Copyright © 1996 R.J. Kilcullen
This week we read extracts from the Defensor Pacis (Defender of the Peace) of Marsilius of Padua. Marsilius regarded the papacy as a revolutionary force undermining the constitutions of states. He argues that the clergy should have no coercive power (i.e., governmental power) at all, that there should be only one government in a state.
It is commonly believed that the middle ages were the 'age of faith', and that religion dominated all spheres of life. A little reading of medieval history will dispel that belief. Anticlericalism was very strong, and nobles and kings in particular often treated the representatives of religion with contempt and even violence. (For example: Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury was exiled, Archbishop Thomas a Becket was murdered, pope Boniface VIII died after being roughly handled; for other examples of violent conflict see Ullmann, Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages (BX955.2.U53), pp. 154-61, 255-61, 273-82.) There was a series of controversies between writers who took the part of the Church and other writers (usually also clergy) who took the part of kings and emperors. Medieval political thought was partly the product of academic study in universities, but mainly the result of the use of academic materials in the course of conflict between Church and State, or Empire and Papacy. The main conflicts were the following:
Two there are, august emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, the sacred authority of the priesthood and the royal power... In the order of religion, in matters concerning the reception and right administration of the heavenly sacraments, you ought to submit yourself rather than rule... The bishops themselves, recognizing that the imperial office was conferred on you by divine disposition, obey your laws so far as the sphere of public order is concerned. (Tierney, pp. 13-4.)Historians call this the Gelasian theory: that emperors and kings on the one hand, and popes and bishops on the other, have their distinct spheres of authority and derive power not from one another but directly from God; in secular matters the clergy obey secular rulers, in religious matters the secular rulers obey the clergy. In the thirteenth century, however, some popes, notably Innocent III and Innocent IV, claimed to have a superiority over secular rulers, at least in certain circumstances. See Boniface VIII, Unam sanctam, in Readings. This claim was based on various considerations.
From 1305 until 1378 the popes, although bishops of Rome, did not live in Rome, but in Avignon, a papal possession in France. (See G. Mollat, The Popes of Avignon.) During this period the papacy was much under French influence. In 1314 the seven electors of the Roman empire (certain German hereditary princes and bishops who had the right to choose the next emperor when the present emperor died) held an election in which a majority favoured Ludwig of Bavaria, and the minority supported Frederick, Duke of Austria. They did not have the rule that the majority view prevails; unless there was unanimity the outcome of the election was regarded as being in dispute. The two rivals fought until Frederick was defeated in 1322. In 1316, after the papacy had been vacant two years (because the Cardinals had difficulty in agreeing on any candidate by the necessary majority of two thirds), pope John XXII was elected. He asserted, as several of his predecessors had done, that the candidate elected by the electors of the Empire required papal confirmation before he could actually become emperor. When Ludwig exercised some of the powers of the Emperor without papal confirmation John excommunicated him (1324). Ludwig led an armed force into Italy to help his allies there. In Rome he had himself crowned Emperor, not by the pope but by representatives of the Roman people, and set up there a rival pope. One of his advisers at this time was Marsilius of Padua. After eight months in Rome Ludwig retreated to Pisa and then to Germany; his 'pope' made his peace with John XXII. Ludwig made many efforts to reach an agreement with John XXII and his successors Benedict XII and Clement VI but without success. He died, still excommunicate, in 1347. This was the last major conflict between Emperor and Pope; the issue was whether the pope had power to confirm or disallow the election made by the Imperial electors. The papal claim implied that the Empire was subject to the pope. (See Offler, 'Empire and papacy: the last struggle', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, n.s. 5, vol. 6, 1956, pp. 21-47.)
Marsilius was a university teacher in Paris in the early fourteenth century. His Defensor pacis (The Defender of the Peace) criticises papal claims to fullness of power. Pope John XXII condemned his book in 1326. Marsilius took refuge with Ludwig of Bavaria and lived in Germany until his death in 1342.
The purpose of Marsilius's book is to argue that no pope or other churchman has any coercive power, still less plenitude of power, even over the clergy in Church matters. In any state there can be no more than one government, which must be secular (since the clergy have no coercive power, and government is coercive). From the single secular government all coercive power in the territory is derived. This last point is the notion of sovereignty, still going strong: the notion that only one supreme authority can have any right to coerce individuals living in a given territory, except when that authority delegates coercive power to some agency. (Cf. Max Weber's definition of the state as the agency that claims a monopoly of legitimate coercive power in a territory.) This means, for example, that parents can coerce their children only by state acquiescence. Trade unions, (which coerce their members -- otherwise strikes would never work) are a challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty; liberals have always doubted their legitimacy, and during the 19th century they were illegal. Marsilius seems to be the first explicit advocate of the notion of sovereignty.
