Copyright © 1996, 2000, R.J. Kilcullen
To make use of these comments you will need
Macaulay's review, "Mill on Government", available for example in T.B. Macaulay, Prose and Poetry, ed. G.M. Young (London, 1967). Macquarie University Library: PR4963.A6/1967
J. S. Mill, Collected Works, vols. 18 and 19 ("Appendix B" and Representative Government). Macquarie University Library B1602.A2.
James Mill (father of J.S. Mill) wrote a number of essays for the 1816-1823 supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. (On the history of the Encyclopaedia Britannica see the article "Encyclopaedia Britannica" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.) James Mill contributed articles on "Government", "Jurisprudence", "Liberty of the Press", and "The Law of Nations". His article on Government, first published in 1820, was an argument for democracy -- or at least for giving the right to vote to all male citizens. This was a revolutionary proposal at a time when the franchise (i.e. the right to vote) was mostly confined to property owners. James Mill was saying that even poor men, without any property, should have the vote. Mill's essay was republished in 1828 and was reviewed by T.B. Macaulay in the Edinburgh Review in 1829. Macaulay's review is an attempt to refute James Mill's arguments for democracy. At the time only a small minority of people at the most extreme left of the political spectrum supported democracy. Put a mark half-way down the RH side of p. 361, after "such an arrangement must lead", and read to there (pause the tape while you do that).
Now some comments. On the third line of the extract, "pecuniary" means "monetary". A pecuniary qualification or money qualification means that you don't have the right to vote unless you own property of a certain minimum monetary value.
The last paragraph of the passage you've just read begins with a quotation from James Mill's essay: "That one human being will desire" etc. Mill assumes, first, that the basic human motive is a desire to experience pleasure and avoid pain, and, second, that each person is entirely self-interested -- each desires his own pleasure, no matter what pain will be inflicted on others. This theory of human motivation is the foundation of his theory of government.
So Macaulay asks, given this account of human motivation -- that everyone always seeks his own pleasure and avoids pain -- what will be the result of a arrangement that gives the poor majority political power over the property of the rich minority? Put a mark halfway down the RH side of p. 362, after "we appeal to the 20th century", and read to there. Pause the tape while you do that.
Some comments. Look again at the second paragraph, second sentence, of the passage you've just read (the one that begins "But we are rather inclined"): "If so, the Utilitarians will say, that the rich ought to be plundered." In fact the Utilitarians did not say this -- they were opposed to the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor. Macaulay is trying to saddle their theory with an implication that most people in those days -- at least, those who were able to read essays and reviews -- would have regarded as shockingly immoral, simple theft.
But who were the Utilitarians? They were a philosophical movement of the late 18th and early 19th century, whose leader was Jeremy Bentham. James Mill was Jeremy Bentham's close friend and supporter. They did not call themselves Utilitarians -- this term was introduced by James Mill's son, John Stuart Mill; but let's call them by it. The Utilitarians were "reformers" of the legal system, of the political system, and of other British institutions. Jeremy Bentham was especially interested in reform of the law. At the time there were heavy penalties, including the death penalty or transportation to NSW, for a large number of crimes, including crimes we would regard as minor. Bentham argued that the pain inflicted on criminals needed to be justified by some good it would do, and if heavy penalties don't do much good then the penalties should be reduced. To generalise his approach: if you want to know whether some institution or rule or action is good or bad, ask what contribution it makes to the happiness of the human race generally, and if you can think of something that would contribute more to human happiness then adopt that instead. "Human happiness generally" is the criterion. "Generally" means: not giving special weight to the happiness or unhappiness of you and your friends, or any special set of people. As Bentham said, "each to count for one, no one for more than one". So for each of the possible courses of action, calculate how much happiness it will give to whoever it benefits, how much unhappiness it will cause to whoever it affects adversely, and then adopt the course of action that does on balance most for the happiness of all who are affected. Bentham boiled this down to a slogan: "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". You must consider both intensity ("the greatest happiness") and extent ("the greatest number").
What did Bentham think about inequality of wealth? First, he said that in so far as wealth makes people happy, the average happiness would be maximised if wealth were distributed equally, because although being twice as wealthy will probably make you happier, it probably won't make you as much as twice as happy. But second, he said that governments should not try to bring about equality by taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Why not? First, because if a government started redistributing property, its action would cause so much insecurity and apprehension that everybody would be unhappy; and, second, no one would invest and work in the hope of becoming wealthier in the future because they would expect to have their extra wealth taken from them. According to Bentham, then, an attempt to bring about equality would do more harm than good.
