Copyright © 1996 R.J. Kilcullen
To use this reading guide you will need to have before you either the course Readings book or J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism.
On the face of it, this is not the way evaluations are usually made. For example, we decide whether an act is right or wrong by reference to rules of morality; to say that justice requires something is not to say simply that it will make human beings happier.
So as you read the extracts from Mill's Utilitarianism, ask whether Utilitarianism can account for, or improve on, the normal methods of making evaluations, and (if not) whether it should replace the normal methods.
J.S. Mill was not the inventor of Utilitarianism, though he seems to have invented the word. The theory denoted by the word is essentially the moral theory of David Hume (who had predecessors, such as Hutcheson). Mill's father, James Mill, and his father's friend, Jeremy Bentham, and also the writer on Jurisprudence, John Austin, were exponents of the same theory. J.S. Mill's book Utilitarianism set out to defend the doctrine of James Mill and Bentham against criticism, modifying it somewhat in the process.
The edition we use is in J.S. Mill, Collected Works, ed. J.M. Robson et al., University of Toronto Press.
Line 4, "Pleasure": not merely physical pleasure but any kind of pleasure
P.218 line 3, "Not the agent's own happiness": Utilitarianism is not a form of Egoism.
P.218 lines 5-6, "Impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator": cf. Adam Smith. "Disinterested" here does not mean uninterested or not interested; it means impartial.
Notice the reference to Jesus of Nazareth. J.S. Mill was never a Christian, but nothing he published would have indicated this to the reading public, most of whom in those days were Christians.
"Disinterested" does not mean not interested. It means impartial, not motivated by self-interest.
The practical calculus as explained by Jeremy Bentham goes like this: tabulate all the pleasures and all the pains likely to result from each of the possible courses of action (including inaction)--include all results likely to be experienced by all persons affected; add up the net pleasure or net pain for each possible course of action, counting equally the pleasures and pains of different people--as Bentham said, "each to count for one, no one for more than one" (this is impartiality); then choose and carry out the possible course of action that has the largest net balance of pleasure or smallest net balance of pain.
Mill recognises that there may well be a clash between an individual's desire for his/her own happiness and the requirement of impartiality. Social arrangements will have to be designed so as to harmonise the interests of individuals, and moral education will have to develop habits of caring about other people.
READ Ch.2, pp. 219-220.
P. 220, line 18, "things which people forbear to do, from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial": For example, to tell a lie, or to steal, might on some occasions be beneficial not only to the agent but to mankind generally, but even on those occasions they are opposed by "moral considerations", i.e. by the moral rules against lying or stealing. Compare Hume's remark that the connection of rules of justice with interest is "somewhat singular", Treatise p.497 (in POL167 Readings, p.346)
READ Ch.2, p. 223.
"Expediency" in Mill's language means generally just usefulness, without any implication of wrongness--without contrast with principle. In this paragraph, however, he does use the term in its bad sense.
READ Ch.2, pp. 224-6.
"Sanction" in the chapter title is a word with various meanings. Here it means penalty for violation.
On p.227, in the second paragraph, and on p.228 the various references to Christ and to God do not imply that Mill is a believer.
P.228, 6 lines down, the distinction between external and internal sanctions is borrowed from Jeremy Bentham.
The paragraph begining "So far as to external sanctions" is about the internal sanction, and here (at the end of the paragraph) we meet Mill's account of conscience. You should compare it with Adam Smith's. Five lines into this paragraph, "disinterested" again does not mean uninterested, but impartial or objective.
READ Ch.3 pp.230,233
In the paragraph beginning "It is not necessary" Mill leaves it an open question whether the feeling of duty is innate, that is inborn or instinctive, or something learnt in the course of life. In the next paragraph he rejects the notion of an innate or instinctive or natural morality: "if as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate." On the naturalness of morality compare Hume, Treatise p.484 (POL167 Readings, p.343).