His book is divided into three discourses. The first is philosophical, and is based closely on Aristotle's Politics. Its most distinctive feature is an emphasis on election (i.e., choice) by the whole people (or its weightier part) as the source of political power. Marsilius's argument is based on that of Aristotle in Pol. III.11 (which in the version Marsilius used was numbered chapter 6.) It would be a good idea at this point to re-read that chapter.
Open Readings at p. 181. I will use the page numbers of the translation; p. 181 LH is thus p. 45. I will also refer to the paragraph numbers. The extracts begin with para. 3, para. 4 begins 3 lines from the bottom of this page, para. 5 is 7 lines down p. 47.
'Efficient cause': The agency which brings something into existence. We would say simply 'cause'.
'Election or will': 'Election' means literally choice; it need not mean the choice of a person by popular vote. In this case it is the choice of a law.
'The weightier part... [considering] quantity and quality': Marsilius does not believe in 'one vote one value'. What he is saying does not rule out aristocracy or oligarchy.
In paragraph 5 put brackets around 'which represents... opposition of these men': this is to explain why the choice need not be unanimous.
'First proposition': i.e., of the first proof (line 4 of para. 5), namely 'The absolutely primary human authority... best laws can emerge'.
Read p. 49-54
Notice the argument (in para. 2) that since in all men there is a natural impulse toward civil community there will be more weight on the side of those who wish the community to endure. This argument is based, as Marsilius says, on natural philosophy.
The second objection (in para. 5, p. 53): this is the passage on p. 49, para. 1 beginning 'Another objection'.
The third objection (answered in para. 6, p. 53) is the passage on p. 49, para. 1 beginning 'Again'.
The whole community is the Legislator. It establishes a Ruler (pars principans), who executes the decisions of the Legislator about the offices needed in the state (including the priesthood). Marsilius argues (I.xvi) that it is better to elect each ruler individually, rather than to elect a ruler to be succeeded by his heirs; e.g., an elective monarchy (as the Roman Empire was) is better than an hereditary monarchy. However, the Legislator may decide to establish an hereditary monarchy. It may also choose to establish a collective Ruler (e.g., an aristocracy). At all events, the constitution which the Ruler must execute is decided on by the whole multitude or its weightier part.
Read pp. 80-3.
Unity of government - p. 80, para. 2 is to make it clear that the thesis that the ruler must be one is not meant to exclude rule by some sort of committee.
That priests have no coercive power: Marsilius argues that Christ came into the world not to dominate men, nor to wield temporal rule; and he excluded himself, his apostles and disciples and their successors, bishops and priests, from all coercive authority and worldly rule (p. 114). He shows this by means of various bible texts: 'My kingdom is not of this world'; 'When Jesus therefore knew that they would come to take him by force and make him king, he fled again into the mountain'; 'Man, who hath appointed me judge or divider over you?'; 'Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's'. That Christ meant to exclude his apostles from worldly rule is proved by: 'The kings of the gentiles lord it over them... But you not so'. Paul says: 'No soldier of God entangleth himself with secular affairs'. And so on. Marsilius supports his interpretation of these texts by quotations from Jerome, Origen, Chrysostom, Bernard and other Church writers. See pp. 113-140 in the complete text.
That Christ's law is not coercively enforced in this life: Human law has been laid down for 'the sufficient life of this world' to control acts which affect others; human laws provide that those who break them are to be coerced by punishment in this life. On the other hand, for [i.e., to regulate] life in this world, but 'for [i.e., for the sake of] the status of the future world' (life after death), a law has been laid down by Christ. 'This law is coercive, and distributes punishments or rewards, but inflicts these in the future world, not in the present one' (pp. 158-9). 'For in his mercy Christ wished to give every person the opportunity to become deserving up to the very end of his life, and to repent...'; 'It would be useless... to coerce anyone to observe them [Christ's commandments], since the person who observed them under coercion would be helped not at all toward eternal salvation'; p. 164.
Marsilius distinguishes various senses of the words 'law' and 'judge'.
Read pp. 35-6 (Readings, p. 186), 107-8.
'Evangelic': Gospel
Christ's law in relation to the present world is not a law in the sense of rules coercively enforced; the priests who teach Christ's law are not judges with power to coerce, though they may be judges in some other sense.
Read pp. 164-6.
'The present world', 'this life', in contrast with 'the other world', 'the future life' after death. Souls are immortal; after the death of the body the soul is rewarded or punished in the afterlife.
'The Apostle': i.e., Paul.
'law in its last and proper sense': rules enforced by coercion and punishment. A judge 'in the third sense' is one who has coercive power to enforce law in its proper sense.
Read pp. 174-9.
Note that 'no one is punished in this world for sinning against theoretic or practical disciplines precisely as such'. Heretics and infidels are not to be punished precisely because they believe the wrong things; but notice that Marsilius does not exclude the possibility that human law may forbid heresy.
In para. 7, 'a person is not punished by the ruler solely for sinning against divine law': because it is not enforced in this life.
