Copyright © 1996 R.J. Kilcullen
This week we read from John Locke, whose more liberal view of politics contrasts with Hobbes's authoritarianism. It contrasts also with the doctrine preached at the time by the Church of England, that it is the subject's duty under all circumstances not to resist the powers that be, however tyrannical they may be. According to Locke it may be justifiable to rebel against a tyrannical government. The purpose of government is not merely to maintain order, but to protect property in a broad sense of the term.
Reader, Thou hast here the Beginning and End of a Discourse concerning Government; what Fate has otherwise disposed of the Papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, 'tis not worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the Throne of our Great Restorer, Our present King William; to make good his Title, in the Consent of the People, which being the only one of all lawful Governments, he has more fully and clearly than any Prince in Christendom; And to justify to the World, the People of England, whose love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine.Locke does not in fact argue, but assumes, that the only title to lawful government is the consent of the people. This was a medieval idea which Locke took over (cf. Marsilius, I.ix.5, p. 31). The argument of the book is designed to show that not even apparent consent to absolute government can oblige a people to submit to tyranny.
Read John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, ch. 20, section 22 ff (tr. John T. McNeill, Philadelphia, 1960, vol. 2, p. 1509 ff).
Notice section 25 - there is a duty of obedience to 'all who, by whatever means, have got control of affairs, even though they perform not a whit of the prince's office' (ibid., p. 1512).
But notice the reference to ephors and tribunes, section 31.
The 'Exhortation concerning... obedience' from Certain Sermons or Homilies, Queen Elizabeth's official sermon book for the Church of England, is also worth reading in the library (BX5133.A1.C4). These sermons were to be read on Sundays by clergy who did not have the Bishop's licence to preach.
The duty to obey 'the powers that be' was limited by the duty 'to obey rather God than man' (Acts 5:29 - cf. Plato, Apology, 29d). In 'matters indifferent' (i.e., things neither commanded nor forbidden by God in the bible) a Christian must obey the ruler 'actively', by actually doing what he commands. But if the ruler forbids something God has commanded, or commands something God has forbidden, then the Christian must obey God actively and the ruler 'passively' - that is, by undergoing punishment without resistance. ('Passive' comes from the Latin word for 'suffer' or 'undergo'.) It was permissible to avoid punishment by running away, but not by fighting. This is the doctrine of 'passive obedience':
NOTE that passive obedience does not mean absolute obedience, but disobedience without resistance to punishment. The doctrine was also called the doctrine of non-resistance.
During the 16th century a bitter civil war was fought in France between Calvinists (Huguenots) and Catholics, in the course of which many French Calvinists abandoned Calvin's doctrine of non-resistance and adopted the doctrine common among Catholics, that in some situations resistance or rebellion might be justified. During the seventeenth century most French Protestants again accepted the doctrine of non-resistance; the English puritans who cut off King Charles's head obviously did not accept it. It was abandoned again by some French Protestants in the 1670s, when the government of King Louis XIV began to persecute them. Their ideas were much like Locke's, and were derived from earlier Catholic writers (See Dodge, The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion (not in Macquarie library) and Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought (JA81.554), vol. 2, pp. 16-19, 303 ff.. Compare Ockham: regulariter the emperor has a right to rule, casualiter he may be deposed. Compare also Thomas Aquinas: "If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power"; On Kingship, p. 27, in vol. 3, Supplementary Readings, p. 93.)
Compare II.2 with the first chapter of Aristotle's Politics. Like Aristotle, Locke is careful to distinguish the power of a magistrate (or a king, in the terminology Aristotle uses) from the power of a father. Filmer had confused them, according to Locke.
II.4 'As they think fit': Compare Hobbes's 'right of nature' (p. 189). Is there a difference? The law of nature also holds, at least in certain ways, in Hobbes's state of nature. It remains to be seen whether Locke's law of nature and Hobbes's have the same requirements.
'A state... of equality': In respect of the right to rule (jurisdiction), not in all respects. At II.54 he says:
"Though I have said above, Chap. II, That all men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the common level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality which all men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality I there spoke of... being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man". Cf II.95.
II.5 'The judicious Hooker': an Anglican writer of the 16th century, who wrote Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, against the Puritans. Locke quotes him because Tory readers will regard him as an authority.
II.6 'Not liberty to destroy himself': Christians believed that suicide is morally wrong, that there is not only a right but a duty of self-preservation. Locke bases his argument against political absolutism on this duty. [Cf. Marsilius, II.xiii.5, p. 198].