Compare p.233 with Adam Smith on Sympathy. Mill does not put as much emphasis on sympathy in the sense of sharing the feelings of other people; the corresponding notion in Mill's theory is that of concern for the happiness of others. Smith would make the same criticism of Mill as he did of Hume--that they look to effects (in Mill's case effects on the happiness of others) when they should look to motives or causes (see Smith TMS, p.18, paragraph 8 [Readings, p.3])
The argument that happiness is desirable because it is desired in weak, and the argument that the general happiness is everyone's goal because each desires his or her own happiness is even weaker. Mill really has no proof of the utility principle, and as he says in the first sentence of the chapter a first principle cannot be proved. As Henry Sidgwick (the leading Utilitarian of the late 19th century) acknowledged, Utilitarianism rests upon an intuitive principle.
The interesting thing about this chapter is how Mill handles the objection that virtue is an end in itself, not desirable merely as a means to the general happiness. On p.235 in the paragraph beginning, "But does the utilitarian doctrine", 5 lines down, underline "only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue", viz. happiness, and near the end of the paragraph underline "not naturally and originally part of the end". Now go back, and at lines 12 or 13 from the top of the paragraph, underline "The mind is... not in the state most conducive to the general happiness", and several lines down "even although... it should not produce those other desirable consequences". This can be understood by reference again to Hume's remarks on the "singular connection" between justice and interest (Treatise, p.497, POL167 Readings p.346). Hume says:
However single acts of justice may be contrary either to public or private interest, 'tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive... to the support of society and the well being of every individual [i.e. in Mill's terms to the general happiness]. Though in one instance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule and the peace and order which it establishes in society.Similarly Mill is saying that the whole plan or scheme of being virtuous furthers the general happiness even though in particular instances virtuous acts may not have beneficial consequences. And part of this plan or scheme is that the commitment to virtue should be disinterested, principled, not to virtue only as a means but to virtue as an end in itself. What he says toward the end of this paragraph is meant to remove the paradox: underline "utility does not mean that any given pleasure", "a means to a collective something called happiness", and "they are part of the end". These comments bring Mill close to Aristotle who held that happiness is the good or goal of human life and that happiness consists in the doing of virtuous actions. Aristotle did not think that happiness consists in pleasure, though to the virtuous virtuous action gives pleasure.
READ now p.239
Virtue is a habit or set of habits. The importance of good habit is like Hume's "whole plan or scheme"--virtuous habit commits a person reliably to the steady prosecution of the rules of morality.
In the first sentence underline "common attributes" and "surveying the objects". Mill wants to formulate a definition of justice, to formulate what is common to instances of justice, so he surveys various instances and discusses various opinions about what justice requires, looking for the single "Form" in which all the instances share (as Plato would say--Mill's method here is Platonic).
The paragraph, "secondly", considers a question we met with in Calvin and Locke and in other authors, whether it is ever just to disobey the law. Underline at the end of this paragraph the phrase "moral right", and underline, in the paragraph before this one, the phrase "legal rights".
Some of the questions touched on in this survey of diverse opinions will be taken up again later in the chapter.
Now READ pages 246-248
This is a scheme of division and subdivision (as in Plato):
READ now pp.248-249
What Mill is saying here is close to Adam Smith. In Articles and Chapters, in the chapter by Haakonssen, see pp.83-86, for similar ideas.
Like Adam Smith, Mill rejects the hypothesis of a special moral sense; he must therefore offer some other explanation of the strength of the sentiment of justice.
He has to counter one of the objections against Utilitarianism, namely that it cannot account for the fact that justice has a specially strong sentiment attached to it that gives it a higher priority than mere usefulness or expediency: if, as Mill holds, morality is a matter of utility and justice is part of morality, how can justice out-rank utility? His answer is that it can do so because of the very high ranking, in terms of utility, of the rights which justice protects. Adam Smith did not think that morality or justice were a matter of utility, but he also emphasised, like Mill, that justice is concerned to protect people from being pushed into the depths of misery; and that, according to Adam Smith, gives justice a special priority.
In the fourth paragraph on p.248, underline "self defence" and "sympathy".
Two paragraphs down, underline "what is moral is the exclusive subordination of it to the social sympathies", and a little further down "in the directions comformable to the general good".
This like Adam Smith's theory. But there is a difference: for Smith the criterion is the impartial spectator's going along with the feeling of resentment that motivates the infliction of punishment. Mill's theory is like Hume's, that the criterion is the usefulness of punishment.
