JOHN WYCLIF, DE CIVILI DOMINIO CHS. 1-10

Introduction

On Civil Lordship continues a comprehensive examination of lordship that Wyclif began in On Divine Lordship. In the earlier work he gave a general definition of the sort of lordship he was concerned with: "Lordship is the relational disposition of a rational nature according as it is characterised as being over some person or thing that serves it" ("Dominium est habitudo nature racionalis secundum quam denominatur suo prefici servienti", De dominio divino, I, p. 4; servienti covers both persons and things). Similarly, he defines servanthood as "the relational disposition of a creature according to which it is said formally to be subjected to its lord ("Servicium... est habitudo creature secundum quam dicitur formaliter suo subici dominanti"; ibid., p. 7) There is a difference between service (servitium) and slavery (servitus): the latter involves coercion and is due to sin, whereas service befits even Christ and the saints and every rational creature must serve God at least (ibid, pp. 7-8). Servus means ambiguously either a slave, who is compelled to do service, or a servant, who serves willingly (ibid, p. 7).

These definitions put lordship and servanthood into the category of relations. According to Wyclif a relation has a subject, a term (or "object," ibid., p. 15) and a foundation; the subject and term he often refers to together as the "extremes." For example, "Peter's likeness [a relation] to Paul is subjectively in Peter, terminatively in Paul, and foundationally in the quality of Peter and Paul according to which they are said to be similar" (ibid., p. 9). The foundation of the lord-servant relationship is the lord's right to service. Thus it is an error to define lordship as being a kind of right or power, but its foundation is a right (ibid., p. 8). In On Civil Lordship Wyclif maintains that the foundation of civil lordship consists in, or presupposes, grace. ("Civil right is a right of nature or grace, or something that necessarily presupposes such a right"; below, p. 000). {De civili dominio, p. 39, line 15}).

Human lordship is a gift of God; God gives lordship to human beings without in any way reducing his own lordship. Human lordship divides into natural (or original), gospel and civil. Original lordship is the lordship Adam had before sin; gospel lordship is a (partial) restoration of original lordship. Civil lordship is established by human beings because of sin; it differs from original and gospel lordship in being coercive (De civili dominio, I, p. 73, 75), and also in involving property, i.e. exclusion (ibid., p. 126-8). Whereas original lordship is a right on the part of each person who enjoys it to be served by every one of God's creatures, civil lordship belongs to one person (or body of people) to the exclusion of others. It is "not [as a whole] communicable on equal terms to each of many lords" (incommunicable singulis et ex equo multis dominis, ibid., p. 126; for the sense of ex equo see p. 127-8). As the Roman law puts it, "Two persons cannot have lordship or possession in solidum [i.e. of the whole thing]," Digest, 13.6.5.15. Much of Wyclif's doctrine on lordship comes (as he says) from Richard FitzRalph, who in turn was probably influenced (though he does not say so) by Franciscan writers such as Bonagratia and Ockham. (For Ockham, see Short Discourse, p. 87-104, and Work of Ninety Days, c. 2, translated in A Letter to the Friars Minor and other Writings, pp. 27-48.)

The ten chapters translated below, the first ten chapters of On Civil Lordship, argue two main theses. The first is that a person in mortal sin does not have a simple right to anything and therefore does not have a simple right to civil lordship. This is because God does not grant any gift except to those who are pleasing to him, i.e. those who are "in grace." (This thesis again comes from FitzRalph, and behind him are Giles of Rome and Augustine; but whereas Giles of Rome inferred that all civil lordship depends upon the pope, FitzRalph and Wyclif hold that the gift is given by God with grace directly to each person.) The second main thesis of these chapters is that those who are in "finally gratifying grace" in reality lords of all God's good things, including God himself and one another. The notion of "finally gratifying grace" needs explanation. Wyclif believes that humanity is divided between "the predestined" (i.e. those who will go to heaven) and "the foreknown" (those who will go to hell). Which division an individual belongs to depends on whether he or she is in gratifying grace (i.e. grace that makes a person pleasing to God) at the moment of death. For someone to be predestined means that God wills that that person will be in grace at the moment of death (this will is the grace of "final perseverance"); the foreknown, on the other hand, will be in mortal sin at the moment of death. A given person may be at some times in grace and at other times in mortal sin; neither that person nor any other human being can know which state he or she will be in at death, i.e. whether the person is predestined or foreknown. The second thesis is, then, that anyone in "finally gratifying grace," i.e. anyone who is in grace and will remain so until the final moment of life, has lordship over all things. Predestined persons temporally in mortal sin do not at that time have a right to all things, but they will have again when they return to grace, and meanwhile they have the main thing, the gift of final perseverance. Those of the "foreknown" who are temporarily in grace have a right to whatever civil lordship they hold, but they are not lords of "all things" since they do not have the grace of final perseverance and consequently have no right to the kingdom of heaven.

What are the practical or political implications of Wyclif's denial of lordship to sinners? The answer is not clear and interpreters disagree. Others had said that sinners are not worthy of the civil lordship they hold, of which they are nevertheless not to be deprived (cf. Ockham, Short Discourse, p. 96). Wyclif in some places says that the perfect will not have civil lordship at all, since it involves sin (see Daly, The Political Theory of John Wyclif, pp. 76-7). However, in the extract translated below he argues that the civil judge should award civil lordship to Peter against Paul if he knows that Peter is in grace and Paul in mortal sin (below, {DCD, ch. V, p. 38.32} p. 000). "The whole body of human law ought to rest upon the gospel law as its essentially directive rule"; De civili dominio, I, p. 139. He sometimes attributes civil lordship to sinners (e.g. "The unjust lack instruments or other goods of fortune, though they have a civil right in such things," below, {fol. 71r, line 58. } p. 000), but he means "false or pretended" right (see below, {fol. 71r, line 62} p.000).

One practical implication that eventually becomes clear is that secular lords can rightly deprive sinful clergy of their property. In Chapter 37 (not translated) Wyclif asserts that "kings, princes and temporal lords can lawfully and very meritoriously take riches away from any ecclesiastical person or community habitually abusing them." Several of the propositions condemned by Pope Gregory XI in 1377 came from Chapter 37; Book II of De civili dominio is a defence especially of that Chapter. He professes not to be asserting that the clergy are actually abusing riches: "Whether today the Church is in that case is not for me to discuss; it is the business of politicians who supervise the practicalities and state of kingdoms; indeed, I protest that I am speaking conditional truths concerning what is possible, leaving to them the judgment of fact. I know that it is the business of the temporal lords to examine the question"; De civili dominio, I, pp. 269-70. However, there is not much doubt that he thought not only that the clergy were in fact abusing church endowments, but that abuse was inevitable as long as the Church remained wealthy. Like Marsilius, Wyclif wanted all the clergy to live in apostolic poverty.

MANUSCRIPTS

The Latin text is based on the edition by R.L. Poole, Ioannis Wycliffe Tractatus de Civili Dominio Liber Primus (London, Truebner, 1885), which was based on the manuscript Wien ONB 1341 (siglum W). Words in {curly brackets} are variants from the manuscript Paris, BN, f.l. 15869 (siglum P). (On this manuscript see W.R. Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf: An Annotated Catalog (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies), p. 51. Variants adopted are marked with an asterisk.

Conventions

[ ] enclose material added by editor or translator
Variants are of the word immediately preceding, or of the words between '{' and ':'
om: P omits
add: P adds
trs.: P transposes last two words of the text
trs. 1432: P transposes last four words of text into the order first, fourth, third, second
If a variant is shown, and also a transposition, the transposition is of the variant (i.e. in reconstructing the readings of the manuscript, implement transpositions last).

The English translation contains various words and phrases in curly brackets, which will eventually be deleted. It also contains various typesetting codes (\SC, \ES, surround small capitals; \PN means "-"). "[??]" indicates suspicion that there may be something wrong with text or translation. The translation does not read smoothly and is not always clear, but this is true also of Wyclif's text. Most of the references are from Poole's edition.

John Wyclif, On Civil Lordship, chapters 1-10
Cap. I. [fol. 70r, line 1] Tractando de civili domino hominis superaddito naturali, oportet in primo *{primis} videre si civile dominium presupponat dominium [fol. 70r, line 2] naturale fundatum in gracia, sicut ius civile presupponit ius divinum {?primum}, tamquam causam essencialiter exemplantem. Intendo {om.} itaque {et} pro dicendis ostendere {ponitur} [fol. 70r, line 3] duas {? add.} veritates quibus utar {?} tamquam principiis ad {in} dicenda {dicendis}: prima, quod nemo ut {de} est in peccato mortali habet iusticiam simpliciter ad {aliquod add.} donum Dei; [fol. 70r, line 4] secunda, quod {om.?} quilibet existens in gracia gratificante finaliter nedum habet ius, sed in re habet omnia bona dei {sed... dei: illegible}. Sed {et} ne in primo impediatur sentencie explanacio [fol. 70r, line 5] ex equivocacione vel ignorancia terminorum, suppono {supponatur} quod ille solum {trs.} dicatur habere simpliciter ius ad bonum aliquod vel in illo, dum pure [fol. 70r, line 6] iuste, *{sic add.} quod non tunc {between lines} iniuste, {?quidquam occupat add. -- occupat crossed out} ipsum possidet sive habet; sic videlicet {scilicet}, *{quod add.} si aliquis {quis} pro aliquo tempore iniuste quidquam occupat, non habet [fol. 70r, line 7] illud simpliciter iuste {trs.} pro eodem. Quo supposito, arguitur per raciones, primo per tres consequentes raciones cum suis ratificacioibus ad probandum questionem propositam *{Quo supposito... propositam: tunc arguo} .	Chapter 1 In discussing the civil lordship that human beings have in addition to natural lordship we must first see whether civil lordship presupposes a natural lordship founded in grace, just as civil law presupposes divine law as its essential exemplary cause. For the sake of what is to be said I intend, therefore, to show two truths which I will use as principles for what is to be said later. The first is that no one in mortal sin has a simple {iusticiam} right to any of God's gifts; the second is that anyone who is in finally gratifying grace not only has the {ius} right, but has in reality all God's good things. But so that the explanation of the doctrine will not be impeded from the outset by equivocation or ignorance of terms, I suppose that a person is said to have simply a right to, or in, some good while he possesses or has the thing purely justly, so that he does not have it at that time {tunc} unjustly--that is, so that if he holds {occupat} something {pro aliquo tempore} at a certain time unjustly, {pro--true in reference to that time} at that time he does not have it simply justly.
Primo sic: Omne ius humanum {trs.} presupponit causaliter ius divinum, ut patet de iure, *{de iure,: om.} ex supradictis, tractatu primo, capitulo [fol. 70r, line 8] iii; ergo omne dominium iustum ad homines presupponit iustum dominium quoad deum. Sed quilibet existens in peccato mortali {trs.} caret, ut sic, [fol. 70r, line 9] iusto dominio quoad deum; ergo, et {om.} simpliciter iusto dominio. Sicut enim in relatis tenet consequencia a quoad *{add ad: conjecture} simpliciter, ita tenet si aliquid sit iustum *{vel [fol. 70r, line 10] iniustum add.} quoad deum, tunc simpliciter erit *{est} tale, cum regula prima non potest arbitrando deficere. Set peccator caret vero dominio quoad deum, *{Set... deum: minor apparet} quod quilibet existens in peccato mortali caret, ut sic vero dominio quoad deum. Argumentatur *{in peccato... Argumentatur: etc} sic {between lines}: Omne bonum quod talis [fol. 70r, line 11] possidet, iniuste possidet, ergo deficit a cuiuscunque dominabilis vero dominio. Antecedens probatur {arguitur}: Peccator solum illo modo quo est possidet, sed qualitercunque est [fol. 70r, line 12] iniuste est, ergo qualitercunque possidet, iniuste possidet; maior *{minor} patet {arguitur} ex {per} hoc quod mortale peccatum {trs.} cum inficit naturam, multo evidencius inficit omnem [fol. 70r, line 13] modum vel accidens eiusdem, ut si vita hominis sit iniusta, ita quod iniuste vivit, tunc quelibet operacio eius est iniusta cum non aliter operatur quam vivit, [fol. 70r, line 14] et cum vivere viventibus sit *{est} esse (ex {om.} secundo De Anima) patet quod sicut iniuste est et vivit, ita iniuste est dominus et iniuste subiacet cuilibet signabili [fol. 70r, line 15] accidenti.	[No one in mortal sin has a simple right to God's gifts] [First Argument] Then I argue first as follows. Every human law {ius} causally presupposes divine law, as is clear from what was said above, Tract \SCI\ES (De mandatis divinis), chapter 3; therefore every lordship just in relation to human beings presupposes a lordship just in relation to God. [a] But those who are in mortal sin {caret} lack, as such, just lordship in relation to God; therefore they also lack simply just lordship. For as in {relatis} relateds {tenet consequencia} it is valid to argue from "in relation to" to "simply," so it is valid to argue that if something is just or unjust in relation to God then it is such simply, since the first rule cannot {deficere} fail in judging. But the minor ([a] that those who are etc.) is clear thus: [b] Every good that such persons possess, they possesses unjustly; therefore they {deficit} lack true lordship of everything that can be subject to lordship. The {antecedens} premise, [b], is proved: Sinners possess only in the mode in which they are; but [c] however sinners are, they are unjustly; therefore however they possess, they possess unjustly. The minor premise, [c], is clear from the fact that when mortal sin poisons a nature, much more evidently it poisons every mode or accident of the nature; so if people's lives are unjust, so that they live unjustly, then each of their actions is unjust. Since they act no otherwise than as they live, and since life is the being of living things (De Anima, \SCII\ES.4), it is clear that if they exist and live unjustly, then they are lords unjustly and are unjustly the subjects of any accidental quality {signabili} that can be mentioned.
Ista racio, etsi videatur multis sophistica, daret tamen cuilibet methaphysico plenam fidem, cum sit conclusio primi Philosophi: Math. vi. 22, 23, sic dicit {sic dicit: om.}: "Si oculus [fol. 70r, line 16] tuus simplex fuerit, totum corpus tuum lucidum erit; et si nequam fuerit, et corpus tuum {simplex... tuum: usque} tenebrosum est. Cum ergo *{Cum ergo: ubi} secundum sanctos noscentes quomodo *{noscentes quomodo: om.} Veritas modo suo {modo suo: in ore suo} intelligit per organa operaciones elicitas ab eisdem, patet {ita} quod iste {om.} sit sensus: Si intencio [fol. 70r, line 17] sit recta, tota multitudo operum consequencium {sequencium} erit iusta, et si intencio obliquet a iusticia, tota multitudo operum etiam bonorum de genere est iniusta. [fol. 70r, line 18] Iusticia enim secundum Aristotelem, quinto {2} Ethicorum, est virtutum preclarissima {praeclara}, lucens inter ceteras sicut hesperus inter {in} astra; cui sensui videtur Christus alludere {trs.} quando vocat totam [fol. 70r, line 19] multitudinem operum iustorum lucidam et totam multitudinem {?etc} iniustorum operum {trs.} tenebrosam.	Even if this argument should seem sophistical to many, any metaphysician would nevertheless give it full credence, since it is the conclusion of the foremost Philosopher. In Matthew 6[:22\PN3] he says this: "If your eye is sincere, your whole body will be full of light, and if it is evil, your body also will be shadowy." Here, according to the saints, Truth in his usual way means by the organs the actions they elicit. It is clear that the meaning is this: If your intention is right, all the resulting actions will be just, and if your intention deviates from justice, all your actions, even those good in their kind, are unjust: for justice, according to Aristotle (Ethics, \SCV\ES.3), is the most splendid of the virtues, shining among the others like the Evening Star among the stars. Christ seems to allude to this meaning when he says that all the actions of the just are "full of light" and all the actions of the unjust "shadowy."
Et {Ex quo} si ex isto {ex isto: om.} infertur quod peccator iniuste habet {trs.} corpus et *{vel} [fol. 70r, line 20] animam ac organa *{ac organa: om.} vel quodcunque bonum aliud {trs.} naturale, patet quod nimis bene {?} concluditur {trs.}. Nam si talis iniuste vivit, patet quod iniuste habet animam et sic vitam. [fol. 70r, line 21] Et aliter non tam crebro diceret Veritas, que {qua W (Poole); que P} mentiri non poterit, quod {om.} "Qui amat animam suam", volendo eam {ipsam} voluptuose contra iusticiam [fol. 70r, line 22] amare, "perdet eam" (ut dicitur *{ut dicitur: om.} Ioh. xii.25). Nemo autem perdit possessum vel habitum nisi dum eius privatur iusticia, ergo etc. Et inter alia hoc {trs. 312} movet *{movit} Augustinus, [fol. 70r, line 23] super Iohannem omelia prima, quod "Peccatum nihil est et nihil fiunt homines cum peccant {cum peccant: etc}". Nemo enim peccans mortaliter habet pro tunc corpus vel animam nec *{vel} aliquod bonum fortune [fol. 70r, line 24] nisi equivoce, quia cum habet esse ex pura gracia, quo esse tenetur ex lege nature continuare in gracia, dum perdit regulam huius iuris non manet creatura {creaturam} vel quidquam [fol. 70r, line 25] possidens nisi equivoce.	And if from this it is inferred that the sinner has body or soul or any other natural good unjustly, clearly the inference is very well drawn. For if such a person lives unjustly, it is clear that he has soul and thus life unjustly. Otherwise Truth, who cannot lie, would not have said so often {?} that "whoever loves his soul," meaning loves it pleasurably contrary to justice, "will lose it" (John 12[:25]); but no one {perdit} loses what he possesses or has except when {privatur iusticia} his right is taken away; therefore, etc. And this, among other things, moved Augustine to say (first homily on John) that "Sin is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin." For no one who sins mortally has (except equivocally), {pro tunc} for that time, body or soul or any good of fortune; for since he has being by pure grace and by this being is bound by the law of nature to continue {continuare} in grace, when he {perdit} loses the rule of this {iuris} law he does not remain a creature, or one who possesses anything, except equivocally.
Secundo principaliter {arguitur} sic argumentatur {om.}: Si contingit iniustum simpliciter {om.} iuste temporalibus dominari, per idem contingeret iniustum pure iuste uti [fol. 70r, line 26] temporalibus quorum habet simpliciter iustum dominium. Consequencia patet ex hoc quod *{ex... quod: quia} nemo habet {om.} liberum et purum iustum dominium cui iuste debet {?} negari quilibet ususfructus; [fol. 70r, line 27] cuilibet ergo iusto possessori licet legitime uti suis. Sed {om.} contra consequens datum {arguitur add.} sic argumentatur {om.}: et sit Petrus {et... Petrus: Sortes} iniustus occupans temporalia de quibus faciat [fol. 70r, line 28] elemosinam egentibus, cum quibuscunque circumstanciis volueris {?habitis add.} ipso tamen stante iniusto continue; et patet quod {om.} si aliquis usus temporalium iniusti non foret iniustus, [fol. 70r, line 29] potissime foret {esset} talis, maxime cum *{maxime cum: cuius} opus sit *{esset} bonum de genere quod nihil inficeret nisi iniusticia {iustitia} quasi *{qua} distribuens est iniustus; quod si detur, per idem inficeret [fol. 70r, line 30] quodlibet {om.} aliud bonum opus {quovis add.}, quia de *{om.} quocunque dando, comitante iniusticia, eque bene {om.} procedit. Detur ergo quod Petrus {Sortes} iniustus {om.} non iniuste sed distribuens elemosinam in mortali peccato iniuste distribuit, et sic quodcunque opus bonum de genere iniuste, ut sic, operatur *{sed... operatur: om.} sed pure et *{om.} iuste distribuerit {distribuit}. Contra: [fol. 70r, line 31] Nullum opus extrinsecum est iustum simpliciter, nisi ut procedit a virtute iusticie; sed distribucioni Petri {Sortis} defuit {defecit} in Petro {Sorte} virtus iusticie, cum sit [fol. 70r, line 32] habituatus {in add.} iniusticia repugnante: ergo {et add.} distribucio data non est iusta simpliciter; ymmo, cum iusticia sit omnis {?communis} virtus (ex {supra et} quinto {2} Ethicorum), [fol. 70r, line 33] si iuste distribuit, tunc distribuit virtuose; et per consequens {per consequens: ita} est virtuosus operans placenter et meritorie quoad deum {om.}: consequens contra philosophorum {physicorum W (Poole); philosophorum P} et theologorum [fol. 70r, line 34] omnem {om.} sentenciam, qui dicunt quod existens in peccato mortali {?licet add.} operatur {operetur} bonum opus de genere sed non bene. Similiter, Deus requirit ab isto, sicut *{requirit add.} a quolibet viatore, [fol. 70r, line 35] quod nihil operetur nisi in gracia. Iste autem {Iste autem: igitur} operatur extra graciam, cum sit in peccato {om.} mortali (ut supponitur): ergo operatur aliter quam debet. Nec ista alietas operandi exigitur {exigit corrected to exigitur W (Poole)} *{exigita} [fol. 70r, line 36] obligat {exiget} Petrum {sortem} ad aliter operandum sub pena qualibet, sed sub pena mortalis peccati {om.}. Ex quo patet {apparet} quod, si Petrus {Sortes} sit iniustus, quidquid fecerit, sive dormiendo sive [fol. 70r, line 37] comedendo sive quodcunque opus bonum {trs.} de genere faciendo, continue peccat mortaliter.	[Second Argument] Second (principally) it is argued as follows. If it is possible for the unjust to be simply justly a lord of temporal things, then [a] it would likewise be possible for the unjust to use purely justly the temporal things of which he has the simply just lordship. The {consequencia} inference is clear because no one to whom any usufruct ought justly be denied has free and pure just lordship; therefore any just possessor is lawfully permitted to use his property. But against the {datum--the one referred to} given {consequens} conclusion, [a], it is argued as follows. Let Peter be an unjust man who holds temporal possessions from which he gives alms to the needy--in whatever circumstances you wish, {tamen} provided [only that] he {stante} remains {continue} all the time unjust. And it is clear that if use of temporal things by an unjust person were ever not unjust, this use would most of all be such, since its act would be good in its kind, since nothing would taint it except the injustice by which the almsgiver is unjust--if it be supposed [that there is such a taint in this case], it would likewise taint every other good action, because it follows equally well whatever we suppose along with injustice. Let it be supposed, therefore, that the unjust man, Peter, distributes alms not unjustly but in a purely just way. Against: No external action is simply just except as it proceeds from the virtue of justice; but Peter's almsgiving lacked the virtue of justice in Peter, since he is {habituatus} imbued with an injustice that is inconsistent with it. The almsgiving in question {data} is therefore not simply just. Indeed, since justice is the whole of virtue (from Ethics, \SCV\ES.3), if he distributes alms justly, then he does so virtuously and consequently is a virtuous man acting pleasingly and meritoriously in God's sight; this implication is against every {sentenciam} opinion of philosophers and theologians, who say that someone in mortal sin may perform an act good in its kind but cannot act well. Similarly, God requires of Peter, as he requires of every wayfarer, that he do nothing except in grace. But he acts without grace, since he is (it is supposed) in mortal sin; therefore he acts otherwise than as he ought. This required otherness of acting does not oblige Peter to act differently under just any penalty, but under the penalty of mortal sin. From this it is clear that, if he is unjust, whatever Peter does, whether sleeping or eating or doing any act good in its kind, he {continue} continually sins mortally.
Nec hoc vertitur in dubium theologo qui noscit quomodo interior homo infectus [fol. 70r, line 38] peccato inficit totum residuum nature corporee et singulos actus suos: quemcunque {why accusative? agrees with act or homo?} autem iniustum est {trs.} vivere, iniustum et cuiquam dominari. Si queris [fol. 70r, line 39] testimonium scripture {om.} quoad istam {hanc} sentenciam, ecce conclusio conversionis {?connexionis} {See DMLB, conversio, 2c; OLD, conversio 4} apostoli (1 Cor. xiii.3): "Si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habuero {in cibos... habuero: etc. usque} nihil mihi prodest." Et {om.} notum est {autem add.} cuicunque noscenti terminos [fol. 70r, line 40] quod iniusticia et caritas sunt duo immediate opposita, ita quod oportet alterum inesse homini et, si unum inest, alterum deesse {deest}, et econtra.	This will not be called into question by a theologian who knows how the inner self poisoned with sin poisons all the rest of a person's corporeal nature and each of that person's acts, [and knows] that if people live unjustly, it is unjust for them to be lords over anything. If you seek Scripture's testimony to this {sentenciam} opinion, consider the conclusion of the Apostle's antistrophe in 1 Cor. 13[:3]: "If I should distribute all my property to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, but have not charity, it profits me nothing." And it is known to anyone who understands the terms that injustice and charity are two contradictory opposites, so that one or other of them must be in a person, and if one is the other is not, and vice versa.
Et iterum {Et iterum: item} notum est, si [fol. 70r, line 41] non sit possibile iniustum uti aliquo nisi eo ipse iniuste utatur *{eodem add.} vel pocius abutatur, per idem {per idem: om.} non est possibile iniustum alicui dominari nisi, ut sic, [fol. 70r, line 42] iniuste dominetur vel {aut} potius tiranniset, cum iniuste extorquet et occupat aliena. Quod si queris *{Quod... queris: Ad hoc est} sanctorum doctorum testimonium, ecce magni *{ecce magni: om.} Augustini *{enim add.} sentencia {om.}: Epist. xxxvii [fol. 70r, line 43] ad Macedonium de tyranis, plane docet *{de tyranis... docet: dicit} istam {istam add.} sententiam: "Ideo" {ita} inquit {om.} "si prudenter {inquit add.} intueamur quod scriptum est, Fideli homini totus mundus divitiarum [fol. 70r, line 44] est, infideli autem nec obulus; nonne omnes qui sibi videntur gaudere licite {licitis W (Poole); licite P} conquesitis {acquisitis} eisque {eis qui} uti nesciunt, aliena possidere convincimus? [fol. 70r, line 45] Hoc enim certe {vere W (Poole); certe P} alienum non est, quod iure possidetur, hoc autem {autem hoc W (Poole); hoc autem P} iure quod iuste, et hoc iuste quod bene. Omne ergo quod male possidetur, [fol. 70r, line 47] alienum est: male autem possidet, qui male utitur. Iusticiam" inquit "nemo male {omits male W (Poole); male P} habet, et qui non dilexerit non habet. Pecunia vero et a malis male habetur, et a bonis tanto melius habetur quanto minus amatur". Hec Augustinus {ille}.	Again, it is known that, if the unjust cannot use anything without by that very act using it unjustly, or rather abusing it, it is likewise not possible for the unjust to be lord over anything without, as such, being lord unjustly, or rather tyrannizing, since an unjust person unjustly takes by force and holds things that belong to someone else. Holy doctors testify to this. For Augustine in Letter \SCXXXVII\ES [Letter cliii in modern editions], to Macedonius, expresses this teaching: "Therefore," he says, "if we read with insight the text, 'The whole world of riches belongs to the faithful, but to the faithless not a penny,' do we not convict of possessing other people's property all those who seem to themselves to enjoy things lawfully acquired but do not know how to use them? For a thing is certainly not another's if it is possessed {iure} lawfully, and it is possessed lawfully if it is possessed justly, and it is possessed justly if it is possessed well; therefore everything possessed badly is another's, but a person possesses badly who uses badly... No one," he says, "has justice badly, and whoever has not loved it does not have it. Money, on the other hand, the bad have badly, and the good have it better when they love it less." Thus Augustine.
Iterum *{om.} tercio *{principaliter add.} arguitur ad idem {arguitur ad idem: sic}: Multa sunt dominia civilia hominum civiliter [fol. 70r, line 48] dominancium super temporalibus (ut suppono) {ut suppono: supponatur}, et ad tale dominium non sufficit {sufficere} ponere dominativum et dominabile esse simul; ergo oportet aliquod fundamentum dominii [fol. 70r, line 49] ponere {trs.} in altero extremorum: sed nullum est pertinens si non *{si non: nisi} iusticia dominantis; ergo adversum *{ad verum} civile dominium presupponitur disposicio virtutis iusticie in taliter dominante. [fol. 70r, line 50] Minor patet {apparet} ex {per} hoc quod tunc omnis homo, eo ipso quod est {quod est: om.}, dominaretur {dominatur W (Poole)} *{dominatur} civiliter omnibus temporalibus huius mundi; et patet quod dominium non est relacio que essencialiter consequitur ad [fol. 70r, line 51] extrema, sicut equalitas et {vel} inequalitas per se consecuntur quantitates {quantitatem}, ut patet {ut patet: om.} quinto {2o} Methaphysice ii. Cum ergo nulla creatura sit per se dominus cuiuscunque, quia tunc non posset [fol. 70r, line 52] sibi acquiri accidentaliter dominium vel deperdi, palam {om.} sequitur quod preter extrema oportet ponere in quocunque domino mediantem {domino mediantem: divino mediante W (Poole)} *{domino mediantem: dominante} civiliter disposicionem dominio pertinentem. Sed *{om.} et *{om.} hoc omnes rectiloqui [fol. 70r, line 53] {concorditer add.} confitentur, dicentes concorditer {om.} quod oportet omnem talem dominum {dominii W (Poole); dominium P} habere ius ad rem cui civiliter {civitati W (Poole); civiliter P} dominatur, ut iure hereditario, emcione, vel donacione, [fol. 70r, line 54] et quod {cum} non sit aliquod ius creatum nisi a iure primo *{trs.} fuerit extractum (ut patet de {in} communi sermone de iure); palam {om.} sequitur quod nemo habet ius vel dominium super quemquam {quodcunque} [fol. 70r, line 55] nisi habuerit ad hoc {trs. 231} beneplacitum Dei sui.	[Third Argument] Third (principally) as follows. There exist (I suppose) many civil lordships of people who exercise civil lordship over temporals. For such lordship, however, it is not enough to posit the [mere] coexistence of someone who can be a lord {dominativum} with {dominabile} something or someone that can be subject to lordship. Some foundation of lordship must therefore be posited in one of the extremes [i.e. subject and term of the lord-servant relationship]. But no foundation is relevant except the lord's {iusticia} justice; therefore true civil lordship presupposes the disposition of the virtue of justice {iusticie} in such a lord. The minor is clear, because [if mere coexistence is enough] then everyone, {eo ipso} simply by existing, has civil lordship of all the temporal things of this world. Also it is clear that lordship is not a relation that follows essentially upon the extremes, as equality and inequality follow essentially upon quantities, as is clear in Metaphysics, \SCV\ES.2. Since, therefore, no creature essentially is the lord of anything whatever (because then a creature could not accidentally acquire lordship or lose it), it follows manifestly that, in addition to the extremes, we must posit in anyone exercising civil lordship some disposition relevant to lordship. All who speak rightly admit this; they say unanimously that all such lords must have a right to the thing over which they have civil lordship (e.g. by hereditary right, purchase, or grant) and that no such right is created unless it has been drawn from the primary right (as is clear in common speech about right). It follows manifestly that no one has right or lordship over anything, unless for this he has his God's goodwill.
Confirmatur: Omne iustum creatum ideo est iustum, quia placet {?} deo; cum non potest esse tale iustum quod de Dei beneplacito [fol. 70r, line 56] non procedat. Similiter, sive iudex sentenciaverit sive lex propter aliquam trium causarum predictarum {dictarum} approbaverit cuiuscunque dominium, ideo sic facit, quia est iustum et racionabile [fol. 70r, line 57] ita esse; et per consequens {per consequens: ita} prius naturaliter {trs.} {est add.} iustum est hominem dominari quam lex creata vel iudex terrenus non errans hoc approbat; et per consequens {per consequens: ita} primus titulus iusticie [fol. 70r, line 58] cuiuscunque civilis dominii est a deo.	This is confirmed: Every created just thing is just because it pleases God, since there cannot be such a just thing which does not proceed from God's goodwill. Similarly, whether a judge has passed sentence or the law has approved anyone's lordship for one of the three reasons stated above [i.e., inheritance, purchase or gift], this has been done because it is just and reasonable that it be done; and consequently the justice of someone's being lord is naturally prior to its being approved by created law or an earthly judge not in error; and consequently the first title of the justice of any civil lordship is from God.
Nec hoc licet catholicis dubitare, cum iste magnus Dominus, racione sue omnipotencie et efficacia sue volencie, habet in suo [fol. 70r, line 59] regno quidquid vult, et quidquid noluerit {voluerit vel noluerit} non habet; et patet quod ad omnem iustam occupacionem civilem oportet quod iste dominus [fol. 70r, line 60] auctoriset, ratificet, et confirmet, cum omne quod ipse {om.} non approbat, non est iustum. Nec oportet circa hoc solicitari, cum Ioh. {ad Rom} i.3, Collocens. i.16, et Iacobi i.17, [fol. 70r, line 61] dicitur concorditer {et add.} cum philosophis quod omnia sunt per ipsum; dominium ergo creature si est, est per Deum ipsum originaliter approbantem. Et ex ista maxima iuris nature [fol. 70r, line 62] regula {om.} extractum est ius monarchie terrene, quod non licet inferiori domino alienare, specialiter ad manum mortuam, bonum immobile sine licencia domini [fol. 70r, line 63] capitalis; quod ideo est quia in omnibus ille habet iustum *{interesse a quo sine suo consensu non ex [conjecture: est] iustum add.} quod excidat. Et patet quomodocunque homine conmutaverint inter se aliqua sine suo consensu, non est iustum *{Et patet... iustum: om.}; et patet *{quod add.} quomodocunque homines conmutaverint [fol. 70r, line 64] bonum *{bona} domini emendo, vendendo, donando, iudicando, nisi ipse concesserit, conmutacio est iniusta. Hoc ergo habito probatur quod *{Hoc... quod: tunc sic} Deus non approbat quod iniustus aliquis dominetur, [fol. 70r, line 65] quia sit de Petro {Sortes} iniusto. Contra, si Deus approbat istud dominium, per idem approbat usum illius dominii et omnia alia que sibi pertinent; et cum omnis talis abutatur bonis [fol. 70v, line 1] domini (ut {om.} patet ex secundo argumento), sequitur quod Deus approbat hunc abusum: ymmo, cum quodlibet opus talis iniusti sit peccatum, sequitur quod Deus sit auctor *{adiutor} et approbator [fol. 70v, line 2] peccati, non solum quoad esse secundum sed quoad esse primum; quia si Deus vult quod iste dominetur et iste solum sic dominatur tyranisando, sequitur quod Deus vult quod [fol. 70v, line 3] ipse tyranniset, et per consequens, ut sic, *{per... sic,: ita quod ?iste} peccet: quod {hoc} est {om.} blasphemum dicere {om.}.	Catholics cannot rightly doubt this, since that great Lord, by reason of his omnipotence and the efficacy of his will, has in his kingdom whatever he wills and does not have whatever he is unwilling to have; and it is clear that for any just holding under civil law the Lord must authorize, ratify, and confirm it, since whatever he does not approve is not just. And we need not labor this point, since in John 1[:3], Colossians 1[:16], and James 1[:17], it is said, in harmony with the philosophers, that all things exist through him; therefore if a creature's lordship exists, it exists through God's original approval. (From that axiom of natural law derives the rule of earthly monarchy that an inferior lord cannot rightly alienate immovable property, especially to a "dead hand," without permission from the chief lord; this is so because he has a just interest in all things, which it is not just {quod excidat} for him to lose without his consent; and it is clear that however people exchange the lord's property by buying, selling, granting and judging, the exchange is unjust unless he consents.) Then [I argue] thus: God does not approve the lordship of anyone who is unjust. For let it be so concerning Peter, an unjust man. Against this: If God approves that lordship, he likewise approves the use of that lordship and all other things that pertain to it; and since every such person abuses the lord's goods (as is clear from the second argument), it follows that God approves this abuse. Indeed, since every act of such an unjust person is a sin, it follows that God is the helper and approver of sin, not only in relation to its second being but in respect of its first being. For if God wills that Peter be lord and he is lord in this way only by tyrannizing, it follows that God wills him to tyrannize and thus to sin. To say this is blasphemy.
