterson, 1966).
Bonaventure, Opera omnia, vol. viii, Ad Claras Aquas, 1898.
Brett, Annabel, Liberty, Right and Nature: Individual rights in later scholastic thought (Cambridge, 1997).
Brooke, R.B., The Writings of Leo, Rufino and Angelo, Companions of St. Francis (Oxford, 1970).
Buckland, W.W., A Textbook of Roman Law revised by Peter Stein (Cambridge, 1975).
Burr, David, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the "Usus Pauper" Controversy (Philadelphia, 1989).
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