Note 2. The term 'voluntarism' seems to have been introduced by historians in the 19th century. As applied to Ockham and other medieval thinkers it seems to cover four possible positions:

1. the rather vague thesis that the will is a nobler faculty than the intellect;

2. the thesis that in the beatific vision of God in heaven, the human will is in some way more important than intellect;

3. in relation to natural law, the thesis that the laws of nature bind as laws only because they are imposed on us as laws by God's will;

4. the thesis that the content of the law of nature is determined by God's will, so that (for example) if God willed it adultery would be a morally good action.

Propositions (3) and (4) are distinct. It might be that the content of the law of nature is independent of any will and discoverable by reason, and yet it might become law, binding and obligatory, only by being imposed by an authoritative will. This seems to be Hobbes's view (cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 216-7). Duns Scotus and William of Ockham also seem to hold the third thesis, but in this paper I will be concerned with Ockham's position in relation to the fourth. It should be noted that 'natural law' in the middle ages meant the moral law, not the 'laws' formulated by the physical sciences.

Note 3. 'It would seem, then, at least at first sight, that we are faced with what amounts to two moral theories in Ockham's philosophy. On the one hand there is his authoritarian [voluntarist] conception of the moral law. It would appear to follow from this conception that there can be only a revealed moral code. For how otherwise than through revelation could man know a moral code which depends entirely on God's free choice? Rational deduction could not give us knowledge of it. On the other hand there is Ockham's insistence on right reason, which would seem to imply that reason can discern what is right and what is wrong . . . That there is truth in the contention that two moral theories are implicit in Ockham's ethical teaching can hardly, I think, be denied.' Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 3, part 1 (Westminster, 1953), pp. 118-9.

Note 4. The studies I have found most useful are: Marilyn McCord Adams, 'The Structure of Ockham's Moral Theory', Franciscan Studies, 46 (1986), pp. 1-35; David W. Clark, 'Voluntarism and Rationalism in the Ethics of Ockham', Franciscan Studies, 31 (1971), pp. 72-87; David W. Clark, 'William of Ockham on Right Reason', Speculum, 48 (1973), pp. 13-36; David W. Clark, 'Ockham on Human and Divine Freedom', Franciscan Studies, 38 (1978), pp. 122-60; Lucan Freppert, The Basis of Morality According to William Ockham (Chicago, 1988); Linwood Urban, 'William of Ockham's Theological Ethics', in Franciscan Studies, 33 (1973), pp. 310-50. All of these historians in some way interpret Ockham as holding that the fundamental principles of morality include obedience to God's will and that these principles are not, or not all, dependent on God's will.

Note 5. For example, Thomas Aquinas (though his theory is often misinterpreted as an example of the first kind). See Summa theologica, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, where he likens the precepts of natural law to the first principles of demonstration. (In that article he goes on to order natural laws in relation to the ends to which man has a natural inclination, but this does not mean that the first principles are proved by argument from natural inclination.) According to Duns Scotus, natural laws in the strict sense of the term are known per se, are immutable, and are not dependent upon any will. See A. Wolter (ed. and tr.), Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, 1986), pp. 263, 275-81.

Note 6. This does not mean that they are analytic propositions; in Scholastic terminology propositions per se nota are a larger class than analytic propositions (see Aristotle, Anal. Post., I.4). In Ockham's terminology such propositions are known by abstractive rather than intuitive knowledge, but in the modern sense of the term I believe his moral theory is intuitionist.

Note 7. 'A cognition that deduces conclusions syllogistically from principles that are known either per se or through experience is demonstrative. But moral learning is like this'; Quodl. II, q. 14, tr. Freddoso and Kelley, pp. 148-50.

Note 8. See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, 1930), chapter 2. The historical connection between Ross and Ockham is Aristotle, whose ethics contains intuitionist elements; see B. H. Baumrin, 'Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionism', The New Scholasticism, 42 (1968), pp. 1-17.

Note 9. Answering Marsilius's argument that unless there is one ruler there will be occasions on which subjects do not know which court to attend, Ockham says that since 'a general rule cannot be given for every case to decide whom they should go to . . . it should be left to the discretion of a prudent person [to decide - intuitively] which he should appear before, because in such matters, because of the multiplicity of the cases that can happen, it is not possible to give a general rule that never fails.'Eight Questions, 3.12

Note 10. Translations of Canon law are from E. Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas (New York, 1974), of civil law from S. P. Scott, The Civil Law (New York, 1937).