Confirmatur ex scriptura: nam {ex... nam: om.} Osee viii.4 Deus dicit {dixit} {trs.} prophetice de tyrannis, "Ipsi regnaverunt et non [fol. 70v, line 4] ex me"; tyrannides enim dicuntur equivoce regnaciones pretense (ut dictum est superius {supra}, capitulo tercio de iure simpliciter et pretenso); et patet {?} cum iniusti non [fol. 70v, line 5] dominantur ex Deo {dicto W (Poole); deo P} quod nullius *{nullus talis} simpliciter dominantur.	This is confirmed from Scripture. For in Osee 8[:4], God says prophetically of tyrants, "They have reigned, but not by me"; for pretended "reignings" ([so called] by equivocation) are called tyrannies (as was said above, chapter 3, about right simply and by pretense); and since an unjust person is not lord "by God," it is clear that no one who is unjust is simply lord.
Cap. II. Licet autem {Licet autem: om.} {iste add.} raciones tres {trs.} predicte {om.} dent {faciunt} fidem [fol. 70v, line 6] pluribus ad conclusionem propositam, tamen quia alii, secundum variationem suorum sensuum, et in aliis racionibus delectantur, ideo ut conclusio sit universalius et magis evidens, adiciam sex raciones alias ad eandem {ad conclusionem... eandem: nunc pro delectationibus sensuum quorundam adduntur alie}.	Chapter 2 Though the three arguments above may convince many of the intended conclusion, nevertheless, because others, according to the variation of their understandings, also take pleasure in other arguments, I will add six other arguments for the same conclusion, so that it may be more universal and more evident.
Primo sic {om.}: Non est possibile hominem iuste simpliciter habere aliquod bonum sibi adiacens, nisi Deus donando [fol. 70v, line 7] id sibi {trs.} prestiterit (ut {om.} patet tractatu tercio de dominio divino {om.}); sed Deus non prestat alicui, dum est in mortali peccato {om.}, aliquod donum suum: ergo nullus existens in mortali peccato {om.} habet pro tunc [fol. 70v, line 8] iuste simpliciter {trs.} aliquod bonum. Minor videtur {apparet} ex hoc {ex hoc add.} quod non est prudentis prestare inimico, quem scit solum abuti prestito et ad sui damnum [fol. 70v, line 9] dissipare bona prestantis: deus autem est summe prudens et providus; ergo non prestat creature sue quidquam pro tempore quo peccat mortaliter.	[Fourth argument] The first is as follows: No good can be attached to anyone in a simply just way unless God {prestiterit: In De Dominio Divino, I.3, p. 19.25- and elsewhere Wyclif uses prestare to imply lending, but this is not the sense here, I think} provides it to that person by granting it (as is clear from Tract \SCIII\ES, On divine lordship); but God does not {prestat} provide any of his gifts to anyone while that person is in mortal sin; therefore no one in mortal sin has simply justly any good {pro tunc} during that time. The minor is clear from this, that prudent persons do not {prestare} provide anything to enemies they know will only abuse what has been {prestito} provided and squander the {prestantis} provider's gifts to the provider's own harm; but God most of all is prudent and far-sighted; therefore he does not {prestat} provide anything to his creatures {pro tempore} during the time when they sin mortally.
Confirmatur ex hoc [fol. 70v, line 10] quod non est possibile Deum prestare alicui aliquod {aliquid} nisi digno: nullus talis est dignus esse Dei prestarius {?prestaturus}; ergo nulli tali, pro tempore quo est huiusmodi, prestat *{quidquam add.} assumptum. {sentence should begin before assumptum} Patet {apparet} ex [fol. 70v, line 11] hoc quod Deus cum {om.} non potest nisi voluntarie et racionabiliter prestare, eo ipso quod prestat aliquid creature, dignificat ipsam ut sit Deo prestarius {?prestaturus}: et cum hoc sit magna gracia, videtur [fol. 70v, line 12] quod Deus prius vel simul gratificat creaturam racionalem, dum aliquid sibi donat.	The argument is confirmed by this, that it is not possible for God {prestare} to provide anything to anyone except someone worthy; no such person [i.e., no one in mortal sin] is worthy to be God's {prestarius} beneficiary; therefore nothing is {prestat} provided to such persons {pro tempore} during the time when they are such. The minor premise is clear from this: Since God cannot {prestare} provide except voluntarily and rationally, by the very fact of {prestat} providing something to a creature God {dignific-} makes the creature worthy to be his {prestarius} beneficiary; and since this is a great grace, it seems that when he grants anything to a rational creature God previously or at the same time confers grace.
Secundo {om.} confirmatur ex hoc quod {ex hoc quod: om.} *{oportet omnem impetrantem a deo dominium esse in gratia; sed add.} oportet omnem impetrantem [fol. 70v, line 13] dominium, eo ipso impetrare a Deo dominium, ut *{cum} sit capitalis dominus cuiuscunque (ut patet ex ultima *{tercia} racione capituli precedentis); ergo conclusio: et minor *{maior} patet ex {per} hoc, [fol. 70v, line 14] quod impetrare, cum sit creaturam se {om.} dignificare, est mereri, quod non potest inesse *{esse} nisi per graciam.	It is confirmed, second, by this: Everyone who {impetrantem} successfully requests lordship from God must be in grace; but everyone who successfully requests lordship must {eo ipso} by that fact obtain it from God, since God is the capital lord of everything (as is clear from the third argument of the preceding chapter); therefore the conclusion. The major premise is clear from this: to request successfully, since it consists in the creature's {se dignificare} making himself worthy, is to merit, which cannot be except by grace.
Tercio confirmatur ex hoc quod si quis impetret a Deo, Deus consentit [fol. 70v, line 15] impetracioni, et per consequens {per consequens: ita} iustum est quod habeat id {?illud} {trs.}; et cum omnis iusticia accidentis presupponit iusticiam in subiecto (ut patet ex racione prima {trs.} prioris {?primi} capituli), sequitur quod, prius quam iustum [fol. 70v, line 16] sit quod quis habeat donum Dei, oportet eum {ipsum} in sua substancia esse iustum {trs.}. Et istud {Et istud: hoc} {innuere add.} videtur scripturam {scriptura} innuere {om.} (Iacobi primo capitulo, 5 {capitulo, 5: om.}), quando dicit {quando dicit: om.} "Si quis enim *{om.} vestrum indiget sapientia postulet a deo qui dat omnibus affluenter {sapientia... affluenter: etc.} et non inproperat. Ecce *{ubi} [fol. 70v, line 17] *{apparet add.} quod oportet impetrare {impetrat} a Deo quidquid homo {in margine 2a manum additum W (Poole); in text P} habere voluerit; secundo, quod Deus non donat nisi grato, quia non inproperat in donando, sed post conveniendo ingratos [fol. 70v, line 18] et infideles servos ad iudicium (ut patet {ut patet: om.} Math. xxv.14 de homine profecto peregre postquam tradidit famulis bona sua). Et *{om.} potest istud {illud} confirmari per illud Psalm. [fol. 70v, line 19] xlix.16, ubi improperat peccatori quia enarrat iusticiam suam et assumit testamentum suum {ubi... suum: peccatori autem dixit etc.} per os suum tam indignum. {?illud ?plica? ?i.e. 42 add.} Si ergo non licet peccatori sine gravi {gratia in} peccato predicare vel legis divine [fol. 70v, line 20] sentenciam pertractare {trs.}, a maiori vel pari *{trs 321} nec alicuius doni {donum} Dei usum vel pocius abusum percipere.	It is confirmed, third, by this: If someone {impetret} successfully requests something from God, God consents to the request, and consequently it is just for the requester to have it; and since the {iusticia} justice of an accident always presupposes {iusticia} justice in the subject (as is clear from the first argument of the first chapter), it follows that, before it is just for someone to have a gift of God, he must be just in his substance. And Scripture seems to suggest this (James 1[:5]), when it says, "If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly and does not upbraid." Here it is clear that we must {impetrare} make a request to God for whatever we wish to have; secondly, that God grants only to those who are in grace, because in granting he "does not upbraid" but he afterwards calls graceless and unbelieving servants to {iudicium} judgment (as is clear in Matthew 25[:14] of the man who went abroad after delivering his goods to his servants). This can be confirmed by the text of Psalm 49[:16], where God upbraids the sinner because he tells of his [i.e. God's] justice and takes his covenant into a mouth so unworthy. If, therefore, it is not permissible, without grave sin, for sinners to preach or treat of the doctrine of the divine law, by equal or greater reason it is also not permissible for sinners to receive the use, or rather abuse, of any of God's gifts.
[fol. 70v, line 21] Sed obicitur *{Sed obicitur: om.} contra illud *{predicta arguitur primo} per hoc quod Deus prestat hominibus post lapsum tam corpus quam animam, et tamen tunc sunt in originali peccato; ergo stat Deum prestare [fol. 70v, line 22] iniustis misericorditer bona sua {trs.}. Sic enim hortatur {?} Veritas discipulos suos ad misericordiam instar Dei qui pluit super iustos et iniustos {super... iniustos: etc.} (Math. v. 45).	[Objections to the fourth argument] The first argument against the above is this. God {prestat} provides human beings after the fall with both body and soul, and nevertheless they are then in original sin; therefore it is {stat} sure that God mercifully {prestare} provides his good things to the unjust. For thus Truth exhorts his disciples to be merciful in imitation of God, who "makes the rain fall upon the just and the unjust" (Matthew 5[:45]).
Similiter *{secundo} videmus [fol. 70v, line 23] *{quod add.} nedum peccatoribus *{Christianis add.} sed eciam infidelibus donantur bona naturalia et bona fortune, eque sicut iustis. Cum ergo omne donum perfectum est descendens a Patre luminum {est descendens... luminum: etc.} (Iac. i, 17) videtur [fol. 70v, line 24] quod Deus sine personarum accepcione donat tam iustis quam iniustis.	Second, we see that not only Christian sinners but even unbelievers are granted natural goods and goods of fortune, equally with the just. Since therefore "every perfect gift is coming down from the Father of Lights" (James 1[:17]), it seems that God grants without favoritism to both the just and the unjust.
Similiter *{tercio} nisi peccator haberet meritum de bonis {?meritis} propriis {vel de bonis propriis add.}, non expediret [fol. 70v, line 25] peccatori bonum facere {bonum facere: beneficere}, cum ut sic abutitur {utitur} alienis.	Third, unless the sinner gained merit by means of his own goods, it would not benefit the sinner to do good, since as such he abuses things that belong to others.
Ad primum dicitur quod donare et prestare presupponunt existenciam prestarii, et per consequens {per consequens: ita} Deus nulli homini prestat [fol. 70v, line 26] substanciam anime {trs.}; et *{ex quo} patet ad primum. Et per idem sequitur *{ad... sequitur: om.} quod Deus non prestat originaliter peccanti aliquam partem corporis vel aliquod {aliud} donum suum; et per idem nos non [fol. 70v, line 27] deberemus *{debemus} prestare vel donare aliquid peccatori dum cognoscimus ipsum esse talem, tum quia sic foveremus proditorem Domini nostri et non exemplaremus donacionem [fol. 70v, line 28] nostram conformiter ad ipsum; tum eciam *{om.} quia non licet nos *{nobis} alienare bona nobis {om.} solum prestita sine approbante *{om.} licentia Domini {dei} nostri (sed ipse non approbat aliquod bonum *{?donum} [fol. 70v, line 29] iniusti pro tempore quo vivit iniuste; ergo nec nos): debemus tamen communicare cum ipso, specialiter correpcione fraterna et aliis bonis, de {pro} quanto media sunt [fol. 70v, line 30] ad sui conversionem et non ultra. Et ad istum sensum precipimur {nobis preceptum est} diligere inimicos, id est, velle illis bonum ad Dei honorem et nostri comodum; [fol. 70v, line 31] et sic Deus diligit inimicos, sed non {2a manu additum W (Poole); in text P} donat eis aliquid proprie dum sunt tales.	[Answers] To the first it is said that {donare} granting and {prestare} providing presuppose the existence of the {prestarii} beneficiary, and consequently God does not {prestat} provide anyone with the substance of his soul. From this it is clear that God does not {prestat} provide to anyone in original sin any part of his body or any of his gifts. Likewise we ought not {prestare} provide or grant anything to sinners while we know them to be such: First, because in that way we would foster a traitor to our lord and would not model our granting in conformity with him [God]. Also, because we are not permitted to alienate goods {prestita} provided only for us without the permission of our lord; but he does not approve any gift to the unjust {pro tempore} for the time when he lives unjustly, therefore neither should we. We ought, nevertheless, {communicare} have dealings with them [the unjust], especially by fraternal correction and other good [acts], so far as these things are means to their conversion and no further. And in that sense we are commanded to love our enemies, that is, wish them good for the sake of God's honor and our advantage; God loves enemies thus, but he does not in the proper sense grant anything to them while they are such.
Pro quo notandum, quod donacio dicit gratuitam dacionem, et dacio est equivocum {?} [fol. 70v, line 32] ad tradicionem solum ad bonum nature aut esse primum, vel ad bonum gracie vel {aut} perfeccionem secundam: primo modo dat Deus omni inanimato vel iniusto quidquid habet; sed secundo [fol. 70v, line 33] modo dacionis, que est donacio, non dat aliquid nisi iustis. Unde signanter dicit Scriptura quod {om.} Deus solem suum facit oriri versus malos et pluit super [fol. 70v, line 34] iniustos, sed non dicit quod aliquid donat eis *{ita et nos debemus diligere inimicos et ?communicare ?eis add.} in nomine Domini bona fortune accipimus *{et} non ut laudem [fol. 70v, line 35] nobis aut voluptatem {nobis add.} indebite cumulemus.	In support of this it must be noted that {donacio} "granting" means a {gratuitam dacionem} gratuitous giving, and {dacio} "giving" can mean equivocally handing over either only for the good of nature (or first being) or for the good of grace (or second perfection): in the first way God gives to all inanimate things and unjust persons whatever they have, but in the second mode of {dacio} giving, which is {donacio} granting, he does not give anything except to the just. Thus {signanter} it is significant that Scripture says that God "makes his sun arise on the bad and makes rain fall on the unjust," but it does not say that he {donat} grants anything to them. And thus we ought to love enemies and share {communicare} goods of fortune with them in the Lord's name, and not so as to heap up improperly praise or pleasure for ourselves.
Ad secundum nature argumentum {?}: Cum nihil donatur proprie nisi Deus donaverit; Deus autem non donat sic iniustis; [fol. 70v, line 36] ergo nec aliqua creatura (licet multi prodigaliter, contra liberalitatem eciam Aristotelis, distribuant indignis que non donant sed proditorie usurpant, dissipando bona Dei {dissipando bona Dei: ?quam bona} [fol. 70v, line 37] {?domini add.} dissipando}); et per consequens *{et per consequens: ?pro ?cuius ? est notandum quod omnia naturalia ?peccatorum sunt dona dei et ita} ex mera gracia ipsa donat {om.}. Sed ut sciatur quibus donantur, [fol. 70v, line 38] secundum sensum {intellectum} scripture {trs.}, notandum quod totum genus hominum salvandorum, a primo parente usque ad novissimum electum, est una ecclesia sponsa Christi, que pro tempore [fol. 70v, line 39] milicie miscetur cum reprobis (ut {sicut} patet in parabola Salvatoris de zizaniis {zizania}, Math. xiii.24); et illam eque diligit sponsum continue {om.}, dans sibi quidquid communicatum est [fol. 70v, line 40] reprobis: unde quando prescitus peccans mortaliter habet bona fortune et nature *{fortune et nature: nature vel fortune}, Deus communicando dat *{illa add.} et vult ipsum habere talia; sed solum sue ecclesie [fol. 70v, line 41] inter homines donat {dat} ista {illa} {et add.}. Ideo universitatem malorum, ut *{vel} prescitorum, quam Veritas vocat {om.} mundum, et diabolum eius principem, dividit cum suis ab universitate [fol. 70v, line 42] predestinatorum quam sepe vocat regnum celorum, ut {om.} patet {om.}, Ioh. {Mt.} xv.19: Si, inquit, de mundo fuisset is {om.}, mundus quod suum erat {quod suum erat: etc.} diligeret; mundo itaque dat, et eccelesie [fol. 70v, line 43] donat, omnia que sunt mundi.	To the second argument ([??] of nature): Nothing is properly granted unless God grants it; but God does not grant thus to the unjust; therefore neither should any creature. (Though many distribute to the unworthy things that they do not {donant} "grant" but traitorously usurp, squandering God's good things prodigally and contrary to Aristotle's liberality.) It should be noted that all the natural things of sinners are {dona} gifts of God, and thus he {donat} grants those things of mere grace. But so that it may be known to whom they are granted, according to the teaching of Scripture, it must be noted that the whole race of human beings who are to be saved, from our first parent until the most recent elect, is one Church, the bride of Christ, which {pro tempore} during the time of active service on earth is mixed with the wicked (as is clear in the Savior's parable of the tares, Matthew 13[:24]); and the bridegroom loves it equally {continue} all the time, giving to it whatever has been {communicare} imparted to the wicked. Thus when a foreknown person sinning mortally has goods of nature or of fortune, God in {communicare} imparting them {dat} gives them to him and wishes him to have such things, but he {donat} grants them only to his Church among human beings. Therefore he has divided the whole body of the wicked or foreknown, which Truth calls "the world," and its ruler, the devil, along with their things, from the whole body of the predestined, which he often calls "the kingdom of heaven." This is clear in John 15[:19]: "If," he says, "you had been of the world, the world would love what was its own." He therefore "gives" to the world and "grants" to the Church all the things that are the world's.
Patet ista sentencia ex sentencia parabolica Salvatoris, Math. xxv.28, 29, ubi post tradicionem bonorum hominis Iesu Christi {trs.} servis [fol. 70v, line 44] suis in gracia baptismali vel alias, dum sunt grati, in finali iudicio {pro?fecimus et add.} positurus racionem, {trs.} revertitur et condemnando servum [fol. 70v, line 45] pigrum, quia {qui dominus} noluit {voluit} bona Domini sibi data ad sui profectum et Dei servicium ad augendum dare spiritualiter ad usuram, sodales suos alloquitur [fol. 70v, line 46] per {in} hunc modum {vel sic [correcting qui dominus... voluit above] qui servus noluit etc per hunc modum add.}: Tollite ab eo talentum, et date ei qui decem talenta habet {talentum... habet: etc.} ; et sequitur ad propositum, Omni habenti dabitur et habundabit, ei autem qui non habet et quod videtur habere {habundabit... habere: etc.} aufferetur ab eo. [fol. 70v, line 47] Et *{om.} idem dicit, Math. xiii.12; et patet ex {om.} sequela parabole, secundum concordem doctorum sentenciam, quod intendit hec duo dicere: *{primum add.} quod peccator, licet videatur in facie ecclesie [fol. 70v, line 48] errantis habere dona domini, non tamen vere est dotarius *{?donatarius}, sed ex permissione divina iniuste {om.} occupat hec ad tempus {iniuste add.}. (Unde ad denotandum istam {om.} [fol. 70v, line 49] equivocacionem {hanc add.}, in qua non est contradiccio, habet textus, Marc. iv.25, et Luc. xix.26, Ab eo autem qui non habet, et quod habet aufferetur ab eo {et quod... eo: etc.}.) Et patet secundo {Et patet secundo: secundum patet} quod habens universitatem bonorum [fol. 70v, line 50] Domini figuratam {signatam} per denarium talentorum, aufferret sibi ex donacione Domini ista bona, et sic a iusto active aufferentur hec {dona et add.} bona, ab [fol. 70v, line 51] iniusto materialiter et passive, cum iustus aufferret hoc {hec} ab illo.	This {sentencia} teaching is clear from the Savior's teaching in the parable, Matthew 25[:28\PN29], where after the goods of the man (Jesus Christ) have been handed over (in baptismal grace and otherwise) to his servants, while they are pleasing, the man comes back and condemns the lazy servant, when he is about to put in his account (in the final judgment), because he was unwilling to put the gifts the lord gave him out to usury (spiritually) to obtain an increase (for his advancement and God's service). He speaks to the other servants thus: "Take the talent away from him, and give it to him who has ten talents." And the text continues relevantly: "To all those who have, it will be given, and they will abound, but those who do not have, even what they seem to have will be taken from them." He says the same in Matthew 13[:12]. And from the continuation of the parable it is clear, according to the {concordem sentenciam} consensus of the {doctorum} learned, that he intends here to say two things. The first is that although the sinner may seem in the eyes of the erring Church to possess the Lord's gifts, nevertheless he is not truly the grantee, but by divine permission unjustly holds these things for the time being. Thus, to indicate this equivocation (in which there is no contradiction), the text of Mark 4[:25] and Luke 19[:26] has: "But from those who do not have, even what they have will be taken away." And it is clear, second, that he who had the totality of the Lord's goods (symbolized by the ten-ness of the talents), took those goods for himself by the Lord's granting; and thus these goods were taken by the just man actively and from the unjust materially and passively, since the just man took them from him.
Et *{sic add.} patet {apparet} utraque *{om.} consequencia *{conclusio} in principio proposita; et {?aut} patet {apparet} quod assumptum in secundo argumento et eius [fol. 70v, line 52] conclusio non *{sunt add.} vera, limitando utrobique, ut suppono limitatum, quod Deus non donat creature sue, pro tempore quo est iniusta, bonum aliquod, sed dat ad esse nature [fol. 70v, line 53] et abusum permittit. Et {om.} hinc prelati ecclesie, sencientes humiliter de se ipsis, non dicunt quod ordinacione, donacione, gracia, aut voluntate divina, [fol. 70v, line 54] sunt taliter {trs.} perfecti *{?prefecti}, sed permissione divina: quod sciunt ex {om.} sensu et noticia infallibili esse verum; -- sed *{et} utinam non ad sensum equivocum.	And thus the conclusion stated at the beginning is clear, and it is clear that the minor premise in the second objection and its conclusion are not true--{utrobique} everywhere {limitando} stipulating, as I suppose has been {limitatum} settled, that God does not grant any good to his creature {pro tempore} for the time when it [the creature] is unjust, but gives what is needed for natural existence and permits abuse. And thus prelates of the Church who think humbly of themselves do not say that they have been put thus in charge by divine ordinance, grant, grace or will, but "by divine permission": they know this to be true by sense and infallible knowledge (and I wish it were not in an equivocal sense!).
Ad tercium dicitur [fol. 70v, line 55] quod quilibet existens in peccato {om.} mortali debet mereri et uti continue bonis Domini, faciendo bonum opus {trs.} de genere: patet quod {trs.} {sic add.} quilibet existens {om.} talis debet esse in gracia et facere [fol. 70v, line 56] consequenter que ad servum fidelem pertinent; quod debitum quia obmittit, ideo {om.} peccat continue sic in Deum.	To the third objection it is said that anyone who is in mortal sin ought to merit and {continue} continually use the Lord's good things to do a work good in its kind: it is clear that anyone who is such [i.e. in mortal sin] ought to be in grace and ought, accordingly, do the things that befit a faithful servant. Because he does not do as he ought, he thus sins against God {continue} continually.
Sed difficultas conclusionis stat {om.} in isto {est add.}: Utrum expedit [fol. 70v, line 57] peccatori pro tempore quo est in mortali peccato {om.} facere bonum opus de genere {trs. 3421}? Et partem affirmativam huius difficultatis {Et partem... difficultatis: question mark; quod sic} declarat Lincolensis, lxviii, {dictio add.} racione septemplici {6ci W (Poole)} *{sextuplici}: Opera, inquit, bona extra caritatem facta, {trs. 321} [fol. 70v, line 58] licet non mereantur celum, tamen aliis {?} modis {modum modum} valent {begin new sentence} et prosunt *{sunt} {sunt W (Poole)}: isti *{modi add.}	[A difficulty] But the difficulty of the conclusion {stat} consists in this: Whether it is advantageous to the sinner {pro tempore} for the time during which he is in mortal sin to do an act good in its kind? And the Bishop of Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste] explains the affirmative side of this difficulty, in Dict. lxviii, by a sixfold argument. "Good works," he says, "done without charity, though they do not merit heaven, nevertheless are of value in other ways." These ways [according to Grosseteste] are as follows.
a magno {magis} malo excusant, et prescitum se {om.} in illis {se add.} exercentem {exercitatem} micius *{minus} {micius 2da manu; prima ut suspicor minus W (Poole)} dampnant, minus in peccato profundant, et per consequens {per consequens: ita} minus a gracia divina {trs.} elongant, aliis multipliciter proficiunt, et ad primam graciam disponunt. [fol. 70v, line 60] Nec sunt ista bona parvipendenda; nam sicud prodest incarcerato minus profunde poni in carcere et torqueri, correspondenter {intelligitur add.} [fol. 70v, line 61] de damnato intelligitur {om.}. Et sicud prodest lapso minus produnde lacu infigi minusque a sublevante {sublevacione} removeri, sic prodest iniquo minus profunde viciis [fol. 70v, line 62] irretiri et sublevanti {sublevando} ad graciam apropinquari {propinquari}.	They excuse the sinner from great evil and damn less the foreknown who exercises himself in them, they submerge him less in sin and consequently distance him less from divine grace, they benefit others in many ways, and they dispose to the first grace. (And these benefits should not be weighed lightly. For just as it is beneficial to a prisoner to be less deeply buried in the prison and less tortured, so we should think likewise of the damned; and just as it is beneficial to one who has fallen to be submerged less deeply in the lake and to be less distant from the rescuer, so it is beneficial to the wicked to be enmeshed less deeply in vices and to be closer to someone who will help him toward grace.)
Quinto, bonum male factum valet *{prodest magis ecclesie quam opus malum de genere male factum add.} [fol. 70v, line 63] in tantum, quod pollitici, secundum faciem iudicantes, respiciunt solum {solam} substanciam boni actus, non curantes sive bene factus fuerit sive male; quod Deus [fol. 70v, line 64] scrutans corda appropriate respicit.	Fifth, a good thing done badly is more beneficial to the church than an act bad in its kind done badly (to the extent that {pollitici--pejorative?} politicians, judging by appearances, look only on the substance of the good act and do not care whether it has been done well or badly; God, searching hearts, appropriately considers this).
Sexto {igitur}, sicut exul vel carceri adiectus {additus} non meretur protunc aput dominum, a cuius presencia elongatur, sed habentes [fol. 70v, line 65] liberum accessum ad dominum quibus incarceratus ad partem seorsum proficit; sic peccator non meretur sibi, ut sic, beatitudinem vel graciam, [fol. 70v, line 66] cum nemo scit si *{scit si: meretur sibi prima gratia oportet} {conjecture: add quod} bona opera sua, que facit alii existenti in gracia, sunt occasio, vel *{ut} oracio grati recipientis elimosinam peccatoris mereatur {?} ipsi {sibi} primam graciam, quod {cum} ipse non potest in propria persona {trs.}: cum illis paribus.	Sixth, just as an exile or someone {adiectus} thrown into prison does not for the time being merit with his lord, from whose presence he is removed, but [may merit] with persons who have free access to the lord, [namely, persons] whom the prisoner separately benefits in part, so a sinner, as such, does not merit for himself blessedness or grace (since no one merits for himself the first grace): it must be that good works that he does for another person who is in grace are an occasion [i.e. an occasional cause having the effect] that the prayer of the grateful recipient of the sinner's alms merits for him the first grace, which {cum illis paribus} under the circumstances he cannot merit in his own person.
Et bonum argumentum addit doctor, {Et bonum... doctor,: sexto} quod assuefaccio sensualis peccatoris in operibus bonis de genere reddit ipsum post [fol. 71r, line 1] adeptam graciam facilitatum ad operandum virtuose, ubi aliter et {etiam} {trs.} data gracia operaretur cum difficultate.	And that learned man [Grosseteste] adds a [seventh] good argument, that the sensual habituation of the sinner in works that are good of their kind makes it easier for him, after he has obtained grace, to act virtuously, when otherwise, even when grace was given, he would act with difficulty.
*{sed dicitur quod add.} Oportet enim *{om.} omnem virtuosum esse [fol. 71r, line 2] in caritate, licet Aristotles et alii gentiles philosophi, ex quacunque operacione bona de genere tracta in consuetudinem delectabilem, convincunt *{?coniciunt} {convinciunt W (Poole)} hominem esse [fol. 71r, line 3] mortaliter *{moraliter} virtuosum.	[Reply] But it is said that every virtuous person must be in charity, although Aristotle and other pagan philosophers conjecture that we are made morally virtuous by any action good in its kind developed into a pleasurable habit.
Et patet *{Et patet: Secundo dicitur} quod peccator, si *{sicut} non meretur pro {om.} tunc {om.} beatitudinem, *{sic add.} nec meretur pro tunc, ut alius mereatur {om.}, sibi propriam *{primam} graciam {mereatur add.} nec bonum [fol. 71r, line 4] aliquod temporale. Nam, cum omne mereri sit creaturam racionalem se dignificare ad premium, patet si tunc meretur aliquid, facit se tunc {trs.} {esse add.} dignum ad id *{illud; new sentence}; {et add.}on [fol. 71r, line 5] cum mereri dicit simul {trs.} actum merendi et dignitatem ad premium. Patet quod {Patet quod: om.; no new sentence} si nunc {non add.} meretur, nunc *{non} facit se esse {nunc add.} dignum ad premium; quia aliter peccator indubie *{om.} [fol. 71r, line 6] mereretur pro tempore quo esset in peccato premium sempiternum; quia multi sunt, qui dum peccant faciunt se esse expost dignos ad regnum Dei {om.}.	Second, it is said that just as sinners do not {pro tunc} for that time merit blessedness, so neither do they {pro tunc} for that time merit that someone else should merit for them the first grace or any temporal good. For since in every case for rational creatures to merit is for them to {dignific-} make themselves worthy of reward, it is clear that if someone then merits something, he makes himself then worthy of it. And since "to merit" means at once the act of meriting and worthiness to receive the reward, it is clear that if he does not merit now, he does not make himself worthy of the reward--for otherwise the sinner would undoubtedly merit, {pro tempore} for the time when he was in sin, an eternal reward ([??] for there are many who, while they sin, make themselves to be worthy afterwards of the kingdom of God).
Et *{om.} ex istis videtur [fol. 71r, line 7] mihi {om.} quod nullus prescitus, in quantumcunque magna gracia fuerit {trs.} secundum presentem iusticiam, meretur regnum vel graciam finalis perseverancie, sed *{nunc add.} aliquod bonum citra. Et *{om.} racio est {om.} [fol. 71r, line 8] quia nemo meretur aliquid, nisi habuerit ius ad illud: sed nullus prescitus habet ius ad regnum, cum tunc (iuxta conclusionem tercii capituli tractatus primi) haberet pro suo [fol. 71r, line 9] tempore {?} ius in regno; ergo nullus prescitus meretur regnum: non *{nemo} enim se dignificat {trs.} ad habendum quod Deus vult ut non habeat; cum omne ius creatum [fol. 71r, line 10] sit a iure, quod est divina volicio, extractum. Et {om.} ex eodem sequitur quod nullus predestinatus, quantumcunque graviter peccaverit secundum {presentem add.} iniusticiam {iusticiam} iam instantem, [fol. 71r, line 11] demeretur penam perpetuam; quia dignum non est, cuius contradictum {contradictionem} placet Deo. Unccio ergo gracie predestinacionis, a qua nemo potest excidere, salvat omnem [fol. 71r, line 12] predestinatum, nec si {sic} peccat: sed omne meritum mercedis perpetue respicit finalem perseveranciam in bono vel abstinenciam *{obstinanciam} in malo. Itaque {ita quod} nemo meretur [fol. 71r, line 13] mercedem perpetuam, nisi ut alterum istorum dat meriti conplementum {?}. Unde, sicut conductus pro denario ex opere diurno, bene {om.} faciens {om.} usque ad primam [fol. 71r, line 14] et {ex add.} post ociando continue, non meretur denarium, sed eius privacionem; sic, secundum parabolam Salvatoris, est demerentibus *{de merentibus} mercedem propriam *{perpetuam}.	From these points it seems to me that no matter how great a grace the foreknown are in according to present {iusticia} justice, they do not merit the kingdom [of heaven] or the grace of final perseverance, but {nunc} rather some other good. This is because they do not merit anything unless they have a right to it; but the foreknown have no right to the kingdom, since then (in accordance with the conclusion of Tract \SCI\ES [De mandatis divinis], chapter 3) they would have, {pro suo tempore} for their own time, a right in the kingdom. Therefore the foreknown do not merit the kingdom, since they cannot make themselves worthy to have what God wills them not to have, since every created right is drawn from the right which is the divine will. And it follows likewise that the predestined, however gravely they sin in accordance with the injustice in them at the moment, do not deserve an everlasting penalty, because nothing is deserved if its opposite pleases God. Anointing with the grace of predestination, which no one can {excidere} lose, therefore saves all the predestined even if they sin. But in every case desert of everlasting recompense relates to final perseverance in good or obstinacy in evil, and so no one deserves everlasting recompense except as one or other of these gives completeness of desert. Thus, just as someone hired for a penny for a day's work who works well for the first hour and afterwards loafs continually does not deserve the penny, but deserves to lose it, so it is, according to the Savior's parable, of those who earn everlasting recompense.