This is exactly the point that Macaulay is making: To plunder the rich would be for the interest of the greatest number -- it would make them happier. So it would seem to follow on Utilitarian principles, Macaulay says (but he's wrong), that the rich ought to be plundered. Not so, Macaulay says (as Bentham also had said): if the object of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, then the intensity of the various happinesses and unhappinesses must be considered (as Bentham also held). Macaulay assumes that the unhappiness of the plundered rich will be so intense that it will outweigh the increased happiness of the poor -- which is of course a dubious assumption. But then he moves on to Bentham's second point, the effect of equalisation of wealth upon investment, its effect on future generations. Re-read the rest of this paragraph and the next one. (Pause.)
When he says, "how on his own principles he could do this" etc., Macaulay is referring to Mill's belief that each human being seeks his or her own pleasure at no matter what cost to anyone else. On this assumption the majority of the present generation will not restrain themselves for the sake of future generations. You can perhaps now see the relevance of this nineteenth century dispute to our own times: putting it in contemporary terms, Macaulay is arguing that a democracy will not allow governments to adopt policies favouring conservation or saving and investment (think of proposals relating to the forests, a carbon tax, reduction of green-house gas emissions, higher taxes to increase public saving and investment, and so on -- will public opinion in this and other "democratic" countries allow government to do what it should do for the sake of future generations?) Re-read to the mark at "we appeal to the 20th century". (Pause.)
What is he saying about America and the 20th century? Notice near the end of the passage: "If there be the least truth in the doctrines of the school to which Mr Mill belongs, the increase of population will necessarily produce it [i.e. desperate poverty] everywhere". This is a reference to the doctrines put forward by Mill's friend, Thomas Malthus. According to Malthus, human population tends to increase faster than the production of the necessities of life. Hence the situation of the poor is hopeless: as soon as their standard of living improves, more of their children will survive, and within a generation they will all be starving again. In America in the nineteenth century this was not yet happening because the population was still small and there was still plenty of good agricultural land; but when the population increases to the point where all the good land is occupied and farmers have to use less productive land, then productivity will fall and the poor in America will be as badly off as the poor in the more populous countries of Europe. Macaulay is supposing that this will happen sometime during the 20th century.
Make a mark two-thirds of the way down LH side of p. 363 after "generations which are to follow", and read to there. (Pause.) Why does Macaulay think that the interests of better-off people are identical with the interests of future generations? Because he thinks they are more likely to save and invest and practise conservation. Whether they are more likely to practise conservation is perhaps doubtful, but it seems plausible to suggest that they are the people who save and invest, while the very poor live hand to mouth. So Macaulay thinks that these natural representatives of the human race should have enough political power to protect their own property, and thereby the interests of future generations, against their hungry contemporaries.
Make a mark three-quarters of the way down RH side of p. 363, just before the paragraph that begins "So ends this celebrated Essay", and read to there. (Pause.) You could safely infer from the passage quoted that James Mill was a member of the middle class and that he expected most of his readers to belong to that class also.
Read now to the end of the LH side of p. 365, the end of the extract from Macaulay's review. (Pause.) Some comments. At the bottom of p. 363 and the top of p. 364 Macaulay speaks of his object in writing this article, but what he says is ambiguous. It might leave you with the idea that he himself supported democracy but disagreed with Mill's arguments: "Our object... is... to expose the vices of a kind of reasoning... that... ought to receive no quarter, even when by accident it may be employed on the side of truth." This might suggest that democracy is the truth. In fact Macaulay was strongly opposed to democracy. He was not in favour of absolute monarchy, or of any narrow form of oligarchy, but he did fear the evils of popular government. He was in fact a supporter of the moderate extension of the franchise made in the famous Reform Bill of 1832.
What is he saying here about "self-interest"? But first, what do you think about self-interest? Is it true, do you think, that people always act out of self-interest? Is it true that whenever someone seems to be acting out of concern for someone else's welfare, or out of principle, then if you look more closely you will always find that the real motive is selfish? Some of you will say yes to this, and you will no doubt suggest that in cases where no selfish motive can be discovered, the person is acting unselfishly to enjoy the selfish satisfaction of enjoying the spectacle of his own unselfishness. But that's wrong. If people enjoy being unselfish, that may be a sign that they are unselfish, not that they are aiming at their own enjoyment. Satisfaction comes from attaining your goal; satisfaction is not the goal. The truth is that people sometimes act selfishly, sometimes unselfishly.
