John Kilcullen
Copyright (c) 1996, R.J. Kilcullen.
Several elements can be distinguished in morality:
Darwin's theory will explain (1) easily enough. That sort of behaviour is conducive to the survival, welfare and reproduction of those who engage in it. However, this is only the lowest level of morality; perhaps it isn't morality at all but enlightened self-interest.
Darwin himself puts most emphasis on (2). A tribe whose members treat one another well will prevail in competition with other tribes, or will do well in adverse natural circumstances, and will therefore gradually predominate among the human species. The difficulty, however, is to understand why individuals disposed to give consideration to the wishes of other members of the group are not removed by natural selection. To be constrained by the interests of others, even of friends and other members of the tribe, will in some circumstances burden the individual and reduce his or her chances of surviving and propagating.
Modern Darwinists can deal with this objection so far as it refers to relatives. People who help their relatives may not themselves have so many offspring, but as a result of their behaviour the kin group will have more surviving offspring who will carry the genes of the self-sacrificing individuals. Thus the genes that dispose people to behave that way will not be eliminated by natural selection but will in fact do well in competition with the genes of people who do not help relatives. (See Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, chapter 6.)
But this theory does nothing to explain (3). Although the modern Darwinian theory is sometimes said to provide an explanation of "altruism", altruism goes beyond helpfulness to kin. It seems clear that there is in human beings a disposition to treat every human being, even strangers and foreigners, with consideration for their welfare even when they cannot reciprocate or retaliate--otherwise we wouldn't have such concepts as nepotism, favouritism, prejudice, racism, chauvinism, as things to be avoided. How is it possible, on Darwin's "tribal" theory or on the "kin" theory of modern Darwinians, that some people object when their own nation or tribe or group are being unfair to outsiders? In almost every war there has been an ethically-motivated anti-war movement. At the end of the eighteenth century Charles James Fox and his group of Whigs spoke out against the British campaign against the French Revolution. Cobden and Bright spoke out against the Crimean War. Various Liberals opposed the Boer War. There was opposition to World War I, to the Vietnam war, to the Gulf War (some of the American military leaders also seem to have been moved by moral considerations to limit the killing). In World War II there was opposition to the policy of area bombing. In peace time there are organisations to collect money to send to the poor in other countries, obviously without any expectation that the action will be reciprocated. Kin preference is clearly a stronger force than universalist morality, but the latter does have some influence, and it is not accounted for by the current theory.
Perhaps an evolutionary explanation of universalistic morality might be found in the idea that a good deal of variation is "neutral", i.e. that there are variations that make no difference to survival and propagation. In the early history of the human species a disposition to help any human being would have had much the same effect as a disposition to help one's kin, since at that time (when presumably people did not move around as much as they do now) most of the human beings a person would meet would be kin. The explanation might be, then, that if such a disposition happened to arise it would not be weeded out by natural selection and would spread for the same reason as helpfulness to kin would spread.
What about kindness to animals? Perhaps there is a disposition to treat well any potentially friendly animal, humans included.
Above I have been discussing the question whether evolutionary theory is able to account for the existence in human beings of moral dispositions. The question of "foundations" is different. This means, can evolutionary theory provide us with a reason for being moral? (Compare the question raised by the story of Gyges' ring in Plato's Republic (search to Gyges, and read the context.)
Perhaps morality has no foundation outside itself. (See note, "Divine Command as the Foundation of Morality".)
It seems pretty clear that an evolutionary explanation will not provide a foundation for morality. An attempt would be to say that we ought to observe morality because moral conduct enhances the survival chances of our genes. But why should we care about that? We do care about it, perhaps, but if we don't (or didn't), why should we? Or it might be said that moral behaviour on my part improves the survival chances of humanity generally (or of sentient beings generally, or of the planet . . ). The same question arises: if I don't in fact care about such things, can evolutionary theory give any reason why I should?
On the other hand, it seems that the evolutionary explanation may undermine committment to morality. Once morality is seen as serving some purpose, it becomes possible to ask how much we care about that purpose in comparison with other things. Morality is no longer "categorical" or over-riding.
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