Et omnia [fol. 71r, line 15] allegata {alleganda} in oppositum intelligunt quod gratus vel peccans habet [fol. 71r, line 16] disposicionem qua continuata finaliter ita foret; ut sicut Petrus negando Christum habuit disposicionem qua continuata finaliter damnaretur, sic Iudas, quando receperat dona {dei et add.} Christi, habuit, disposicionem in qua, perseverando {continuando} finaliter {om.} salvaretur. [fol. 71r, line 17] Et {ex quibus} patet {om.} per {om.} hoc {om.} quomodo {patet quod} sit {om.} dicendum {est add.} de descripcione peccati mortalis et gracie etc {peccati... gracie etc: gracie et peccati mortalis}.	All the things brought forward for the opposite conclusion assume that a person in grace, or a sinner, has a disposition by which, if it were continued {finaliter} to the end, he would be thus--for example, just as Peter denying Christ had a disposition by which, if continued to the end, he would be damned, so Judas, when he received Christ's gifts, had a disposition in which, if he persevered to the end, he would be saved. And it is clear from this how one should speak of the description of mortal sin and grace.
Cap. III. Sed *{om.} argumentatur *{om.} contra sentenciam ultime racionis per hoc quod *{sentenciam... quod: tertiam rationem principalem} omnis peccator sit *{om.} univoce *{est add.} homo cum iusto; [fol. 71r, line 18] ergo univoce habet corpus et animam cum iusto, et {om.} per idem omnia bona fortune; et per consequens {per consequens: ita} est univoce dominus cum iusto.	[More Objections] Chapter 3 Against the third principal argument [or perhaps rather against the arguments on p. 000 above{answers to objections to the fourth argument}]: [a] Every sinner is a human being, in the same sense as a just person is; therefore sinners have, in the same sense as the just have, body and soul, and likewise all the goods of fortune; and consequently sinners are lords in the same sense as the just are.
Confirmatur primo per hoc quod {primo... quod: om.} sicut placet Deo [fol. 71r, line 19] quod iste homo sit, ita placet Deo quod habeat corpus et animam et omnia organa ac {et} bona sibi accidentalia, et nihil placet *{deo add.} nisi iustum; ergo iustum [fol. 71r, line 20] est quod habeat ista {illa} bona, et per consequens {per consequens: ita} iustissimo titulo {om.} iuris {iure} occupat bona illa {trs.}.	[b] It is confirmed first by this: Just as it pleases God that sinners be human beings, so it pleases God that they have body and soul and all the accidental instruments and goods, and nothing pleases God unless it is just; therefore it is just that sinners have those goods, and consequently they hold those goods by the justest title.
Similiter Deus vult quod iniustus, faciendo bona opera de genere, [fol. 71r, line 21] disponat se {trs.} ad graciam; ergo Deus vult, quod habeat instrumenta taliter operandi. Antecedens patet {apparet} per Lincolensem, ubi supra, et per *{om.} Scripturam *{om.}, Daniel. iv.24, ubi consulit *{consuluit} [fol. 71r, line 22] Nabugodonosori infideli ut {quod} peccata sua elemosinis redimeret et iniquitates misericordiis pauperum {et iniquitates... pauperum: etc.}. Sed {ubi} constat quod tam sanctus propheta non ita consuleret, nec esset bonum aut [fol. 71r, line 23] placitum Deo sic fieri, nisi eciam foret iustum; ergo stat quod pravissimus *{gravissimus peccator} bene et iuste distribuat bona sua.	[c] Similarly God wills that the unjust, by doing acts good in their kind, dispose themselves to grace; therefore God wills that they have the means of acting thus. The {antecedens} premise is clear from the Bishop of Lincoln, above, and from Daniel 4[:24], where Daniel advised Nabuchodonosor, an unbeliever, "to redeem [his] sins by alms and [his] iniquities by works of mercy to the poor." But it is certain that so holy a prophet would not have given such advice, nor would it have been good or pleasing to God that these deeds be done, unless it would also have been just; therefore {stat} it is sure that the worst sinners give alms with their property well and justly.
Similiter, [fol. 71r, line 24] cum mortali peccato {trs.} stat donum caracteris, potestas clavium, et donum prophecie, ut {om.} patet de Balaam (Num. xxiv): cum ergo potestas utendi {uti} {bonis add.} [fol. 71r, line 25] temporalibus videtur *{videatur} maxime elongata a donis Dei gratuitis, videtur quod ista {illa} stant *{stat} cum peccato mortali: et cum ista {illa} sit ius (ex dictis superius {supra}), videtur esse {om.} possibile [fol. 71r, line 26] quod iniustus iuste occupat bona {dona} Dei {vel bona add.}; potissime {maxime} cum comitancia gracie videtur accidentalis dominio, et nullum accidentale variat speciem: [fol. 71r, line 27] non ergo sufficit dicere quod Deus permittit talia, ut peccata, cum ex approbacione divina {om.} habet iniustus tam bona naturali quam fortune.	[d] Similarly, the gift of character, the power of the keys, and the gift of prophecy, {stat} can coexist with mortal sin, as is clear by Balaam (Numbers 24). Since, therefore, the power of using temporal goods seems most distant from the gratuitous gifts of God, it seems that {stat} it can coexist with mortal sin; and since that power is a right (from what has been said above), it seems possible for the unjust to hold God's good things justly--especially since the concomitance of grace seems accidental to lordship, and nothing accidental changes the species [of anything]. Therefore it is not enough to say that God permits such things as he permits sins, since it is by divine approbation that the unjust has both natural goods and goods of fortune.
Hic oportet distingwere de habicione atque iusticia {Hic... iusticia: pro hiis dicitur quod}. [fol. 71r, line 28] Quamvis enim {om.} secundum Aristotelem et auctorem Sex {om.} Principiorum multiplices sunt *{sint} modi *{habendi add.}, tres tamen sufficiunt pro presenti: scilicit *{om.} habicio *{om.} naturalis [[between lines]], civilis, ac {om.} evangelica; et media habicio [fol. 71r, line 29] subdividitur ad sensus equivocos in habere civile verum et pretensum, ut dictum est {ut dictum est: supra} tractatu primo, capitulo iii {om.} de iure. Primo modo habendi habent peccatores bona naturalia, [fol. 71r, line 30] et tamen non iuste simpliciter (ut patet superius) sed iniuste: secundo modo habendi, secundum utrumque membrum {modum} equivocum, habent potentatus seculi {et add.} bona fortune [fol. 71r, line 31] aut *{om.} fortuita *{om.}. Sed tercio modo habendi, excellentissimo possibili, quoad genus, habent solum existentes in caritate vel gracia quidquid habent. Unde propter habictionem tam [fol. 71r, line 32] equivocam dicitur *{dicit veritas} (Luc. xix.26, ut {om.} supra {om.}) quod ab eo qui non habet, et quod habet auferetur per iustum {et... iustum: etc.}; ubi plane patet distinccio modo dicta. Unde quam {?} equivoce diceretur Petrus, tyrannice [fol. 71r, line 33] *{solum add.} occupans dominium, ipsum habere per hoc *{per hoc: om.}, in comparacione ad Paulum qui iure hereditario habet suum; tam equivoce possident iustus [fol. 71r, line 34] et iniustus temporalia hic in via {vita}: et tamen necessitati sumus, post lapsum et multiplicatem *{multiplicationem} peccati, sic loqui; cum Veritas (Math. xix.22) dicit de adolescente [fol. 71r, line 35] avaro, Erat enim multas habens {trs.} divicias *{possessiones} {post divicias in cod. additur possessiones (Poole)} .	[Replies to objections] [Preliminaries] Here we must make distinctions concerning "having" and "justice." For although, according to Aristotle and the author of The Six Principles, there are many ways of having, three suffice for the present: natural, civil, and gospel (evangelica); and civil possession is subdivided by equivocal senses into true and pretended civil having, as was said in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 3, concerning right (De mandatis divinis, p. 18). In the first way of having sinners have natural goods, and yet not simply justly (as is clear above), but unjustly. In the second way of having, according to both equivocal members, the powers of this world have goods of fortune. But in the third way of having, which is in its kind the most excellent possible, they alone "have" what they have who are in charity or grace. Hence because of a "having" that is so equivocal, Truth says (in Luke 19[:26], as above) that "from those who do not have, even what they have will be taken away" by the just, where the distinction just stated plainly appears. Hence, just as Peter holding a lordship tyrannically would be said equivocally to "have" it, in comparison with Paul who has his own lordship by hereditary right, so the just and the unjust equivocally possess temporal things here in the way [i.e. in this life]. Yet after the fall and the multiplication of sins we must speak thus, since Truth (Matthew 19[:22]) says of the avaricious young man, "For he had great possessions."
Sed propter responsionem *{rationem} absolutam ad proponenda, secunda distinccio de iusticia est notanda; [fol. 71r, line 36] *{quod add.} aliquid {aliquod} enim *{om.} est iustum active, et {om.} aliquid ab extrinseco vel passive. Primo modo solum est iustum quidquid habet in {om.} se {om.} virtutem iusticie {in se add.} formaliter: et hoc contingit [fol. 71r, line 37] dupliciter; vel quod ista {illa} iusticia sit essencia iusti, quomodo solus Deus potest esse iustus, vel quod ista {illa} iusticia sit accidens de genere qualitatis, et taliter [fol. 71r, line 38] sunt creature racionabiles {rationales} existentes in gracia solum iuste. Secundo modo *{prime distinccionis add.} est omnis creatura iusta, cum ens iustum et bonum simpliciter [fol. 71r, line 39] convertuntur *{convertantur}. Iusticia autem, naturaliter et per se consequens creaturam, est bonitas qua creatura conformatur voluntati primi principii.	But for the sake of a {absolutam} complete argument toward what must be laid down, a second distinction must be noted concerning justice: that some things are just [1] actively, others [2] extrinsically or passively. Only what has in itself the virtue of justice formally is just in the first way. This happens in two ways: either [1.1] this justice is the essence of the just, and only God can be just in this way, or [1.2] this justice is an accident in the category of quality, and the reasonable creatures who are in grace are just only in this way. In [2] the second way of the first distinction, every creature is just, since "just being" and "good" convert simply; the justice naturally and essentially consequent to the creature is the goodness by which the creature is conformed to the will of the first principle.
Et {illud membrum add.} fundari potest illud membrum distinccionis {illud membrum distinccionis: om.} triplici [fol. 71r, line 40] racione: primo, per hoc quod Deus nichil {non} diligit nisi iustum, sed diligit omnia que sunt (ut patet {ut patet: om.} Sapient. xi.25), ergo omne ens est iustum: secundo, confirmatur per hoc quod *{confirmatur... quod: om.} omne ens ordinatum a Deo [fol. 71r, line 41] esse, est iustum esse, (ut {om.} patet {supra add.}, tractatu primo {trs.}, capitulo primo {3o}), sed omnis creatura est ordinata a Deo esse, ergo omnem creaturam est iustum esse patet {om.} consequencia {apparet add.} ex {per} hoc quod omnis [fol. 71r, line 43] creature esse est essencia, et econtra: tercio confirmatur per hoc quod *{confirmatur... quod: om.} omne opus procedens a creatura iusta simpliciter, secundum direccionem sue iusticie, est iustum, et *{om.} eciam si fuerit malum [fol. 71r, line 43] de genere (ut patet {apparet} philosophis qui concedunt *{talia add.} opera hominum virtuosa), ergo a maiori vel pari *{trs. 321} omne {om.} opus prime Iusticie, quod continue *{om.} facit ad exemplar {exemplum} sue volencie, [fol. 71r, line 44] erit iustum. [??] Dicat, rogo {quis} qui scit {voluerit} racionem diversitatis quia {quam} revera ego nescio, nec estimo {revera... estimo: non est credendum} deum scire.	This member of the distinction can be based on a threefold argument. First, because God loves nothing except the just; but he loves all things that exist (as is clear from Wisdom 11[:25]); therefore every being is just. Second, every being ordained by God to exist, exists justly (as is clear from Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 1 [De mandatis divinis, p. 4]); but every creature is ordained by God to exist, therefore every creature exists justly; {consequencia} the inference is clear from the fact that the being of every creature is its essence and vice versa. Third, every work that proceeds from a creature simply just in accordance with the direction of its justice is just, even if it is evil in its kind (as is clear to philosophers, who concede that such works of human beings are virtuous); therefore, with equal or greater reason, every work of the First Justice, which it does according to the exemplar of his will, will be just. [??] Let whoever knows [of one] give a reason for a difference [between the two cases, of creatures and of God], because in truth I do not know [of one], nor do I believe that God does.
Unde, secundum Augustinum, nichil potest quoad essenciam esse Deo contrarium, [fol. 71r, line 45] cum oportet *{oporteat} omnia contraria habere esse contractum in genere secundum quod repugnant formaliter, ut album et nigrum sunt due forme que superaddunt essenciam; [fol. 71r, line 46] sed in Deo esse *{omne} intrinsecum est purum esse, ergo nichil intrinsecum Deo {trs.} potest esse alicui contrarium: minor patet per Augustinum (septimo de Trinitate), quod *{om.} in Deo esse iustum, [fol. 71r, line 47] bonum, sapientem, etc., non est unum formale superadditum essencie sed esse Deum vel divina essencia. Cum ergo nichil, in quantum est ens, repugnat alteri (quia [fol. 71r, line 48] sic quodlibet repugnaret cuilibet), sequitur quod primo pure {ponitur} esse, quoad sua intrinseca, nichil poterit repugnare; aliter enim non {om.} [[should I delete non?]] adhereret sibi universitas creata, [fol. 71r, line 49] tamquam accidens ad subiectum.	Thus, according to Augustine, nothing can be contrary to God in respect of its essence, since all contraries must have limited being in the genus according to which they are formally repugnant (as "white" and "black" are two forms that add something to the essence), but in God everything intrinsic is pure being and therefore nothing intrinsic to God can be contrary to anything. The minor premise is clear from Augustine (De Trinitate, \SCVII\ES): to be just, good, wise, etc., is not in God something formal superadded to the essence, but is God's being or the divine essence. Since, therefore, nothing, insofar as it is being, is repugnant with another (because thus each would be repugnant with every other), it follows that nothing can be repugnant with the first pure being in respect of what is intrinsic to it, for otherwise the created universe [??] would not adhere to it [i.e. to the first being] as accident to subject.
Ideo quod dictum est {om.} tractatu primo, capitulo v, quod leges *{create add.} repugnant legi Dei; hoc est, secundum mandata et ordinem quem creaturis {creature} [fol. 71r, line 50] instituit, quem ordinem creatura {natura} racionalis nititur dirrumpere vel {et} ab ipso {illo} deficere; et non quoad divinam essenciam.	And so what was said in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 5 (De mandatis divinis, p. 35) [follows], namely that [some] created laws are repugnant with God's law--that is, with the commands and order God has established for creatures, which the rational creature attempts to break {deficere} or defect from--but not with the divine essence.
Et {om.} ex ista {qua} consideracione concludit philosophus {Aristoteles} [fol. 71r, line 51] (primo Phisicorum) quod materie prime nichil potest esse contrarium, cum non {nec} sit quale nec quantum nec aliquid aliorum encium (ex *{om.} septimo Metaphysice).	And from this consideration Aristotle concludes (Physics, \SCI\ES [190 b34\PN5]) that nothing can be contrary to prime matter, since it is not "such" or "so great" or any of the other [kinds of] beings (Metaphysics, \SCVII\ES [1029 a20\PN22]).
Ex istis patet quod nulla [fol. 71r, line 52] creatura potest esse iniusta {iusta W (Poole); iniusta P} nisi per accidens; et *{ita add.} oportet illi iniusticie vel peccato subesse quandam essenciam, qua *{quam}, ex conformitate divini beneplaciti, [fol. 71r, line 53] sit iustum esse.	From these points it is clear that no creature can be unjust except per accidens, and thus some essence must underlie injustice or sin, and the existence of this essence, from its conformity with the divine good pleasure, is just.
Istis *{ex} premissis concedo *{conceditur} quod iustus et iniustus, quantum ad essenciam vel naturam attinet {actuum}, sunt univoce homines et sic iusti. Unde [fol. 71r, line 54] sicut omnis natura mala est bona (ut {om.} patet {om.} Enchiridion 9), sic omnis natura iniusta *{est iusta add.}; quia iniustum active est iustum passive, de [fol. 71r, line 55] quanto est opus prime Iusticie: et ita concedatur *{conceditur} quod tam iustus quam iniustus habet, secundum primam existenciam creature, univoce tam corpus quam animam, cum {et} [fol. 71r, line 56] quolibet alio naturali: verumtamen {et tamen}, quod {quia} iniusto {?potest added and crossed out} deficit perfeccio secunda in talibus, ideo, secundum perfeccionem secundam, non dicuntur iustus et iniustus habere talia [fol. 71r, line 57] nisi equivoce; cum, iuxta dicta superius, omnia bona quoad perfeccionem secundam sunt perdita sic iniusto, et sic habicio caritativa vel evangelica, [fol. 71r, line 58] que est perfectissima, sibi deest. Unde, sicut iusto deest instrumentum vel ad *{aliud} bonum fortune (licet habeat in eo civilitatem), dum deficit quoad usum; [fol. 71r, line 59] sic iniusto deest quidquid habuit *{habuerit}, dum non tunc utitur sed abutitur quocunque quis *{quod} occupat: hinc vere et philosophice dicit Ieronimus {trs. 51423} (capitulo ultimo {capitulo ultimo: om.}, {in add.} Epistola ad Paulinum) [fol. 71r, line 60]: Avaro, inquit {om.}, deest tam {trs.} quod habet quam quod non habet {quam... habet: etc.}.	[Replies] [a] From what has been laid down, it is conceded that the just and the unjust, so far as concerns their essence or nature, are in the same sense human beings and thus just. Hence, in the same way as every evil nature is good (as is clear from Enchiridion, 9 [xii.4]), so every unjust nature is just, because what is actively unjust is passively just insofar as it is the work of the first Justice; and thus it is conceded that both the just and the unjust in the same sense "have," according to the first existence of a creature, both body and soul, along with every other natural [good]. Nevertheless, because in such things the unjust {deficit} lack second perfection, therefore, according to second perfection, the just and the unjust are not said to "have" such things except equivocally, since, in accordance with what was said above, in respect of their second perfection all good things are thus {perdita} lost to the unjust; and thus charitable {caritativa--"carismatic"?} or gospel "having," which is the most perfect, is lacking to them. So in the same way as the unjust lack instruments or other goods of fortune (though they have a civil right in such things) while they {deficit quoad} are lacking with respect to its use, so the things they "have" are lacking to the unjust, while they do not then use, but abuse, all the things they hold. Thus Jerome (Letter to Paulinus, last chapter) speaks truly and philosophically; he says, "Misers lack both what they have and what they do not have."
Et patet {trs.} in principali argumento quod non sequitur quod {om.} iniustus sit univoce dominus cum iusto, licet univoce habeat bona naturalia cum illo {iniustus... illo: iniuste [conjecture: univoce] est habens bona naturalia cum iusto, igitur et [iuste deleted--my guess is that iniuste should also have been corrected to univoce] univoce dominus [fol. 71r, line 61] cum iusto}; set {quia} dominium dicit distincte *{om.} perfeccionem secundam fundatam in gracia, que cum deest iniusto, et verum dominium sibi deest. Et sic quandocunque {quantumcunque} ascribitur tali super {om.} [fol. 71r, line 62] extrinseco dominium sive {vel} regnacio, subintelligendum est usurpative falsum et {vel} pretensum dominium.	And it is clear that in the argument at the beginning [of chapter 3] it does not follow that since they have natural goods in the same sense [of "have"] as the just have them, therefore sinners are lords in the same sense as the just are: because lordship means a second perfection founded in grace, and since this is lacking to the unjust true lordship is also lacking. And thus, whenever lordship or kingship over something outside themselves is ascribed to such people, it must be understood that this is usurpative, false and pretended lordship.
Per hoc patet responsio ad primam confirmacionem, concedendo consequenciam *{Per... consequenciam: Ad secundum conceditur} quod omnis iniustus de divino beneplacito [fol. 71r, line 63] habet quidquid est iustum {trs.} quod habeat (ut patet tractatu primo, capitulo i.), et sic ipse cum omnibus bonis suis est iustus {trs.} passive vel iusticia naturali. Sed cum, [fol. 71r, line 64] loco perfeccionis secunde, habet *{habeat} iniusticiam, patet quod non iustissimo {iusto} titulo, sed {ymo} debilissimo occupat illa bona. Et {unde} patet quod ille {iste} fucus sophisticus [fol. 71r, line 65] non inpugnat veritatem ascitam *{om.} in principio *{assumptam add.}, cum idem {ibi} limitatum est ad puram iusticiam *{vel primam add. -- primam corrects puram} sine permixta iniusticia [fol. 71r, line 66] a *{om.} loco perfeccionis secunde. Cum enim quelibet creatura racionalis habet *{habeat} potestatem datam sibi ad habendum, optimo modo habendi in genere, quidquid habet; patet quod est multum {trs.} [fol. 71v, line 1] culpandus si abutitur {abutatur} sua potestate, quiescendo in habicione pure naturali, ut {sicut} habent ligna vel lapides aut {vel} alie creature insensibiles {invisibiles W (Poole); invisibiles P} [fol. 71v, line 2] bona sua. Insuper si quiescit contentatus de habicione civili, non impetrando a Domino capitali {trs.} bona gracie et glorie quibus hec bona [fol. 71v, line 3] adiacent, secundum cartham vel inscripcionem {scripcionem} securissimam libro vite (ut {sicut} loquitur Veritas, Luc. x.20) indubie {non dubium} est damnandus. Unde *{et} pertinenter confirmando istam {hanc} [fol. 71v, line 4] sentenciam {trs.} dicit Veritas {Christus} (Math. v.20): Nisi, inquit {om.}, habundaverit iusticia vestra plus quam scribarum et Phariseorum, non intrabitis regnum celorum {iusticia... celorum: etc.}. Ubi patet {apparet} primo inplicacio *{om.} quod Pharisei sunt iusti *{naturaliter sive passive qui tamen non dubie sunt iniusti add.}, nam {om.} [fol. 71v, line 5] (sicud notat {J. add.} Crisostomus) nichil habundat super iusticiam non existentem. Et *{om.} patet {apparet} secundo contra mundanos, quod non sufficit ad beatitudinem hec naturalis iusticia, [fol. 71v, line 6] vel civilis; sed oportet superaddere, sub pena damnacionis perpetue, iusticiam evangelicam vel moralem. Unde Lincoliensis super isto textu {passu} dicit [fol. 71v, line 7] *{distinguit} de triplici iusticia, scilicet {prima} naturali que consequitur ad ens; de iusticia *{de iusticia: om.} pollitica, super tradicionibus hominum stabilita, cuiusmodi *{cuius iusticia} solum *{solummodo} infuit [fol. 71v, line 8] Phariseis; et de tercia iusticia *{et... iusticia: om.} ewangelica vel {et} morali, que simpliciter expellit *{excludit} omnem iniusticiam in subiecto.	[b] To the second, it is conceded that all the unjust have, by divine goodwill, whatever it is just they should have (as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES [De mandatis divinis], chapter 1), and thus with all their goods they are just--passively, or by natural justice: but since instead of second perfection they have injustice, it is clear that they hold those goods not "by the justest title" but by the weakest. And it is clear that this sophistical deceit does not impugn the truth accepted as minor premise at the beginning [i.e. "nothing pleases God unless it is just", above, p. 000], since that is {limitatum} limited to first justice without an admixture of injustice instead of second perfection. For since all rational creatures have a power given to them to have whatever they have in the way of having that is best in kind, it is clear that they are much to be blamed if they abuse this power, resting in a purely natural having, as sticks and stones or other senseless creatures have their goods. Further, if they rest content with a civil having, not {impetrando} obtaining from the Chief Lord the goods of grace and glory to which these other goods {adiacent} appertain according to the charter or most secure inscription in the book of life (as Truth says, Luke 10[:20]), without doubt they should be condemned. Pertinently confirming this teaching, Truth says (Matthew 5[:20]), "Unless your justice abounds more than that of the scribes and pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Here it is clear, first, that the pharisees (though there is no doubt they are unjust) are just naturally or passively; for (as Chrysostom notes) nothing "abounds more than" a justice that does not exist. It is clear, second, against worldly [reasoners], that this natural justice, or civil justice, is not enough for blessedness, but, under penalty of everlasting damnation, one must add gospel or moral justice. Thus the Bishop of Lincoln, commenting upon the above text, distinguishes a threefold justice, namely natural, which follows upon being, political, based upon human traditions (the only justice that was in the Pharisees), and gospel or moral justice, which simply excludes all injustice in its subject.
Nota *{Notandum} tamen quod nullum est civile dominium, nisi in iusticia {om.} ewangelica sit {om.} [fol. 71v, line 9] fundatum; ideo peccans mortaliter non habet dominium pocius quam virgo perpetua habet paternitatem carnalem, quia deficit fundamentum in quo huiusmodi relacio fundaretur: [fol. 71v, line 10] nam *{unde} illud dominium quod *{quia} non est sunt tantum *{sunt tantum: sicut tamen sunt} corpus et anima; ideo non est iustum. Et patet quod iustum est quod iniustus habeat bona nature, que non [fol. 71v, line 11] possidet sed habet simplici dacione. Et si aper de silva exhinc concluserit quod iuste sit dominus eorundem, patet cuicunque pastori ovium, [fol. 71v, line 12] quando propter ineptiam {?} sit vulpecula capienda [compare De civili dominio, lib. 1, cap. 15, p. 107 line 35, where "vulpecula" seems to mean a fallacious argument]: nam *{lapis add.} habet iuste omnia que sunt sua; iniuste *{iniustus} habet, iusto {iuste} ex conductu, equum proximi; [fol. 71v, line 13] sicut dampnatus habet iuste penam perpetuam, quia utrobique ex beneplacito Dei sui; et tamen nullus {nullis} eorum {istorum} est dominus dati sui, quia ad dominium [fol. 71v, line 14] requiritur Dei donacio {?}.	It must be noted, however, that there is no civil lordship that is not based on gospel {iusticia} justice; therefore one who sins mortally does not have lordship any more than a perpetual virgin has physical fatherhood, because the foundation upon which such a relation is based is {deficit} lacking. Thus that lordship is not just, because it does not exist as body and soul exist. It is clear that it is just that the unjust should have goods of nature, which they do not {possidet} possess but have by simple gift. And if the wild boar of the forest hereupon concludes that he is justly lord of the same things, it [the absurdity] is clear to any shepherd of sheep when [??] on account of the absurdity a little fox must be caught. For a stone has justly all the things that are its, an unjust person has, by just hire, his neighbor's horse, just as the damned justly "has" an everlasting penalty, because {utrobique} in all these cases by the good pleasure of his God--and yet none of these is the lord of what has been given him, because for lordship a grant from God is required.
Ad secundum *{aliud} conceditur conclusio prima, supposito facto; nam {quia} Deus movet et iuvat peccatorem ad faciendum opera bona {trs.} de genere, et placet sibi de [fol. 71v, line 15] omni actu vel habitudine positiva quam peccator habuerit, sicut omne tale, secundum Lincoliensem, est donum Dei. Sed eo ipso quod peccatum mortale fuerit concomitans [fol. 71v, line 16] in *{om.} quocunque *{quodcunque} quod *{om.} peccans facerit, est abusus et [fol. 71v, line 17] deficere, quod Deus non approbat, sed permittit. Et sic concordande sunt Scripture (Osee viii.4), Ipsi regnaverunt et non ex me (suppone) *{scilicet} secundum illud deficere vel abusum; et Iob xxxiv.30, dicitur quod Deus regnare facit *{dicitur...facit: ipse fecit regnare} ippocritam propter peccata populi {propter peccata populi: etc}, approbando (scilicet) omne esse primum exterius *{exterii} positivi et omne esse secundum defectus cuiusmodi est *{et... est: non autem esse secundum vel defectum primum est} [fol. 71v, line 18] iusta punicio vel profectus; non autem approbat quod aliquis tyranniset. Et hec considera *{hec considera: considerandum}, quod abutentes bonis domini per peccatum exercent actus bonos de [fol. 71v, line 19] genere sed malos moraliter circa illa {ista}, ut comedendo, se tegendo, et {om.} distribuendo, cum sibi similibus: et substancias omnium iustorum *{om.} actuum, cum bonis que inde proveniunt, [fol. 71v, line 20] vult et ordinat {ordinaverit} Deus; sed non vult quod sapiendo abusum deficiatis {qui deficuit} a virtute conformiter *{om.}, sicut dictum est tractatu primo, capitulo quinto de legibus iniquis. Sed [fol. 71v, line 21] deficit cuilibet vicioso dominium et habicio cuiuscunque distantis, circa quod non exercet actus huiusmodi positivos; ita quod nichil habet de bonis fortune nisi quod est sibi presens in [fol. 71v, line 22] exercicio (licet false fingatur dominus terrarum vel bonorum multum distancium), et in hoc differt ab amplo dominio ewangelico, quod propter sui spiritualitatem [fol. 71v, line 23] terminatur {?est terminatio} ad quemlibet punctum mundi.	[c] To the second, the first conclusion is conceded, on the supposition made; for God moves and helps sinners to do deeds good of their kind and takes pleasure in every act or positive habit a sinner has, just as every such thing, according to the Bishop of Lincoln, is a gift of God. But by the very fact that mortal sin accompanies whatever the sinner does, there is an abuse and a {deficere--revolt?} defect, which God does not approve but permits. In this way the following scripture texts should be harmonized: "They reign, and not by me" (Osee 8[:4])--namely, according to that {deficere--revolt?} defect or abuse, and "he makes a hypocrite reign because of the sins of the people" (Job 34[:30])--namely, by approving every first being of a positive external thing but not the second being or {defectum} defect. The first being is a just punishment or benefit, but God does not approve the fact that someone is a tyrant. And it should be considered that those who through sin abuse the Lord's good things perform acts good in their kind but morally bad in relation to those things, such as eating, clothing oneself, distributing [alms], and the like: and God wills and ordains the substances of all actions, along with the good things that result from them; but he does not will that by {sapiendo} savoring abuse you should {deficiatis} defect from virtue, as was said in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 5 (De mandatis divinis, p. 36), concerning wicked laws. But the vicious {deficit} lack lordship and possession of any distant thing in relation to which they do not perform such positive acts, so that they have nothing of goods of fortune except what is present to them in {exercicio} practice {licet} (even if they falsely pretend that they are lords of lands or goods far distant), and in this their lordship differs from full gospel lordship, which because of its spirituality reaches every point in the world.
De Nabugodonosore, quem doctores credunt verisimilter esse de tanto genere *{esse... genere: de numero} salvandorum, dicitur quod eius bona opera *{de genere add.} [fol. 71v, line 24] causaverunt {causare} in eum {eo} penitenciam salutare; et in quocunque salvando vel damnando, aliquo septem dictorum modorum proficiunt: et sic Deus approbat substanciam actus, quem {quam} homo [fol. 71v, line 25] peccando exercet circa bona aliena. Sed absit ex illo inferre quod sit dominus bonorum huiusmodi, vel quod iuste moraliter exerceat illos actus; cum stat *{debet} [fol. 71v, line 26] hominem {om.} facere bonum utile, cuius esse {deus add.} primum Deus acceptat, ut actum bestie, non merendo. Unde correspondenter ad [fol. 71v, line 27] loicam {logicam} moralium conceditur quod iniustus, exercitans se in opere {operibus} bono {bonis} de genere, facit quod debet; ymmo, cum habet multas bonas circumstancias in {de} genere, [fol. 71v, line 28] facit iuste naturaliter sicut debet. Sed quia deficit sibi iusticia morum *{moralis} ideo facit quidquid facerit {facit}, ut non debet, quia iniuste {ergo non add.} moraliter. [fol. 71v, line 29] Multis ergo {trs.} modis facit iuste et iniuste, sed quia offendit in uno factus est omnium reus; licet in casu multum proderit sibi et aliis, sicut philosophi loquuntur {trs.} [fol. 71v, line 30] de vicioso disponente se, per opera bona de genere, ad virtutem. Talis enim bene facit bonum, sed non virtuose, quousque habuerit habitum.	Concerning Nabuchodonosor, who the learned believe is probably among those to be saved [cf. De Civili Dominio, \SCII\ES, ch. 6, p. 50, line 37], it is said that his deeds good in their kind caused in him health-giving penitence. And in any person to be saved or damned, they benefit in one of the aforesaid seven ways [see above, p. 000]. And thus God approves the substance of acts which sinners perform in relation to goods not their own. But it must not be inferred from this that sinners are lords of such goods or that they perform such acts in a morally just way, since they ought to do the useful good, whose first being God accepts as he does the act of a beast, without meriting [cf. Luke 17:10: "We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty"]. Thus in accordance with the logic of morals it is conceded that an unjust person who performs deeds good in their kind does what he ought to do; indeed, since he has many circumstances good in their kind, he acts in a naturally just way, as he ought to do. But because he {defecit sibi iusticia moralis} lacks moral justice, he therefore does everything he does as he ought not do it, because in a morally unjust way. He therefore acts both justly and unjustly in many ways, but because he offends in one [point], he is become guilty of all [cf. James 2:10], though occasionally he greatly benefits himself and others. (Compare the way philosophers speak of vicious people disposing themselves to virtue by means of deeds good in their kind: such people indeed do good deeds, but not virtuously until they have the habit.)