What does Macaulay say? He says that the proposition "men always act from self-interest" is ambiguous. In one sense it is identical, a truism or tautology. What he means by "identical" is illustrated by the truism "Every bachelor is unmarried". If you define "bachelor" as "unmarried man", the statement is equivalent to "every unmarried man is unmarried", which of course is true -- the predicate is identical with part of the subject. Similarly, if you define a man's "interest" as "what he wants", and if you can know what he wants only by seeing what he tries to get, then of course he always acts from self-interest -- he always tries to get what he tries to get. And notice that Macaulay does think that you can know what people want only by seeing what they try to get. He does not think that any theory of human nature can provide you with a short list of things that everybody must want; you can only find out by experience, by seeing what they seek. This is the point of the remarks about the man who cuts his father's throat and the other who risks his own life to save another.
So that is one sense of the proposition that "men always act from self-interest", the sense in which it is true but trivial and uninformative. The other sense is when you narrow down the list of what can count as a person's interest -- say to material objects that exist in short supply. If you could say that "men always act" so as to maximise their possession of scarce material objects then you could make some predictions about how they will act -- but in fact it is not true that people do always act so as to maximise such possessions. The proposition in this sense is not trivial, it does make significant predictions; but it is false, its predictions are misleading.
If you have time you might read on this topic pp. 360-361, an extract from the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume; but if you don't have time don't worry, you'll come to Hume in the last week of the course.
Let's look now at some extracts from writings by James Mill's son, John Stuart Mill. John Mill was impressed by Macaulay's attack on his father's essay and influenced by similar criticisms by others. He moved away from democracy, and he rejected the hypothesis that people always seek their own pleasure at no matter what cost to others: according to John Mill it is important to recognise that concern for the happiness of other people is a possible human motive, and one that ought to be made as strong as possible.
We will read first some extracts from J.S. Mill's earlier writings, on pp. 365-6 of the Readings book. On p. 366, LH side, 5 lines down, underline "two great elements", and in the margin write "wisdom" and "accountability" -- read from line 5 to the end of the paragraph. James Mill's argument for democracy was in terms of accountability: unless the government has to face elections in which every man can vote, it will govern in the interests of the rulers or their class. But if they have to face re-election then the rulers' interests become identical with the interests of the whole population. John Mill says that identity of interest (even if it were really attainable) is not the sole requisite of good government: the other requirement is that the rulers should be wiser than the uneducated mass. Read to the end of p. 366. (Pause.)
Some comments:
p. 365, fourth last line of the first paragraph:
"expediency" did not at the time (at least not in Mill's
usage) have connotations suggesting lack of moral principle.
"Expedient" here means simply what is most effective as a
means to some end.
Notice in the sentence in which this phrase occurs the implication that democracy will be appropriate under some circumstances and sometimes not: "If the bulk of any nation etc...., so far as respects that people". J.S. Mill did not think that democracy should exist everywhere and always. Re-read the remarks on the aristocratic government of Prussia (in the early 19th century) near the bottom of p. 365.
On p. 366, LH side, 3-quarters down, the dots indicate that what follows is from another of Mill's early essays. Here he is talking about "rational" democracy, as contrasted with more doctrinaire versions. Notice, five lines down, the sentence "A governing class not accountable to the people are sure, in the main...": this could have been written by James Mill, except for the qualification "in the main". James Mill thought that selfishness is absolutely inevitable. John Mill thinks it is very likely. Notice what he says about "class morality": an aristocratic ruling class will be restrained by morality, but their morality will be coloured by their class interest.
Half-way down the RH side, "nugatory" is from the Latin word for a cloud; it means "as insubstantial as a cloud", or in plainer language "unreal".
Looking back over these extracts you can see that John Mill had reservations about democracy, and emphasised the importance of the superior wisdom of an educated elite; but at the same time he acknowledges that rulers may seek their own interest at the expense of the governed unless they are in some way accountable to the whole population. The problem is to balance these two requirements -- orientation to the public good, and superior wisdom and independence; and how the balance is stuck and what are the best institutions to ensure proper balance -- democracy or aristocracy -- depends on the circumstances of the time and place.