In the next paragraph underline "no other reason than general utility". This means that there are no natural innate rights. What counts as a right will depend on what is useful in the current state of society. Mill's rights are like Hume's conventions.
Mill's account of rights is that they are general claims which society sanctions because of the utility of doing so. This means that in different ages and cultures rights will be different (indeed, in some there may be no rights), because the circumstances determine what sort of general claims (if any) it would be useful to sanction.
A little further down, underline "extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility", "security" and "the most vital of all interests". This is reminiscent of Hobbes.
The rest of this paragraph is Mill's answer to the objection that Utilitarianism can't account for the very high priority we give to justice over mere usefulness or expediency.
In this passage Mill goes on the attack, against Intuitionism (i.e. against theories, such as Thomas Aquinas's theory of natural law, according to which the basic moral principles are self-evident axioms). The first paragraph of this passage gives a clear statement of what these theories hold. At the beginning of p.252 underline "not some one rule", "but many", "do not always coincide", "choosing", "extraneous standard". Mill's own position is that we must appeal to an extraneous standard, the utility principle. This is "extraneous" in the sense that it is not itself one of the rules of justice. ("Extraneous" here does not mean irrelevant, but "coming from outside"). To resolve conflicts among rules of justice, if we are not just to follow our personal predilections, we must appeal to the external objective standard of social utility.
The next few paragraphs illustrate this contention by going over the various instances he surveyed at the beginning of this chapter (p.241).
On p.252, 12 lines down, "Mr Owen" is Robert Owen, who was referred to in Mill's Logic, p.840 (p.63 of Readings).
Five lines further down underline "without going down to the principles which lie under justice"--this is Mill's point in this section, that there may be conflict among rules of justice, which can only be resolved by recourse to the more basic Utility Principle.
On p.253, the paragraph beginning "Again," 2nd line, underline "many conflicting conceptions of justice". The conflict discussed in the rest of this paragraph is still going on in politics today, in "law and order" campaigns. The view expressed at the end of the paragraph, that it is not just to inflict any suffering beyond the least that will suffice to deter future offences, is the traditional opinion among educated and liberal people (going back at least to Plato), and the opposite opinion, "an eye for an eye", seems lately to be gaining ground.
The next paragraph relates to wage justice. Fourteen lines down from the top of p.254 underline "conflicting principles". The first opinion, the negative side, is these days expressed more at the level of social justice--that while wages should be unequal, people who are handicapped in any way should be helped through social service. Again this is the liberal opinion, lately losing ground.
Eight lines down p.255 underline "there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian". Mill does not spell out how Utilitarians deal with these cases. Presumably they estimate the costs and benefits of each option, and choose the one that yields the greatest net benefit to everyone, counting each person's interest as equal to everyone else's--not an easy evaluation to make!
Read p.255-end
"Is, then, the difference between the Just and the Expedient a merely imaginary distinction?" This is the question which this chapter has tried to answer. Mill's answer is No, justice and expediency are distinct as species from genus: Justice is the species or sub-division of expediency that is concerned with the most vital interest of security, to protect which society guarantees (because it is beneficial or expedient to do so) certain rights to certain persons.
Underline, in the middle of this paragraph "Justice is a name for a certain class of moral rules, which concerns the essentials of human well-being", "a right residing in an individual". What Mill goes on to say is reminiscent of Adam Smith, as presented in Haakonnsen's chapter in Articles and Chapters.
On p.257, 9 lines up from the footnotes, "a direct emanation from the first principle": Mill seems to be wrong here. That people's interests should be given equal consideration does not imply equality in any other sense. Suppose a greedy person who will be greatly distressed not to get the thing, and another person who would not mind so much: then maximising human happiness would mean giving the thing to the greedy person. Secondary principles of morality (e.g. rules of justice) may prevent this and require equal shares, but the Utility Principle does not itself directly require equality.
In the same paragraph, "the equal claim... to happiness... involves an equal claim to all the means of happiness": Not so. Some people may be made happier than others would be by getting possession of a given share the means of happiness.