Note 11. See translation of Rufinus in Lewis, vol. 1, p. 35.

Note 12. Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica (Quarrachi, 1924-48), vol. 4, p. 350.

Note 13. Bonaventure, II Sent., d. 44, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4.

Note 14. See A. Wolter (ed. and tr.), Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, 1986), pp. 263, 275-81.

Note 15. Duns Scotus, IV Sent., d. 15, q. 2, in Opera Omnia (Paris, 1894), vol. 18, pp. 256-8, 265. See Wolter, op. cit., pp. 311-17.

Note 16. For Ockham's academic writings see Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Theologica, ed. Gedeon Gal et al. (St Bonaventure, 1967-); for a translation of volume 9 see William of Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, tr. A.J. Freddoso and F. Kelley (New Haven, 1991). For the Work of Ninety Days and Eight Questions, see Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera politica, ed. H.S. Offler et al. (Manchester, 1940-); for the Breviloquium see William of Ockham, A Short Discourse on Tyrannical Government, ed. A.S. McGrade, tr. John Kilcullen (Cambridge, 1992). The Dialogus is quoted from William of Ockham, A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. A.S. McGrade, tr. John Kilcullen (Cambridge, 1995).

Note 17. Cf. Locke, Essay, IV.iii.18.

Note 18. According to Scotus, some moral propositions are 'true by reason of their terms . . . prior to any act of the will, or at least they would be true even if, to assume the impossible, no act of willing existed'; Wolter, op. cit., p. 275. Cf. the famous remark of Grotius, 'etiamsi daremus . . . non esse deum', quoted and compared with its medieval antecedents in A-H. Chroust, 'Hugo Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition', The New Scholasticism, 17 (1943), p. 115.

Note 19. Quodl. II, q. 14, tr. Freddoso and Kelley, pp. 148-50; my italics. A similar point is made in III Dial., II, 1.5, where the Master distinguishes three kinds of natural law: [1] 'Some are self-evident principles, or follow or are taken from such self-evident principles in morals; and about such natural laws no one can err or even doubt. One can, however, be ignorant of them, because it is possible not to think and never to have thought of them . . . [2] There are other natural laws that are drawn plainly and without great consideration from the first principles of the law . . . [3] There are other natural laws that are inferred from the first natural laws by few even of the experts, with great attention and study and through many intermediate propositions.' It is clear from this passage that Ockham holds that all natural laws are inferred from self-evident principles of morality.

Note 20. For a discussion see Brian Tierney, 'Natural Law and Canon Law in Ockham's Dialogus', in J.G. Rowe (ed.), Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society: Essays Presented to J.R. Lander (Toronto, *).

Note 21. That natural law was in some sense divine law was asserted by Gratian, Decreta, d. 1, ante 1, and c. 1. Later, in III Dial. II, 3.6, the Master explains that every natural law is from God, who is the creator of nature. Also, every law contained or implied in the bible is divine law, and in the bible there are certain general propositions from which, either alone or with other premises, every natural law of all three kinds can be inferred. Elsewhere Ockham quotes in this connection Matthew 7:12, 'Do unto others'; this is no doubt one of the 'general propositions' referred to here.

Note 22. Short Discourse, p. 69.

Note 23. See, for example, Short Discourse, IV.4, p. 112.

Note 24. It was the common opinion that in situations of extreme necessity one could use another's property without permission. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II-II, q. 66, a. 7.

Note 25. The right to use things is not property. Although the right to use is a natural right, Copleston is mistaken in saying that according to Ockham 'Man has a natural right to property' (op. cit., p. 124). See Short Discourse, III.7, pp. 87-90.

Note 26. Elsewhere in the Work of Ninety Days Ockham says that human positive law establishing property rights could not have been enacted but for sin. 'Through iniquity' property was established, meaning not 'wickedly' but 'because of wickedness'; and it was established in accordance with one kind of natural equity (a synonym for 'natural law'). Ockham quotes the gloss to canon law, '"Through iniquity", that is, through a custom of the law of nations, contrary to natural equity', and adds: 'that is, this custom is contrary to the natural equity that would have existed in the state of innocence, and also to the natural equity that should exist among men following reason in all things [cf. the second kind of natural law]; but that custom is not contrary to the natural equity that exists among men inclined to dissension and bad action' (Work of Ninety Days, 92.21-30, p. 669). Supposing the fall from innocence, natural law (divine law) gave the human race a power they did not have before to agree with one another to establish property rights, thereby restricting the natural right to use all things. See Short Discourse, III.7-9, pp. 87-93.