[fol. 71v, line 31] Ad tercium {aliud} dicitur *{conceditur} quod argumentum est verum *{quod... verum: assumptam} sicut conclusio, scilicet {om.} quod donum caracteris, donum prophetandi, et potestas utendi clavibus cum peccato mortali {donum... mortali: etc} stat {cum peccato mortali add.}: sed absit ex hiis *{hoc} concludere quod stat iustum *{iniustum} simul uti [fol. 71v, line 32] cum iniusticia *{iusticia} bonis Dei, cum {om.} eo {enim add.} ipso quod sit peccans, intromittat {intromittit} se de aliquo operando vel pausando {?pensando}; que {consequentie} racione comitancie peccati, sua [fol. 71v, line 33] abutitur potestate ad modum loquendi apostoli, 1 Cor. ix.18.	[d] To the next argument, we concede the minor premise and the conclusion that the gift of character, the gift of prophecy and the power of using the keys {stat} can coexist with mortal sin. But it must not be inferred from this that it is {simul} simultaneously {stat} possible for the unjust to use God's good things with {iusticia} justice, since by the very fact that they are sinners, they are involved in {intromittat se de} something to be done or desisted from. Because of this concomitance of sin, the unjust abuse their power, according to the Apostle's way of speaking in 1 Corinthians 9[:18].
Sed est {om.} notandum {trs.} quod, licet {sic added between lines} exercens potestatem ordinis vel {aut} iurisdictionis peccet mortaliter, tamen Deus, in {om.} cuius nomine [fol. 71v, line 34] ministrat, supplet quod {pro add.} capacibus proficiat, ac si iustus {om.} uteretur debite {debita} potestate; excepto quod in {sic add.} abutente meritum personale subtrahitur. [fol. 71v, line 35] Et patet quod {patet quod: sic} iniustus non debet exequi officium in mortali sed confitendo in gracia *{ministrare add.}; quod si in culpa facit bonum opus {om.} de genere, contingit (ut supra dictum est) {ut supra dictum est: om.} quod sibi proderit [fol. 71v, line 36] et alii mereantur, licet minus bene faciendo quam iustus iniuriatur cuilibet fratri suo, quem iniuste iudicat, licet sentencia sit iusta.	But it should be noted that even if one who exercises the power of order or of jurisdiction sins mortally, nevertheless God, in whose name he ministers, supplies what may benefit those able to receive it, just as if a just person used the power as he ought, except that in the one abusing it the personal merit is withheld [i.e. his ministry earns him no reward]. It is clear that the unjust man should not perform the office in mortal sin but rather, by confessing, ought to minister in grace; if in fault he does a deed good in its kind, it happens (as was said above) that it benefits him and that others merit--though, doing less benefit than a just man, he wrongs each of his brothers, whom it is unjust for him to judge, {licet} even if the sentence is just.
Sed {om.}, redeundo [fol. 71v, line 37] ad propositum, conceditur esse possibile quod iniustus habeat cum hoc eternam Dei voluntatem, que est ius efficacissimum, ad regnandum beatifice, quam voluntatem [fol. 71v, line 38] non potest amittere; sicut nec graciam predestinacionis, que exinde sequitur: et *{sic add.} patet quod non sequitur: nunc habeo ius ad regnum sive {vel} dominium, ergo {nunc add.} iustum est quod nunc {om.} dominer sive {vel} regnem; sed satis {status} est quod suo tempore habeam {habeat} *{illud add.} dominium tale *{om.} {tale in margine 2a manu additum (Poole)}. Quilibet enim homo habet naturaliter {om.} potestatem creatam (que est [fol. 71v, line 40] liberum arbitrium) secundum quam dominari poterit toti mundo; nec *{tamen add.} ex ista potestate sequitur ius regnandi. Ideo, preter istam {illam} potestatem, oportet superaddere {addere} aliam, que [fol. 71v, line 41] sit ius creatum a iure eterno extractum: et sic est *{et sic est: quam} inpossibile {possibile W (Poole); impossibile P} *{est add.} quod {sit add.} simul cum mortali, et per consequens cum {illa add.} iniusticia, habeam *{habeat} ius ad dandum; unde, per adventum [fol. 71v, line 42] peccati mortalis, donum Dei desinit esse peccanti donum, eo quod ut sic perdit datum. Sicut habens iure humano ius perpetuum pro se et suis [fol. 71v, line 43] {ad videlicet ?dominium add.} post forefacturam perdit illud dominium, licet ad tempus habeat eius usum {trs.}; multo magis existens in gracia, secundum quam potest {om.} in persona propria gaudere perpetuo [fol. 71v, line 44] hereditate regni et cuiuslibet partis mundi, et decidens in peccatum, cui repugnat usus cuiuslibet {cuiuscumque} usibilis, perdit quodcunque {quantumcunque} quod {om.} prius {habeat vel add.} habuerit; licet habicione [fol. 71v, line 45] naturali inperfecta habeat equivoce multa bona: et sic gracia non est inpertinens sed fundamentum dominii. Sicut naturalis potencia et {vel} actus procreandi [fol. 71v, line 46] preter extrema principiant paternitatem; sic, inquam, gracia requiritur ad usum, et per consequens {per consequens: ita} ad omne verum dominium.	But, to return to the matter in hand, it is conceded that it is possible that the unjust [viz., those who are predestined, but at this time in sin] should have, despite their injustice, God's eternal will, which is the most efficacious right, to reign in blessedness, a will which they cannot lose, just as they cannot lose the grace of predestination, which follows {exinde} from God's will. And thus it is clear that it is not valid to argue, "I now have the right to the kingdom or lordship, therefore it is just that I should now be lord or reign," but it is enough that I should have that lordship {suo tempore} in its time. For human beings naturally have a created power, namely free choice, according to which they can be lords over the whole world; however, a right to reign does not follow from this power. Besides that power, therefore, another power must be added, which is a created right drawn from the eternal right, and it is impossible that someone should have a right to be given this [additional] power together with mortal [sin] and consequently with injustice. Thus, by the advent of mortal sin, God's gift ceases to be the sinner's gift, because a sinner, as such, {perdit} loses the thing given. Just as those who by human law have a perpetual right for themselves and their [heirs] {perdit} lose that lordship after forfeiture, {licet} even if they have use of it for the moment, so--and much more--do those who are in grace (according to which they can in their own persons enjoy perpetual inheritance of the kingdom and of every part of the world), if they {decidens} fall into sin (so that the use of every {usibile--comestible? more general?} usable is impossible for them), {perdit} lose whatever they had before, {licet} even if by imperfect natural having they "have" (equivocally) many good things. And thus grace is not irrelevant to, but is the basis of, lordship. Just as the natural potency and act of procreating, besides the extremes, is a principle of paternity, so, I say, grace is required for use, and consequently for every true lordship.
Cap. IV. [fol. 71v, line 47] Sed quia pauci mundani consenciunt huic sentencie {trs. 231} contentati de iure humano vulgariter accepto; unde se habet probare quod nec testium deposicio [fol. 71v, line 48] nec iudicis sentenciacio nec corporalis possessio, sicut nec descensus hereditarius nec commutacio sive *{nec} humana donacio, confert homini sine gracia [fol. 71v, line 49] dominium vel {aut} ius ad aliquid, nec omnia ista simul.	[Fifth Argument] Chapter 4 But because few of the worldly agree with this doctrine, being content with human right commonly accepted, accordingly it must be proved that neither the deposition of witnesses nor the sentencing of a judge nor physical possession, likewise neither inheritance nor exchange nor human grant, nor all of these together, confers on a person without grace lordship or a right to anything.
Quoad primum palam sequitur quod officium testium est testificari veritatem iusticie delitentis, que si [fol. 71v, line 50] non prefuerit constat quod deposicio testium erit *{est} falsa; et cum nullum falsum probat verum, *{sicut add.} nec illud quod non habet existenciam quidquam causat, palam {om.} sequitur quod testium deposicio [fol. 71v, line 51] non confert ius, sed ius prius latens dilucidat, supposito {supposita} per possibile veritatis deposicione. Et illa {ita} est conclusio *{sentencia} Augustini (Epistola [fol. 71v, line 52] 37) sub his verbis {sub his verbis: dicens ?inter} Hec tolleratur {?} iniquitas male habencium, et quedam inter eos iura constituuntur que appellantur civilia; non quod hinc [fol. 71v, line 53] fiat, ut bene utentes sint {?}, sed ut male utentes minus molesti sint: donec fideles et pii, quorum vere sunt omnia, perveniant [fol. 71v, line 54] ad illam civitatem ubi hereditas et *{om.} eternitas est. Ecce *{unde habetur} quod non sequitur {sequatur W (Poole); sequitur P}: Iura humana {om.} adiudicant Petro {Sorti} b. usibile, ergo non iniuste; [fol. 71v, line 55] cum non ex iure humano sit usus licitus.	As to the first [i.e., the deposition of witnesses], it follows clearly that the duty of witnesses is to testify to the truth of a hidden right; if this right does not pre-exist, it is certain that the deposition of the witnesses is false, and since nothing false proves a truth (just as that which has no existence does not cause anything), it follows clearly that the deposition of witnesses does not confer a right but brings to light a right that was previously hidden (supposing, as is possible, that the deposition is true). And this is Augustine's teaching (Letter \SCXXXVII\ES [Letter cliii in modern editions]), in these words: "In this life the wickedness of those who possess badly is endured, and certain laws are established among them; these laws are called 'civil' laws, not because as a result these people become good users, but because their bad use does less harm, until the faithful and god-fearing to whom all things truly belong, [...] come to that city where their inheritance is eternity." This passage establishes that the argument, "Human laws award a certain {usibile} usable thing to Peter, therefore [he uses it] not unjustly," does not follow, since it is not by human law that use is licit.
Item quero {queritur} a politico si {sicut W (Poole); si P} sequitur: Testes deponunt pro iure Petri ad {om.} b. usibile, ergo Petrus habet [fol. 71v, line 56] ius ad illud {b.} usibile; quod *{om.} si sequitur *{conceditur} ergo *{om.} oportet per idem concedere quod idem *{testes add.} vel alii alias deponentes oppositum, sine variacione pertinenti {?} ex parte [fol. 71v, line 57] rei, extinguunt illud ius et suscitent {sustinent} ius novum: quod est inpossibile, cum origo iuris sit voluntas divina, que non variando consequitur tam [fol. 71v, line 58] inconstantem {?} testificacionem creature peccabilis; ymmo, cum tunc sequeretur contradictorio *{contradictio} quod Petrus habet ius et non habet ius. Patet quod nemo non {nisi} blasfemans {blasfemus} ad [fol. 71v, line 59] tantum extollit testes creatos, quod si quidquam *{quidquid} *{deponunt add.} tunc ergo *{est} verum; cum hoc asserere esset diffinire *{?deificare} creaturam [in]peccabilem {peccabilem W (Poole)} *{peccabilem}, et contra Scripturam sacram [fol. 71v, line 60] (Math. xxvi.60) dicentem quod venerunt duo falsi testes in Christum et quod non fuit conveniens eorum testimonium. Et idem patet de sacerdotibus accusantibus Susannam (Dan. xiii) {dicentem... (Dan. xiii): novissime venerunt etc.}	Also, I ask from {politico} the politician whether this follows: "The witnesses depose in favour of Peter's right to some usable, therefore Peter has a right to that usable." If it is conceded, it must likewise be conceded that if the same witnesses, or others, on another occasion depose the opposite, without relevant change in reality, they extinguish that right and raise a new right. This is impossible, since the origin of right is the divine will, which does not change to follow such inconstant testimony of creatures capable of sin--since indeed the contradiction would then follow that Peter has the right and does not have the right. It is clear that no one who is not blaspheming extols such created witnesses to such a height as [to say] that if they depose anything then it is true, since to assert this would be to make a god of a creature capable of sin, and contrary to sacred Scripture (Matthew 26[:60]), when it says that "two false witnesses came" against Christ and "their testimony did not agree" [Mark 14:59]. And the same is clear of the priests who accused Susanna (Daniel 13).
Cum ergo omnis creatura racionalis {om.} citra {preter} Christum poterit deflecti a veritate, dicendum {?} videtur quod de nulla tali sequitur: Ista [fol. 71v, line 61] deposicio *{deponendo} sic asserit, ergo verum. Quo habito, patet quod ante deposicionem requiritur iusticia ad hoc, quod iuste deponatur vel teneatur *{sentenciatur} pro depositorio: [fol. 71v, line 62] quia tamen ista {cum illa} deposicio non sufficit pro iure fundando (ut ostensum {dictum} est), patet quod oportet causam completam *{aliam add.} superaddere {addere} alteram {om.}; que non est fingibilis, {vel frangibilis add.} [fol. 71v, line 63] nisi ponatur approbacio ac iudicium capitalis domini, qui est Deus.	Therefore, since every rational creature except Christ can be deflected from the truth, it seems that it should be said that of none of them does it follow: "That creature making deposition asserts thus, therefore it is true." With this established, it is clear that for the deposition, or a sentence in favour of the person making the deposition, to be just, {iusticia} a right must exist before the deposition. However, because that deposition is not enough to provide the basis of {iure} a right (as has been shown), it is clear that it is necessary to add another complete cause; none can be imagined, unless we posit the approval and judgment of the chief lord, who is God.
Confirmatur: Deus non potest in aliquo tali actu deposicionis sive iudicii [fol. 71v, line 64] esse neuter; cum necessario in omni accione creata Creator *{om.} {creator creata, with creator deleted W (Poole)} prevenit quamlibet creaturam; ergo, si testes vel iudex deponit aut {vel} sentenciat iuridice, Deus [fol. 71v, line 65] prius testatur et sentenciat illud idem. Si ergo ex testimonio vel iudicio creature {in margin W (Poole); in text P} acquiritur ius homini, multo magis ergo {om.} ex necessario *{om.} iudicio et testimonio *{iudicio et testimonio: testimonio vel iudicio} [fol. 71v, line 66] Creatoris. Cum ergo in Deo oportet ipsum {ipsam W (Poole)} {ista} precedere, nec licet fingere quod non sufficiat *{plenum add.} ius, nisi homo suppleverit: patet quod, ante omnem iusticiam [fol. 71v, line 67] decisam per homines, habet quicunque pro quo iuste iudicatur, plenam iusticiam quo ad Deum. Et patet quod in placitis, ubicunque fertur iustum {end of fol. 71v; one folio of MS is missing} iudicium, non sunt terreni iudices nisi organa Dei ad promulgandum eius sentenciam; nec propter eorum dicere est quoad placitantis iusticiam plus vel minus: cum ergo non sit possibile Deum testificari vel sentenciare pro iure cuiusquam, nisi sit iustum quod illud habeat; patet primo quod deposicione testium non acquiritur ius homini, nisi iusto. Stat autem in hoc racio: per humanam probacionem non acquiritur, nisi Deus prius iustificet; sed Deus non iusticiat pro iniusto, ergo nec creatura iuste iudicat pro iniusto.	Confirmation: In any such act of deposition or judgment God cannot be neutral, since necessarily in every created action he anticipates any creature. Therefore, if the witness or judge deposes or passes sentence judicially, God first testifies and passes sentence to the same effect. If therefore someone acquires a right by the testimony or judgment of a creature, much more, therefore, by the testimony or judgment of the Creator. Since, therefore, those things must precede in God, and since it is not permissible to suppose that this full right is insufficient unless human beings supplement it, it is clear that, before every {iusticia} right {decisam} decided by human beings, anyone for whom just judgment is given has full {iusticiam} right in relation to God. And it is clear that in pleas, whenever just judgment is delivered, the earthly judges are merely instruments of God for promulgating his sentence, and {iusticia} the right of the litigants is not more or less because of what the judges say. Since therefore it is not possible for God to testify or pass sentence in favour of any person's right unless it is just that he have it, it is clear first that by the deposition of witnesses people acquire no right unless they are just. {stat} It comes down to this argument: Nothing is acquired by human proof unless God {iustificet} makes it just first; but God does not {iusticiat} do justice in favour of the unjust, therefore neither does a creature judge justly in favour of the unjust.
Iterum, nemo dat quod non habet, sed nec testes nec iudices civiles habent ius civilitatis ad bonum quod iudicant, ergo non dant ius illi pro quo iudicant. Argumentum patet per hoc quod Deus non posset dare formas ad existenciam creature nisi penes se haberet exemplaria, que alii nominant Ydeas, alii esse intelligibile creature quod est idem essencialiter cum producto; ergo multo magis creatura non potest quidquam dare alteri nisi ipsum prius habuerit. Illud est planum de quocunque fortune bono quod adiacet et non inheret datorio, et de quocunque bono inherente: nichil dat alteri talem formam, nisi consimilem habeat vel excellencius in virtute; ut nichil dat alteri esse calidum, nisi fuerit calidum formaliter vel virtualiter; ut noscunt philosophi et theologi concedentes quod minister Christi non dat alteri graciam vel donum spiritus, licet per suum ministerium habeat illud donum. Sed solum Deus dat huiusmodi illud donum spirituale: et minor argumenti patet ex hoc quod civilitas domini repugnat, ut ex equo convincetur multis. Ideo indubie testes, adducti ad testificandum de iure alterius, non testarentur contra se ipsos, si eis prius ius incumberet; non ergo dant ius, licet faciant quod aliis fiat notum. Istud confirmatur ex sentencia sepe dicta, quod non est possibile creaturam iuste conferre quidquam, nisi prius naturaliter sit iustum quod habeat (quia, deficiente recta causa, collacio creature non est iusta); et per consequens Deus prius plene donat: quoniam non sine causa utitur Scriptura verbo ministrandi vel communicandi in dacione huiusmodi ministeriali (ut patet, 2 Cor. iii.8, 9, Gal. vi.6, et alibi in multis locis); potest autem istud specialiter confirmari per hoc quod omnis potestas est libera nature racionalis potencia {in margin W (Poole)} *{om. P} ad perficiendum ordinem universi; cum ergo a solo Deo potest natura racionalis habere talem potenciam, patet quod solum a Deo potest habere huiusmodi potestatem: quis ergo posset tribuere homini interiori libertatem arbitrii? Indubie solus Deus, qui potest illabi anime. Et ista est conclusio sancti Pauli (Rom. xiii.1) sic dicentis: Non est, inquit, potestas nisi a Deo. Et patet quod iudex terrenus non plus revocat qui mittit {qui mittit: lectio valde dubia (Poole)} vel dat alteri potestatem, quam episcopus dat sacerdoti clavium graciam vel cetera dona Deo appropriata, quomodocunque emuli Scipture locuti fuerint.	Again, no one gives what he does not have; but neither witnesses nor civil judges have a civil right to the good which they judge; therefore they do not give a right to him in whose favour they judge. The argument is clear, because God could not give forms for the existence of a creature unless he had in himself the exemplars, which some call ideas and others call the intelligible being of the creature (which is the same essentially with the thing produced); therefore, much more, a creature cannot give anything to another unless it has it first. That is plain concerning any of the goods of fortune which {adiacet} pertains to but does not inhere in the recipient, and [also] concerning any inherent good: nothing gives another such a form unless it has a similar form or has it virtually in a more excellent way (for example, nothing gives heat to another unless it is itself hot formally or virtually), as the philosophers know--and also the theologians, who concede that Christ's minister does not give grace or the gift of the spirit to another person, although he [the latter] has that gift through his [the former's] ministry, but God alone gives such a person the spiritual gift. The minor of the argument is clear from the fact that the civil right of a lord cannot be proved [to belong] equally to many: therefore, undoubtedly, if the right rested first in them, witnesses brought forward to testify about the right of another would not testify against themselves. They therefore do not give the right, although they make it known to others. This is confirmed by the doctrine often expressed, that it is not possible for a creature to confer anything justly [on someone] unless it is first naturally just that that person should have it (because, in the {deficiente} absence of the right cause, the creature's conferring is not just), and consequently God fully grants first. Whence it is not without reason that Scripture uses the word "minister" or "communicate" in such ministerial giving (as is clear in 2 Corinthians 3[:8,9], Galatians 6[:6], and elsewhere in many places). However, it can especially be confirmed from the fact that every power of a rational nature is free for the sake of perfecting the order of the universe; since, therefore, rational nature can have such potency only from God, it is clear that it can have such a power only from God. Who, therefore, can give freedom of choice to the inner self? Undoubtedly, only God, who can penetrate the soul. And this is the conclusion of Saint Paul, Romans 13[:1], who says: "There is no power except from God." And it is clear that the earthly judge does not "warrant" {revocat, vouch} when he [??] sends or gives power to another, any more than a bishop gives a priest the grace of the keys or other gifts appropriated to God, however enemies of the Scripture may have written.
Ex isto patet quod ius sive iusticia vendi non poterit: nam omne ius fundatur in volicione divina supra potenciam creature; nullum tale est peccunia emibile; ergo conclusio: unde tantum videntur peccare, qui peccunia mercantur iusticias vel aput iudices seu testes, sicut Simon qui voluit emere Spiritum sanctum peccunia; quia utrobique supponitur divinam volicionem trahi consequenter ad contractus eciam illicitos; quod tamen sequeretur, si homines darent dominia; ideo patet quod dominium est speciale donum Dei fundatum in gracia. Unde signanter dicit Sciptura (Gen. xxv.31) quod Iacob dixit Esau quod non venderet ius primogeniture sed primogenita.	From this it is clear that right or justice cannot be sold. For every right is based on a divine volition beyond the power of a creature; nothing such can be bought with money; therefore the conclusion. This is why those who traffic with money in justice or with judges or witnesses seem to sin so greatly, such as Simon who wished to buy the Holy Spirit with money [Acts 8:18\PN19], because it is {utrobique} everywhere supposed [by such people] that the divine will is carried along in accordance with even illicit contracts. This would follow, however, if human beings gave lordships; therefore it is clear that lordship is a special gift of God based upon grace. Thus {signanter} it is significant that Scripture (Genesis 25[:31]) says that Jacob said to Esau, not that he should sell the right of primogeniture, but "the things of primogeniture."
Ex istis colligitur, cum omnis potestas a solo Deo tribuitur, et ius, quod est proxima racio utendi donario, cum precedit omnem usum (ut patet ex dictis), a solo Deo donatur; sequitur quod ministerialis donacio creature presupponit donacionem Dei secundum illa iura que solum convenit Deo dare; et cum Deus non donat nisi grato, palam sequitur quod dominium presupponit dominium *{conjecture: dominum} esse gratum; et cum iudex sentencians presupponit sentenciam ferendam esse probatam per testimonium Trinitatis, patet quod ipse non dat sed declarat decisum dominium:	From these points we gather that, since all power is given by God alone, and right, which is the proximate reason of using the grant {donario} (since it precedes every use, as is clear from what has been said), is granted by God alone, it follows that ministerial granting by a creature presupposes a granting by God according to those rights which it befits God alone to give; and since God grants only to those who are in grace, it clearly follows that lordship presupposes that the lord is in grace; and since the judge passing sentence presupposes that the sentence to be delivered has been proved by the testimony of the Trinity, it is clear that he does not give, but declares an already {decisum} decided lordship.
et multo magis possessio iusta presupponit rem, de qua capitur possessio, esse possidentis, quia aliter indubie esset intrusio usurpata: unde ridiculum est credere quod pedum posicio vel alii ritus in persona occupantis vel sui procuratoris, facti in facie eccelsie, iustificet sine prima gracia usum suum; et per idem nullum trium sequencium.	And, much more, just possession presupposes that the thing taken possession of belongs to the possessor, because otherwise, without doubt, it would be a usurped intrusion. Thus it is ridiculous to believe that a placing of the feet or other ceremonies performed by the holder in person or by his agent, done {facie} in the face of the Church, justify his use without first grace, and likewise none of the three following [i.e. inheritance, exchange and human grant].
Si enim successio hereditaria, sine precedente gracia, daret verum dominium, tunc tale dominium foret pure naturale, forisfactura non inpedibile; consequens contra racionem civilis dominii. Si enim forisfactura contra terrenum dominium sine emenda precludit civile dominium, multo magis gravior forisfactura erga Dominum capitalem, cuiusmodi forisfactura consequitur ad omne mortale peccatum; et per consequens omnis peccans mortaliter est indispositus ad civiliter dominandum. Istud patet ex dictis tractatu primo, capitulo v., ubi ostenditur quod omnis peccans mortaliter est in Deum suum falsissimus conspirator; quia facit servos Dei sui, cui iuravit fidelitatem, insurgere contra illum.	For if inheritance without preceding grace gave true lordship, then such lordship would be purely natural, not liable to be impeded by forfeiture; the {consequens} conclusion is against the nature of civil lordship. For if forfeiture without amends against earthly lordship rules out civil lordship, much more the more serious forfeiture in relation to the Chief Lord; forfeiture of this kind follows upon every mortal sin; and consequently everyone who sins mortally is unfit for civil lordship. This is clear from what was said in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 5 (De mandatis divinis, p. 38), where it was shown that those who sin mortally are most false conspirators against their God, because they make the servants of their God, to whom they swore fidelity, rise up against him.
Et potest aliter confirmari tripliciter: primo per hoc quod quilibet usurpans sibi quod regi suo est proprium, ut sic, est traditor regis sui; ergo multo magis quilibet usurpans sibi quod soli Deo potest competere, est, ut sic, traditor regis sui vel *{conjecture: omit regis sui vel} Dei sui: hoc facit quilibet superbus et per consequens quilibet peccans mortaliter; ergo omnis peccans mortaliter est traditor Dei sui. Minor patet ex hoc quod omnis superbus negat obedienciam Deo suo. Cum ergo soli Deo potest competere dominium, sine hoc quod sit superiori subiectus, sequitur quod omnis superbus, quantum in se est, usurpat regalia que soli Deo possunt competere.	And this can be confirmed in three other ways. First, because anyone who usurps for himself something that belongs to his king, is, as such, a traitor to his king; therefore, much more, whoever usurps that which can belong only to God is, as such, a traitor to his God: anyone who is proud does this, and consequently anyone who sins mortally; therefore every mortal sinner is a traitor to his God. The minor is clear from the fact that every proud person refuses obedience to his God. Since, therefore, lordship that is not subject to a superior can belong only to God, it follows that every proud person, so far as is in him, usurps royal rights that can belong only to God.
Similiter omnis superbus habet peccatum sibi dominans, ut dicit apostolus (Rom. v.17, ubi dicit peccatum regnare); sed nullum peccatum est servus subordinatus Deo; ergo omnis superbus, diffidendo domino, subicit se domino directe opposito: et per consequens non est iustum pro tunc quod quidquam possideat iure Dei: ymmo, quantum in se est, supponit Deum servituti peccati; cum indubie Deus serviret peccato in qualibet diffidencia qua peccator, recedendo a Deo, coniungitur peccato iusticie Dei opposito, nisi omnipotencia Dei eo ipso ipsum puniret, faciendo eum debite pati penam. Aliter enim Deus sustentaret servum inimici et non suum, sine iusta vindicacione, quod si esset, Deus indubie serviret; et patet quod omnis superbus est traditor domini sui: nec tollit, quod Deus non potest servire peccato vel dimittere peccatum aliquod inpunitum (ut patet tractatu primo, capitulo secundo); quia, quomodcunque culpabiliter facit aliquid unde dominus traderetur, nisi dominus prudenti potencia obviaret, est plenus traditor, cum non stat per eum, quominus illa malicia non sequatur.	Similarly every proud person has sin dominating him, as the Apostle says (Romans 5[:17], where he says that sin reigns); but no sin is a servant subordinate to God; therefore every proud person, renouncing allegiance to his Lord, subjects himself to a directly opposite lord. And consequently it is not {pro tunc} for that time just that he should possess anything by God's right: rather, as far as is in him, he subjects God to slavery to sin, since undoubtedly God would be a slave to sin in any renunciation of allegiance by which the sinner, withdrawing from God, is joined to the sin opposed to the justice of God, unless God's omnipotence {eo ipso} by that fact punished him, making him duly suffer a penalty (for otherwise God would uphold a servant belonging to his enemy and not to him, without just {vindicacione} vengeance, and if that were so God would undoubtedly be a slave); and it is clear that every proud person is a traitor to his lord. {nec tollit} This is despite the fact that God cannot [really] be a slave to sin or {dimittere} forgive any sin unpunished (as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 2 [De mandatis divinis, p. 7]); because, however culpably he [the sinner] does something by which the lord is betrayed, unless the lord by prudent power acts against it, he [the lord] is a full traitor, since {non stat per eum quominus... non} he does not ensure that the wickedness does not occur.
Similiter, quilibet iniuste occidens servum domini portantem eius similitatem et representantem personam domini in fungendo officio sic credito, forisfacit: sic est de quolibet peccante post graciam; ergo secundum legem Dei perdit dominium, si quod habuit existens in gracia. Minor patet ex hoc, quod nimis realiter occidit se ipsum, eo quod peccatum separat Deum ab anima, qui prius per graciam fuerat eius vita (et tunc fuit ad similitudinem Dei sui, adherendo sibi per graciam et serviendo sibi ministerio dignissimo quoad genus); ergo, etc.	Similarly, a person forfeits, if he unjustly kills the lord's servant bearing his likeness and representing the lord's person in performing an office thus entrusted to him. It is thus with anyone who sins after being in grace; therefore, according to God's {iure} law he {perdit} loses any lordship he had while he was in grace. The minor is clear because only too really does the sinner kill himself, since sin separates the soul from God, who previously was its life through grace, and he was [then] in the likeness of his God, cleaving to him by grace and serving him with a ministry most worthy in its kind; therefore, etc.
Unde notet homo causas in iure humano, quando quis forisfacit vel sit puniendus ultimo supplicio: videbit quod peccator incidit in illas causas realius quoad Deum; ut committendo, quantum in se est, crimen lese regie magestatis, conspiracionem in mortem, degradacionem principis regum terre, in regalie usurpacione, iniustissima occisione, enormissima fornicacione, et tocius rei publice iniuriacione; et sic de aliis causis polliticis in lege Dei originaliter exemplatis. Unde nimis exorbitant theologi, dicentes quia tales sentencie non sunt vere de virtute sermonis; quia indubie quicunque concedit dominium Dei super qualibet creatura et servicium creature ad Deum, habet concedere consequenter quod recitata delicta tanto realius insunt peccanti in Deum quam peccant *{conjecture: peccanti} in terrenum dominum, quanto Deus est verior dominus.	Whence let us mark the {causas} occasions in human law when someone forfeits or should be punished by the ultimate punishment. We will see that the sinner falls into those occasions more really in relation to God--for example, committing, as much as is in him, treason, conspiracy to kill, the deposition of the prince of the kings of the earth, in usurpation of royal rights, in most unjust slaughter, in the most outrageous fornication, and in injury to the whole commonwealth; and similarly of other {causis polliticis} political occasions of criminality of which the original exemplars are in the law of God. Hence those theologians are too much {nimis} astray who say that such statements are not true by the literal force of the words, because undoubtedly whoever concedes God's lordship over every creature and the servanthood of creatures in relation to God must therefore concede that in one who sins against God the listed delicts are found more really than in those who sin against an earthly lord, to the degree that God is more truly a lord.
Unde politici, propter nutricionem sensus tenebrati in sensibilibus, non considerant divinum dominium nec eius servicium, sed statim auditis hiis verbis applicant dominium et servicium factum homini; idem enim tamquam bestiales solum considerant.	Thus {politici} politicians, because their mind has been brought up darkened among sensible things, do not consider divine lordship or its service, but immediately upon hearing these words apply them to lordship and service done to human beings; for like beasts they consider only that.
Alii dicunt quod misericordia et gracia Dei exigunt quod remittat iniurias, et quod non ita rigide puniat adversarios ut homo. Revera verum capitur quoad primum: cum aliter Deus anichilaret omnem peccantem eo ipso quod peccaret; quod indubie non potest facere, ideo non potest nisi misericorditer punire: sicut nec potest restituere peccatorem ad prius dominium a quo iuste decidit per peccatum, nisi faciendo sibi magnam graciam; et per consequens requiritur ad condonacionem delicti vel restitucionem dominii magna gracia in forisfaciente taliter restituto. Et hoc est quod intenditur. Sed quoad secundam partem, indubie Deus punit gravissime prevaricantes tam pena dampni quam pena sensus, ut patet tractatu primo, capitulo ii. Ideo dicit apostolus contra taliter fabulantes, Rom. xi.22: Vide, inquit, bonitatem et severitatem: indubie non potest Deus dimittere aliquam prevaricacionem in regno suo que non ad regulam sit punita.	Others say that God's mercy and grace demand [a] that he remit injuries and [b] that he not punish opponents as rigidly as human beings do. Indeed in respect of the first, [a], these thinkers grasp the truth since otherwise God would annihilate all sinners by the very fact that they sinned; undoubtedly he cannot do this, therefore he can only punish mercifully--just as he cannot restore sinners to the earlier lordship from which they justly {decidit} fell through sin except by conferring on them a great grace. And consequently, for the {condonacionem} pardoning of a crime or the restitution of lordship a great grace is needed in the forfeiter thus restored; and this is the conclusion aimed at. But as for the second part, [b], undoubtedly God punishes traitors most severely, both by the penalty of damnation and by the pain of sense, as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES (De mandatis divinis), chapter 2. Therefore the Apostle says against tellers of such tales, in Romans 11[:22], "See the goodness, and the severity." Undoubtedly God cannot {dimittere} forgive any treachery in his kingdom that has not been punished according to rule.
Nec valet tercia ficcio in illa materia, quod iustum esset peccatores privari dominiis, sed oportet prius illos convinci probato delicto. Sic autem loquentes non considerant quod Oculi Domini plus sunt lucidiores sole, circumspicientes omnes vias hominum, sicut Ecclesiastici xxiii.28, dicitur contra tales. Non est enim sibi necessaria probacio testium, cum eternaliter scit quidquid est in homine, et adintra iudicat penam cuiuscunque delinquentis eterno iudicio quod non potest infringi vel revocari ab aliquo: sed eo ipso quo terrenus dominus forisfacit, privatur dominio quoad Deum; licet ex gracia sua permittat eum abuti donatis, si forte voluerit converti: verumtamen multo misericordius agit cum multis a quibus subtrahit abusum temporalium et infligit penas sensibiles; quia hoc est signum dileccionis divine, quod apponit curam castigandi, et non permittit desperatum in viciorum voragine profundari, iuxta vocem Apocal. iii.19: Ego quos amo arguo et castigo.	A third fiction, [c], in this matter also is of no avail: that it would be just for sinners to be deprived of their lordships, but they must first be convicted by proving the crime. Those who speak thus, however, do not consider that "the eyes of the Lord are brighter than the sun, seeing round about all the ways of men," as is said against such persons in Ecclesiasticus 23[:28]. For he does not need proof by witnesses, since he knows eternally whatever is in a person, and inwardly judges the penalty for every delinquent by an eternal judgment that cannot be infringed or revoked by anyone. Earthly lords are deprived of lordship in relation to God by {eo ipso quo} the very acts by which they forfeit, though of his grace he allows them to [continue to] abuse the things granted, {si forte voluerit converti} in case they will perhaps be willing to be converted. However, God acts much more mercifully toward many, from whom he takes away the abuse of temporal things and inflicts sensible penalties; for it is a sign of divine love that he applies the cure of chastisement and does not permit the desperate to be drowned in a whirlpool of vices, according to the saying of Apocalypse 3[:19], "Those I love I rebuke and chastise."
