Quotations below are from Plato, Collected Dialogues, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (New York, 1963).
Plato went to Syracuse in the hope of converting the tyrant who ruled there to philosophy. The rest of Letter VII describes the attempt and its failure; see also Plutarch, Lives, life of Dion.
Plato lived to be about 80 years old. All his life he was concerned with politics. His philosophy developed largely out of his political concerns. The philosophical school he founded, the Academy, was to train political activists.
What Plato said in discussions or lectures in the Academy was not written down. (See [Letter VII, 341c-5a]). His writings for public circulation were mostly dialogues, i.e., conversations, like plays. In many of them Socrates is one of the characters. We do not know whether Plato gives an historically faithful account of what Socrates said. Often the conversation reaches no definite conclusion. The dialogues seem to have been meant to get people thinking about questions Plato regards as important, and perhaps to recruit them to the Academy.
Plato's dialogues are sometimes direct speech (e.g. Gorgias), sometimes Socrates' report of a conversation (e.g. Protagoras, Republic), sometimes someone else's report of a conversation between Socrates and others (e.g. Phaedo). Some of the dialogues are literary, some didactic; some book length, mostly play-length. Some readers find the argument slow-moving, so you must be prepared to enjoy the dialogues as conversation.
Political Values
The material relating to politics in the dialogues often raises questions about the value of democracy. Before going on you should reflect a little on this topic. Until the twentieth century most educated people had nothing good to say for democracy. It meant the rule of the ignorant, the destruction of property and civilisation. 'But that would be democracy!' would have been an objection. These days democracy is the ultimate value in politics. 'But that would be undemocratic!' is the conclusive objection.
Do you think that what the majority thinks must be right? Would it be right for the majority to enslave a minority? If not, then there are apparently individual rights which majority decision cannot abolish. What are these rights? Who is to say what they are? The majority? What does 'enslave' mean? If a minority does not like a decision they can, in most organisations, resign, and form a break-away association of their own: can a dissatisfied minority secede from a democratic country? Who draws the boundaries defining countries, and can they ever be changed, and if so how and by whom? Is there any alternative better than democracy?
Read Apology 17ab, 19a-20a.
Read 20e-21d, 23a-d.
The highest wisdom attainable by human beings is to be conscious of not knowing -- of not being wise. Socrates questions his accusers and replies to various points of the indictment -- that he corrupts youth, is an atheist.
Read 28b-29b
Notice the argument of 29ab: no one knows whether death is an evil, but we know that to do wrong is an evil; it is better to choose what we do not know to be evil rather than what we know to be evil. Do you think it is a sound argument?
Read 31d-33a.
Notice the implied judgment (31e) of successful politicians in a democracy.
The jury decided on the death penalty.
Against this Socrates argues that we need rather an art to enable us to avoid doing wrong; that it is worse to do wrong than to be wronged, worse to escape deserved punishment than to be punished.
Callicles (an admirer of Gorgias) replies that 'natural' virtue is this, 'that the man who is going to live as a man ought should encourage his appetites to be as strong as possible instead of repressing them, and be able by means of his courage and intelligence to satisfy them in all their intensity' (491e-492a). This is the aim of those who seek political power.
Socrates replies that those who seek political power for such a reason will 'pander' to those who can confer it -- to the demos in a democracy. Pleasure or the satisfaction of desire is not always good. Virtue seeks to fulfil desires whose satisfaction makes a man better and to deny those which make him worse. The true aim of politics is not to satisfy whatever desires the people happen to have, but to make them better. Callicles admires Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles, but Socrates does not.
Read Gorgias 509
Rhetoric enables a man to protect himself and his friends, according to Callicles, and a man is ridiculous if he cannot protect himself. Socrates thinks that what is needed most is a skill or art enabling a man to avoid doing wrong.
Read Gorgias 510
Read Gorgias 510-13
Read Gorgias 513-19
Socrates' criticism of Pericles and the other famous politicians is that they gave the people what pleased them, not what was good for them.
Does the fact that the Athenians turned against Pericles (for a time) show that he did not make them better?
Read Gorgias 521-2
The anti-democratic implications are clear. A successful democratic politician must give the people what they want, which is not (or may not be) what is good for them; to succeed he must become like them. The true politician would give the people what was good for them, and (at first, at least) they would not like it. The true politician is not like the people, he knows what is good for them better than they do, he must rule them (at least at first) against their will.
Protagoras was a real person, one of the most famous of the sophists. See W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists (B171.G83), p. 262 ff. Various other sophists also figure in this dialogue, and it is one of the main sources on the sophists and on Socrates' attitude toward them. From a literary point of view it is one of Plato's most brilliant works. Unfortunately we can only fit in a short extract.