Next we will read extracts from Mill's book Considerations on Representative Government, written much later, in 1861 (available online.)
Read p. 367. (Pause.) Some comments.
The first sentence indicates that Mill does not think that the ideally best form of government (which he thinks is popular government, something like democracy) is always possible, or always desirable ("eligible" means worthy of being chosen). Under some social circumstances popular government would not be a good thing, some non-democratic form of government might have better results.. It is ideal in the sense that when the circumstances are ideal, then it will have better results than any other form of government. The rest of the page explains why he thinks that. The argument is summed up in the last sentence: "no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others, can make it safe to tie up their own hands".
The word "polity", half way through the first paragraph, means "form of government". At the end of that paragraph notice the reference to "national character", and compare the last part of the next paragraph (the reference to "personal energies"). Mill is talking about what these days would be called culture. He is saying that one of the advantages of popular government is that it encourages what we might call an entrepreneurial culture, a culture of independent energetic action.
Notice the references to "universal selfishness" (James Mill's theory). John Mill does not believe in it: "For my own part, not believing in universal selfishness...". Still, he believes (or says that opponents of popular participation in government believe) that "most men consider themselves before other people". Selfishness is not universal, but it is pretty widespread. But "it is... not necessary to affirm even thus much" etc. (8 lines down p. 367 RH). All the case for popular participation need assume is that people tend to overlook or not understand the interests of others. As you will gather from the rest of the page, in 1861 working people did not have the vote in Britain. The suffrage was extended somewhat in 1867 (Mill was at that time a Liberal member of parliament, and spoke and voted for the extension), but it was not until the 20th century that the right to vote in Britain was extended to all members of the working classes.
Now make a mark on p. 368, RH, two-thirds down, after "immediate effects, beneficial", and read to there. (Pause.) Some comments. About 13 lines down, underline "democracy". Mill is arguing that democracy will not necessarily treat all classes justly. James Mill drew a contrast between rulers and ruled, and assumed that the ruled, the public, all shared the same interests. John Mill is pointing out that the population may be divided in its interests, and the majority may oppress a minority. The first instance, where the division is between whites and negroes, is a reference to the United States. Mill supported the North in the civil war. But he did not expect American democracy, in which the majority are whites, to do justice to the negroes. The second instance, where the division is between Catholics and Protestants, is Ireland. In Ireland as a whole the majority are Catholics; in Northern Ireland the majority is Protestant; no way of drawing boundaries will ensure that a democratic regime (either in Ireland as one country, or in Northern Ireland as a separate state) will do justice to both groups. The next instance, English/ Irish, is Great Britain at the time, when Ireland was governed from London. Modern politics has plenty of examples: the former Yugoslavia, Israel, South Africa, the Lebanon, Canada, etc. etc. In most cases the solution to the conflict will involve some sort of restriction on what the majority group can do, i.e. some departure from democracy -- some sort of "power sharing" between the groups, some guarantee of representation for the smaller group in Parliament, some constitutional guarantee of the minority's rights.
But then Mill comes to the division between rich and poor, and makes the same point. In a democracy the rich will be unjustly oppressed. Re-read the lower half of p. 368 LH side, and think of parallels in Australian politics and industrial conflict.
The next paragraph, beginning at the bottom of p. 368 LH, sounds very much like Macaulay. Remind yourself of Macaulay on p. 362-3., and re-read p. 368 RH. (Pause.) Three lines from the top, "oligarchy" means "rule by the few". "Aristocracy" means "rule by the best", who are few. Whether you call a regime an aristocracy or an oligarchy depends on whether you think the few are ruling well in everyone's interest, or selfishly in their own.
Read now to the bottom of p. 369 RH. (Pause.) This is Mill's remedy to the dangers arising from the conflict of interest between employers and employees: The representative body, Parliament, should be balanced between the two great classes. It should contain an equal number of representatives of both classes. This will give the balance of power to the minority of both classes who care about "reason, justice and the good of the whole". Three-quarters of the way down: "The representative system ought to be so constituted" etc. "It ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice and the other sectional interests combined". The employers are a minority; Mill is saying that they should be more represented than in proportion to their numbers. But as he said earlier, the working classes must also be represented in Parliament (as they were not at the time) -- but not in proportion to their numbers. This would not be democracy, if democracy means equal representation. Mill thinks that everyone should be represented, but not equally.