Ergo istis refellitur quarta cecitas mundanorum putancium quod sufficit habere pretensa dominia in facie ecclesie militantis; in tantum quidem quod politici asserunt nimis heretice quod, si ecclesia adiudicat cuiquam aliquod bonum ecclesiasticum vel aliquod temporale, tunc est iustum quod habeat illud bonum; quod indubie, si esset verum, destrueret ex integro fidem catholicam: cum certum sit quod stat cum iudicio ecclesie iniquitas ex parte persone pro qua iudicatur, ex parte testium vel iudicis, et utrobique propter discordiam iuri primo, quod non foret maius ius quam in quantumcunque tyrannice occupante; ut, si testes false deponunt, vel iudex corporeus per cautelam Deo odibilem sentenciat, vel tercio si sentenciat pro aliquo tamquam digno quem Deus non approbat, non licet catholico dubitare quin nullo tali iudicio legitime, sed damnande, quicunque fuerit iniustus occupat bona Dei. Et patet quam periculosum est secularibus negociis implicari; et utinam ecclesiastici nostri temporis purgarent oculos mentis ad videndum errorem illius argucie: Iudex secularis vel ecclesiasticus adiudicat mihi hoc bonum vel beneficium; ergo iustum est quod illud possideam. Sine dubli oportet requirere ius ulterius quoad Deum, quod non sit nisi avariciam declinando, etc.	These points, therefore, refute a [d] fourth blindness of worldly people, who think that it is enough to have pretended lordships in {facie} the eyes of the church militant, to such an extent, indeed, that certain {politici} politicians assert, quite heretically, that if the Church adjudges to someone some ecclesiastical or temporal good, then it is just that that person should have that good. If this were true, it would without doubt wholly destroy the Catholic faith, since it is certain that with the Church's judgment {stat} can co-exist iniquity on the part of the person for whom the judgment is made, also on the part of witnesses or judge, and {utrobique} on all sides because of discord with the first right. It would no more be a right than in someone who held the thing however tyrannically. For example, if the witnesses gave false evidence, or the earthly judge gave sentence through a trick hateful to God, or, thirdly, if he gave sentence for someone as being worthy whom God does not approve, no Catholic can rightly doubt but that any unjust person holds God's good things not lawfully, but damnably, by any such judgment. And it is clear how dangerous it is to be involved in secular business. I wish churchmen of our times would purge the eyes of their minds to see the error of this {argucie} sophistry: "A secular or ecclesiastical judge has awarded me this good or benefice; therefore it is just for me to possess it." Without doubt a further right must be looked for in respect of God, which cannot exist unless we shun avarice, etc.
Cap. V. Consequenter faciam alias tres raciones que quietant aliquos ad probandum conclusionem primo propositam;	Chapter 5 Next in order I will make three other arguments which will satisfy some to prove the conclusion first put forward.
primo sic: Eo ipso quo quis est in mortali peccato, habet primam legem sibi contrariam; et eo ipso quod sic, non occupat nisi iniuste; ergo eo ipso quo quis est in mortali peccato, non habet protunc iustum dominium alicuius. Maior patet ex dicto Salvatoris (Math. v.25): Esto consenciens adversario tuo cito dum es in via cum ipso (ut exponitur tractatu primo, capitulo v.): patet ergo quod omnis peccator habet legem, que est prima iusticia, adversantem; et cum illa non potest esse in uno consenciens homini, in alio contra illum (cum sit sapiencia odiens duplicitatem, et nihil amans vel odiens nisi ex integro), sequitur quod iniustus, in omni quod occupat, habet legem sibi contrariam; et cum illa sit lex simpliciter, penes cuius dampnacionem vel approbacionem debet attendi quodcunque aliud illegitimum vel legale, videtur quod omnis peccator, habens illam legem utrobique sibi adversarium, facit illegaliter quidquid facit.	[Sixth argument] The first is as follows. By the very fact that a person is in mortal sin, he has the first law against him; and by the very fact that this is so, he does not hold anything except unjustly; therefore by the very fact that a person is in mortal sin he does not {pro tunc} for that time have just lordship of anything. The major is clear from the Savior's saying (Matthew 5[:25]), "Reach agreement quickly with your adversary while you are on the way with him" (as is explained in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 5 [De mandatis divinis, p. 41]): it is clear, therefore, that all sinners have the law, which is the first {iusticia} right, against them; and since it cannot agree with them in one thing and be against them in another (since it is a wisdom that hates duplicity and only loves or hates whole-heartedly), it follows that the unjust, in all they hold, have the law against them. And since that law is the law simply, upon whose condemnation or approval anything else that is unlawful or lawful ought to {attendi} depend, it seems that all sinners, having that law {utrobique} everywhere against them, do unlawfully whatever they do.
Istud patet noscenti quomodo Deus non potest concordare cum homine pro uno peccato, cum hoc quod aliud remaneat irremissum; quia non concordat vel remittit nisi ex integro, eo quod gracia repugnat cuicunque peccato mortali: et exhinc dicunt doctores quod sicut virtutes, sic et vicia stant connexa. Unde Iacobi capitulo ii.10 dicitur, Qui offendit in uno factus est omnium reus: quia, da quippe, conveniat mandato de dileccione Dei, cum hoc tamen quod non conveniat mandato de dileccione proximi, vel econtra; si Petrus offendat in altero istorum mandatorum, peccat mortaliter, et per consequens iniuriatur Deo et cuilibet proximo, et per consequens nullum diligit sicut debet illud diligere (declaratum est tractatu primo, capitulo secundo): ymmo descendendo specialiter patet, si quis offendat in aliquo mandatorum, peccat, iniuste ac furtive auferendo bona proximi, que tamen connexio videtur maxime elongata. Nam eo ipso quod quis iniuste, invito vel ignorante domino, capit bona aliena, furtum commitit vel latrocinium: cum ergo omnis iniustus iniuste capit bona corporis sui ac bona fortuita, que omnia sunt cuiuscunque iusti (ut post ostenditur); et constat quod ipso non consenciente, cum tunc peccaret, et eciam ignorante: ergo rapit quecunque bona huiusmodi vel furatur: et per idem cupiendo, cum comitancia illius peccati, quod omnia bona mundi sint sicut non esse debent, abutitur cuiuslibet proximi; cum omnis conplacencia inordinata de natura corporea est abusus, dicta volicio est conplacencia inordinata de omni natura corporea, ergo volicio est abusus. Debet enim habere conplacenciam serviendo Deo in caritate; sed modo placet sibi, serviendo peccato contra Deum, ergo conplacencia inordinata: et patet quod quilibet vocatus usus iniustus realiter est abusus; sed de isto postmodum.	That is clear to one who knows that God cannot be {concordare} reconciled with a person for one sin while another sin remains unforgiven, because he does not reconcile or forgive except wholly, because grace is repugnant with each and every mortal sin; and consequently the learned say that, like the virtues, the vices also {stant} are connected. Thus in James 2[:10] it is said, "He who offends in one thing has become guilty of all": because suppose he keeps the commandment about loving God, {cum hoc tamen} yet at the same time does not keep the commandment about love of neighbor, or vice versa; if Peter offends in either of these commandments, he sins mortally, and consequently wrongs God and every neighbor, and consequently does not love anything as he ought to love it (as was explained in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 2 [De mandatis divinis, p. 13]). Indeed, to be specific, it is clear that if anyone offends against any commandment, he sins by taking away the goods of a neighbor unjustly and like a thief, {tamen} even though this connection seems most remote. For anyone who takes another's goods against the will or without the knowledge of the owner, by that very fact commits theft or robbery: since, therefore, all the unjust unjustly take the goods of the body and the goods of fortune, which all belong to each of the just (as is shown afterwards), and since it is certain that this is without the agreement of the just (since they would then sin) and also without their knowledge, therefore the unjust rob or steal every good of this kind. And likewise by desiring while in that sin that all the goods of the world be such as they ought not be, the unjust abuse the goods of every neighbor. Since every inordinate satisfaction concerning a corporeal nature is abuse, the said volition is an inordinate satisfaction concerning every corporeal nature; therefore the volition is an abuse. For they ought to take satisfaction in serving God in charity, but instead sinners please themselves, serving sin against God, therefore with a satisfaction that is inordinate. And it is clear that everything we call an unjust use is really an abuse; but we will speak about this shortly.
Item, de racione domini, ut huius, est quod suo preficiatur servienti: sed iniustus ut sic non preficitur temporalibus, sed eius servienti subicitur, ergo non est dominus eorundem. Maior patet ex descriptione dominii, cum aliter quelibet creatura indifferenter dominaretur cuilibet. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omnis peccator voluntarie prefert, in suo amore, bono eterno bonum aliquod temporale, et, eo ipso quod sic, servit huiusmodi temporali, quia subicit se secundum supremam potenciam, scilicet volitivam; ergo, etc. Argumentum declaratum est superius, tractatu primo, capitulo quinto, de modo temptacionis et superacionis hominis ad peccandum, quomodo est propter adherenciam ad bonum conmutabile et declinanciam ab inflexibili veritate. Ex quo plane patet (cum bonum temporale ad tantum damnificat abutentem et trahit ipsum, secundum supremam potenciam, ad gradum infimum) quod non pocius servit tunc homini quam servus qui dominum suum prosterneret et in lacum traheret per capillos.	[Seventh argument] Also, it belongs to the concept of a lord, as such, to be placed over a someone or something that serves him. But the unjust, as such, are not placed over temporal things, but are subjected to their servants; therefore they are not lords of the same. The major is clear from the definition {descriptio} of lordship, since otherwise any creature would be indifferently lord over any other. And the minor is clear from the fact that all sinners voluntarily in their love prefer some temporal good to the eternal good, {eo ipso} and since this is so, they serve this temporal thing, because they subject themselves according to their highest faculty, the will; therefore, etc. (The argument has been explained above, Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 5 (De mandatis divinis, p. 37), on the way in which someone is tempted and reduced to sinning, how it is because of adherence to a mutable good and a turning away from an unbendable truth.) From this it plainly appears, since temporal goods to such an extent damn those who abuse them and drag them, according to their highest faculty, to the lowest degree, that then instead of serving human beings temporal things are slaves that would overthrow their lords and drag them into the lake [of fire] by the hair.
Et hinc vere dicunt doctores quod quidquid homo magis dilexerit, illud constituit deum suum et bonum ad cuius cultum principaliter intuetuer; et hoc dissonat in uno sermone. Et patet quam philosophice dicit ille divinum Philosophus, veritas in abstracto (Luc. xvi.13), Nemo potest univoce Deo servire et mammone. Et suus discipulus conqueritur (Rom. i.25) quod philosophi perversi a Deo ad mundum servierunt pocius creature quam Creatori. Et sic intelligendus est Augustinus, epistola xxxvii superius allegata, quod Peccunia tanto verius habetur a bonis quanto minus amatur ab eisdem. Patet eciam quomodo intelligendi sunt doctores, dicentes quod ydolatria consequitur ad omne peccatum; quia, eo ipso quod quis peccat peccato mundi, carnis, sive dyaboli, prefert in sua affeccione bonum temporale, cuius habet simulacrum vel fantasiam, bono incommutabili, supra omnem fantasiam intelligibili, ut ostendit Augustinus in De vera Religione xiv. et Confessionibus similiter, unde, propter dictam connexionem peccatorum adinvicem et servitutem qua peccator superatus servit pocius creature quam Deo, dicit beatus ewangelista pro finali conclusione, concludente sufficienter totam regulam Christianam, Filioli mei custodite vos a simulacris (Prima Ioh. ultimo). Nec dubium alicui philosopho de ista sentencia, qui admittit Scripturam sacram vel racionem philosophicam sine protervia. Omnis enim peccator constituit creaturam, quam plus Deo vero diligit, deum suum, quod est ydolatrare. Nec refert ad hoc, sive sit argentum sive aurum que sunt simulacra avarorum, sive corpus proprium quod est simulacra carnalium, cum gracia illius voluptuose fovendi: offendunt divinum mandatum, quod est signum infallibile prestancioris amoris sine fantasia honoris mundani que omnia sunt connexa et indubie inficiunt fidem et quodlibet preceptorum. Patet ergo quod omnis iniustus caret vero dominio cuiuscunque creature: nam potissime dominaretur suo proprio corpori; sed illi subicitur serviliter superatus; ergo, etc.	And thus the {doctores} learned truly say that whatever we love more we establish as our god and the good to whose worship we chiefly look--and this [a finite good as god] is discord within a single phrase. It is clear how philosophically speaks that divine Philosopher, Truth in the abstract: "No one can serve," in the same sense, "God and mammon" (Luke 16[:13]). And his disciple lamented that philosophers who turned away from God to the world "served the creature rather than the Creator" (Romans 1[:25]). And in this way Augustine must be understood, in his Letter \SCXXXVII\ES quoted above, [when he says] of money, "The good have it better when they love it less." It is also clear how the {doctores} learned should be understood when they say that idolatry follows upon every sin, because, by the very fact that someone sins by a sin of the world, the flesh or the devil, he prefers in his affection a temporal good, of which he has the idol or image, to the unchangeable good, intelligible above every image, as Augustine shows in On True Religion \SCXIV\ES, and likewise in his Confessions. Thus, because of the connection of sins with one another (mentioned above) and the slavery in which the vanquished sinner serves a creature rather than God, the blessed evangelist says for his final conclusion, adequately summing up the whole Christian rule, "My little children, keep yourselves from idols" (1 John 5:21). And philosophers do not doubt this judgment, if they acknowledge sacred Scripture or philosophical argument without wanton opposition. For all sinners establish as their god the creature they love more than the true God, and this is idolatry. In this it does not matter whether it is silver or gold, which are the miser's idols, or their own body, which is the idol of the carnal, when for the sake of pleasurably cherishing it they offend against the divine commandment: this is an infallible sign of {prestancioris} a more outstanding love, [even] without an image of worldly honor. All these are connected and undoubtedly poison faith and each of the precepts. It is clear, therefore, that the unjust all lack true lordship of any creature whatever; for they would most of all be lords of their own bodies, but, having been vanquished, they are subjected to the body like slaves.
Confirmatur universaliter per hoc quod Omnis qui facit peccatum servus est peccati iuxta vocem Veritatis, Joh.viii, 34; sed omne peccatum est in servis, quia minus ens quam aliqua creature, ergo omnis peccator degradat se ad serviendum inferiori quam aliqua creature: et cum dominus, in quantum huiusmodi, prefeccionem significat, sequitur quod peccator, ut huiusmodi, nulli creature proprie dominatur; sed virtuosus, dominans omni generi peccatorum, multo magis dominatur omni peccatori, cui peccata singula dominatur. Unde dominus Armachanus, qui tractavit istam materiam usque ad fundamentum, in capitulo quarto, libro quarto de Pauperie Salvatoris, sic ait: Cum, inquit, dominus a domo, cui debet preesse, dicitur, patet, cum peccator non sic presit sed subsit domui, et aliis rebus ab eo iuste detentis, vere servus et non dominus est censendus. Et patet responsio ad questionem politicam, qua queritur quid requiritur ad hoc quod quis sit dominus alicuius, cum existencia extrinsecorum non sufficit, et (ut probatum est capitulo proximo) iuducia et ritus vel opiniones hominum non pertinent; ideo oportet et sufficit extremis superaddere virtutem dominativi mediate *{me^te, probably mediante W} qua serviat Deo, et tunc indubie serviunt sibi inferiora creata singula.	This is confirmed universally by the fact that "Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin," according to the voice of Truth, John 8[:34]; but [??] every sin is in[ferior to] slaves, because it has less being than any creature; therefore every sinner degrades himself to the service of something inferior to any creature. And since "lord," as such, signifies a perfection, it follows that the sinner, as such, is not properly lord over any creature; but the virtuous, dominating every kind of sin, a fortiori dominates every sinner, who is dominated by each sin. Thus the Bishop of Armagh [Richard FitzRalph] (who has treated this matter to its foundation), in On the Savior's Poverty, \SCIV\ES, chapter 4, says this: "Since 'lord' (dominus) is said from the house (domus) over which the lord ought to rule, it is clear that, since a sinner does not thus rule the house but is subjected to it and to the other things he holds unjustly, truly he should be reckoned a slave and not a lord." And the answer is clear to the {politicam} political question in which it is asked what is needed for someone to be the lord of another [thing or person], since the existence of extrinsic things [i.e. the mere co-existence of the extremes of the lord-servant relationship] is not enough and (as was proved in the last chapter) the judgments and ceremonies or opinions of human beings are not relevant; it is therefore necessary and sufficient to add to the extremes the virtue of the dominative [subject] by means of which he [the lord] serves God, and then undoubtedly all created inferiors serve him.
Iterum, iuxta sentenciam sepe tactam, omne dominium hominis naturale vel civile est principaliter a Deo collatum homini pro reddendo Deo continue servicio debito, eterno consilio suo stabilito; sed eo ipso quo quis omittendo vel committendo peccat mortaliter, subtrahit a capitali domino dictum servicium et per consequens forisfacit; ergo eo ipso quo quis peccat mortaliter, est de iure privandus quocunque domino: sed cum in Deo non sit probacio vel conviccio expectanda (iuxta dicta proximo capitulo), sequitur quod omnis peccator statim privatur vero domino. Si enim finis gracia cuius confertur dominium, qui mensurat media, sit subtractus, tunc et media ab isto essencialiter dependencia; ut si do tibi decem marcas ad finem ut servias mihi, tamquam per se causam, patet quod si subtrahis servicium et ego plene sciam atque sufficiam, racionabiliter subtraham collatum dominium. Et super isto fundantur multa iura regni Anglie de forisfactura, de preexita licencia capitalis domini, et de excepto servicio capitalibus dominis debite consueto. Nec dubitat theologus de asserto secundum quamlibet eius particulam. Deus enim naturali instinctu mandavit homini ut sibi serviret correspondenter ad suum dominium: nec potest cum debito illius servicii dispensare, cum fundatur in Scriptura et lege incommutabili; quia aliter homo posset esse exutus ne teneretur Deum diligere vel facere sicut debet.	[Eighth argument] Again, according to the doctrine often touched on, every natural or civil human lordship is principally conferred by God on human beings for the purpose of {continue} continually rendering God due service, according to his eternally {stabilito} established counsel; but all who sin mortally, whether by omission or commission, by the very fact withdraw service from their chief lord and consequently forfeit; therefore those who sin mortally by the very fact should by right be deprived of every lordship; but since God does not need to wait for proof or conviction (according to what was said in the last chapter [above, p. 000]), it follows that every sinner is deprived of true lordship immediately. For if the purpose for which lordship is conferred, which measures the means, is taken away, then also the means, which are essentially dependent on it, [are taken away]: for example, if for the purpose (as essential reason) of obtaining your service I give you ten marks, it is clear that, if you withdraw the service and I fully know and have the power, I will with reason withdraw the lordship conferred [i.e. over the ten marks]. This is the basis of many of the laws of the kingdom of England concerning forfeiture, the prior obtaining of permission from the chief lord, and exempt service customarily due to chief lords. A theologian does not doubt the assertion [i.e. the major premise, that every natural or civil human lordships is principally conferred, etc.] in any of its particulars. For God commanded human beings by natural instinct to serve him in a way that corresponds to his lordship, and he cannot dispense with the debt of this service, since it is based on Scripture and unchangeable law; for otherwise people could be {exutus ne} released from the obligation to love God or to do as they ought.
Confirmatur per hoc quod nullum civile dominium est iustum simpliciter, nisi in naturali dominio sit fundatum; sed nemo habet naturale dominium pro tempore quo peccat mortaliter; ergo nec civile dominium iustum simpliciter. Minor patet ex facto iudicis summe iusti, qui expulit primum hominem de paradiso post peccatum (Gen. iii.23,24): et cum perante dominatus fuit paradiso (ut patet tractatu primo, capitulo secundo), patet quod iniuste sic fecisset, nisi homo naturale dominium perdidisset; eo quod non potest punire nisi racione peccati: ergo, cum eadem sit racio de quolibet peccante mortaliter, sequitur quod naturale dominium sit incompossibile cum peccato mortali. Et maior argumenti potest suaderi tripliciter,	It is confirmed by the fact that no civil lordship is simply just unless it is based on natural lordship; but no one has natural lordship {pro tempore} for the time when he sins mortally; therefore neither does he have simply just civil lordship. The minor is clear from the action of the judge who is just most of all, who expelled the first man from paradise after sin (Genesis 3[:23, 24]); and since he [the man] had previously been lord of Paradise (as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 2 [not found; see Tract \SCII\ES, De statu innocencie, c. 6]), it is clear that he [God] would have done this unjustly if the man had not {perdidisset} lost natural lordship, because God cannot punish except by reason of sin. Therefore, since the same argument applies to anyone who sins mortally, it follows that natural lordship cannot exist with mortal sin. The major of the argument [that no civil lordship is simply just unless it is based on natural lordship] can be made persuasive in three ways.
primo ex facto summi iudicis expellentis Adam occupantem paradisum racione peccati, quod non iuste fecisset si tunc habuisset dominium civile in eodem; ergo cum eadem sit racio de quolibet peccante mortaliter, sequitur probandum: si enim conquestus vel sola occupacio rei que prius non est proprium alicui, facit civilem iusticiam, subiecta gracia, non est fingendum quin Adam post peccatum habuit verum dominium de paradiso.	[1] First, from the action of the highest judge when, by reason of sin, he expelled Adam from the occupation of Paradise, which he would not have done justly if he [Adam] had then had civil lordship in Paradise; therefore, since the same argument applies to anyone who sins mortally, the point to be proved follows. For if [as Wyclif denies] conquest or the mere holding of a thing which is not already someone's property makes a civil {iusticiam} right {subiecta gracia} (grace being set aside), it cannot be {non est fingendum quin} pretended that after sin Adam did not have true lordship of Paradise [but he did not, since God expelled him].
Similiter Adam vel aliquis de filiis suis post expulsionem habuit verum dominium in valle miserie; ergo aliqua fuit causa incepcionis veri dominii: et cum nuda occupacio non sufficit, relinquitur quod restitucio naturalis dominii post datam graciam penitenti (ut tangitur tractatu primo, secundo capitulo). Sicut ergo omnis forma artificialis [fol. 72r, line 1] presupponit naturalem, sicut et {om.} ars creature presupponit artem Dei; sic omne {esse} artificiale dominium presupponit naturale dominium, tamquam necessarium fundamentum. [fol. 72r, line 2] Aliter enim non potest *{posset} iustificari quomodo civilia dominia {originaliter add.} forent {?vera vel add.} iusta originaliter {om.}; ut capto primo civili dominio, cum ipsum non fuit iustum ex sola ordinacione [fol. 72r, line 3] hominum (cum homines ideo ordinant, quia iustum), relinquitur quod Deus prius {trs.} iustificet; quod tamen non potest facere, nisi dando graciam et dominium naturale: relinquitur ergo eius [fol. 72r, line 4] necessitas {requiritur add.} ad humanum.	[2] Likewise, after the expulsion Adam or one of his sons had true lordship in this vale of misery; therefore something caused true lordship to begin [again]. And since bare holding is not enough, it remains that [the cause of its beginning was] the restoration of natural lordship when grace was given to the penitent (as is touched on in Tract \SCI\ES, chapter 2 [not found]). Therefore, just as every artificial form presupposes a natural one (just as the art of the creature presupposes God's art), so every artificial lordship presupposes natural lordship as its necessary foundation, for otherwise it could not be explained how civil lordships could be just originally. So that, when civil lordship is first acquired, since it was not just by human ordinance alone (since the reason why human legislators make an ordinance is that it is [already] just), it remains that God justifies first; but he cannot do this except by giving grace and natural lordship. It remains, therefore, that grace is necessary to human lordship.
Tercio {om.} confirmatur per deducciones ad inconveniens; ponendo quod Petrus {Sortes} in gracia habeat solum naturale dominium ad a usibile, [fol. 72r, line 5] et Paulus {Plato} iniustus habeat solum civile dominium in eodem; et conveniat {?} utrique simul necessitas utendi a {ab} usibili usibus inconpossibilibus: tunc queritur utrum {an} [fol. 72r, line 6] Linus politicus iuste iudicaret pro Petro {Sorte} vel pro Paulo {Platone} quoad datus usus, post plenam noticiam iuris utriusque. Et videtur multipliciter *{tripliciter} quod pro Petro {Sorte}; primo quia [fol. 72r, line 7] Petrus {Sortes} habet ius auctorisatum a Deo et Paulus {Plato} solum ab homine; ergo ius Petri {Sortis} est longe {trs.} uberius: similiter *{secundo} manifesta foret blasphemia dicere quod Iudex [fol. 72r, line 8] iustissimus subtraheret a suo pio servitore posito in ultimata {extrema} necessitate, auctoritatem sive licenciam utendi bonis domini cui servit [fol. 72r, line 9] tam sedule, et dare suo publico contemtori. Et *{om.} iterum *{Tertio} palam *{manifestum} {malum W (Poole)} est quod pro quocunque istorum {illorum} qui habet prestanciorem licenciam quoad Deum debet [fol. 72r, line 10] Linus hoc noscens iudicare, eo quod omnis iudex adversans divino iudicio et scienter iniuste iudicat: ergo secundum legem civilem Petrus {Sortes} haberet [fol. 72r, line 11] ius in illo {om.} casu {presens add.} ad a, et Paulus {Plato} nullum simpliciter. Ex quo {quibus} patet quod ius civile sit ius nature vel {aut} gracie, aut ipsum necessario supponens {presupponens}; nam Linus [fol. 72r, line 12] in casu posito sentencians pro Paulo {Platone} facit {om.} sentenciam {sentenciaret} iniuste contra legem Dei et eius iudicium: et {ex quibus} patet conclusio *{om.} quod civile dominium presupponit graciam, quia dominium naturale; ideo etc.	[3] Third, it is confirmed by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that Peter, who is in grace, has only natural lordship of a certain {usibile} usable, and Paul, who is unjust, has only civil lordship in the same thing; and let it be necessary for both of them at the same time to use this usable by incompatible uses; then it is asked whether the {politicus} politician Linus would judge justly for Peter or for Paul in relation to the use {datus} in question, if he had full knowledge of the right of each. And it seems in three ways that he would decide in Peter's favor. First, because Peter has a right authorized by God, and Paul only by human authority; therefore Peter's right is far fuller. Second, it would be manifest blasphemy to say that the most just judge would withdraw from his pious servant in a situation of extreme necessity the authority or license to use the goods of the Lord he serves so assiduously and give [them] to someone who publicly despises him. Third, it is clear that Linus ought to give judgment in favour of whichever of them has {prestanciorem} the superior permission in God's eyes, if he knows which that is, since every judge who knowingly goes against divine judgment judges unjustly. Therefore, according to the civil law Peter would in this case have a right to the thing, and Paul simply none. From these points it is clear that civil right is a right of nature or grace, or [rather] something that necessarily presupposes such a right; for in the case supposed, if Linus gave judgment in Paul's favour, he would give judgment unjustly against God's law and against God's judgment. From these points it is clear that civil lordship presupposes grace, because [it presupposes] natural lordship; therefore, etc.
Cap. VI. [fol. 72r, line 13] Ultimo {om.} in ista materia argumentatur {om.}, per modum universalis {om.} epilogi, isto {om.} modo {arguitur sic}: Nulla creatura potest esse dominus alicuius nisi Deus ipsum donaverit, ut patet ex [fol. 72r, line 14] sepe dictis; sed {dominus add.} Deus non potest quidquid donare {om.} nisi optimo modo capacitati donaturi {donatori} possibili; ergo si creature sit dominus, hoc erit titulo huius [fol. 72r, line 15] dacionis. Minor patet {apparet} racione naturali et sanctorum {per} testimoniis {sanctos}. Sicut enim Deus est, quo maius cogitari {excogitari} non potest; sic est, {esse add.} cui non potest competere melior modus dandi: cum enim oportet {trs.} [fol. 72r, line 16] magnificum servando {?} virtutem dare proporcionaliter ad sui magnificenciam, patet {sic} quod {om.} oportet Deum donare optimo modo possibili capacitati sui dominii; aliter enim {om.} redundaret [fol. 72r, line 17] defectus modi dacionis in parcitatem donantis, quod non potest Deo competere: oportet ergo quod si Deus donaverit aliquid creature, quod det liberalissime, securissime, et {om.} utilissime, [fol. 72r, line 18] quoad eius capacitatem.	[Ninth argument] Chapter 6 Finally as an epilogue in this matter it is argued as follows. No creature can be lord of any thing unless God grants it, as is clear from what has often been said; but God cannot grant anything except in the best manner possible to the capacity of the granter; therefore if a creature is a lord, that will be by the title of such a grant. The minor is clear by natural reason and by the testimonies of the saints. For just as God is "he than whom no greater can be thought," so he is also he to whom no better mode of giving can pertain: for since in practicing virtue it is necessary for someone great to give in proportion to his greatness, it is clear that God must grant in the best way possible to the capacity of his lordship, for otherwise defect in the manner of giving would suggest niggardliness on the part of the granter, which cannot be true of God. If God grants anything to a creature, he must therefore give [1] most liberally, [2] most securely and [3] most usefully, in respect of his capacity.
Quo habito patet secundum Lincoliensem (Dicto xxvi) quod Optimus modus donandi {dandi} usibilis {?usibilem} creature est {om.} quo *{quando} donum bonum in se sub hac condicione [fol. 72r, line 19] donatur et recipitur quod donatorius {donatarius} potest eo uti *{et quomodocunque et quandocunque voluerit, ?quod si aliquod istorum ?defecerit possit esse donatum add.} liberius et sic melius: [fol. 72r, line 20] secundo, quod datum nemo auferre possit {trs.}, quamdiu donatorius eo uti {trs.} voluerit, quia aliter non esset securissimus, si aufferri possit domino inculpato: [fol. 72r, line 21] et {om.} tercio quam cito ipse {om.} donatorius ipso dono abuti voluerit, eo ipso ipsum perdat; aliter enim {om.} non esset modus donandi utilissimus, cum semper datum, quo quis abutitur, [fol. 72r, line 22] ipsum dampnificat: Deus ergo istum modum donacionis usibilium secundum legem infrangibilem observabit.	With this established, it is clear, according to the Bishop of Lincoln (in Dict. \SCXXVI\ES) that the best manner of granting something {usibilis} usable to a creature is when a gift good in itself is granted and received under the condition that the grantee can use it however and whenever he likes, because if either of these [conditions] is lacking the grant can be made more liberally and thus better; secondly, that no one can {auferre} take the gift away as long as the grantee wishes to use it, because otherwise it would not be most secure, if it could be taken away without fault in the lord; and thirdly, as soon as the grantee wishes to abuse that gift, he {eo ipso} thereby {perdat} loses it, for otherwise it would not be the most useful manner of granting, since a gift someone abuses always damages him. Therefore God will observe this manner of granting {usibilium} usables according to an unbreakable law.
Sic enim Filius datus est nobis quoad {?} incarnacionem [fol. 72r, line 23] (ut dicitur Ysaie ix.6), et Spiritus sanctus cottidie modo optimo creature possibili, et quoad modum donantis, et quoad precium rei date {datur add.}: datur enim nobis [fol. 72r, line 24] ad fruicionem perpetuam, sic quod nemo potest eos *{eum} amittere nisi gratis voluerit delinquendo; et indubie {om.} eo ipso quo peccaverit perdit illos *{illum}. Et eciam *{om.} in istis donis dat homini {om.} [fol. 72r, line 25] virtutes in via et gloriam consumatam in patria, et indubie {om.} solum ad fruicionem, sic quod nemo potest abuti istis bonis nec perdere nisi velit	For thus "a Son is given us" in the incarnation, as is said in Isaias 9[:6], and the Holy Spirit [is given] daily in the best manner possible to a creature, both in respect of the manner of the granter and in respect of the value of the thing given: for [1] he is given to us for perpetual enjoyment, [2] in such a way that no one can lose him [i.e. the Holy Spirit] unless he wishes to transgress {gratis} freely; and, [3] undoubtedly, by the very fact that a person sins he {perdit} loses him [the Spirit]. And in these gifts God also gives to human beings virtues on the way [i.e. in this life] and consummate glory in the fatherland [i.e. heaven], and undoubtedly only for enjoyment, in such a way that no one can abuse these gifts or {perdere} lose them without wishing to.
{quo ad [fol. 72r, line 26] bona creaturae [conjecture: naturae] dictum est supra cap. 2 quod semper dat illa sumpto [conjecture: sponsae] vel eccelesie ad utendum nec potest [quis between lines] ipsa perdere nisi velit add.}; cum corpora {om.} lacerata a tortoribus, [fol. 72r, line 27] servata caritate, deponuntur eo gloriosius et securius ad beatitudinem, iuxta illud apostoli, {2 add.} Thimoth, i., {12 add.} Scio cui credidi, et certus sum quod potens est depositum meum {et... meum: etc.} servare in hunc {illum} diem. [fol. 72r, line 28] Cum enim sit demonstrabile quod iustus, consumans hanc vitam {trs.}, beatificabitur in {om.} anima et corpore {trs. 321}, et iterum quod eadem essencia humani corporis servatur in materia [fol. 72r, line 29] prima non anichilabili, quomodocunque fuerit in minimis micis {minimis micis: minutiis} fracta vel *{et} formis variata; quilibet Christianus cum apostolo debet {trs. 312} esse certus quod deponendo corpus pro [fol. 72r, line 30] Christo in gracia, non perditur interiori homini, sed securissime conservatur.	As for goods of nature, it has been said above in Chapter 2 that God always gives them to his spouse or Church for use, and no one can {perdere} lose them unless he wills, since those whose bodies are lacerated by the torturers lay them aside (if charity is not lost) the more gloriously and more securely for beatitude, in accordance with the Apostle's saying (2 Tim. 1[:12]), "I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that he is able to preserve what I have entrusted to him against that day." For since it is demonstrable that the just, completing this life, will be beatified in body and soul, and again that the identical essence of the human body is preserved in prime matter, which cannot be annihilated however much it may be broken into minute parts and changed in its forms, every Christian ought to be certain with the Apostle that if we lay aside the body for Christ in grace, it is not {perditur} lost to the interior self but most securely preserved.