Hippocrates wakes Socrates just before daybreak, eager to take Socrates to meet Protagoras, who has just come to Athens. Socrates asks 'whom do you think you are going to, and what will he make of you?' (Cf. Gorgias [447-9], in which Socrates wants to know 'what sort of man' Gorgias is -- i.e., what art he practices -- and 'what the power of his art consists in'.) Hippocrates answers that Protagoras is a sophist, and he hopes not to become a sophist himself but to acquire a liberal education. Socrates remarks that it is dangerous to 'entrust the care of your soul' to a sophist if you do not even know what a sophist is, or whether sophists are good or bad. He trains 'clever speakers' -- but speakers about what? (Cf. Gorgias [451a].) After more talk about the dangers of buying something that you must receive 'straight into the soul' they reach the house where Protagoras is staying. Socrates asks on Hippocrates' behalf what effect Protagoras' teaching will have on him? He answers: 'Young man, if you come to me, your gain will be this: the very day you join me, you will go home a better man, and the same the next day. Each day you will make progress towards a better state' (318b). Socrates asks, 'Better at what?' The answer is: at the art of politics and good citizenship. Socrates answers that he did not think that that could be taught, since, apparently, it is not an art.
Read 319a-320b
Compare Gorgias [455b, 514-5].
Read 320c-328d
This passage is an impressive answer to some of Plato's usual objections against democracy -- though I think if you reflect you will realise that the answer is not conclusive. It is, as Protagoras says, 'a story', or 'myth'. Note that the object in the distribution of powers is 'that no species should be destroyed'. The art of politics, the art of living in a city (polis), requires 'qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union' (322c). If the human species is to be preserved, these qualities must be had not by a few specialists but by the whole population: 'There could never be cities if only a few shared in these virtues' (322d).
Yet they are not innate (inborn): they have to be learnt. Everyone (or nearly everyone) is capable of learning them, and efforts are made to ensure that everyone does learn them (323c-326e).
Everyone teaches these virtues, but some are better teachers than others, just as some learn them better than others (326e-328d).
Notice how well-adapted the story is to Protagoras' purpose. He wants to prove that politics is an art, and that it is possible for someone (like himself) to be a professional teacher of the political art, even though apparently sensible people like the Athenians will listen to anyone's political opinions, as if there were no experts. His reply is that, to some extent, everyone is an expert -- that is how it can be an art, and yet a subject on which anyone gets a hearing. Still, some people are better at this art than others, so some can set up as professional teachers.
Look again at 322cd (RH p. 49, near the top), "Shall I distribute to all alike": This doesn't mean "to all equally". Similarly "Let all have their share" does not mean "equal share". Some are better than others, which is why there can be professional teachers. This is provides opponents of democracy with an argument: the share of justice and respect that most people get consists in willingness to obey leaders wiser than themselves. (Cf. Mill: "It is not necessary that the many should themselves be perfectly wise; it is sufficient if they be duly sensible of the value of superior wisdom". Readings, vol. 2, p. 366.)
In the next part of the dialogue, Socrates raises the question whether virtue is a single whole, and justice and self-control etc. its parts, or are these merely different names for one and the same thing? This is a preliminary to the question what virtue is, as a preliminary to the question whether virtue can be taught. Whether there is just one virtue is the topic of the rest of the dialogue, important as a contribution to ethics, but not so much to political thought. (For a summary of the whole dialogue see the Penguin edition, pp. 30-7.)
The Republic is in dialogue form, but it is the length of a novel -- the conversation, if it had really occurred, would have taken place over some days. Like other ancient books of such a size, it is divided into "books". It is generally regarded as Plato's main work of political philosophy. It is an attempt to answer two main questions: (1) What is justice? (2) Is there any good enough reason to be just, apart from the alleged expediency of being just? Plato's answers to these questions may well seem unsatisfactory and disappointing, but along the way he says much that is interesting and valuable.
'Why be just?' is a question about how an individual should live, and the relevant justice is a virtue of an individual. The political discussion in this dialogue is there partly for the sake of politics, but mainly to provide an analogy for answering this question about individual life: Socrates suggests that if we construct an imaginary city, and decide what its justice would be, then we may be better able to say what the justice of an individual person is. The city is like a person (a unity), and a person is like a city (a city is a unity composed of many different parts, and similarly an individual has body and soul, each of which has various organs or powers). Perhaps the purpose of constructing an analogue of a just person gives Plato's city too much unity -- his city may seem to give too little freedom and autonomy to its individual members. Plato's political opinions did in any case, apart from the requirements of this analogy, favour unity and discipline.
His conception of individual justice is very broad. We might wish to call it integrity, or moral righteousness (in general), rather than justice (which is part of righteousness), and rephrase the second question as Why do what is right? The righteousness or integrity of the individual is the harmonious and unified functioning of his parts, just as the justice of the city is the harmonious and unified functioning of the people in it. The answer to the question Why do what is right? is that being righteous is like being healthy: the harmonious and unified functioning of the various parts of one's personality is obviously a good thing, apart from the consequences it may bring. It is obviously best to be that kind of person.
(Critics have pointed out that this is not enough to show that we should do the actions which justice is generally supposed to require -- it still has to be shown that we cannot be a righteous person unless we do the actions that justice is generally supposed to require; see Sachs. 'A Fallacy in Plato's Republic', Philosophical Review, 72 (1963), pp.141-58 (B1.P5))
The first definition tested [331c-] is that justice (doing right) consists in telling the truth and returning what we have borrowed (i.e., doing the actions generally supposed to be required by morality). But there are cases in which doing such an action is not right -- e.g. returning a borrowed weapon to a madman.