'Nobler use than its bare preservation': Locke supposes that creatures are ranked, with man above inferior creatures. To feed a man is a nobler use than the mere preservation of a plant or animal, so men can eat plants and animals. But man 'has not liberty to destroy... any creature' for no good reason, wantonly.
'For men being all the workmanship': Contrast Hobbes, 'Kingdome over men... belonged Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator... but as Omnipotent' (p. 397, Readings, p. 282).
'As if we were made for one another's uses': human beings are all of the same rank (see II.4). This rules out Aristotle's 'natural slavery', which supposes that some are marked out by nature to serve others.
'Not to quit his station': Compare Plato's argument against suicide, Phaedo, 61e-62e.
'When his own preservation comes not into competition': What is his duty when it does? Would Locke agree with Hobbes that in such a case he may kill another, since 'this is no more than his own conservation requireth' (p. 184)?
II.7 'Preservation of all mankind': Not merely preservation of oneself.
'Execution': enforcement, not necessarily by inflicting death ('execution' has narrowed in meaning). In the State of Nature each tries not only to preserve himself but also to preserve others, and for that reason tries to deter wrong-doing even when it might not threaten himself.
II.8 'Reparation and restraint': Not retributive punishment or vengeance. [Compare Hobbes, seventh law, p. 210.]. (In the seventeenth century 'retribution' and 'revenge' did not have the narrow meaning they have now.)
'Whole species': Again, the individual is not concerned merely with self-preservation.
II.9 'Punish an alien': Cf. Hobbes, p. 354 (Readings, p. 279.
II.10 There are two natural rights, of punishment and of taking reparation.
II.13 'Absolute monarchs': here for the first time Locke begins to point the anti-absolutist moral for contemporary English politics.
II.14 'In reference to one another': A citizen of Switzerland, not in the state of nature in reference to other Swiss, is in the state of nature in reference to citizens of other countries, and to those who belong to no civil society; the latter are in the state of nature in reference to every other human being.
II.16 'The fundamental law of nature': Not preservation of self, but preservation of all mankind (cf. II.7, 8).
According to Roman and Canon lawyers it belongs to the law of nature to resist violence: 'As we resist violence and injury. For, indeed, it happens under this law that whatever anyone does for the protection of his body is considered to have been done legally'; Florentinus, in Digest, 1.1.1.3 (Readings, p. 156, bottom of LH, top of RH).'... the repelling of force with force'; Isidore, in Gratian's Decretum, d. 1, c. 7 (Readings, p. 158).Locke regards resistance to violence as an implication of the duty to preserve mankind. It is the basis of his argument for a right to rebel against tyrannical government.
I.17 'Absolute power': Again, the argument is directed against absolute monarchy.
'Design upon his life': Cf. Hobbes, p. 192 (Readings, p. 268, LH, two thirds down: 'a man cannot tell...').
II.19 'Some men': Hobbes?
'Living... without a common superior': Locke's definition of the state of nature.
'Force... upon the person... where there is no common superior': Locke's definition of the state of war. This state may exist in civil society; it may exist briefly between two individuals (traveller and highway man).
II.20 'In society': it is permissible to drive off the aggressor, but not to pursue with the intention of punishing or taking reparation.
'Until the aggressor offers peace': Compare the emphasis earlier on the limits to the right to punish (see II.8, 12, Readings, pp. 291, 292).
'Nay...': a reference to contemporary English politics.
II.21 'Appeal to heaven': this means simply to fight, without any suggestion that God guarantees that right will triumph.
'Who shall be judge?': Each person must judge whether the civil administration of justice has become a cover for violence and injury.
II.22 Note the contrast between 'natural liberty' and 'liberty... in society'.
II.25 'In common': the usual medieval doctrine, that originally there was no property. See Ockham, Short Discourse, iii.7 (in Readings, p. 203); also Gratian, Decretum, d. 1, c. 7, where it is said that natural law includes 'the common possession of all things' (Readings, p. 158).
'A supposition': Filmer's. Cf. II.1.
'Without... compact': Note this part of Locke's intention. He doesn't agree with the common medieval doctrine, of Thomas Aquinas and Ockham for example, that property rests on human law or convention. John XXII claimed that property exists by divine positive law, Locke wants to show that it exists by natural law.