Read pp. 148-9.
Marsilius is clear that God's law is not enforced 'as such', i.e., as being God's law, by the human community, or by anyone in this world, because God does not wish it to be. He seems to envisage, however, that the human community might, for its own reasons, enforce excommunication, or require heretics and infidels to live somewhere else. He does not explain what reasons it might have for doing so - perhaps to maintain peace. He does not seem to have a theory forbidding the rulers to enforce religious laws for civil purposes (e.g., to achieve social harmony). Similarly he does not give any philosophical reason why the clergy could not be appointed as the rulers (though in that capacity they would not enforce divine law as such); the reason why they should not is a theological one, namely that Christ indicated that he did not want them to exercise that role. (For this reason see Discourse II.iii and iv.)
Marsilius distinguishes between the essential powers of the priesthood, conferred directly by God alone, and powers conferred on priests by human beings (see p. 233-). The essential powers are to be able to perform the sacrament of the eucharist, and to bind and loose men from their sins (p. 235). With respect to the essential powers all priests are equal - in respect of the essential powers the pope and bishops are not superior to any simple priest. In the primitive Church there was no distinction between priest and bishop (p. 236). As the size of the Christian community increased the priests elected some of their number to guide and direct their work; this is an appointment made by man, and does not give any increase of essential priestly power. The designation of particular priests to minister to particular places is also a human arrangement. The guiding priests, including the bishop of Rome, have no coercive power (unless the human legislator delegates some to them).
With reference to the pope in particular, Marsilius argues that Peter had no coercive jurisdiction over the other apostles, that the Roman bishop is not the successor of Peter any more than he and other priests are of the other apostles. It cannot be proved that Peter was bishop of Rome, or that he was ever at Rome; if he was there it was after Paul. See II.xvi. (Here Marsilius anticipates points made by the Protestants of the sixteenth century: such ideas were already current in the early fourteenth century, being found in other writers besides Marsilius.)
The power to appoint the clergy to offices in the Church belongs (once the Church is properly established) to the multitude of believers, not to the clergy. See II.xvii. Before the civil community became Christian the Christian believers made their own appointments. Now that practically the whole population had become Christian, the civil community ('the human legislator') may if it chooses make the appointments.
Read pp. 264-5.
'The faithful legislator': the human legislator become 'faithful', i.e., Christian.
Notice that when the legislator (the civil community) gives temporalities to the Church these things always remain the property of the legislator; the gift does not transfer ownership to the Church or its clergy, to use or alienate these things as they wish. (John of Paris says the same; On Royal and Papal Power, p. 210.) Things given by private donors must be used in accordance with the donors' wishes.
None of the rest is in the Readings
Church Councils: Since 'the catholic faith is one' (p. 272) there must be some way of resolving disputes, by defining doctrine. This is the task of general councils of the Church ("ecumenical" councils). Christ promised 'I am with you always even unto the end of the world' (Mt. 28). A general council representing the Christian community will not err. 'Christ would have handed down the law of eternal salvation in vain if he did not reveal to the believers its true meaning... but... allowed the majority of them to be in error regarding it, when they beg and invoke him for this true meaning'; p. 275. That the definition of truths of faith belongs to a council representing the Christian multitude is proved by an argument like that which established that the legislator is the multitude of the people (see pp. 281-2, cf. pp. 45-7). It does not belong the Roman pontiff, who may fall into heresy; or to him with his cardinals 'who will very likely share his error, because he chooses... whichever men he wants' (pp. 282-3).
The right to convene a general council belongs to the faithful human legislator, not to the pope or clergy. If the pope or cardinals or other clergy were accused of some crime which required the calling of a council, the pope would avoid doing so (p. 288). Since the pope has often appointed unworthy men to office in the Church (although it is really the function of the faithful legislator to appoint to office in the Church), a council should include faithful non-priests named by the faithful legislator (p. 286). A council cannot make any binding rules enforced by coercion in this life except by the authority of the human legislator (p. 272).
(In the early days of the Church when the legislator was not 'faithful' then believers convened general councils as best they could, with none of them having any special right to do so; see pp. 306-7.)
Thus, what all of this amounts to is that when the population has become mostly Christian the secular government takes control of the Church, appointing priests and bishops, controlling Church property, calling councils to define doctrine, deciding who should attend councils, enforcing conciliar decrees. The hierarchy (pope, bishops, parish priests) is a merely human arrangement; the pope and bishops have no particular authority, especially no coercive power, except as conceded to them by the secular government.
Chapter xxii is on the historical development of the papal headship of the Church. Plenitude of power is the topic of II.xxiii-xxvi.
2. Does he advocate the separation of Church and State?
3. Does he advocate the toleration of heresy and unbelief?
4. Do you think he goes too far in advocating unity of government?
5. Henry VIII's government had a translation of Marsilius published. Why?
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