Someone (Polemarchus) quotes a poet to the effect that it is right 'to give every man his due'. But what is borrowed is 'due' to the owner, even a madman. 'What is due to another is to do him good, not harm'. But this definition is not sufficiently specific: medicine and other arts also do good. (Notice the assumption that justice is an art or skill: this would seem to imply that the just man will also be good at doing harm, just as a doctor will be skilled as a poisoner.) 'Justice is the ability to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies' (as an effective politician was expected to do). But is it really right to harm any man? Harming them makes them worse -- justice can hardly be skill in making people worse.
Thrasymachus breaks in (336b). (Thrasymachus was a real person -- see Guthrie, The Sophists.) He defines justice as 'what is in the interest of the stronger party' -- rulers always make the rules in their own interest, and justice is obedience to the law. He infers that anyone who keeps the rules when he is strong enough to break them is a fool.
Socrates points out that the rulers may mistake their interest and make rules that are not really in their own interest. When they do, if justice is to obey the rules, it will not be in the interest of the stronger party. Thrasymachus answers that to mistake one's interest is weakness -- precisely as stronger and as rulers, rulers make no mistake (340c-). (Notice the expression 'as': the ruler 'as ruler', or the ruler 'as such', or 'insofar as he is a ruler', or 'by virtue of being ruler', or 'in his capacity of ruler'; or, as the learned sometimes say, 'qua ruler'. You have the right to vote not qua student but qua citizen; you have the right to use the library not in your capacity as citizen, but as student.)
Socrates argues that as rulers (whatever may be true of them in some other capacity) rulers act in the interest of their subjects. Every art or skill has some end or purpose, which is not its own perfection but the perfection of its subject matter; and every practicioner of an art, as practicioner, aims at that end. The doctor, qua doctor, works for an interest of the patient (his health), not for his own interest. (As businessman he may aim at making money, but not as doctor.) Similarly the ruler, as such, aims at his subjects' welfare.
Socrates restates his argument that each art seeks the good of its subject matter (345c-347d). Practicioners expect to be paid because they derive no direct benefit themselves from the exercise of the art. (This does not meet Thrasymachus' point that ruling may be like animal husbandry, a subordinate part of a business enterprize. It may be true that rulers should aim at their subjects' good, but that cannot be proved from the fact that ruling is an art, since practice of an art may serve futher purposes, beyond those of the art itself.)
He also contests Thrasymachus' claim that the unjust man has a better life than the just, that it is foolish to be just, intelligent to be unjust. Socrates argues (349b-350d) that since the unjust have incompatible aims (they come into conflict not only with the just but with one another) injustice cannot be an art, because the practicioners of an art share the same aim.
Further, the unjust cannot cooperate, because they cannot trust one another. Similarly injustice damages an individual: 'It renders him incapable of action because of internal conflicts and division of purpose, and sets him at variance with himself and with all just men' (352a).
Finally, Socrates argues that the just man is happy, using the ideas of 'function' and 'virtue'. A thing's function is what only it can do, or what it is best for doing (the eye's function is to see, since only an eye can see; a pruning knife's function is pruning, since -- although other things can be used -- a pruning knife is best for pruning). A thing's virtue is the state in which it performs its function well, and is a good thing of that sort (a pruning knife's virtue is sharpness, since it prunes well when sharp, and a sharp one is a good one). The soul's function is thought, control, attention, and life; justice is its virtue; therefore those who have justice will live well.
This brings us to book II of the Republic.
Read 357a-367e (Glaucon and Adeimantus).
Notice in 358e-9a the contrast between nature and convention (justice is a 'compact'); cf. Gorgias 482-3.
Bear in mind for future reference the story of Gyges' ring: how would you act if you could become invisible at will?
Read 368a-369a
This is the connection between the questions about individual justice and the political topics with which The Republic is largely occupied: justice in a city is the analogue of justice in the individual. This topic will be taken up in next week's reading.
Let's look back briefly over what you have read so far. Letter VII shows something of Plato's motivations and attitudes to politics, the Apology and the Gorgias something of those of Socrates. The Protagoras shows how one of the Sophists might have answered Socrates' and Plato's criticisms of democracy.
The Republic, in the part we have read so far, discusses two questions: What is justice? Why be just? To answer these questions Socrates will go on to discuss justice in the state.
I won't make any suggestions for futher reading this week: if you have time, go on with next week's reading of Plato.
2. What is morality? Is it a matter of rules, qualities of character, ideals, purposes, or what? Is it a constraint? If it is a constraint, why submit to it? (See Apology 28b, Republic 360bc.)
3. Is morality imposed by God? Is it imposed by society? Is it self-imposed?
4. How would you define justice? Under what conditions will the democratic process probably further justice, and under what conditions will it probably not do so? (See Readings, vol. 2, p. 368.)
5. How might opponents of democracy reply to Protagoras' myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus?
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