II.26 'Appropriate them some way or other': But in what way? Is it necessary to appropriate the fruit etc. in any other way than by actually eating it, in order to be nourished by it? Need a non-consumable be appropriated otherwise than by using it? What Locke wants to justify is a permanent property right.
II.27 is the essence of Locke's theory.
II.28. Note that labour may be no more onerous than picking up off the ground. Locke is not arguing that effort deserves a reward.
'Consent' Cf. last sentence of II.25.
'Servant': the servant's labour becomes the master's by virtue of the contract between master and servant, which makes what would otherwise have been the servant's property the master's.
II.30 'Positive laws... this original Law of Nature': Something not already anyone's property becomes my property when I mix my labour with it by virtue of the Law of Nature. Positive, man-made laws 'determine', i.e., set precise boundaries to, this natural property right, e.g. by saying what is to count as an act transferring property to someone else. Property exists not by positive law but by natural law, although positive laws can be made regulating use and transfer of property.
'Fish any one catches' etc: the examples allude to the Roman law doctrine of occupatio. According to Justinian's Institutes, 2.1.11-12, by natural law or the law of nations (here synonymous) 'all creatures that exist on the earth, in the sea, or in the air, as soon as they are taken by anyone immediately become his'.
II.31. This sets a limit upon the amount of property anyone may have. Some call this the 'spoilage proviso' - appropriation is legitimate, provided nothing spoils. 'To spoil or destroy': cf. II.6.
So far Locke has been speaking of property in things consumed by use. Now he speaks of property in land:
Read II.32-39
II.32 'Use the Product of': the limit on the amount of land one person may appropriate is based on the limit laid down in II. 31. Property in land is based on the mixing of labour; cf. II.27.
II.33 'Enough and as good': cf. end of II.27. Is this another limit on appropriation, in addition to, or instead of, that laid down in II.31? Some call this 'the Lockean proviso', as if it were Locke's only principle limiting appropriation.
If what is left is enough for others, and just as good as what has been taken, does it matter if more has been taken than can be used before it spoils? Won't it spoil anyway, even if no-one takes it? If I have taken more than I actually need, and what is left is not enough for others, have I not taken too much, even if I can use it all before it spoils? See Waldron, 'Enough and as Good Left for Others', in vol. to3, Supplementary Readings, p. 180.
II.35 'Money and commerce': Locke will shortly explain that the invention of money makes land scarce, by making it possible to 'use' an unlimited amount of the produce of land.
II.35 'Common by compact': Locke is thinking of the town common, which is not land that anyone can appropriate, but the common property of all the residents of the town, common by virtue of law or custom. (Some C17th century writers distinguished between "negative" and "positive" community: something is common negatively if it is simply not appropriated; it is common positively if appropriation is positively excluded by some law. The town common in this language is common positively.)
II.36 'Rule of Propriety': Notice that the rule is not that 'enough and as good' should be left, but that property should be limited to what can be used. His argument in II.36-7 is that if it were not for the institution of money (to which all have consented, so they cannot complain) appropriation of land would not harm anyone else, but rather benefit them. He assumes that appropriated land is more productive.
II.38 'Without any fixed property... settled the Properties': Some take this to mean that property in land does not exist except by human positive compact or law. This is not likely to be Locke's meaning. Perhaps he thinks that by natural law any unappropriated land with which anyone mixes his labour becomes his while he is still using it, but that human positive law makes various additional rules (cf. Thomas Aquinas, S.T., 1-2, q. 95, a. 2, Readings, p. 184: Human law derives from natural law either by logical implication or by "determination" -- e.g. human law says "drive on the left" to enforce our obligation not to endanger human lives). So the law of nations might add the rule that non-citizens cannot come in and take over unappropriated land within the territory of a state, and civil law might add the rule that once a person has appropriated land by use it remains that person's property even when he is not using it, and might perhaps allow appropriation of land otherwise than by use (so that land that has never been cultivated could be someone's property). But it is not clear exactly what Locke means by 'settling' properties.
Read II.40-45.
These paragraphs reinforce the argument of II.36-7, which assumed that appropriated land is more productive. These paragraphs seem to be the origin of 'the labour theory of value' found in Adam Smith and many 19th century economists - i.e. that the value of a thing in a certain market is proportional to the amount of human labour required to bring it into that market, so that prices reflect the labour cost of production. (Though Locke does not seem to think that labour is the only source of value - cf. 'natural, intrinsic Value' and 'scarce, and so of some value'.)