Et {om.} quoad bona fortune, patet quod Deus non potest dare illa [fol. 72r, line 31] {trs.} ad {?} abusum *{sed ad usum} solum; cum non potest *{possit} intendere vel velle quod homo abutatur aliquo bono suo {trs. 2341}, eo quod {eo quod: ex quo patet quod} non est possibile hominem abuti {uti W (Poole)} *{uti} aliquo usibili *{nisi} secundum [fol. 72r, line 32] virtutem nisi *{nec abuti nisi} peccando; ergo, si Deo velit quod quis {aliquo add.} abutatur aliquo {modo add.}, vult quod peccet.	As for goods for fortune, it is clear that God cannot give them for abuse, but for use only, since he cannot intend or wish human beings to abuse any of his good things. From this it is clear that it is not possible for human beings to use any {usibili} usable except in accordance with virtue, nor to abuse except by sinning. Therefore, if God wishes someone to abuse something, in some way he wishes that person to sin.
Ex istis {quibus} patet {sequitur} primo quod si iniustus recipit [fol. 72r, line 33] bona fortune vel alia bona Dei, hoc erit {trs.}, racione peccati {? crossed out add.}, longe inperfeccius quam convenit Deo donare; et per consequens {per consequens: sic} habicio {illa add.} non esset *{est} sufficiens ad {om.} [fol. 72r, line 34] fundandum {om.} in sic habente dominium: ecclesie autem donat quidquid iniustus modo naturali et simplici {trs. 2341} habet. Ex *{om.} istis *{om.} secundo patet {sequitur} quod Adam fuit creatus in gracia, cum Deus donavit [fol. 72r, line 35] sibi dominium universitatis sensibilis, ut patet tractatu secundo, capitulo -. Nichil enim obesset quod Deus daret sibi optimo modo dandi, cum peccatum precedens non ponat obicem {trs. 312}. [fol. 72r, line 36]	From these things it is clear, first, that if the unjust receive goods of fortune or other good things of God, they will, because of sin, receive them much more imperfectly than it befits God to grant them, and consequently such possession is not enough to be a foundation of lordship in those who thus possess; rather, whatever the unjust possess in a natural and simple manner God grants to the Church. It follows, second, that Adam was created in grace, since God granted him lordship of all sensible things, as is clear in Tract \SCII\ES, chapter - [see De statu innocencie, c. 6]; for there would be no reason why God should not give to him in the best manner of giving, since [in Adam as first created] previous sin does not pose an obstacle.
Et *{om.} patet tercio *{igitur} quod omnis iniustus caret dominio; primo ex hoc quod modus donacionis divine sit sibi inconpossibilis; secundo per {ex} hoc quod perdit {om.} per iniusticiam graciam Dei, [fol. 72r, line 37] et per {om.} consequens {sic} dominium consequens ad gratiam. Si enim rite vocatus in lege humana perdit, propter defectum conparicionis per se vel {per add.} procuratorem, terras et [fol. 72r, line 38] tenimenta; quanto magis rite vocatus secundum legem Dei ad respondendum pro suo dominio, et illegitime se absentans, perderet suum dominium? revera tanto racionabilius, [fol. 72r, line 39] quanto Deus verior *{verius est} dominus et preco vocans dignior {trs. 312}; cum sit Trinitas cum suis sanctis nichil potens {?} exigere nisi iustum. Et certum est quod {autem} [fol. 72r, line 40] vocat sub pena amissionis omnium bonorum, quoad titulum gracie ad servicium continuum; et alius modus habendi non plus sufficit [fol. 72r, line 41] fundare dominium in homine quam in bestia. Tercio patet {om.} ex hoc quod nullus paterfamilias sciens, {et add.} potens, et prudens, committeret preposituram bonorum suorum [fol. 72r, line 42] servo {om.} proditori, dissipatori, et {om.} inobedientissimo dominum contempnenti; specialiter dum ipsum noverit {trs.} esse talem, et habuerit ex uno latere sufficienciam [fol. 72r, line 43] degradandi, sine expectacione probacionis testium vel ferende sentencie, ex alioque latere habuerit copiam servorum fidelium {trs.} et prudencium, qui [fol. 72r, line 44] dominum suum diligunt viscerose: nulli {non} dubium quin sic facere foret suprema fatuitas; non ergo potest {trs.} competere iudici iustissimo, omniscienti, [fol. 72r, line 45] omnipotenti, habenti omnia bona mundi distribuenda et ad manus istas duas maneries {?} famulorum.	It is clear, therefore, that the unjust all lack lordship: first, because the manner of the divine granting is incompatible with their state; second, because through injustice they {perdit} lose God's grace and consequently the lordship that follows upon grace. For if people rightly summoned [to court] under human law {perdit} lose lands and holdings {propter defectum comparicionis} if they fail to appear in person or through a representative, how much more would people rightly summoned to answer for their lordship under God's law, if they unlawfully absent themselves, {perderet} lose their lordship? In truth much more reasonably, inasmuch as God is more truly a lord and the crier summoning them more worthy, since it is the Trinity with his saints, who cannot exact anything but what is just. And it is certain that God does summon upon pain of loss of all goods, in respect of the title of grace to {continuum} continual service; no other mode of possession suffices as a basis for lordship, any more in human beings than in beasts. Third, it is clear because no knowledgeable, able and prudent head of a family would entrust the charge of his goods to a servant who is a treacherous, wasteful, and most disobedient despiser of his lord--especially while he knows him to be such and has, on the one hand, power to sack him without waiting upon proof by witnesses or the passing of sentence and, on the other hand, has plenty of faithful and prudent servants who love their lord sincerely. No one doubts that to act thus would be the utmost stupidity; it therefore cannot befit the most just judge, all- knowing and all-powerful, who has all the goods of the world to distribute and has at hand those two kinds of servants.
Quod si obicis factum, {quod... factum: si dicatur videri posse contrarium} [fol. 72r, line 46] cum tyrranni habundant diviciis, iuxta {om.} illud {om.} Iob xii {22}.6, Habundant tabernacula predonum {etc.} , et Ierem. xii, i, Iustus quidem es, Domine, si disputem tecum; verumtamen iusta loquar ad le: Quare via impiorum prosperatur: bene est omnibus qui prevaricantur, et inique agunt patet solucio ex predictis; nam *{quod} iniustos Deus permittit habundare diviciis, [fol. 72r, line 47] quas habent ad sensum equivocum, non ad sui utilitatem sed dampnacionem. Et *{om.} patet *{secundo add.} quod questio Ieremie implicat duo falsa: nam {quia} Osee viii 4 dicitur, [fol. 72r, line 48] propter talem defectum usus {om.} tyrrannorum, Ipsi regnaverunt, et non ex me; suppone {?}, non habent auctoritatem taliter abutendi: iustis autem dat {?} illa bona {simpliciter add.} que promittit *{permittit} [fol. 72r, line 49] iniustis cedere ad abusum, iuxta {secundum} {om.} illud {om.} Math.xxv, 28 superius {om.} allegatum {om.}, Tollite ab eo talentum et date illi qui decem talenta habet {talentum... habet: etc}. {omni enim habenti dabitur et habundabit Pro solutionem questionis ?esset notandum quod omnis iustus predestinatus in finem ?excellentiori modo habendi habet hec temporalia quod [conjecture: quam] iniustus prescitus ipsi enim add.} Ita {om.} equivoce *{ habet ista} abutens eis ad sui incommodum, [fol. 72r, line 51] licet non habeat aliquam {quamdam} pruriginem sensualem, sed *{om.} miro *{tamen add.} modo crescit anxietate insaciabili circa illa, quousque cum dolore magno in [fol. 72r, line 52] articulo mortis illa perdiderit, et dehinc, propter abusum *{abusus} et *{om.} delectacionem sophisticam, in perpetuum crucietur imo {?} {uno W (Poole)}: contra, iustus vere dives habens in omnibus *{?talibus} temporalibus [fol. 72r, line 53] delectacionem et per consequens usum *{et... usum: ?solum quo ad usum} statui innocencie conpetentem, crescit continue, modo motus naturalis {?naturali}, in {om.} usu delectabili possessorum, quousque [fol. 72r, line 54] intrans in gaudium Domini sui regnet beatifice super omnia bona sua. Et patet quod iste habiciones sunt condiciones opposite.	But if you object that in fact he has acted thus, since tyrants abound in riches, according to the text of Job 12[:6], "The tents of robbers abound," and in Jeremias 12[:1], "You are indeed just, O Lord, if I dispute with you; yet I will speak what is just to you: Why does the way of the wicked prosper? Why is it well with all who transgress and act wickedly?," the solution is clear from what was said before: that God allows the unjust to abound in riches, which they "have" in an equivocal sense, not to their advantage but to their damnation. It is clear, second, that Jeremias' question implies two false things. For it is said in Osee 8[:4], because of such {defectum} lack of use on the part of tyrants, "They rule, and not from me"--understand, "They do not have authority for such bad use." But God gives to the just the good things that he permits {iniustis cedere ad abusum} the unjust to give up to abuse, according to the text of Matthew 25[:28] quoted above, "Take the talent from him and give it to him who has ten." To solve the question it would have to be noted that the finally predestined just possess temporal things in a more excellent manner of possession than the foreknown unjust, who possesses them equivocally, abusing them to their own disadvantage. Even if they do not have any sensual urge, yet they now grow in insatiable anxiety about those things, until, with great grief, at the moment of death they {perdiderit} lose them, and from then on, because of the deceitful pleasures of abuse, they are everlastingly tormented. On the contrary, the just, truly rich, taking pleasure in such temporal things only in respect of the use appropriate to the state of innocence, grow continually, in the manner of a natural movement, in the pleasant use of possessions, until they enter into the joy of their Lord and reign in blessedness over all his good things. It is clear that these "havings" are opposite conditions.
Sed quia nondum solvitur questio Ieremie, {Et patet... Sed... Ieremie: sed non apparet} quare Deus {autem} permittit [fol. 72r, line 55] huiusmodi abusus {trs.}, approbando in eis omnia positiva {?presentia/ ?principia} {ut sic satisfiat questioni Jeremie? add.}; ideo {om.} dicitur {dicit} quod {?huius potest esse add.} triplex est {om.} causa in genere quare sic [fol. 72r, line 56] divites *{om.} ordinantur: primo ad puniendum peccata sic abutencium bonis Dei, et populi subiecti, qui multiplicis prevaricacionibus meruit se *{sic} puniri, iuxta illud [fol. 72r, line 57] Iob xxxiv.30: Deus regnare facit ippocritam propter peccata populi {propter... populi: etc.}. Unde, secundi Regum ultimo, peccatum Davidi numerantis populum in ipso populo et non in ipso David pestilencialiter est punitum. [fol. 72r, line 58] Dignum namque est ut communitas inficiens aerem verbis pompaticis de gestis regiis ac {et} magnatum, et sic adulatorius *{adulatoribus} provocans eos [fol. 72r, line 59] ad superbiam, puniatur pestilenter infeccione aeris, et {om.} proporcionabiliter ad delictum: unde non legitur in Scriptura pestem inflictam, nisi ut notetur [fol. 72r, line 60] peccatum lingue venenantis aerem hoc fecisse.	But because Jeremias' question has not yet been resolved why God permits such abuses, approving in them everything positive, therefore it is said that there are three reasons in general why matters are ordered thus. First, to punish the sins of those who thus abuse God's good things and the people subject [to them], who for multiple transgressions have deserved to be punished in that way. According to the text of Job, 34[:30], God "makes a hypocrite to reign on account of the people's sins." Thus, in 2 Kings, last chapter [24:17], David's sin in counting the people was punished by pestilence upon the people, and not upon David himself. For a community that poisons the air with pompous words about the deeds of kings and magnates, and thus through flatterers provokes them to pride, deserves to be punished by pestilence by the poisoning of the air, and in proportion to the crime. Thus we do not read in Scripture of the infliction of pestilence unless it is noted that the sin of the tongue poisoning the air has done this.
Secunda causa est ad exercendum iustos in paciencia contra persequentes, et post beatos cum usuris [fol. 72r, line 61] premiandos; ut patet tractatu primo, capitulo secundo. Ex quibus indubie {om.} sequitur decor universitatis creati, omni genere encium decorate, scilicet, pena et premio, carcere et regno; [fol. 72r, line 62] ut sic innotescat nobis divina severitas, iusticia, et bonitas, que hec ordinant ad iusta {iustam}, in {om.} penam pravorum, ad {et} gloriam sanctorum, [fol. 72r, line 63] et universitatis ambitum ampliandum; (de {om.} istis {om.} patet tractatu primo, capitulo quinto, et infra, capitulo decimo:) unde longe melius est, universitatem istam esse ex bonis et malis oppositis [fol. 72r, line 64] sic ample {esse add.} compositam quam esset {om.} quod {om.} solum ex bonis arcius integretur. Et patet solucio ad questionem que rotatur communiter in ore *{ad... ore: om.} plebeorum *{plebeiorum} disputancium quare Deus sic potens [fol. 72v, line 1] et prescius permittit tot mala fieri: nam ex iustis penis prevaricatorum et gaudiis beatorum, ac {sicut} bonis exinde *{inde} sequentibus, intendit Deus [fol. 72v, line 2] perficere {om.} pulchritudinem universi; sed absit ex istis concludere, quod cuiquam {in ?} sit *{deus causa add.} peccandum *{peccandi}.	The second reason is to practice the just in patience against persecutors, which will be rewarded with interest afterwards, when they are blessed, as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 2 (De mandatis divinis, p. 11). Undoubtedly these things produce the beauty of the created universe, adorned with every kind of entities (namely, punishment and reward, jail and kingdom), so that thus it may make known to us the divine severity, justice and goodness, which ordain these things to just ends--to the punishment of the wicked, the glory of the saints, and the increased extent of the whole; these matters are clear in Tract \SCI\ES (De mandatis divinis), Chapter 5, and below in Chapter 10. Thus it is much better for the whole to be so amply constituted of goods and opposite evils than for it to be more narrowly composed only of goods. And the solution is clear to the question plodding disputants ask, why God, so powerful and foresighted, allows so many evils to come about: for from the just punishments of traitors and the joys of the blessed and the goods thence {exinde} resulting, God intends to perfect the beauty of the universe; but let it not be inferred from this that God causes anyone's sin.
Tercia causa est {om.}, ut innotescat viris ewangelicis quod non [fol. 72v, line 3] proporcionaliter ad civile dominium, nec eciam ad iustum temporalium ministerium, est persone accepcio quoad Deum (ut {om.} patet {om.} Luc.xii.15 et xxi.3): {ne add.} per hoc enim {om.} non {om.} speraremus in [fol. 72v, line 4] incerto diviciarum, nec fuco faciendi elemosinam cumularemus nobis divicias, dimittendo vitam ewangelicam {trs. 231}. Stat enim, quoad mundum, [fol. 72v, line 5] ditissimos esse {om.} quantumlibet cruciatos corpore {trs.}, animo visiosissimos, et utrumque eternaliter puniendos; et sic non {nec} preponeremus bona fortune [fol. 72v, line 6] bonis gracie cum sint infima inter quinque. Unde secundum Augustinum (primo de Civitate Dei, capitulo ix). si solum iustis communicarentur divicie, nec iusti forent tam liberi ad merendum, [fol. 72v, line 7] nec Deus tam misericorditer ageret cum iustis. Si solum iniusti haberent divicias, reputaretur Deus non esse eorum *{ipsarum} dominus, ymmo deficeret servis suis [fol. 72v, line 8] fidelibus in mediis necessariis ad servicium {serviendum vel servicium} quod requirit: et *{sic add.} patet ex modo habendi solucio questionis prophetice.	The third reason is to make known to followers of the Gospel that a person's acceptance with God is not proportional to civil lordship or even to just administration of temporal things (as is clear from Luke 12[:15] and 21[:3]), for through this we would not hope in the uncertainty of riches, or by the trick of giving alms pile up riches for ourselves, {dimittendo} abandoning the gospel life. For {stat} it is possible that those who are richest in the world's eyes are ever so much tortured in body, most vicious in soul, and in both soul and body to be punished eternally. And thus we would not prefer goods of fortune to goods of grace, since they are the lowest among the five [viz., goods of glory, grace, reputation, nature and fortune (Poole)]. Hence, according to Augustine (City of God, \SCI\ES.8), if riches were {communicare} imparted only to the just, the just would not be so free to merit and God would not act so mercifully toward the just, but if the unjust alone had riches, God would be thought not to be the lord of riches, indeed he would {deficeret} fail his faithful servants in the means necessary to the service he requires. And thus it is clear from the manner of "having" how the prophet's question is resolved.
Ex istis {quibus} colligitur quod si Deus homini det {trs.} bonum {?} [fol. 72v, line 9] quodcunque, statim dum ipse abutitur, deficit *{?sibi add.} iusta vendicacio ex titulo {?vendicatione add.} donacionis divine {trs.}; et {?} revera {om.} {vero add.} si titulus iste deficit, nescio *{non est querendum} quis *{quid} valebit. Probatur sic {om.}: Deus solum *{om.} concedit hec bona *{solum add.} ad {in margin W (Poole); in text P} usum, et nullatenus ad abusum; sed omnis peccans abutitur bonis Dei; ideo {ergo} deficit sibi verum {trs.} dominium quia titulus [fol. 72v, line 11] donacionis divine: ut si acomodem {concedam} tibi equum meum {om.} sub certis condicionibus ad tantum limitem et {tu add.} illicenciatus excedis pactum *{om.} et *{om.} limites *{limitem} utrobique, nonne iniuste [fol. 72v, line 12] occupas equum meum? Correspondenter Deus limitans cum famulo suo continuum servicium, constituit utrobique limites usus {trs.}, abusum penitus interdicens; ideo [fol. 72v, line 13] non *{om.} dubium *{om.}, eo ipso quo abutitur potestatem, iniuste occupat bona Dei, quia sine licencia ad hoc data: et per {om.} consequens {ita} Omnipotens eo ipso spoliat ipsum {trs.} iure suo; quia aliter [fol. 72v, line 14] indubie {om.} oporteret *{oportet} quod Deus autorizet et *{om.} abusum quem iniustus continuat, quidquid facit.	From these points we gather that if God gives people any good thing whatever, as soon as they abuse it, they {deficit sibi} lose just claim by title of divine grant; and, indeed, if this title {deficit} fails none can be found that will avail. This is proved as follows. God grants these goods only for use, and not at all for abuse; but those who sin abuse God's good things; therefore they {deficit sibi} lose true lordship, because [they lose] the title of divine grant. For example, if I lend you my horse on certain conditions with such-and-such a {limitem} limit and you without permission {utrobique} everywhere exceed the {limitem} limit, do you not hold my horse unjustly? Similarly God, {limitans} stipulating with his servant for {continuum} continuous service, establishes {utrobique} everywhere {limites} limits of use, altogether forbidding abuse; therefore, by the very fact that this servant abuses power, he holds God's goods unjustly, because without any permission given for this: and consequently the Omnipotent by that very fact deprives him of his right; because otherwise, undoubtedly, God must authorize the abuse that an unjust person {continuat} continues, whatever he does.
Quod *{om.} si obicitur *{dicatur quod ?tunc} melius esse *{esset} Deum aufferre corporaliter sive simpliciter bona sua a [fol. 72v, line 15] peccante; sicut acomodans gladium compoti mentis, decidenti postmodum {trs.} in furiam, deberet, si sufficeret, repetere gladium quo furiosus abutitur: [fol. 72v, line 16] patet quod ille {iste} modus propter ineptitudinem non potest Deo competere; primo, quia sic Deus necessitaret, sed *{om.} non liberaret, hominem ad merendum, secundo, quia tunc inurbane, eo [fol. 72v, line 17] ipso quod quis mente peccaverit, foret omni bono sensibili spoliatus, et per {om.} consequens {ita} omni conversanti detectus, quod esset Deo infaceta crudelitas; ymmo, si bene [fol. 72v, line 18] consideretur, tunc oporteret anichilacionem consequi, et sic non proficeret bonorum ablacio sive pena. Cum enim peccatum primo ingruit secundum potenciam volitivam, patet quod oportet *{oporteret [fol. 72v, line 19] ?secundum} dictam legem illam primo subtrahere {?}, cum quocunque alio subtracto; et illa servata inesset nedum {trs.} peccabilitas sed, occasione crudelitatis exercite, occasio [fol. 72v, line 20] blasfemandi: et quod Deus minus peccans vel accionem prebens subtrahat, et servat peccans gravius {trs.}, non videtur esse indifferens *{om.} nec *{om.} consonum racioni *{vel indifferens add.}: patet ergo, [fol. 72v, line 21] cum essenciale non potest esse sine accidentali, iuxta illam {istam} legem, ad omnem iniusticiam anichilacio sequitur. Tercio, quia Deus, universitatis sue providus gubernator, [fol. 72v, line 22] debet ex condicione sua {om.} intrinseca, pariter peccatoribus (et secundum condicionem summe iusticie) *{et... iusticie: om.} misereri, aufferendo ius atque {et} dominium, et servando naturam, atque permittendo abusum sine scandalo sensibili proximi {trs.} [fol. 72v, line 23] quem {quam} hoc latet. Unde nobis, quibus non patescit experiencia de creacione, manifestatur maxime ex divina parcencia et misericordia eius omnipotencia et bonitas infinita; [fol. 72v, line 24] non enim posset servare peccatum tantum elongans {elongans is neuter accusative, agreeing with peccatum} a virtute, cum pena tam subiecta et decenti, nisi esset bonitatis et potencie infinite ex cuius infinitate, occasione [fol. 72v, line 25] peccati perficit mundum suum. Et {om.} tercio exemplificat nobis quomodo debemus inimicis nostris proporcionaliter misereri, non {ex add.} contencione tumultuosa scandalisando, [fol. 72v, line 26] sed causam nostram, servando caritatem fraternam, in manu *{?summi add.} Iudicis comittendo (ut *{dictum add.} est doctum *{om.} tractatu primo, capitulo secundo): et patet quomodo lex et modus dandi manent undique inculpato {inculpata}. Sed considera diligenter et distingue subtiliter quod in racionali creatura auffert Deus, occasione peccati, graciam et activam iusticiam, servando iusticiam naturalem; et sic de omni genere positivo habenti existenciam in peccante. Sed loquendo de habitudine, que foret dominium, quia non existit (licet deceptis appareat ipsum esse), concedendum est simpliciter quod iniustus non habet dominium, licet habeat bona naturalia modo inproprio, ut est dictum: et patet conclusio de carencia dominii peccatoris. *{Sed considera... peccatoris: om.}	If it is said that then it would be better for God to take their goods from sinners physically or simply--just as anyone who lends a sword to someone of sound mind who afterwards {decidenti in furiam} goes mad ought, if possible, reclaim the sword the madman abuses--it is clear that that way of acting, because of its inappropriateness, cannot be God's: [1] First, because thus God would force, not free, a person to merit. [2] Second, because then {eo ipso quod} immediately someone sinned in his mind, he would be {inurbane} roughly deprived of every sensible good and consequently {detectus} exposed to everyone {conversanti} around him, which would be {infaceta} coarse cruelty on God's part. Indeed, if it be well considered, annihilation must then result, and thus the deprivation of goods or penalty would be of no use: for since the first onset of sin is in the power of willing, it is clear that it would be necessary, according to the said law [i.e. that a good abused should be taken away], first to take away the power of willing (along with whatever else is taken away); also, if the will were preserved, there would be present not only ability to sin but, on occasion of the cruelty exercised, an occasion to blaspheme; also, it does not seem reasonable or indifferent that God should take away something that sins or causes action less and preserve what sins more gravely. It is clear, therefore, [??] since the essential cannot exist without the accidental, that, according to that law, annihilation [would] follow upon every injustice. [3] Third, because God, far-sighted governor of his universe, ought, from his intrinsic condition, have mercy on sinners by taking away their right and lordship, {pariter} at the same time preserving their nature and permitting the abuse (without perceptible scandal to their neighbor, to whom this [abuse] is hidden). Thus to us, who do not have clear experience of creation, his omnipotence and infinite goodness is made manifest mainly by the divine forbearance and mercy; for he could not preserve sin, which alienates a person so far from virtue, together with punishment so [??] {subiecta} subject and becoming, unless he were of infinite goodness and power; from this infinity on the occasion of sin he perfects his world. And third [sic], he gives us an example how we likewise ought to be merciful to our enemies, not causing scandal by tumultuous contention but, preserving brotherly charity, committing our cause into the hand of the supreme Judge (as was said in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 2 [De mandatis divinis, pp.9\PN10]). And it is clear how the law and the manner of giving remain on all sides without blame. {But consider diligently and distinguish subtly that in the rational creature God takes away, on the occasion of sin, grace and active justice, preserving natural justice; and this is true of every positive kind having existence in the sinner. But speaking of the habit that would be lordship, because it does not exist (though to the deceived it seems to exist), it must be conceded simply that the unjust do not have lordship, though they have natural goods in an improper manner, as has been said; and the conclusion is clear concerning the sinner's lack of lordship. This passage, not found in the Paris ms, is a vague summary of earlier argument, not relevant at this point. I think the Paris ms should be followed here.}
Cap. VII. [fol. 72v, line 27] Consequenter {nunc} ad {om.} dicta {om.} restat {om.} ostendere {ostenditur} quod quilibet {om.} iustus dominatur toti mundo sensibili: primo per hoc quod sufficit ad verum et naturale dominium [fol. 72v, line 28] coexistencia {?} extremorum, {terminorum} naturalis prefeccio dominative potencie et caritas in eadem; sed hec omnia insunt {sunt in} cuilibet {quolibet} iusto, quoad totum mundum sensibilem *{igitur add.} et verum [fol. 72v, line 29] dominium in eodem. Et {om.} hinc {hoc} dicit Veritas (Matth. vi. {7} 33) post phisicam {? -- not phisicam or philosophicam} solicitacionem *{sollicitudinem} *{circa temporalia add.}: Querite, inquit, primo regnum Dei et iusticiam eius, et hec omnia adicientur vobis {regnum... vobis: etc.}; intendens quod principium *{?primum} quinque bonorum recitatorum [fol. 72v, line 30] superius principalissime debet queri ex *{et} hoc per medium bonum, quod est iusticia, et tunc ad illa consequitur, si habetur {habentur} universitas bonorum inferiorum: [fol. 72v, line 31] nec turbetur iustus quod non habet civile dominium in hiis bonis, quia revera {om.} non proficeret sed noceret. Et *{om.} hinc dicit Ieronimus capitulo ultimo epistole {om.} ad Paulinum: Credenti, inquit, totus [fol. 72v, line 32] mundus diviciarum est; infidelis eciam obulo indiget, {diviciarum... indiget: om.} etc.	[Anyone in gratifying grace (finally) has in reality all God's good things] [Five Arguments to prove that everything belongs to the just] Chapter 7 Next in order after what has been said it remains to show that the just are all lords over the whole sensible world: First, from the fact that the coexistence of the extremes, natural perfection of dominative power and charity in the same are sufficient for true and natural lordship. But all of these are present in any just person, in respect of the whole sensible world--therefore also true lordship over the same. And hence Truth, after speaking about natural solicitude concerning temporals, says, "Seek first God's Kingdom and his justice, and all these things will be added to you" (Matthew 6[:33]), meaning that the first of the five goods listed above [in Chapter 6] ought to be sought most principally, and by a good means, which is justice, and then upon this, if it is possessed, follows the totality of lower goods. And the just are not troubled that they do not have civil lordship in these goods, because in truth it would not benefit but harm. Thus Jerome says, in the last chapter of his letter to Paulinus: "The whole world of riches belongs to the believer; but the unbeliever lacks even a penny," etc.
Iterum, omnis existens in caritate predestinacionis est, quandocunque habet graciam Dei, filius adoptivus; sed, eo ipso *{om.} quod sic, habet ius ad regnum integrum, [fol. 72v, line 33] et per consequens ad quamlibet eius partem; ergo omnis sic iustus dominatur toti mundo sensibili: maior {patet add.} supponitur {supposita} ex fide et racione filii adoptivi; [fol. 72v, line 34] et minor patet ex hoc quod, quantumcunque *{conjecture: quomodocunque} fuerit iuvenis {trs.} filius regis, si non forisfecerit nec habuerit superiorem, cuius regnacio est *{foret} incompossibilis [fol. 72v, line 35] regno suo, eo ipso est verus {om.} dominus dati regni. Cum ergo quilibet sic iustus est *{sit} filius Regis eterni {trs.}, non forisfaciens nec habens regnacionem [fol. 72v, line 36] contrariam sibi {trs.}, quilibet *{om.} talis est vere dati regni dominus {trs. 312}. (Nam propter spiritualitatem regnandi ewangelice sunt quotlibet regnaciones compossibiles, ut patet ex fide [fol. 72v, line 37] et exemplo. Species enim quotlibet qualitatum moralium *{materialium} in eodem medio sunt compossibiles, ubi *{nisi} ille qualitates propter sui moralem *{materialem} grossiciem repugnarent *{repugnant}). [fol. 72v, line 38] Unde istam sentenciam philosophice *{unde... philosophice: Hinc philosophiam eadem} inculcat {om.} apostolus, Rom. viii. 15: Accepistis, inquit {om.}, spiritum adopcionis in quo clamamus, Abba, Pater {abba pater: etc}; et {om.} sequitur quod summus *{quod summus: si} filii et heredes. Et {om.} hinc vere dicit {om.} Salvator {dominus} (Math. v. 3, 10), Beati pauperes [fol. 72v, line 39] spiritu, {etc. add.} et {qui add.} persecuti propter iusticiam, quoniam ipsorum est regnum celorum. {quoniam... celorum: etc.} Si, inquam, sint beati, habent quidquid boni voluerint: sed constat quod dominari toti mundo {trs. 231} est bonum [fol. 72v, line 40] ab eis volibile, cum foret de perfeccione bonorum; ergo realiter habent illud.	Again, everyone who is in the charity of predestination is, whenever he has God's grace, an adoptive son; but by the very fact that he is such he has a right to the whole kingdom, and consequently to any part of it; therefore everyone who is just in that way is lord over the whole sensible world. The major is supposed from faith and from the notion of an adoptive son. The minor is clear from this, that if he does not forfeit and does not have a superior whose reign would be incompatible with his, in whatever way a young man is the king's son he is thereby true lord of the kingdom {dati} in question. Since, therefore, anyone thus just is the son of the eternal king and does not forfeit or have a reign contrary to him, such a person is {eo ipso} thereby truly lord of the kingdom in question. (For because of the spirituality of reigning in the gospel way, any number of reigns are {compossibiles} possible together, as is clear by faith and by example; for any number of forms of material qualities are possible together in the same medium, unless those qualities would conflict because of their material coarseness.) Hence the Apostle inculcates the same philosophy in Romans 8[:15]: "You have received the spirit of adoption, in which we cry, Abba, father"; and he continues, "if sons, heirs also." And thus the Savior says truly (Matthew 5[:3, 10]), "Blessed are the poor in spirit" and "those persecuted for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." If, I say, they are blessed, they have whatever good they wish: but it is certain that to be lord over the whole world is a good willable by them, since it would belong to the completion of goods; therefore they really have it.
Item {tertio}, omnis iustus utitur toto mundo sensibili; sed nullo utitur [fol. 72v, line 41] cuius non habet dominium (cum sit iustus), ergo omnis iustus dominatur toti {toto} mundo sensibili. Argumentum *{antecedens} patet {apparet} ex dictis de usu et dominio innocentis: nam, eo ipso quo {quod} [fol. 72v, line 42] res natura inferior proficit alicui, de tanto ipsa utitur usu dominativo; sed totus mundus prodest cuicunque iusto multipliciter; ergo, etc.: prodest enim sibi {ergo... sibi: om.} de quanto terminat actum meritorium [fol. 72v, line 43] copulandi {?contemplandi}, de quanto integrat universitatem a *{om.} qua {conjecture: cui} iustus preficitur, et ipsum iuvat tanquam *{iustus add.} in natura; aliter enim {om.} non diceret apostolus, I Thimoth. [fol. 72v, line 44] vi. 17, quod Dominus prestat nobis {trs.} omnia habunde {trs.} ad fruendum. Si enim iusto serviat iniustus, adversans et crucians cum pena et ceteris que videntur [fol. 72v, line 45] a servicio iusti maxime elongari *{aliena} multo magis et alia que videntur minus contraria: et {om.} ista videtur {om.} esse {est} sentencia apostoli (Rom. viii. 28), Scimus enim quoniam {quia} diligentibus Deum [fol. 72v, line 46] omnia cooperantur in bonum, hiis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt {omnia... sunt: usque} sancti. Si ergo omni predestinato, secundum eternum Dei {om.} propositum, omnia inferiora proficiunt, quomodo non foret illorum dominus? ut si iustus habuerit usum [fol. 72v, line 47] fructus de bonis avari, merendo ex illis beatitudinem, ubi avaro non serviunt sed dominando obfiunt {officiuntur}, quomodo diceretur avarus istorum {illorum} dominus [fol. 72v, line 48] et non iustus {? add.}, cum quomodocunque et {quodcumque et add.} quandocunque voluerit potest {possit} recipere eorum usum {trs. 231}?	Third, the just all use the whole sensible world; but they use nothing of which they do not have lordship (since they are just), therefore the just are all lords over the whole sensible world. {antecedens} The premise is clear from the statements about use and about the lordship of the innocent: for by the very fact that a thing inferior in nature advantages someone, to that extent that person uses it by a dominative use; but the whole world advantages each of the just in many ways; therefore, etc. For it advantages them [1] inasmuch as it terminates [??] a meritorious act of {copulandi or contemplandi} contemplation, [2] inasmuch as it makes a whole over which the just are placed, and [3] it helps them as being just in nature; for otherwise the Apostle would not say that the Lord "gives us abundantly all things to enjoy" (1 Timothy 6[:17]). For if the unjust serve the just when they oppose them and torment them with punishments and other things that seem quite alien to the service of the just, much more also [are they served by] other things that seem less contrary. This seems to be the doctrine of the Apostle: "For we know that to those who love God all things work together to good, to those who according to his purpose have been called to be saints" (Romans 8[:28]). If, therefore, according to God's eternal purpose all inferior things benefit every predestined person, how will that person not be their lord?--as, if a just man had usufruct of the goods of a miser and with them merited beatitude, whereas they do not serve the miser but hinder by dominating [him], how would the miser be said to be their lord and not the just man, since he can receive their use however and whenever he wishes?