Further down he speaks of a "right to equality of treatment": But it seems that the Utilitarian cannot establish this right directly from the Utility Principle ("act so as to maximise human happiness"), but only through an argument for recognising a right to equality of treatment as a secondary principle. (Thus it might be argued that there will be too much damaging conflict, detrimental to the general happiness, unless we all recognise a right to equality of treatment in certain specified respects.)
P.259, 12 lines down, "though particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important as to overrule any one of the general maxims ofjustice". Go back to p.255 (4 lines up from the paragraph beginning "The moral rules which forbid") and underline "more", and on p.258, 7 lines down, "bends", and 6 lines from the end of the book "though not more so": Note from these passages that Mill envisages cases in which rules of justice will be overridden by some other moral rule which is not a rule of justice. Apparently the relative importance of justice somehow depends on how the issue of justice is embodied in the concrete case. This implies that the morally relevant features of concrete cases cannot all be grasped abstractly: otherwise it would be possible to formulate the rules in such a way that rules of justice always took precedence in cases to which they apply (e.g., "a promise must be kept except when...": in cases covered by the exception this rule would not apply); or we could have a set of priority rules determining which rule takes precedence in case of conflict. It seems that according to Mill moral decisions can not be made by applying abstract rules, we must somehow deliberate with our eye on the concrete case.
The notion that moral decision making cannot simply be a matter of mechanically applying rules is reminiscent of Aristotle (recall Aristotle's emphasis on prudence or practical wisdom--the mean is "relative to us", we must learn what prudence requires by associating with people who have that virtue). In the 20th century the Aristotelian scholar, W.D. Ross, in The Right and the Good, ch.2, suggested that moral decision is a matter of "weighing" sometimes conflicting prima facie obligations. Prima facie means "on the face of it". One prima facie obligation may be "outweighed" by another and then it is not actually an obligation. When we look at some situation we may see, on the face of it, an obligation to keep some promise (for example), but when we look more closely we see some other morally relevant feature of the case that suggests action inconsistent with the promise. We ought to keep a promise, but we also ought to help someone in distress. If we see an accident on the way to keep an appointment, do we break the appointment to help the accident victim? According to Ross, no general answer can be given: we must "weigh" the promise in its concrete application in the case, and also "weigh" the duty to help in its concrete application, and then fulfil whatever we come to feel is the weightier obligation in the situation. This is a revival of intuitionism. Ross's criterion is not Mill's social utility, but the felt weight of an obligation considered concretely. (Compare Adam Smith's contention that moral rules are generalisations of decisions made on the basis of feeling in particular cases.)
Turn to Articles and Chapters, p.52, and you will find a reply to Urmson's article by J.D. Mabbott (reprinted from Studies in Utilitarianism, ed. J.K Hearn, New York, 1971, p. 161 ff). Mabbott takes G.E. Moore as the orthodox exponent of Utilitarianism. Seven lines down from the beginning of the article underline "actions", and in the second line of the next paragraph underline "orthodox". On p.164, 8 lines down, the word "heuristic" means "aiding discovery". Read Mabbott's article. Go back and mark a few passages as especially important. In the middle of p.164 underline, "No, there are occasions when, though you see another route leads to the general happiness, you must follow the signpost". On p.165, 5 lines down, underline "when more good will be done by some alternative", and on p.166 2/3, underline "would never have known".
According to some of the participants in the discussion that arose from Urmson's article, Rule Utilitarianism makes no sense, at least not as a version of Utilitarianism. How can it be better for the general happiness to follow a set of rules even in some cases in which the rules exclude some action that would be better for the general happiness than any action they permit, than to follow the simple policy of doing in each case what will in that case best further the general happiness?
Turn now to Articles and Chapters, p. 57, to Kilcullen, "Utilitarianism and Virtue" (originally published in Ethics, 93 (1983), p. 451ff).
Four lines down, underline "what is lost in the odd cases".
At the end of the next paragraph underline "By virtue I mean"; next page, 2/3 of the way down, just before (b), underline "then there will be some loss".
Two pages on, about the middle, underline "the appearance of loss...may not be removed".
Two pages further, 9 lines down, underline "a state of character which guarantees that we will obey the rules even when no one is watching". (Recall Gyges' ring).
On p.462 notice the paragraph, "so a gap opens between expediency and morality".
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