II.45, 'Settled the bounds': See comment on II.38 above.
Review references so far to money: end of II.36, beginning of 37, 45.
Read II.46-51.
This is Locke's explanation of how the invention and acceptance of money gave men a moral right to enlarge their possessions indefinitely, so that land became scarce.
Note that 'use' includes giving away and bartering.
The essential point about money is its durability. The invention of fruit canning would have had the same effect.
Note that Locke regards the 'spoilage' proviso as setting the limit, not the 'enough and as good' idea that some call the Lockean proviso.
Locke seems to think that money acquires value by agreement. Later economists argued that it gets its value in the same way as anything else does, by human labour (gold mining, refining etc.) and/or scarcity relative to demand. (They were thinking of gold and silver; paper currency has value by law.) Perhaps the 'agreement' is the willingness to accept money in exchange for useful things, in reliance on others' continuing to be willing to do the same - i.e. on their being willing to accept the money I accept now for this useful thing in exchange later for some other useful thing that I want then (II.47).
II.50 'Out of the bounds of society': Locke assumes that the use of money may predate the establishment of government. Appropriation by mixing labour is earlier still, being found in the state of nature, by natural law: as soon as anyone picked an apple from a tree, or scooped up a handful of water, a property right came into existence. The earliest, natural, property right was limited in extent to what one could actually use; property acquired after the acceptance of money could be much more unequal; later governments were established (in part) to protect property, including the extensive and unequal properties that money makes possible. So first natural property, then money, then government.
Note the contrast with most medieval theories of property. Medieval writers mostly held that by natural law all things are common, that the right to appropriate came in by positive human enactment - either by the law of nations (understood as a set of 'compacts' existing even before government) or by civil law. They held that property was introduced as a consequence and remedy for sin, that it would not have existed in the state of innocence. Pope John XXII introduced the doctrine that even in the state of innocence property existed, that no one can consume anything without having property in it. Locke's position is like John XXII's (notice in II.26, 28, 29 the examples about consumption of food).
Hugo Grotius earlier in the C17th held that by natural law the consumption of food and drink establishes property, but that property in things not consumed in use exists by a convention which imitates the natural property in consumables - anyone who uses durable things, including land, acquires property by human convention. See Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, (JX4423.G8).ch. 5.
Chapter VI is about 'Paternal' power. This is the wrong term: the mother has as much right to power over the children as the father has, II.52-3. (Cf. Hobbes, pp. 253-4.) The power of parents arises from their duty to take care of their offspring, to inform their minds and direct their actions until the children are old enough to direct themselves; II.58-9. The parents' power is thus not absolute or permanent, and it does not reach to the life, liberty or property of the child.
Chapter VII distinguishes conjugal society, the society of parents and children, and the relation of master and servant, from political society (cf. Aristotle, Pol. I.2). In none of these relationships does the superior have power of life and death (which Locke regards as the defining characteristic of political power; II.3).
II.87 'His property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate': Note that property includes life and liberty, as well as estate. The word means whatever is one's own exclusively (Latin proprium). 'By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that Property which Men have in their Persons as well as Goods'; II.173.
'To judge of, and punish': cf. II.7-9.
'That exclude him not from appealing': as, for example, when there is no time. Cf. II.19.
'Private judgment': A term used in controversy between Catholics and Protestants. The latter claimed that each individual Christian had the right and duty to interpret the bible for himself (and the duty to interpret it correctly), whereas Catholics held that each Christian must accept the doctrines taught by the Church, including its interpretation of the bible. Locke is saying that each citizen must accept the interpretation and application of natural law made by the Community, and not insist on his own. Cf. Hobbes, pp. 227, 365
'The Community' comes to be umpire. [Cf. Marsilius' 'legislator', I.xv.2, p. 61.] Besides "community" Locke also uses the terms 'Society' and 'Commonwealth' (II.88); cf. II.89.
'There only is Political Society... on earth': cf. II.19-21, Readings, p. 294.
Read II.90-94.
This section may be taken as Locke's answer to Hobbes.
II.91 'Standing rule': cf. references in II.87 and 88 (Readings, p. 302) to 'settled' or 'standing' laws by which the magistrate is to judge. This is 'the rule of laws, not of men'. See Aristotle, Pol. III.16 (Readings, p. 107) [and other texts collected by Marsilius, I.ix, p. 28 ff].
