Political Obligation

John Kilcullen
Macquarie University
Copyright (c) 2000, R.J. Kilcullen.


The idea of "political obligation" is that there is (at least under certain circumstances) a moral obligation to obey the government and its law even if, apart from this obligation, there would be no moral obligation to do so.

It is supposed to be a moral obligation, not simply a legal obligation or a matter of expediency. If we disobey we should feel guilty, we should feel that we have done something ethically wrong.

Political obligation makes certain action (or inaction) obligatory even when apart from this obligation it would not be. Murder is against the law, but even if it were not illegal or we recognised no obligation to obey the law, we would still (presumably) recognise a moral obligation not to commit murder. But we do not regard it as morally wrong to stand our car in a 'no standing' zone unless we acknowledge a moral obligation to obey the law precisely because it is the law. The claim is that there is a moral obligation to obey the law just because it is the law, apart from its content.

The idea  that there is such an obligation goes back a long way. In Plato's Crito Socrates is presented as acknowledging an obligation not to run away from Athens even though he is to be put to death unjustly; he explains that one's country is "either to be persuaded, or if not persuaded, to be obeyed" (Crito 51). The most influential ancient source, however, is Paul's Letter to the Romans, chapter 13: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation... Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake". Theologians (some theologians) interpreted this to mean that "for conscience sake" we must obey the powers that be, even if they are unjust, as long as what they command is not contrary to what God commands (Paul's text is limited by another: "We ought to obey God rather than men", Acts, 5:29).

Some modern political thinkers have secularised and democratised this doctrine. They say that we ought (not just legally but morally ought) to obey a decision that has been arrived at by majority vote even if we were not persuaded by the arguments for it and voted against it. The usual argument is that by living is a country and taking part in its political process we have "tacitly" undertaken to obey whatever is decided, at least if the process is democratic. The most influential source of this idea of tacit consent is probably John Locke:  "Every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government" (Second Treatise, sec. 119). 

Some writers argue that anyone who votes in an election thereby tacitly commits him/herself to obeying the government elected, however much they may have opposed its policy---by voting against Hitler in the 1933 election, a voter would have acquired a political obligation to obey Hitler's government. (Hitler did not get a majority in that election, but the coalition government he formed was the legal outcome of the election process).  Some who adopt this position say that the obligation to obey if you have voted is a "prima facie" obligation, which may be overriden by some other obligation. 

Against all this, I think we ought to reject the doctrine of "political obligation" altogether. In an organisation, such as a democratic state, in which the constitution gives the majority the power to determine the organisation's policy and actions, then the minority has to admit that when the officials implement the policy decided by the majority they are acting in a properly authorised way and are not misusing the organisation's name, power and resources; i.e. they are obliged to admit that the majority and its agents are acting legally. But this is as far as their "obligation" extends. The minority are not obliged to admit that the policy is right, and they are not morally obliged to conform to it or help carry it out themselves. They are fully entitled to act on their own belief. They may choose to obey if there are penalties for disobedience, but if they choose to risk the penalties there is no reason why their conscience should reproach them.

The obligation of officials goes further than the obligation of private citizens or members, but not much further. Officials who disagree so seriously with the majority policy that they are not willing to carry it out should resign, or at least make it clear that they will not carry it out (the majority may then remove them from office, or they may think that their services are worth more than the implementation of the policy). For example, a military officer or soldier should refuse an order that goes against his or her conscience, even if it has been produced through the proper lawful process. ("Conscience" is the term we use for a serious ethical judgment; it means a judgment arrived at through ordinary thinking processes-- it does not imply any special faculty of moral judgment or any religious doctrine.) Refusal of orders by conscientious officials is an important safeguard against abuse of government power.  

In my view, then, commitment to democracy does not mean accepting a moral obligation personally to carry out the will of the majority. It means supporting the legal (or quasi-legal) rule that the organisation's official policies should be decided by majority vote.

That policies should be decided this way is not, in my view, a self-evident axiom. Everyone seems to think that in some organisations some decisions should be made in some other way. Even when the majority rule is accepted, there are different ways of implementing it, and weight is sometimes given to other considerations besides mere numbers (e.g. to geographical dispersion). "Democracy" is a generic term. Exactly what constitutional arrangements you or I should commit ourselves to supporting is a question that each of us should decide in view of the circumstances by considering which arrangement is, in our individual judgments, most likely normally to produce the right decisions (i.e. decisions that conform to the value system we individually subscribe to, which is of course modifiable through discussion with others). A commitment to supporting that arrangement in general is not a commitment to accepting each decision it produces.

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