Iterum *{quarto} Deus nichil dat capaci, nisi optimo modo dandi (ut patet superius, {ut... superius: supra} capitulo vi.); [fol. 72v, line 49] sed omnis {om.} iustus est capax optimi modi donacionis in genere; ergo Deus non dat, pro tempore quo quis est iustus, nisi solum *{solummodo} modo illo {trs.}: nec hoc potest verti [fol. 72v, line 50] in dubium; cum, eo ipso quo {quod} dat existenti in caritate aliquid, dat sibi caritatis originem, que est Deus: {ut dicitur add.} I Ioh. iv. 16 scribitur {om.}, Deus caritas est; et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo {et qui... eo: etc}. Nec [fol. 72v, line 51] aliter esset possibile, Spiritum sanctum esse datum homini, nisi, eo ipso quo datur gracia, detur ipse {trs.}: unde, sicut repugnat magnificencie regis Anglie {om.} dare maxime indigenti [fol. 72v, line 52] precise {om.} atomum, vel inimico {?alternative to atomum?}, sic repugnat liberalitati magnifice Regis regum donare famulo suo {trs.} tam egeno temporalia que Scriptura vocat [fol. 72v, line 53] stercora et pulverem {trs. 321}, nisi accessorie ad donum complecius; tunc enim parte et incomplete remuneraret suum assiduum servitorem: et ista [fol. 72v, line 54] videtur mihi *{om.} Veritatis *{salvatoris} sentencia, Math. vii.11: Si, inquit, {vos add.} cum sitis mali, nostis bona dare filiis vestris, quanto magis Pater vester celestis dabit Spiritum bonum {nostis... bonum: etc} petentibus se; quasi diceret {in margin W (Poole); in text P}, Si oporteat donum proporcionari magnificencie [fol. 72v, line 55] donatoris, et vos, patres incompleti nichil habentes nisi ex prestito, scitis illis dare {trs.} bona naturalia et fortune, quantum magis Pater celestis, [fol. 72v, line 56] {in add.} infinitum plus diligens et {plus add.} sufficiens, dabit {in margin W (Poole); in text P} non solum bonum {om.} creatum sed Spiritum increatum {trs.}: unde Deus non potest dare creature aliquod {om.} {aliquod creature W (Poole)} bonum creatum, nisi prius [fol. 72v, line 57] dederit increatum. Patet sic {om.}: Deus non potest donare aliquid creature, nisi det graciam (ut {om.} patet {om.} supra capitulo secundo), et non potest dare graciam, nisi dederit Spiritum sanctum (ut patet ex dictis) {et... dictis: om.}, ergo conclusio {om.}: nec est possibile hominem recipere illud donum, nisi eo ipso [fol. 72v, line 58] totum mundum secum habuerit; quia, cum sapiencia vincit maliciam (ut {om.} patet {om.} tractatu primo, capitulo quinto), patet *{quod add.} ex parte cuiuscunque ipsa fuerit, tota universitas eciam {etc} usque ad peccata [fol. 72v, line 59] tenebit [Is this a garbled reference to the following passage? sit fortitudo divina attingens inclusive a deitate que est finis universitatis create usque ad peccatum quod est finis extrinsecus creature, in tantum quod se ipsum fecit peccatum ad exhaurienda peccata -- De mandatis divinis, p. 40] : et hinc, Rom. viii. 31, per *{post} condonacionem *{donacionem} Spiritus filiis adoptivis, et miseracionem {?} conclusionum pulcherrime contextarum {?insertarum}, subdit: Si Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? [fol. 72v, line 60] et constat quod meliorem usum de dominabili nemo posset recipere, quam quod idem iuvaret hominem ad inpugnandum hostes nitentes perdere [fol. 72v, line 61] animam et corpus {trs. 321}, et acquirere beatitudinem; ad quod, cum ministrat omnis natura corporea cuicunque predestinato in gracia, sequitur {et ita} quod {om.} omnis talis istis dominabilibus, secundum usum [fol. 72v, line 62] summe fructiferum, dominatur.	Fourth, God does not give anything {capaci} to anyone able to accept except in the best manner of giving (as is clear above, Chapter 6); but the just are all able to accept the manner of granting that is best in kind; therefore, {pro tempore} for the time in which someone is just, God gives only in that manner. And this cannot be called into question, since, by the very fact that he gives something to someone in charity, he gives him the origin of charity, which is God: in 1 John 4[:16] it is written "God is charity, and he who dwells in charity dwells in God, and God in him." And it would not be possible for the Holy Spirit to be given to human beings {aliter... nisi} unless, by the very fact that grace is given to them, he himself is given: whence, just as it is inconsistent with the magnificence of a King of England to give precisely an atom, especially to the poor [??] or to an enemy, so it conflicts with the magnificent liberality of the King of Kings to grant his servant, who is so needy, the temporal things that Scripture calls dung and dust, except as an accessory to a more complete gift; for then he would remunerate his assiduous servant partly and incompletely. And this seems to me to be the Savior's opinion in Matthew 7[:11]: "If you, who are evil, know how to give good things to your children, how much more will your heavenly Father give the good Spirit to those who seek him?"--as if to say, If the gift must be proportioned to the magnificence of the granter, and if you, incomplete fathers who have nothing except by {prestito} gift, know how to give them natural goods and goods of fortune, how much more will the heavenly Father, infinitely more loving and more capable, give not only the created good but the uncreated spirit? Whence God cannot give creatures any created good unless he has first given them the uncreated. This is clear as follows. God cannot grant anything to a creature unless he gives grace (as is clear above, Chapter 2), and he cannot give grace unless he gives the Holy Spirit (as is clear from what has been said), therefore the conclusion. And it is not possible for human beings to receive that gift unless they {eo ipso} thereby have the whole world with it; because, since wisdom conquers wickedness (as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 5 [De mandatis divinis, p. 40]), it is clear that [??] from no matter which it will be, the whole universe including sins will hold. And hence, in Romans 8, after the giving of the Spirit to adoptive sons and the mercy of conclusions most beautifully {contextarum} woven together, he adds: "If God is for us, who is against us?" [Romans 8:31]. And it is certain that we cannot receive a better use of things able to be subjected to lordship than that they should help us fight enemies trying to {perdere} destroy body and soul and [help us] acquire beatitude, since to this end every corporeal nature ministers to anyone predestined in grace; it follows that every such person is lord over these things able to be subjected to lordship according to a most fruitful use.
Item *{quinto}, eo ipso quo donat principale, donatur et quodlibet essencialiter consequens ex eodem. [fol. 72v, line 63] Sed Deus non donat {dat} quidquam homini {om.}, nisi principaliter det se ipsum (ut {om.} patet {om.} Rom. viii. 32, et declaratum est De divino Dominio {om.}, tractatu *{om.} tercio {om.}, capitulo secundo); ergo Deus donat quodlibet accessorium consequens ex se ipso. [fol. 73r, line 1] Minor patet ex eo quod ridiculosa esset donacio dare equum vel quodvis aliud subiectum, non donando partem vel accidens consequens ex eodem; [fol. 73r, line 2] et habito consequente palam sequitur: cum esse intelligibile cuiuslibet creature absolute necessario inest Deo, sed Deus donatur homini, igitur {om.} et esse intelligibile cuiuslibet creature; [fol. 73r, line 3] et cum supremum esse possibile *{om.} creature *{sit esse suum intelligibile, sequitur quod dato deo ? datur sibi supremum esse cuiuslibet creature add.}, et per consequens multo magis [fol. 73r, line 4] esse existere cuiuslibet creature, cum id adheret esse intelligibili essencialius, si fieri potest, quam accidens ad subiectum. Et ista racio dat plenam fidem nutritis [fol. 73r, line 5] in materia de ydeis, et patet ex testimonio apostoli, Rom. viii. 32: Si Deus, inquit, proprio Filio non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum, {sed... illum: om.} quomodo non eciam cum illo omnia nobis donabit? patet plane, [fol. 73r, line 6] si quis habet {habeat} sapienciam increatam tamquam suum donum, habet et intellectivitatem cuiuslibet intelligibilis, et per consequens intelligibilitatem cuiuslibet intelligibilis, donum [fol. 73r, line 7] suum; et per consequens existere intelligibilis, quod est accessorium. Et sic intelligendum est illud Sapient. vii. 7, 8: Invocavi, et venit in me spiritus sapiencie; et preposui illam regibus et sedibus, et divicias nichil esse duxi in comparacione illius: et sequitur, Venerunt autem mihi omnia bona {et preposui... bona: etc usque} pariter cum illa.[fol. 73r, line 8]	Fifth, by the very fact that someone grants the main thing he grants also anything that essentially results from it. But God grants nothing to human beings unless he mainly gives himself (as is clear from Romans 8[:32], and has been explained in De divino dominio, \SCIII\ES, Chapter 2 [p. 207]); therefore God grants everything accessory that results from himself. The minor is clear, because it would be a ridiculous grant to give a horse, or any other {subiectum} thing, and not grant a part or an accident resulting from it. And if that {consequens} conclusion is established, clearly the following argument is sound: Since the intelligible being of any creature absolutely necessarily is in God, but God is granted to someone, therefore also the intelligible being of any creature; and since the highest being of a creature is its intelligible being, it follows that when God is given [to someone] there is given the highest being of every creature, and consequently much more the being of existence of every creature, since that adheres to the intelligible being more essentially than accident to subject, if that is possible. This argument gives full conviction to those {nutritis} trained in the material about ideas, and it is clear from the testimony of the Apostle, Romans 8[:32]: "If God did not spare his own son, but gave him up for us all, how will he not also with him grant us all things?" It is quite clear that if someone has as his gift uncreated wisdom, he has also the intellectivity of every intelligible, and consequently the intelligibility of every intelligible, as his gift--and consequently the existence of the intelligible, which is the accessory. And we should understand in this way the text of Wisdom 7[:7, 11]: "I called [upon God], and the Spirit of wisdom came upon me; and I preferred her to kings and thrones, and I thought riches nothing in comparison with her... Now there came to me with her likewise all good things."
Nec dubium quin ista sit conclusio Veritatis, quod omnis relinquens universitatem temporalium, propter Christum in affeccione debita {om.} debite preponendum, habet {licet W (Poole); habet P} ex adieccione consequenti [fol. 73r, line 9] omnia illa melius quam esset possibile habere illa amore prepostero; unde {sicut} Marc. x. 29, 30 sic {om.} testatur: Amen dico vobis, nemo est qui dimisit domum, aut [fol. 73r, line 10] fratres, aut sorores, aut patrem, aut matrem, aut filios, aut agros, propter me et propter evangelium, qui non accipiet cencies tantum, nunc in tempore hoc, domos, et fratres, et sorores, et matres, et filios, et agros, cum persecucionibus; et in seculo futuro {domum aut... futuro: etc usque } vitam eternam: quod dictum non licet catholico ad sanum sensum vertere *{negare} *{trs. 4132} in *{om.} dubium *{indubie} {vertere... dubium: verum indubie W (Poole)} de virtute sermonis. Sunt autem hec alia bona fortune, [fol. 73r, line 11] mundialis amicicie {?}, vel nature: bona autem fortune inanimata sunt, alte domus, iocalia {om.}, et alia artificialia minime necessaria; ideo prepontiur eorum [fol. 73r, line 12] reliccio tamquam facilima. Per fratres intelliguntur amicicie ex carnali cognacione contracte; per sorores, amicicie ex connubio contracte, [fol. 73r, line 13] *{cum add.} correspondenter ad sexum, sunt magis debiles. Bona autem nature consistunt {?} in tribus: scilicet, in potenciis {trs. 231} anime signatis per patrem, in bonis [fol. 73r, line 14] corporis signatis per matrem; quia nono de Naturalibus dicit Aristoteles quod in procreacione {creacione} carnali vir dat formam et mulier dat {om.} materiam; unde correspondenter [fol. 73r, line 15] ad bonitates sexuum valent et ista bona: tercium bonum nature est bonum prolis, vel ex nutricione incrementum {?} corporis signatum per filios. [fol. 73r, line 16] Septimum bonum magis necessarium vite nostre est bonum temporale unum quo alimur et vestimur, et id {illud} signatur per agrum in quo mittuntur *{nutriuntur} terre [fol. 73r, line 17] nascencia, ut granum, vites, et bestie. In affeccione itaque inordinate ad istum {illum} septenarium consistit universitas peccatorum. Unde, [fol. 73r, line 18] per {om.} hoc {om.} quod {om.} Math. xix. 29, superaddit, per {om.} uxorem {in qua add.} signatur voluptas, que, cum sit in omnibus istis communis, non ponitur {?ponit} in numerum {vel add.} cum eisdem.	And there is no doubt that this is the conclusion of Truth, that everyone who leaves all temporal things for Christ's sake, duly purposing in due affection, by consequent {adieccione} addition has all those things in a better way than it would be possible to have them by a {prepostero} disordered love. Thus in Mark 10[:29, 30] there is testimony as follows: "Amen, I say to you, there is no one who has left behind home, or brothers, or sisters, or father or mother, or children, or lands, for my sake and for the Gospel, who will not receive a hundred times as much, now in this time--homes, and brothers, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life." A Catholic may not deny this in a sense undoubtedly sound by virtue of the meaning of the words. However, there are these other goods: [1] of fortune; [2] of worldly friendship; [3] of nature. [1] Inanimate goods of fortune are grand houses, jewels, and other artifacts that are by no means necessary; therefore the relinquishing of those is put first as being easiest. [2] By "brothers" is meant friendships formed through fleshly kinship, by "sisters" friendships formed by marriage (since in correspondence with [the female] sex they are weaker). And [3] goods of nature consist in three things, namely [a] powers of the soul, signified by "father," [b] corporeal goods, signified by "mother" (because in book \SCIX\ES of the Natural Treatises Aristotle says that in carnal procreation the man gives the form and the woman gives the matter, so those goods are valued in correspondence with the goodnesses of the sexes). [c] The third natural good is the good of offspring, or the growth of body by nutrition, signified by "sons." [d] A seventh good more necessary to our life is a temporal good by which we are fed and clothed, and it is signified by the "land" in which are nourished the things that grow in the earth, such as grain, vines and animals. The whole range of sins consists in inordinate affection to those seven. Whence, by "wife" (which Matthew 19[:29] adds) is signified pleasure which, since it is common in all of these, is not put into the count with them.
Non ergo est aliquis [fol. 73r, line 19] secularis {?} abutens bonis Dei quin habeat quandam falsam pretensam {?} iusticiam ad omnia ista vel {ad add.} aliquod eorundem. Sed {et} quicunque reliquerit [fol. 73r, line 20] istum titulum, capiendo a capitali Domino titulum gracie, ob amorem Christi et iuris ewangelici accipiet {om.} centuplum *{talium add.} bonorum et {accipiet} in hac vita; [fol. 73r, line 21] et per centuplum intelligite universitatem {universitas} bonorum, cum sit denarius in se ductus. Patet sic: Si quis habet titulum gracie vel ius ewangelicum ad [fol. 73r, line 22] aliquod, tunc habet totum mundum et omnia ista bona, cum Deus non potest donare partem nisi totum donaverit; possessio autem ex humano titulo est satis {trs.} [fol. 73r, line 23] stricta, et patet valore comercii ex conmutacione humani tituli ad dominium: unde Luc. xviii. 30, dicitur {om.} quod {om.} nemo est sic conmutans, qui non recipiat [fol. 73r, line 24] multo plura in hoc tempore, et preter hoc in seculo venturo vitam eternam, sicut dicunt alii {in hoc... alii: etc} *{et hoc dicunt add.} duo ewangeliste concorditer. Unde quod spiritualiter {sic} debet {debeat} textus Marci intelligi {trs. 312}, patet ex hoc quod nemo ambigit [fol. 73r, line 25] quin non consequatur virum ewangelicum ex tali conmutacione, sequendo Christum, cencies tantum de fratribus, sororibus, matribus, et filiis [fol. 73r, line 26] carnalibus; sed tota {tunc add.} universalis ecclesia erit sibi tunc {om.} frater prestancior quam carnalis; secundum naturam corpoream erit {enim add.} soror; gignendo eum in filium [fol. 73r, line 27] ecclesie erit mater; et reciproce {?} iuvando, ut Christus formetur in illis, habebit omnes filios adoptivos. Et {om.} istum sensum docet Veritas {?Christus} (Math. xii. 50), quando {om.} dicit {om.}, Quicunque fecerit [fol. 73r, line 28] voluntatem Patris mei qui in celis est, ipse meus frater, soror, {patris...soror: etc} et mater est. Et quantum ad bona fortune cum suis appendiciis, certum est quod omnia illa, quoad dominium ewangelicum, consequuntur; unde videtur [fol. 73r, line 29] mihi *{om.} quod verbum Marci, cum persecucionibus, non sonat in tribulacionem, sed in perfectam sequelam cuiuslibet positivi fundati in illis, quorum possessio ewangelica est quesita; [fol. 73r, line 30] ut non oportet, {quod add.} si hec omnia sint bona iusti, quod defectus qui illis insunt {in vel insunt} sint eciam iusti; quia non est perfecta secucio peccati ex homine: et patet [fol. 73r, line 31] veritas cuiuslibet particule dicti Christi; et indubie {om.} ad hec bona antecedent in predestinato bona gracie et glorie, et per consequens universitas bonorum adiacet omni iusto, etc. *{om.}	Therefore every secular person who abuses the good things of God has some false pretended {iusticiam} right to all those things or to some of them. But whoever, for love of Christ and the gospel law, abandons that title, accepting from the chief lord the title of grace, will receive such good things one hundred fold even in this life; and by "one hundred fold" understand the totality of good things, since it is ten fold multiplied by itself. This is clear as follows. Those who have the title of grace or a gospel right to something have the whole world and all those good things, since God cannot grant part unless he grants the whole; but possession by human title is quite narrow, as is clear by commercial value in the exchange of human title to lordship. Thus in Luke 18[:30] it is said that there is no one who makes such an exchange who "does not receive much more in this time and," beyond that, "in the world to come, eternal life," as the two gospel writers say in agreement. That Mark's text ought to be understood spiritually is clear from the fact that everyone knows that from such an exchange, by following Christ, the followers of the gospel do not acquire hundreds of merely fleshly brothers, sisters, mothers and children; rather, the whole of the universal Church will then be a brother {prestancior} of a higher than fleshly kind; for according to [??] bodily nature it will be a sister; begetting a man as a son of the Church it will be a mother; and by assisting reciprocally, as Christ is formed in them, it will have all as adopted sons. Truth himself teaches this interpretation when, in Matthew 12[:10], he says, "Whoever does the will of my Father who is in heaven is my brother, sister and mother." And as for goods of fortune and their appendages, it is certain that, as far as gospel lordship is concerned, all these follow. Thus it seems that the saying of Mark, "with persecutions" [in Latin, "followings"], does not suggest tribulation, but perfect following of anything positive based on the things whose gospel possession is sought; so it is not necessary, if all these things are goods of the just, that the {defectus} defects in them should also belong to the just, because there is no "perfect following" of sin by a human being. And the truth of every part of Christ's saying is clear; and undoubtedly these goods are preceded in the predestinate by the goods of grace and glory, and consequently the totality of goods {adiacet} pertains to every just man.
Cap. VIII. Ex istis {hiis} patet quod bonum fame vel amicicie presupponit caritatem vel graciam in habente. Nam si crebrescat fama viciosi inter homines tamquam [fol. 73r, line 33] iusti, cum subsit falsitas, non est vera; ymmo secundum Augustinum, cum mundus laudat hominem tamquam talem et non est talis, non illum laudat sed alium qui est talis. [fol. 73r, line 34] Sicut ergo dominium creature *{presupponit add.} donacionem Dei et per {ita} consequens {om.} existenciam creature in gracia presupponit *{om.}, sic fama vel vera laus hominis presupponit laudacionem Dei [fol. 73r, line 35] et per {sic} consequens {om.} graciam in laudato; et {om.} hec est conclusio apostoli (2 Cor. x. 18) inquientis {om.}, Non enim qui se ipsum commendat, iste probatus est, sed quem Deus commendat {iste... commendat: etc}. Nec hoc verti debet {trs.} in dubium apud philosophum qui recte sapit de Dei [fol. 73r, line 36] sciencia atque infringibili {infrangibili} et universali iudicio.	[Implications regarding true and false fame] Chapter 8 From these points it is clear that the good of fame or of friendship presupposes charity or grace in the person who has it. For if a vicious person's fame increases among human beings as if that person were just, then, since there is underlying falsity, it is not true [fame]; rather, according to Augustine, when the world praises someone as being such who is not such, they praise not that person but another who is such. Therefore, just as the lordship of a creature presupposes God's grant and consequently the creature's being in grace, so fame or true praise presupposes God's praise, and consequently grace in the one praised; and this is the Apostle's conclusion in 2 Corinthians 10[:18]. He says, "For it is not those who commend themselves who are approved, but those whom God commends." And this ought not be called into question in the mind of a philosopher who thinks rightly concerning God's knowledge and inviolable and universal judgment.
Ex istis {quibus} patet primo {om.} quod omnis iniustus pretense {?} dominans sit infamis ippocrita: infamis, *{quia deficit sibi [fol. 73r, line 37] substantiam eufamie quod est virtus, hypocrita add.} quia pretendit se dominari iuste {trs.}, et per consequens esse iustum, dum {cum} tamen actualiter {?} sit iniustus; unde {ideo} signanter dicit Scriptura nostra *{om.} (Iob xxiv. 30) quod {om.} Deus {om.} regnare facit {deus add.} ippocritam propter peccata populi {propter... populi: etc}.	From these points it is clear, first, that all the unjust who pretend to be lords are infamous hypocrites; infamous, because they {deficit sibi} lack the substance of good fame, which is virtue; hypocrites, because they pretend to be lords justly, and consequently to be just, while being nevertheless actually unjust. Thus {signanter} it is significant that Scripture says, Job 24[:30], that God "makes a hypocrite to reign on account of the sins of the people."
Et {om.} patet secundo {trs.} quod omnis iniustus est ippocrita, et econtra: omnis enim iniustus pretendit se non iniuste [fol. 73r, line 39] ocupare bona Domini; quod cum sit falsum, patet quod pretendit se esse {om.} sanctum sine {om.} veritate substrata {subtracta}, quod est proprium ippocrite. Sicut enim virtutes, sic et [fol. 73r, line 40] vicia sunt connexa; unde signanter reprobavit Salvator Phariseos, secundum tradiciones hominum temporalibus abutentes, de peccato ippocrisis, ut {om.} patet {om.} Math, xxiii.	And it is clear, second, that all the unjust are hypocrites, and vice versa: for the unjust all pretend that their possession of the Lord's good things is not unjust, and since this is false, it is clear that they pretend to be holy without the underlying truth, which is the characteristic of a hypocrite. For just as the virtues, so also the vices are connected. Thus it is {signanter} significant that the Savior reproves the Pharisees, who abused temporal things according to human traditions, for the sin of hypocrisy, as is clear in Matthew 23.
[fol. 73r, line 41] Patet tercio {?etiam} quod bonum fame est melius {trs.} quam civilis dominio {dominatio} alicui personalis *{possibilis}. Nam si fama vera {trs.} inest homini, hoc est propter virtutem qua commendatur [fol. 73r, line 42] aput Deum, iuxta {secundum} illud apostoli, 2 Cor. x. 13: Nos autem non immensum gloriabimur, sed secundum mensuram glorie quam nobis mensus est Deus: {mensuram... deus: etc} cum ergo illa commendacio sit prestancior {trs.} quam aliquod dominium temporale, sequitur [fol. 73r, line 43] conclusio: illa enim manet perpetue {trs.} cum beatis, sed omne civile dominium oportet excidere, iuxta {om.} apostolum {om.} 1 Cor. v. Unde {om.} Proverb. xxii. 1 dicitur {om.}, Melius est nomen bonum quam divicie {etc} multe {om.}; et, innuendo [fol. 73r, line 44] quod illud nomen fundatur in gracia, subdit, Super argentum enim {om.} et aurum gracia bona.	It is clear, third, that the good of fame is better than the civil lordship anyone can have. For if someone has true fame, this is because of the virtue by which that person is commended before God, according to the Apostle's statement, 2 Corinthians 10[:13], "But we will not glory beyond measure, but according to the measure of the glory which God has measured out to us": since, therefore, commendation before God is {prestancior} superior to any temporal lordship, the conclusion follows: for the commendation remains perpetually with the blessed, but every civil lordship must {excidere} perish, according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 5. Whence it is said in Proverbs 22[:1], "A good name is better than great riches"; and, suggesting that that name is founded in grace, it adds, "For good grace is above silver and gold."
Quarto patet quod non est possibile diffamare {om.} iustum nisi peccando excidat {excideret} a virtute. Patet [fol. 73r, line 45] sic {om.}: Omnis fama creature servatur aput Deum proporcionaliter ad virtutem; sed non est possibile creaturam famam istam {illam} a Deo tollere {trs. 312}, stante [fol. 73r, line 46] dignitate {famati add.}; ergo conclusio. Unde falsum est quod mencientes denigrant famam constantis, cum inscripta sit libro vite, qui est speculum sine macula (Sapiencie [fol. 73r, line 47] vii. 26); sed, ad proprium modum loquendi Verbi veritatis, Math. v. {?} II {recte 15:12?}, mencientes scandalizati sunt in iusto {? add.}, et secundum Aristotelem sicut tetragous *{tetragonus} sive *{sine; W could be sine} vitupero *{vituperio} [fol. 73r, line 48] {unintelligible reference (3 re/orum) add. -- EN I.v (Grosseteste), I.x (modern chapter division)}.	It is clear, fourth, that no one can take away the fame of the just unless by sinning they {excidat a} fall from virtue. This is clear as follows. A creature's fame is always preserved before God in proportion to virtue; but no creature can take away that fame in God's eyes while the famed person's worthiness {stante} remains; therefore the conclusion. Whence it is false that liars blacken the fame of someone who has constancy, since that fame is written in the book of life, which is "a mirror without blemish," Wisdom 7[:26]; but, in the characteristic manner of speaking of the Word of Truth, in Matthew 15[:12], liars are "scandalized" by the just, and according to Aristotle, "[the just is] foursquare beyond reproach" (Ethics, 1100 b21).
Quod si dicatur ipsos *{denigrare add.} famam proximi diffamare *{om.} {diffamatur expunctum W (Poole)} aput graves personas que male opinantur de diffamato {famato}, dicitur quod a nullis talibus personis [fol. 73r, line 49] dependet fama iusti, sed tam illi quam mencientes sunt diffamati, sed *{?si}, nimis creduli, falsum {om.} fuerunt {falsum between lines add.} suspicati; et iusti, cuius nomen eiectum est, equanimiter [fol. 73r, line 50] sustinentis, sit fama serenior, quia racione paciencie aput tres Personas gravissimas accepcior. Unde Math. xv. 12, 13, postquam Veritas {dominus} reprobavit [fol. 73r, line 51] doctrinam Phariseorum vocando ipsos ippocritas, discipuli quadam ceca comparacione *{?compassione} dixerunt: Scis quia Pharisei audito hoc verbo scandalizati sunt? Et ille respondens ait, Omnis plantacio quam non plantavit Pater meus celestis {audito... celestis: etc} erradicabitur; quod [fol. 73r, line 52] dicit: Omnis laus vel fama yppocrite inserta {incertis} mentibus deceptorum, ex hoc quod non inscribitur {scribitur} libro vite, non crescet, sed punito peccato ippocrisis [fol. 73r, line 53] peribit funditus; quia Job xx. 5 dicitur, Gaudium ippocrite ad {om.} instar puncti. Ex quibus capitur {accipitur} quod utilis veritas non est tacenda propter scandalum [fol. 73r, line 54] reprobati, quia qui verum {?} dicit taliter non diffamat; et nunc *{om.} utinam placitantes pro infamiis {infamis} accenderent ad istam sentenciam, instar [fol. 73r, line 55] Christi (Ioh. viii. 50) dicentis, Ego gloriam meam non quero: est qui querat et iudicet {quero... iudicet: etc}.	And if it be said that they destroy their neighbor's fame in the eyes of serious persons who think ill of a defamed person, it is said that the fame of the just depends on no such persons, but those persons (and the liars) lose their own fame, if, too credulous, they have suspected what is false; and the fame of the just, whose names have been {eiectum} cast out, if they bear it with equanimity, is the brighter, since by reason of their patience their names are more approved in the judgment of the three weightiest Persons [i.e., Father, Son and Holy Spirit]. Whence in Matthew 15[:12, 13], after the Lord reproved the teaching of the Pharisees, calling them hypocrites, the disciples, moved by some blind compassion, said, "Do you know that the Pharisees were scandalized when they heard that saying?"; he answered, "Every planting which my heavenly Father did not plant will be up- rooted." This means: the praise or fame of a hypocrite planted in the minds of the deceived will never grow, because it is not written in the book of life, but it will perish completely when the sin of hypocrisy is punished; because in Job 20[:5] it is said, "The joy of a hypocrite is like a moment." From these things we gather that useful truth should not be left unspoken to avoid scandalizing the reprobate, because anyone who speaks the truth in such a way does not defame. I wish that those who plead for the infamous would kindle to that doctrine, in imitation of Christ, who says, John 8[:50], "But I do not seek my own glory: there is one who seeks and judges."
Quod si obicis per hoc quod {Quod... quod: Si dicatur} quicunque menciendo depravat fratrem, iniuriatur sibi, faciendo alios amicos, odiendo, falsum [fol. 73r, line 56] *{sive male add.} de ipso {illo} opinari; concedo *{conceditur} consequenciam *{conclusio}: ymmo conceditur {queritur W (Poole); conceditur P} (ut patet tractatu primo, capitulo secundo) quod non est possibile hominem peccare convivendo *{?communicando} cum aliquo, nisi [fol. 73r, line 57] iniurietur cuilibet fratri suo; et, cum pro minoribus iniuriis non prosequimur contra fratres, verissimum {?verisimilem} est quod pocius pro fama notificata [fol. 73r, line 58] in facie ecclesie, instar ippocrite, quam pro fraterna correpcione, tam acute prosequimur contra {fratres sicut contra add.} illos; quia indubie {om.}, quantum ad nos attinet, [fol. 73r, line 59] fama nostra foret sincerior committendo causam supremo Iudici, orando caritatem pro iniuriante, quam zellando pro propria vindicacione, [fol. 73r, line 60] ut patet capitulo tercio tractatus primi: cum quibus autem circumstanciis talia possunt {possint} fieri {om.}, bene {fieri between lines add.} patet {om.} inferius {?}, tractando {?dicere} si licet {habet, licet in margin W (Poole); licet P} contendere sive {om.} pugnare {om.} pro bonis fortune.	And if you object that to slander a brother by lying wrongs him by making other friends hate him and think falsely or evilly of him, {consequencia} the conclusion is conceded. Indeed, it is conceded that we cannot sin in {communicando} our dealings with someone {nisi} without injuring every one of his brothers; this is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 2 (De mandatis divinis, p. 13\PN14; cf. p. 39). And since we do not proceed against brothers for minor injuries, it is very true that, like hypocrites, we proceed so sharply against them rather on account of fame {in facie} in the eyes of the Church than for brotherly correction; for undoubtedly, as far as we are concerned, our fame would be purer if we entrusted the cause to the supreme Judge, praying charity for the wrongdoer, instead of being zealous for our own vindication; this as is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, Chapter 3 [not found; see De mandatis divinis, c. 2, p. 10]. But under what circumstances such things can be well done appears below, when we discuss whether it is permissible to contend or fight for goods of fortune.