Make a mark at LH p. 370, before the paragraph beginning "I hasten to say", and read to there. (Pause.). This is clear enough. Mill is arguing for "plurality of votes", i.e. for giving everyone at least one vote, but some people more than one vote; this will ensure that everyone is represented, but give extra representation to some. On p. 370, 7 lines down, underline "a higher figure being assigned" etc. -- "suffrages" means votes. This passage is about superiority of wisdom (compare p. 366). How does it relate to the point made on p. 368, that the rich should be protected from the poor? Make a mark two lines from the end of p. 370 RH, and read to there. (Pause.)
What Mill is saying is that extra votes should go to greater intelligence, not to greater property or wealth, but that occupation is some measure of intelligence and education, and for that reason employers should get extra votes. I think there is some fluctuation in Mill's mind. Macaulay's argument implies that property, as such, should be protected, and I think Mill really thinks that. But notice on p. 370, LH, 5 lines up from the bottom, the reference to "permanent maintenance". Mill does not think that the "democracy" (by which he here means the common people, not a form of government), the common people will not permanently accept that property should be protected, but they will accept that superior education deserves more influence, especially if there are public examinations open to anyone to prove their right to extra votes. Extra votes for educated people will in effect protect property: even apart from the fact that it will be difficult for the desperately poor to qualify for the extra votes, it can be assumed that educated people will understand the long-run importance of repeat for property rights.
Make a mark near the end of p. 371, before the paragraph beginning "So much importance", and read to there. (Pause.)
This is clear enough. Notice the reference to voluntary examinations (halfway down LH p. 371).
Near the bottom of LH p. 371, where he says "though this exceptional privilege at present belongs" etc., you need to realise that in Britain at the time the electoral law was complicated and some people did have several votes -- notably, graduates of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge had a vote in the Oxford or Cambridge constituency and also in their place of residence. ("Constituency" means "electorate".)
On RH p. 371, a third of the way down, where he says "entirely levelled in some particular constituencies", realise that there were at the time in Britain different voting qualifications for different constituencies. He is saying that in some places every resident could have the vote without property qualification even though in other places a property qualification was maintained.
Mr Hare's plan is in effect what we call proportional representation (our Senate is elected under the "Hare-Clarke" system.) Hare's original suggestion was that voters should be allowed to choose which constituency to vote in. So if an advocate of some minority point of view stood for election in a certain constituency, then electors who favoured that point of view from all parts of the country could vote in that constituency, and if there were enough of them their candidate would be elected. In the modern versions of Hare's plan, voters are not allowed to vote except in the electorate in which they live, but each constituency returns several members, and the more strongly a political program is supported the more of its candidates are elected, but minority view still get represented provided the minority is not too small. (For fuller explanation see course materials vol. 3, "Voting systems".)
Make a mark at p. 372 RH half way down, before the paragraph beginning "In the preceding argument", and read to there. (Pause.)
Some comments. Second line of this passage, "whose votes are useless, because always outnumbered". If you are a Labor voter living in a safe Liberal electorate, your House of Representatives vote is wasted because your preferred candidate will certainly be defeated -- you might as well not vote at all. But your Senate vote is not wasted, because it will help elect one of the Senators returned by your State. This illustrates the point of Proportional Representation. Mill is thinking not of political parties but of minority points of view. Under "equal and universal suffrage", the enlightened minority (whichever that is) will always be outvoted and will be unrepresented in Parliament, unless the proportional representation system is adopted. If it is, then even equal and universal suffrage might be tolerable, Mill says.
Notice on p. 372, LH, how Mill is frankly elitist; he does not pretend to think that everyone is as wise as everyone else -- this is the "false creed" popular in America. Contrast this with the attitude of rational deference described on p. 366, LH side. (Pause.) He is not offering his proposals to be judged democratically by the majority: he is arguing that the people who presently have political power should not concede democracy unless some safeguards, such as the ones he suggests, are adopted. In writing Representative Government Mill regards himself as an enlightened person writing to persuade enlightened readers that they should support a version of democracy modified to make sure that the ignorant majority will not have power to override and disregard the views of the enlightened minority: everyone, including the ignorant, will have one vote, but educated people will have several votes, and the representative body will be balanced between the two great classes, so that the educated minority will have the balance of power.