Note 27. Work of Ninety Days, 66.47-9, p. 581. The passage continues: 'and the opposite cannot be enacted by human law, for the law would be iniquitous, contrary to the order of charity, and contrary to the teaching of Christ, who says in Matthew 7[:12], "All things, therefore, whatsoever that you would wish men to do to you, so also do you to them; for this is the law and the prophets"'.

Note 28. Thomas Aquinas: 'When Abraham consented to slay his son (Genesis 22), he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, who is lord of life and death. For he it is who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be . . . the precepts of the decalogue . . . are unchangeable; but as to any determination by application to individual actions - for instance that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not - in this point they admit of change; sometimes by divine authority alone . . . sometimes also by human authority'; Summa, I-II, q. 100, a. 8, ad 3. In other words, what would have been murder was not, because of God's command. Ockham says more bluntly that God made an exception to the rule against killing the innocent.

Note 29. III Dial., II, I.5, quoted partly in note 19 above. Ignorance of the first kind of natural laws 'excuses no one, because even if we have never before thought of them, such natural laws occur [to us] immediately when we are obliged to do or omit something in accordance with them, unless we will to proceed to the act, or to omit such act, without any deliberation and rule of reason. Ignorance of such a law in such a case therefore proceeds from negligence or contempt deserving of condemnation and therefore does not excuse. For if, on some occasion, someone is tempted to kill an innocent person who never did harm, then immediately, if he wills to deliberate, even briefly, about whether he should kill him, it will occur [to him] that he should not kill him; and therefore, if without any deliberation he kills him, such ignorance does not excuse him.'

Note 30. According to Scotus the second table of the decalogue consists of laws 'very consonant with' natural law but not strictly part of it. Ockham does not follow him in downgrading the second table.

Note 31. Quaest. variae, q. 8, vol. 8, p. 424.

Note 32. The fundamental principle, if there is one, is not the only premise from which moral judgments are derived. It will constitute the major premise common to practical syllogisms, but minor premises will be supplied by other intuitive principles and by experience. The moral virtues are connected 'in one way in respect of the general practical principles of all virtue; these principles are partial premises inferring practical conclusions, and when they are had acts of virtues can be elicited in the will, and without them not. Example: This is one such principle, "Everything dictated by right reason on account of a due end (and so of other circumstances) is to be done". Another: "Every good dictated by right reason is to be loved". These and many others are principles common to all virtues without which the virtuous act cannot be elicited'; III Sent., q. 12 (vol. 6, p. 425). The answer to Clark's suggestion ('Right Reason', p. 28; 'Voluntarism and Rationalism', p. 85) that Ockham's basic principle is 'contentless' is that it does not stand alone; it is applied in conjunction with other premises. Pierre Bayle's ethical system is similar: there is just one basic divine commandment written into the human mind, 'Act on the truth'; as we come to know other truths (including the truth that what seems true may not be and that we should therefore investigate) we acquire our various obligations. See Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth, pp. 75-6.

Note 33. Duns Scotus does. See Duns Scotus on Will and Morality, p. 200.

Note 34. 'In God the act of will and the act of intellect and the will are in every way the same, nor is the act of will more distinguished from the will than the will is distinguished from the will'; I Sent., d. 10, q. 1 (vol. 3, p. 329). 'And when it is said that 'the intellect is the noblest power', I concede it; and similarly the will is the noblest power, because the power that is the intellect and that which is the will are in no way distinguished a parte rei or a parte rationis . . . because they are names signifying the same, connoting precisely distinct acts, namely of understanding and of willing'; I Sent., d. 1, q. 2 (vol. 1, p. 402). Cf. II Sent., q. 20 (vol. 5, p. 441).

Note 35. Thus Copleston says that in Ockham's eyes 'the moral law, including the whole decalogue, is the arbitrary creation of the divine will'; op. cit., vol. 2, part 2, p. 273.

Note 36. Quaest. variae, q. 7, vol. 8, p. 395.

Note 37. Quaest. variae, q. 8, vol. 8, p. 409-10.

Note 38. Clark, 'Right Reason', adduces this passage as evidence that in Ockham's moral theory the authority of right reason does not depend on God's will.