II.94 'Absolute monarchy': absolutus in Latin means 'untied', 'not tied'. The emperor was said to be legibus solutus, not tied by the laws.
Read II.95-99.
These are Locke's arguments in favour of majority rule. Contrast Aristotle's more pragmatic arguments, Pol. III.11 (Readings, p. 105), [and Marsilius, I.xii, xiii, pp. 44-55.]
This chapter is on the beginnings of political society: it begins by a compact, in which each agrees to unite into a political society, and to be bound thereafter by majority decision. In the rest of the chapter [II.100-122] he answers Filmer's view that individuals are born into a political society.
Read II.116-122.
Complete and permanent membership of a political society requires explicit consent; once given it cannot be retracted. Tacit consent, implied for example by accepting property which is subject to the government's jurisdiction or even simply by being within its territory, makes a person subject even in conscience to the civil laws: but not permanently, only while he enjoys that property or is within the territory; he is free to abandon the property or leave.
'Even in conscience': the government has the right to coerce him even without his tacit consent (cf. II.9, Readings, p. 292); his consent means that he ought to cooperate.
Read II.123-31
II.128, 129. Notice that the first power is to do what he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others. Cf. II.7, Readings, p. 291. This power is not wholly given up in society; cf. II.19, p. 294
Read II.132
To become a member of the political community a person must give his own individual consent. In becoming a member he consents to accept the form of government established by the majority. Although the majority may establish a democracy, it may instead establish an hereditary monarchy. Locke's arguments for majority rule are therefore not arguments for a democratic form of government, but for accepting the form of government (which may be monarchy) that has majority support.
Read II.149
'Not a power to part with': cf. II.23 (Readings, p. 295).
'Not as considered under any Form of Government': Note that the majority cannot change the form of government at will. It can do so only when those who govern under the existing form have forfeited their trust. Once they have established an hereditary monarchy it must continue as long as the monarchs govern for the common good. Cf. II.243 (Readings, p. 313-4).
A form of government provides for a Legislative and an Executive. Chapter XI is about the Legislative power. It is not arbitrary; it exists for the public good, and is obliged by the laws of nature. It is bound to decide the rights of the subject by promulgated, standing laws, the same for everyone, applied by known, authorised judges. It cannot take the subject's property (taxation) except 'with his own Consent, i.e. the Consent of the Majority'. The legislative is superior to the executive.
Chapter XIV is about the 'prerogative' of the executive power. The laws cannot foresee and provide for every eventuality; some discretion must therefore be left to the executive. This is the prerogative, 'the power of doing public good without a rule' [II.166].
Read II.168.
'Appeal to heaven': cf. II.21 (Readings, p. 295).
'Any single man': Note that even an individual has the right to act against injustice done to him alone.
'Tho' the People cannot be judge, so as to have by the Constitution...': Except perhaps in a city state, the whole people cannot meet to judge; even if they did, they would need to be called together, and there would have to be a presiding officer.
Chapter XVI is about conquest, as a means of acquiring political power; compare Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 20. (Some partisans of the monarchy argued that since the monarchy was established by William the Conqueror its power was absolute.) Like Hobbes, Locke argues that conquest gives no right unless the subjects consent. The conqueror who has fought a just war may acquire power over the lives of those who by fighting against him unjustly have forfeited them, but not over their wives and children and fellow citizens, and not over their property (except insofar as he has a right to reparation - but in exercising such a right he must take account of the rights of wives and children).
Chapter XVII is about Usurpation, and chapter XVIII about tyranny. Any act not authorised by law is tyranny, and may be resisted, if it is done by force. (This is a rejection of the doctrine of non-resistance.) Locke argues that his doctrine will not lead to anarchy:
Read II.207-210.
II.210 This was written originally as a critique of the government of Charles II.
'That religion': Roman Catholicism.
Read II.228, 240-243.
See also in Supplementary Readings, p. 168 ff. and 180ff my article "Locke on Political Obligation", and Waldron's article "Enough and as good for Others".
2. How does Locke explain the origin of property without recourse to compact or human law?
3. What difference does the invention of money make to the right to appropriate, and how?
4. How does the chapter on property fit into Locke's overall argument?
5. What is the place in Locke's theory of consent, explicit and tacit?
6. Does Locke's justification of rebellion go too far?
7. Is there a moral obligation to obey the law?
Return to Teaching
Materials on Political Thought
Return to Home Page