Read now to the end of p. 373. This is pretty clear. "Universal but graduated suffrage" (first line of the passage) is the proposal that everyone should have at least one vote, but some should have more than one vote. The reference near the end to a woman now reigning means Queen Victoria; "the most glorious ruler whom that country ever had" is a reference to Elizabeth I.
Spend a few moments now looking back over these extracts from Representative Government, and then read the extract from Mill's Autobiography, pp. 374-5. (Pause.)
Some comments on the passage from the Autobiography. In the second line he refers to another person, also referred to below by "we". He means Mrs Harriet Taylor who became Mill's friend and later his wife.
He refers to several stages of his thinking: At first he was a Benthamite, educated as such by his father, James Mill, Jeremy Bentham's close friend. Then he went through a period of reaction against his father and against Bentham's opinions. Then, as he says, he turned back from what there had been of excess in his reaction against Bentham. In some respects, he says, his later opinions were more radical than they had been when he was in his first Benthamite phase, because he began to question the institution of private property. Hence he describes himself as a socialist. But he was less of a democrat than he had been as a Benthamite: "so long as education continues to be so wretchedly imperfect, we dreaded the ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass". The rest of the extract relates to socialism, and refers to the "Chapters on Socialism" of his book, The Principles of Political Economy.
"Socialism" is a word with many different meanings. Some use it very narrowly to mean the state ownership of the means of production. Mill was not a socialist in that sense. Originally the word "Socialism" was intended to contrast with "individualism". Socialists were people who emphasised in some way the importance of fellowship, fraternity, social solidarity, against what they saw as the individualism of others. Instead of thinking of the human race as a set of competing individuals relatively indifferent to one another's fate, they tried to apply more widely the attitudes ideally found within families. Mill became a socialist both in this broad sense and also in a narrower sense (though not in the narrowest sense of state ownership of the means of production), that he did not think that the rights of private property owners were sacrosanct. For example, toward the end of his life he advocated what we might call a capital gains tax on land, arguing that the increase in the value of land due to increase of population should be appropriated by the public through taxation. He also advocated restrictions on the right of bequest: he suggested that there should be an upper limit on what one person could inherit from all sources. On the ownership of the means of production, he thought that factories should eventually be owned and controlled by the people who work in them (not by the state, but by the workers in the enterprise).
For Mill's views on social inequalities see in volume 3 of the Course Materials, "Free enterprise and its critics", near the end.
Historians classify Mill not as a Socialist nor as a democrat, but as a liberal. J.S. Mill is in fact regarded as the chief 19th century advocate of liberalism. Liberalism is a political and social creed or platform consisting of a number of different elements.
Part of it is summed up by the early 19th century Whig
slogan, "civil and religious liberty".
Liberals believed in religious toleration, freedom of
association, freedom of speech, and in the other freedoms that
repressive political regimes curtail.
So much of 19th century liberalism has become the basis of modern thinking that you may not see it as anything distinctive. The main distinctive elements are a strong preference for market mechanisms rather than government action, and, especially in 19th century liberalism, an emphasis on the importance of property rights, to the extent of opposing democracy as long as it seemed a threat to property -- the elimination of unjust inequalities takes second place to the security of property.
You have now completed the essential reading for Week 1. Let me point out the relevant optional reading, and then I will give you some tutorial paper topics.
On p. 376 of the Readings book there is a chapter from Mill's Principles of Political Economy, the chapter on the "Laissez-faire" principle, i.e., on free enterprise. If you look now in vol. 3 of the course materials, in the table of contents, see two lectures, "Democracy in Australia", and "Liberal Democracy", and an essay, "Free enterprise and its critics". You won't have time to read all of this this week, but try to read at least "Democracy in Australia" and "Liberal Democracy", if you have time after preparing your tutorial paper, which internal students should hand in at the tutorial in week 2.
Write a page, not much more, on any one of the following:
(1) What is Macaulay's criticism of democracy? Do you think it has any force?
(2) What was Macaulay's criticism of James Mill's view of human nature?
(3) What were John Stuart Mill's opinions on democracy?
(4) Would anything like Mill's plan of extra votes for educated people be a good idea?
This is the end of the first cassette.
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