Note 39. Quaest. variae, q. 8, vol. 8, p. 411.

Note 40. Quaest. variae, q. 8, vol. 8, p. 436.

Note 41. For a discussion of the term see Clark, 'Right Reason', pp. 15-16.

Note 42. On the first of these two passages Copleston comments: 'In other words, the ultimate and sufficient reason why we ought to follow right reason or conscience is that God wills that we should do so' (op. cit., vol. 3, part 1, p. 121). Rather: Given that obedience to God is one of the basic principles, the fact that an act would be contrary to God's command is a sufficent, but not necessarily the ultimate, reason why it should not be done.

Note 43. Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, I.1.

Note 44. I Sent., d. 1, q. 5, and q. 4, vol. 1, pp. 464, 447. Cf. Scotus, in Wolter, op. cit., p. 425.

Note 45. Not necessarily by divine command, perhaps by natural reason.

Note 46. Quodl. III, q. 14, tr. Freddoso and Kelley, p. 213.

Note 47. Referring to the possibility of a divine command to hate God, Suarez writes: 'A certain contradiction would be involved in such a situation; for obedience to God is a virtual love of him, and the obligation to obey springs above all from love; therefore it would be contrary to reason that one should be bound by a precept to hold God himself in hatred'; Francisco Suarez, Selections from Three Works (New York, 1944), p. 288. 'Is the divine precept, then, the basis for the obligation to love God? Or on the contrary, is the love of God itself the basis for obeying his precept that he must be loved? It would seem that the second alternative is the only one which can save Ockham from falling into a vicious circle in which the love of God is based on obedience to a divine command, and the obedience in turn is obligatory because man is obliged to love God and what God wills. . . . If the love of God would be obligatory out of obedience, why is obedience obligatory? . . . Obedience means doing what God wills because he wills it; but the phrase, "because he wills it" is equivalent to saying "out of love for God", a love of god above all and for himself . . . To love God is to obey him.'; Freppert, pp. 121-2. Cf. Urban, p. 342. Surely it is possible to obey out of fear, without loving. There is no vicious circle if God's goodness is the reason for obedience, and also for love, but neither of these the reason for the other.

Note 48. Sent. II, q. 15, vol. 5, p. 353.

Note 49. Quodl., III, q. 14, vol. 9, p. 256; my italics. 'It seems incorrect, as far as I can see, to say "the creature could not obey in this case"; rather, it should be said "the creature cannot disobey in this case"' (i.e. by eliciting an act of love of God above all things); Freppert, p. 138. In such a case we cannot perform the act that would constitute disobedience. See Clark, 'Right Reason', pp. 34-5, and 'Freedom', pp. 155-6, for discussion of the views of various historians on this passage.

Note 50. See Short Discourse, p. 91. The terminology is perhaps not the best, since it seems possible to formulate many commands either negatively or positively; later the point was made in terms of 'broad' or 'imperfect' obligation and 'perfect' obligation (terms with their own drawbacks).

Note 51. Vol. 5, p. 352.

Note 52. The Lyons edition perhaps inserts 'of God' because passages before and after this one relate to acts of hatred of God caused by God as sole cause; however there is nothing in the passage itself to demand this, and the manuscripts are apparently unanimous in omitting it.

Note 53. Vol. 7, p. 352. Adams says: 'Ockham does not mean here that hatred of God could be morally virtuous, but rather that - under the logically possible divine statutes hypothesized - it would be meritorious, in the sense that it would be pleasing to God and rewarded by him with eternal life'; Adams, p. 31. In fact he says, not that it would be meritorious and rewarded, but that it would be right.

Note 54. Suarez makes a telling point: 'Nor can he [God] even bring it about that it should be right and proper to hate an object that is worthy of love'; ibid.

Note 55. Sent., II, q. 15, vol. 5, p. 353.

Note 56. Op. cit., p. 26.

Note 57. Quaest. variae, q. 7, vol. 8, pp. 362-3.

Note 58. Ibid., p. 394.

Note 59. Vol. 5, p. 352.

Note 60. Suarez, op. cit., p. 190.

Note 61. Ibid., pp. 287, 288.

Note 62. Urban, op. cit., p. 347.

Note 63. Ibid., p. 345.

Note 64. Ibid., p. 335.

Note 65. Ibid., p. 346.

Note 66. Ibid.