Ex *{om.} isto *{om.} patet quinto quod [fol. 73r, line 61] nullius est hominis {trs.} fama laudabilis nisi ubique fuerit promulgata. Patet sic {om.}: De racione fame, in quantum huiusmodi, est {om.} quod sit bonum nomen, et specialiter virtutis, pluribus [fol. 73r, line 62] publicatum; sed nemo diffamari potest, nisi per totum mundum Trinitas increata ostenderit nomen suum; ergo conclusio: non enim est fama hominis [fol. 73r, line 63] opinio vera vel falsa quam fratres de ipso concipiunt; tum quia ista {om.} opinio non est proprium bonum {trs.} diffamati sed bonum opinancium multum alienum [fol. 73r, line 64] a famato, nec fama habet se {trs.} proporcionaliter ad opiniones huius modi, ut patet combinantibus {?} {meaning: to set in couples together (Thomas)}; tum eciam *{om.} quia nullum bonum inest nominato secundum virtutem, [fol. 73r, line 65] que {agrees with virtutem} est una pars nominis, quod {agrees with nominis} est proprietatum vel accidencium coleccio in subiecto; et sic vere *{om.} bonum nullum *{nomen} non inest homini, nisi {how can the premises admit this exception?} communiter fuerit cognitum [fol. 73v, line 1] utrobique. Sicut enim Deus non potest creature sue donare {trs. 312} dominium, nisi ipsum {primum} se extenderit ad quamlibet partem mundi {trs.}; sic nec potest dare bonum {folio 73v, line 2} nullum *{nomen} homini, nisi Trinitas ipsum cognoverit utrobique. Et {om.} patet quam {hoc etiam quod} sit arta {?} fama {sit add.} sophistica que non fundatur in iusticia, sicut {folio 73v, line 3} et tale pretensum dominium. Pro cuius {quo} declaracione {om.} notandum secundum Boetium, primo de Consolacione, prosa xii., quod tota sphera terre est quasi punctus contoralis {?} {contoralis means "bedfellow" DMLB. Otherwise not found in any dictionary. Contor 1 dep. "to found, to feel the bottom in water, to abide, to inquire diligently" (Thomas)} in {?} comparacione {?} ad {?} magnitudinem {?} {folio 73v, line 4} universi: a qua sphera si primo notaveris separatam superficiem terre sub zona torrida divisam in septem climata; et {om.} secundo notaveris {folio 73v, line 5} situs climatum per loca non limitata, ut deserta, maria, atque campestra; tercioque, quod *{quot} loca habitacionis humane non sunt hominibus occupata; {folio 73v, line 6} et {om.} quarto, quantumcunque celebre fuerit {trs.} nomen hominis aput mundum, non ex hoc {?} integre est cognitum uni provincie {folio 73v, line 7} vel opido; ymmo, posito quod sit, modicum vel nichil valet fame effacio *{efflatio} {efflatio W}, et eciam in momento oblivioni committitur {et... committitur: ?}; pateret, quam {?quod} arta et vana sit laus humana. Patet sentencia ista, Sapiencie v. {folio 73v, line 8} Econtra de iusto finaliter: unde Christus, docens nos famam mundi aufugere et curare de bono nomine (Luc. x. 18-20), sic alloquitur {discipulos add.} {folio 73v, line 9} septuaginta duos discipulos {om.}, reversos cum inordinato gaudio de hoc quod illis demonia sunt subiecta: Vidi, inquit, Sathanam sicut fulgor de celo cadentem. Ecce dedi vobis potestatem calcandi supra serpentes: verumtamen in hoc nolite gaudere, quia spiritus vobis subiciuntur; gaudete autem quoniam nomina vestra {sicut... vestra: etc} scripta sunt in celis. In quo {folio 73v, line 10} dicto patet primo, pertinenter ad inordinatum {ordinatum W (Poole); inordinatum P} gaudium, {delete comma} discipulorum {why genitive?} doctrinale exemplum ab inani gloria revocatum {agrees with exemplum}, cum supremus angelus, in hoc {folio 73v, line 11} abutens potestate sua {trs.}, statim decidit ab originali dominio {?}; et sic {sicut} in {om.} fulgure notantur {nota?} fetor {?} peccati, intollerabilis cum celesti dominio, et {folio 73v, line 12} inflammacio tumida {?} alios ad superbiam provocandi: ideo non de opibus {operibus} magnificis in vestram famam {famem W (Poole); famam P} et laudem mundanam procurantibus, debent Christi discipuli {folio 73v, line 13} inaniter gloriari, sed securi {?} de vera et {om.} ampla et perpetua {?} fama, qua in {om.} racionibus exemplaribus et naturis angelicis inscribuntur. Et {om.} patet *{secundo add.} quod est fama simpliciter {folio 73v, line 14} sive laudabilis quia solum illa que est aput Deum accepta et ubique: licet enim quelibet creatura secundum esse intelligible sit ubique {?} famata {?} {fama W (Poole)}, tamen secundum esse {folio 73v, line 15} existere est reputative {putative} et terminative in Deo, et sic in qualibet parte mundi; sicut dominium est terminative {?} ubicunque {?} est serviens, licet utrumque {?} sit {folio 73v, line 16} subiective solum in dominante substancia vel famata.	It is clear, fifth, that no man's fame is praiseworthy unless it is promulgated everywhere. This is clear as follows. It is of the nature of fame, as such, that it is a good name, and especially for virtue, published to many; but no one can be {diffamari} widely famed unless the uncreated Trinity shows his name throughout the whole world; therefore the conclusion. For a person's fame is not the opinion, true or false, that brothers conceive of him: First, because that opinion is not a good that belongs to the famed person, but a good that belongs to those who hold the opinion, quite separate from the famed person, and fame is not proportionally related to such opinions, as is clear to those who compare them. [??] Second, because no good inheres in the person named according to virtue, which is a part of the "name," which is a collection of properties or accidents in a subject; and thus a good name does not inhere in someone unless it is commonly known {utrobique} everywhere. For just as God cannot grant his creature lordship unless it extends to every part of the world, so neither can he give a good name to someone unless the Trinity knows that person {utrobique} everywhere. And it is clear how confined is the deceptive fame that is not based on justice, just like such pretended lordship. To explain this, it should be known (according to Boethius, Consolation, prosa 12 [ii, pr. 7]) that the whole sphere of the earth is a mere point in comparison with the greatness of the universe; from this sphere, if you first noted the separate surface of the earth under the torrid zone divided into seven climes, and then noted the position of the climes throughout boundless spaces (such as deserts, seas, and open country), and then how many places of human habitation are not occupied by human beings, and then [that] however much someone's name may be famous in the world it is not therefore wholly known to [even] one province or town (indeed, even if it is, the extent of fame is of little or no value, and it is committed to oblivion even in a moment), it would then be clear how narrow and empty is human praise. That doctrine is clear in Wisdom chapter 5. The opposite is true of those who are just finally; whence Christ, teaching us to flee the world's fame and care about a good name, speaks thus to the seventy two disciples when they returned with inordinate joy at the fact that the demons were subject to them: "I saw Satan falling like lightening from heaven. Behold, I have given you power to tread upon snakes. Nevertheless, do not rejoice in the fact that spirits are subject to you, but rejoice that your names are written in heaven" (Luke 10[:18\PN20]). In this statement is clear, first, in relation to the disciples' inordinate joy, an instructive example [??] recalled from empty glory, when the highest angel, abusing his power in this matter, immediately {decidit ab} fell from his original lordship; and thus in the lightening are made known the stench of sin, incompatible with heavenly lordship, and the puffed-up inflammation of provoking others to pride. Therefore Christ's disciples ought not in an empty way glory in procuring magnificent powers leading to worldly fame and glory, but, being safe, [should glory] in the true, full and everlasting fame by which they are inscribed in the exemplar reasons and angelic natures. And, second, it is clear what is fame simply or the praiseworthy, that it is only what is accepted with God and everywhere: [??] {the following is not good sense} for although every creature in its intelligible being is famed everywhere, in its being of existence it is, as object of thought and terminatively, in God, and thus in every part of the world, just as lordship is terminatively wherever there is someone serving, though fame or lordship is subjectively [i.e. as accident in substance] only in the dominating or famed substance.
Sexto patet quod nihil potest privare hominem fama sua {trs.} nisi ipse gratis consenciat. Probatur {patet quia}: Eo ipso quo homo perseverat in gracia aut virtute, manet fama sua {trs.} integra et illesa (iuxta conclusionem quartam {trs.}); sed nemo potest virtutem perdere {trs.} nisi velit; ergo neque famam. {folio 73v, line 18} Minor patet tripliciter ex modo donacionis divine que est liberalissima (ut patet supra, capitulo sexto {7}); donacio autem que est absoluta sine repugnacione {?} que noceret {?} {folio 73v, line 19} {margin: alia littera post quam fit} donacioni {donacio W (Poole)} *{donatario}, est liberalior quam donacio {que esset add.} post quam fit {post quam fit: om.} spoliacio sine demerito donatorii; ergo sola ista potest Deo competere {?}. Similiter *{secundo}, nemo potest privari virtute nisi {folio 73v, line 20} peccaverit; sed nemo potest peccare nisi consenciendo peccaverit; ergo etc. Nam secundum Augustinum (primo Retractacionum, xiii.) omne peccatum est adeo {trs.} voluntarium, quod si non est voluntarium, non est peccatum {quod... peccatum: om.}. Similiter *{?tertio}, si Deus [fol. 73v, line 21] posset servum suum {trs.} spoliare fidelem {trs.} virtute sine suo demerito, per idem posset quantumlibet dampnificare et peiorare hominem ipsum sincerius continue {trs.} [fol. 73v, line 22] diligentem, consequens {om.} contra fidem. Ideo dicit Crisostomus quod Nemo leditur nisi ledatur principaliter a se ipso (ut patet tractatu secundo, capitulo primo). Cum ergo Deus non potest {possit} aufferre famam [fol. 73v, line 23] de suo fideli ministro sine eius demerito, nec quidquam {?} potest creatura {?} rapere de manu Dei (ut {om.} dicit {om.} Veritas {om.}, Ioh. x. 28); sequitur {om.} conclusio {om.}: nec quidem creatura potest quidquam facere nisi {quod add.} [fol. 73v, line 24] Deus approbaverit, utendo creatura pro organo; quia Ioh. xv. dicitur {om.}, Sine me nihil potestis facere {etc}: et cum eodem sic considerato, de quolibet dono Dei sequitur [fol. 73v, line 25] quod nemo {?} potest perdere dominium nisi gratis peccaverit; quicunque enim gratis {om.} perdit tam utile donum Dei, peccat indubie {om.}, factus stultus {om.}: renunciacio {?} autem civilitatis propter [fol. 73v, line 26] Christum {dominum}, etsi videatur multis stulticia, est tamen magna negociandi prudencia; cum, propter dominium sophisticum non existens, acquiritur verum dominium universi, [fol. 73v, line 27] secundum {om.} quod {om.} I Cor. ii 14 scribitur {dicitur}: Animalis homo non percipit ea que Spiritus {om.} Dei sunt; stulticia enim est illi {sunt... illi: etc}, et non potest intelligere, quia spiritualiter examinatur. Oportet enim examinare voluntatem {trs.} [fol. 73v, line 28] legem Dei cum veritatibus stultis *{substantialibus} in ea absconditis, exuere vim cognitivam a corporalibus fantasmatibus, et non quiescere in isto fuco sophistico: [fol. 73v, line 29] 'Nemo {enim add.} est dominus alicuius {?} usibilis {?} quoad mundum nisi sit notum {trs.} mundo et capit de illo occupacionem, secundum exigenciam seculi abusivam; ergo aliter [fol. 73v, line 30] non est simpliciter et vere dominus.' {non sequitur add.} Fumus iste cum libidine temporalium excecat plurimos in tantum quod quidem professores Scripture [fol. 73v, line 31] nostre *{sacre} dicunt quod talia devota {?} sunt predicabilia sed non vera: sed revera praedicabilia debent exquisitissime examinari ne secundum aliquid [fol. 73v, line 32] sapiant falsitatem; primo ne tam publice predicans comittat mendacium; secundo ne auditorium deprehendens falsitatem exortantis in aliquo, habeat [fol. 73v, line 33] totum sermonem {?} suspectum tamquam ludicrum; tercio, cum voces praedicantis signa sint {trs.} {eorum que in necessitate add.} ad nihil vel modicum {habere add.} efficacia [fol. 73v, line 34] ad hortandum, nisi de quanto veritas, {delete comma} subtracta {?} *{conjecture: abstracta, meaning "Truth itself"; cf. chapter 5, "veritas in abstracto (Luc. xvi. 13)...", Poole's text, p. 35, line 16} veritate *{vere}, {delete comma} docet et excitat, patet quod {om.} si deest {desit} veritas, deest doctrix, quia quod non {om.} est {om.}, non edocet. [fol. 73v, line 35] Et hinc dicit Augustinus quod, si aliqua pars Scripture sacre {trs.} foret falsa, ipse haberet totam {scripturam add.} suspectam; ymmo, auditorium nesciret quomodo *{quando} predicatori *{conjecture: predicator} [fol. 73v, line 36] admodum concionatoris fingentis fabulas loqueretur et quomodo *{quando} predicaret sensum catholicum: et hinc dicitur {dicitur: ita correctum; fuerat dicit Gregorius W (Poole)} *{dicit Gregorius} quod parabole Salvatoris [fol. 73v, line 37] erant narracio veridica rei geste; cum Dominus veritatis non indiguit {indigeat} mendicare fabulas vel iocose mentiri ad populum edocendum: in [fol. 73v, line 38] exhortacionibus quidem {?} debet {om.} burdacio, sicut et falsitas, precipue {between lines: add. debet} semoveri. Et {om.} revera {unde} si scirem aliquam {aliqua} partem {pars} Scripture sacre, et specialiter dictum Domini, non [fol. 73v, line 39] esse verum de virtute sermonis, ego {om.} non {deberet quis add.} forem {fore} amplius {trs.} Christianus: sed {unde} scio {sciendum} quod cicius celum et terra deficerent; ideo firma fide adhereo {tenendum et adherendum} dictis Christi de *{om.} amicicia *{om.}; patet, primo, capitulo iii., etc.	It is clear, sixth that nothing can deprive someone of his fame unless he himself {gratis} freely consents. Proof: By the very fact that he perseveres in grace or virtue, a person's fame remains whole and undamaged (in accordance with the fourth conclusion); but no one can {perdere} lose virtue without willing to; therefore not fame either. The minor is clear in three ways: From the manner of divine granting, which is most liberal (as is clear above, chapter 6); but a granting that is absolute without a {repugnatio} conflict which would harm the grantee is freer than a granting followed by a spoliation without any demerit on the grantee's part; therefore only the former can pertain to God. Second, no one can be deprived of virtue without sinning; but no one can sin without consenting; therefore, etc. For according to Augustine (Retractations, \SCI\ES.xiii) every sin is voluntary to such an extent that if it is not voluntary it is not a sin. Third, if God could despoil his faithful servant of virtue without demerit on the servant's part, he could likewise to any extent damage and wrong someone who more sincerely loves him {continue} continually, {consequens} an inference which is against the faith. Therefore, Chrysostom says that "We are not wronged unless we are wronged in the first the first place by ourselves" (as is clear in Tract \SCII\ES, Chapter 1 [De statu innocencie, p. 480; cf. p. 482]). Since, therefore, God cannot take away the fame of his faithful servant without demerit on the servant's part, and a creature cannot snatch anything from the hand of God (as Truth says, John 10[:28]), the conclusion follows. Indeed, a creature cannot do anything unless God approves, using the creature as an instrument; because in John 15[:5] it is said, "Without me you can do nothing." And, keeping that point in view, it follows concerning any gift of God that no one can {perdere} lose lordship except by {gratis} sinning freely; for whoever {gratis} freely {perdit} loses such a useful gift of God undoubtedly sins, having become foolish: but the renunciation of civil interests for Christ's sake, even if it seems foolishness to many, is nevertheless very prudent management of one's affairs, since true lordship of the universe is acquired in exchange for a non-existent deceptive lordship, according to what is written in 1 Corinthians 2[:14]: "The animal man does not perceive things that are of God's spirit; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand, because it is spiritually examined"--for we must examine the will [and] law of God with the substantial truths hidden in it, and {exuere} divest the cogitative power of bodily imaginings and not rely on the following deceptive sophistry: "No one is lord of any {usibilis} usable in relation to the world unless it is known to the world and he takes possession from the world in accordance with the world's wrongful demands, therefore he is not simply and truly lord in another way." That smoke, together with lust for temporal things, blinds many, to such an extent that some professors of sacred Scripture say that such devout matters are fit for sermons but are not true. But in truth sermon points ought to be most thoroughly examined in case they smack of falsity in any respect; first, in case someone who preaches in such a public way perpetrates a lie; second, in case the hearers, if they catch the preacher in any falsehood, regard the whole sermon as suspect and ludicrous. Third, since the preacher's utterances are signs with no or little hortatory effect except to the extent that abstract Truth truly teaches and incites, it is clear that if truth is lacking, the teacher is lacking, since what does not exist does not teach--hence Augustine says that if some part of sacred Scripture were false he would regard the whole as suspect. Indeed, the hearers would not know when the preacher spoke like a rabble rouser inventing tales and when he preached Catholic doctrine. Hence Gregory says that the Savior's parables were true narrations of events, since the Lord of Truth did not need to borrow fables or tell lying jokes to teach the people; in exhortations, certainly, jest, like falsity, ought especially to be put aside. And in truth if I knew that any part of sacred Scripture, and especially a statement of the Lord, was not true {de virtute sermonis} in the plain meaning of the words, I would no longer be a Christian: but I know that heaven and earth would fail sooner, and therefore I adhere by firm faith to Christ's statements. This is clear in [Tract] \SCI\ES, Chapter 3 [not found].
Cap. IX [fol. 73v, line 40] Ex istis patet {?infertur} ulterius, si {om.} non {om.} fallor {om.}, quod Deus non potest donare homini quodvis donum {dominium} quod, sine suo defectu {trs.} [fol. 73v, line 41] dampnificando, quis aufferat; vel quod iustus perseverans privetur dono aliquo, nisi Deus secundum valencius recompenset. Prima pars patet {supra add.} ex {om.} proximo {om.} dictis {om.}, quod Deus non [fol. 73v, line 42] potest dampnificando velle aufferre a servo grato donarium; et cum potest impedire quamlibet creaturam adversantem legi sue, ne in substancia [fol. 73v, line 43] dissolvatur {the law, or the creature? -- the law}, patet conclusio. Cum enim ablacio dicit remanentem existenciam ablati, patet quod si quis aufferret a iusto membrum vel tunicam, servando caritatem, habet ipsum [fol. 73v, line 44] excellencius *{quia add.} in maiori gracia ex {om.} virtute paciencia cumulata; et quanto maior est gracia sive {vel} dileccio fundans dominium, tanto est dominium verius {trs. 321} [fol. 73v, line 45] sive {vel} firmius, quia divino dominio similius: et ideo {illud} vere {videtur} dicit {dicere} Augustinus, epistola xxxvii, quod temporalia tanto {om.} verius habentur quanto minus amantur; quia, cum amor eorum [fol. 73v, line 46] subtrahit ab amore Dei, et econtra, patet quod de quanto minus amantur, amor Dei de tanto intenditur: illi enim amores mutuo se [fol. 73v, line 47] augmentant et minuunt ex adverso; et patet quod raptores auferendo temporalia iustorum fundant in eis *{iustis} titulum ampliorem; et ideo [fol. 73v, line 48] signanter, commendans prudenciam Hebreorum, dicit apostolus (Hebr. x 34), quod rapinam bonorum {suorum add.} cum gaudio susceperunt, non [fol. 73v, line 49] intelligendo quin liceat habere temporalia et displicere de iniusticia rapientis, sed nemo affectaret illa {ea} nisi de quanto sunt {present} sibi {trs.} necessaria ad [fol. 73v, line 50] ministerium Dei sui, nec excidet {future indicative} a fraterna caritate {trs.} propter aliquam iniuriacionem {iniuriam, margin iniuracionem W (Poole); iniuracionem P} possibilem fratris sui; que si assit {affuit}, patet quod {quia} iniurians [fol. 73v, line 51] non dampnificat, sed lege invincibili cooperatur in comodum servi Dei; et patet prima pars conclusionis.	[God will not allow the just to be deprived of anything without recompense] Chapter 9 From these points it is clear, further (if I am not mistaken), [1] that God cannot grant a person any gift that someone can {aufferat} take away without any damning failing on that person's part, and [2] that someone who perseveres in justice cannot be deprived of any gift unless God makes some more valuable recompense. The first part is clear from the statements immediately above, that God cannot, by doing damage, wish {auferre} to take {donarium} a grant away from a servant who pleases him; and since he can block any creature opposing his law, lest it be substantially dissolved, the conclusion is clear. For since "removal" means that what is removed continues to exist, it is clear that if someone {auferret} took away from a just man a limb, or his cloak, then, if he preserves his charity, he has it [i.e. the thing removed, which he still has, since the just have all things] more excellently because he is in greater grace because his virtue is augmented by his patience, and the greater the grace or love that is the basis of lordship, the truer or firmer the lordship, because the more like divine lordship. Augustine therefore says truly, in Letter \SCXXXVII\ES, that temporal things are had the more truly the less they are loved, because, since love of them draws one away from love of God, and vice versa, it is clear that the less they are loved, the more {de tanto intenditur} intense becomes the love of God; for these loves mutually augment and diminish one another inversely. And it is clear that robbers taking away the temporal property of the just man give him the foundation of a fuller title; and it is {signanter} significant, therefore, that in commending the prudence of the Hebrews, the Apostle says that they accept theft of their goods "with joy" (Hebrews 10[:34]), not meaning to deny that it is permissible to have temporal things and to be displeased at the injustice of the robber, but [??] that no one should care about them except insofar as he needs them for serving his God, and he will not {excidet} lose brotherly charity because of some possible wrongdoing of his brother--if injustice happens, it is clear that the doer of the injustice does no damage, but by an invincible law works together to the advantage of God's servant. Thus the first part of the conclusion is clear.
Secunda vero {om.} pars {patet sic et add.} superaddit, cum stat hominem [fol. 73v, line 52] privari viribus corporis, ut visu et {cum} aliis donis Dei, cum hoc quod ista postmodum non existant, et isto {illo} modo contingit Deum privare electos {?dilectos} suos [fol. 73v, line 53] bonis que prius donaverat, ut patet de Iob et {om.} Thobia et multis {?ceteris ?quibuscumque} similibus {om.}. Sed da {dato}, tamquam {per} falsigraphus {falsigraficum}, quod Petrus {.a.} iustus finaliter peyoretur privacione [fol. 73v, line 54] doni Dei {trs.}, vel quod sine suo defectu Deus non retribuat sibi valencius; et {tunc} quero {queritur} utrum {?} Petrus {.a.} servat caritativam {suam} pacienciam {et caritativam between lines add.} vel excidat ab eadem. Si [fol. 73v, line 55] excidit ab {om.} ea {om.}, peccat mortaliter; et cum nemo peccat in aliquo, nisi in illo quod potest declinare (cum lex Dei non potest obligare hominem facere quod non potest), sequitur [fol. 73v, line 56] quod Petrus {.a.} notabiliter deficit: cuius oppositum erat datum. Si detur altera pars, quod {Si... quod: si autem} Petrus {.a.} perseverat in paciencia caritativa, patet quod notabiliter meretur, et per {ita} consequens {om.} Deus [fol. 73v, line 57] noviter donat sibi graciam et virtutem; *{et add.} cum omne donum gracie sit melius quam universitas bonorum naturalium, corporis, vel fortune, sequitur quod Deus [fol. 73v, line 58] recompensat sibi loco privati longe {melius et add.} valencius; et per {sic} consequens {om.} melioratur et non simpliciter peyoratur.	The second part adds ["unless God makes some more valuable recompense"], since if someone is deprived of bodily powers, such as sight, and other gifts of God, it is {stat} certain that they cease to exist immediately [and therefore he does not still have them], and God can in this way deprive his elect of goods he had previously granted to them, as is clear in the case of Job, Tobias and many similar cases). But grant, as a {falsigraphus} false supposition, that Peter, a finally just man, is damaged by being deprived of a gift of God, or that without any failing on his part God does not give back to him a greater value, and I ask whether Peter preserves charitable patience or {excidat ab} loses it? If he loses it, he sins mortally; and since no one sins except in something in which he can refuse (since God's law cannot oblige someone to do what he cannot do), it follows that Peter {deficit} fails notably--the opposite of what was {datum} assumed. If the alternative be granted, that Peter perseveres in charitable patience, it is clear that he notably merits, and consequently God grants him {noviter} a new grace and virtue; and since each gift of grace is better than the totality of natural goods, goods of body or goods of fortune, it follows that God recompenses him to a much greater value in place of what was taken from him; and consequently he is made better off, and not simply damaged.
Ex isto {quibus} argumento {om.} legis Christi {argumento add.} capiunt sancti [fol. 73v, line 59] quod non potest esse tribulacio vel passio hominis nisi iusta; quia si perseveret in gracia paciencie, tunc passio est meritoria et sic iusta. Si excidat [fol. 73v, line 60] pusillanimiter a gracia, tunc, racione peccati, est iustum {trs.} quod taliter puniatur. Et istam conclusionem clarius demonstrabilem *{quam dulkarnon add.} credo quam *{om.} {quam credo W (Poole)} ego *{om.} esse, [fol. 73v, line 61] fidem in qua sancti vicerunt regna, etc. (Hebr. xi.33); et {om.} eadem fides est {om.} novum testamentum in quo altilia Christi {om.} pasta et condelectata sunt, sustinendo pro [fol. 73v, line 62] ewangelio Christi contumelias et omnes penas inferibiles congaudenter. Et ista videtur *{esse add.} sentencia apostoli (2 Cor. iv.16), ubi {om.} postquam declaravit tribulaciones, [fol. 73v, line 63] aporiaciones, et persecuciones {?} redere *{?cedere} sanctis ad gloriam, subdit finaliter {om.} verbum {om.} spei {spe}: Propter {om.} quod, {om.} inquit, {om.} non deficimus; et quia posset obici contra ipsum de deficiencia [fol. 73v, line 64] corporis, subdit, Sed licet is qui deforis est homo noster corumpatur, tamen is {trs.} qui intus est renovatur de die in diem; cum enim [fol. 74r, line 1] tota personalitas hominis servatur in spiritu, patet quod deponens corpus pro {om.} fideli Domino qui non potest deficere, est securus de retribucione, ut {?} tangitur {?} supra {?}, capitulo [fol. 74r, line 2] sexto. Nec video quomodo Christianus posset aliter {trs.} in Deum suum secure credere {trs.}.	From this argument of Christ's law the saints take it that a man can have no tribulation or suffering except what is just. For if he perseveres in the grace of patience, then his suffering is meritorious and thus just, and if he {excidat} falls pusillanimously from grace, then, because of the sin, it is just that he be thus punished. And this conclusion, more clearly demonstrable than Pythagoras' theorem, I believe was the faith in which the saints "conquered kingdoms" etc. (Hebrews 11[:33]); and the same faith is the New Testament, in which Christ's fatlings are fed and delighted, joyfully bearing for the sake of Christ's Gospel insults and all the penalties that can be inflicted. And that seems to be the Apostle's opinion in 2 Corinthians 4[:16], where, after explaining that tribulations, hardships and persecutions {cedere sanctis ad} redound to the glory of the saints, he adds at the end a word of hope: "For this reason," he says, "we do not {deficimus} fail." And because the body's {deficientia} failings could be objected he adds: "But though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inner is renewed from day to day." For since the whole personhood of a human being is preserved in the spirit, it is clear that one who lays aside the body on behalf of a faithful Lord who cannot {deficere} fail is assured of repayment, as has been touched on above in chapter 6. And I do not see how otherwise a Christian could believe securely in his God.
Ex istis *{hiis} formetur racio ad probandum conclusionem principaliter {om.} propositam: homo {?} in {?} statu [fol. 74r, line 3] innocencie habuit dominium cuiuslibet partis mundi sensibilis {om.} (ut {om.} patet tractatu secundo, capitulo -), et virtute passionis Christi est iustis {trs.} plena peccatorum remissio ac {et} [fol. 74r, line 4] dominium restitutum; ergo iam tempore gracie habet iustus plenum universitatis dominium. Et cum idem sit iudicium de quolibet predestinato, sequitur conclusio: minori [fol. 74r, line 5] autem quoad primam partem nullus fidelis dissenciet; sed quia in secunda parte posset fingi quod *{post add.} lapsus *{lapsum} non dominatur suo corpori, cum peccatis [fol. 74r, line 6] dimissis, secundum apostolum et certissimum experimentum, remanet rebellio, ideo argumentando {arguendo} propositum tollam {remove? take up in the colloqial sense?} primo hanc {which? the objection above, or the following argument?} evidenciam {if the objection, why call it evident?}: nam nemo est iustus {trs.} simpliciter nisi [fol. 74r, line 7] sit immunis a peccato {om.} mortali; sed eo ipso {om.} quod sic, anima dominatur corpori, igitur etc. Nam corpus non dominatur anime, nisi ipsam adduxerit per peccatum {trs. 3412} servituti. [fol. 74r, line 8] Ideo {?} dicit {om.} apostolus (i Cor.ix 27), Castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo, ne cum aliis predicaverim, ipse reprobus efficiar {et... efficiar: etc}. Et patet quod repugnat aliquem esse iustum moraliter nisi anima corpori dominetur; nec oppositum [fol. 74r, line 9] umquam expertum est, vel {nec} apostolum affirmasse, cum rebellio penalis difficultans ad {difficultans ad: construction, meaning?} meritum non tollit *{dominium add.}.	[Another argument to prove that everything belongs to the just] From these [points] an argument is formed to prove the conclusion chiefly aimed at. Human beings in the state of innocence had lordship of every part of the sensible world (as is clear in Tract \SCII\ES, Chapter - [see De statu innocencie, c. 6]); and by virtue of Christ's passion the just have [a] full remission of sins and [b] restored lordship; therefore now in the time of grace a just person has full lordship of the totality. And since the same judgment is to be made of every predestined person, the conclusion follows. No believer will dissent from the minor in respect of its first part, but because in the second part [b] it could be imagined that after the fall he does not have lordship over his body, since when sins are forgiven rebellion remains, according to the Apostle and to very certain experience, therefore in arguing the point proposed I will first {tollam} remove this objection. For no one is simply just unless he is free from mortal sin; but by the very fact that he is such, the soul has lordship over the body; therefore, etc. (For the body does not have lordship over the soul unless it leads it to servitude through sin. Therefore the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 9[:27], "I chasten my body and reduce it to servitude, lest after preaching to others I am myself made reprobate.") And it is clear that it is {repugnat} impossible for someone to be morally just unless soul has lordship over the body; the opposite is never experienced, and the Apostle never affirmed it, since the rebelliousness [of the flesh] that is a punishment [for Original Sin] that makes it difficult for us to act meritoriously does not take away lordship.
Hoc {quo} ergo {om.} habito, probatur quod iustificato {in margin: sive iusto} [fol. 74r, line 10] resituitur dominium sicut et *{?prius ?existenti in} gracia; nam eo ipso quod alicui restituitur principale, restituitur *{quodlibet accesorium et specialiter si [fol. 74r, line 11] restitutio hoc fuerit dominica; sed lapso restituitur add.} complete iusticia, ergo et dominium consequens ad iusticiam sicut passio ad subiectum. Unde veritate *{virtute} asserti *{assumpti} pro maxima parte *{om.} dicunt mundani philosophi {trs.} quod irregularitas tollitur in homicida iniusto, virtute baptistamis, non autem in [fol. 74r, line 13] legaliter ac {aut} meritorie occidente; quia, ut dicunt, irregularitas, licet non sit peccatum, fundatur tamen in peccato priori quod deletur cum suis sequentibus {consequentibus} [fol. 74r, line 14] per baptismum, et in secundo, cum non sit ad peccatum consequens, non deletur. Nec debet principalis conclusio verti in dubium, cum descriptive dominium hominis {trs.} sit habitudo [fol. 74r, line 15] qua dominus {om.} denominatur suo prefici servienti; sed iusto servit totus mundus sensibilis eciam post lapsum (ut {sed... ut: om.} patet ex dictis septimo capitulo), ergo conclusio; nam aliter abuteretur mundo, recipiendo usum tam utilem alieni; ergo etc. [fol. 74r, line 16] Unde apostolus (I Cor.iii.19), sciens quod ista {ita} sapiencia videtur {esse add.} dubia {dura} et fatua apud mundi sapientes, sic {om.} scribit {ait}: Sapiencia huius mundi stulticia est aput Deum; [fol. 74r, line 17] et sic verbum directum Corintiis observantibus caritatem: Omnia, inquit, vestra sunt, sive Paulus, sive Apollo, sive Cephas, sive mundus, sive vita, siva mors, sive prescencia, sive futura {sive Apollo... futura: etc usque}; omnia enim vestra sunt: et {om.} revera {om.} nescio {om.} quomodo {?} ista {om.} {autem possit add.} sentencia planius posset {om.} dici {non videtur add.}. Si autem Corinthii habebant {habeant illa} caritatis titulo omnia {om.} ista {illa}, {igitur add.} a pari quilibet iustus quamlibet [fol. 74r, line 19] partem mundi. Si enim tres precipue columpne ecclesie asserunt *{sed et quelibet}, quod *{om.} quecunque *{om.}, sive vita, sive {vel} mors, amici vel inimici {?}, et omnia futura, de quibis minime videtur, [fol. 74r, line 20] cedunt in *{om.} sanctis {iustis} ad bonum utile, quomodo non totum residuum huius mundi?	With these points established, it is proved that lordship is restored to the justified person just as it existed before when he was in grace. For by the very fact that the principal thing is restored to someone, every accessory thing is also restored (and especially if the restoring was done by the Lord); but complete justice is restored to the person who had fallen, therefore also the lordship that follows upon justice as {passio} property follows {subiectum} essence. Whence by virtue of this {assumpti} minor {pro maxima} used as a basic principle, worldly philosophers [lawyers?] say that irregularity [i.e. incapacity to receive Holy Orders] is taken away in a person who has committed unjust homicide by the power of baptism, but not in someone who has killed legally and meritoriously: because, they say, although irregularity is not a sin, it is based on an earlier sin [i.e., the unjust homicide] which, together with its consequences, is blotted out by baptism, and in the other case, since the irregularity is not a consequence of sin, it is not obliterated. And the chief conclusion ought not be called into question, since lordship is defined as the relationship by which the lord is said to be set over a person or thing that serves him. But the whole sensible world serves the just even after the Fall (as is clear from the statements in chapter 7); therefore the conclusion. For otherwise the just would abuse the world, taking such a useful use of what belongs to another; therefore etc. Thus the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 3[:19], knowing that that wisdom seems doubtful and foolish in the eyes of the worldly- wise, writes thus: "The wisdom of this world is foolishness in God's eyes." Hence the statement directed to the Corinthians who were observing charity: "All things," he says, "are yours, whether Paul, or Apollos or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; for all things are yours" [1 Corinthians 3:21\PN2]. Truly I do not know how the doctrine could be stated more plainly. If the Corinthians had all those things by the title of charity, then by the argument from equals each of the just has every part of the world. For if the three chief pillars of the church [i.e. Paul, Apollos and Cephas], indeed even "all things," whether life or death, or friend or enemy and all "things to come" (of which it seems least likely) {cedere sanctis ad bonum utile} redound to the utility of the saints, how [shall this] not [be so of] all the rest of this world?
Confirmatur tripliciter *{om.}: primo ex *{sic} hoc *{om.} quod *{om.} Deus non potest donare posterius nisi prius [fol. 74r, line 21] donet quodlibet essencialiter ipso prius, cum sit prima natura {trs.} donans ordinatissime, non potens donare aliquid {om.} nisi prius naturaliter det se ipsum iuxta illud apostoli {om.}, Rom.viii 9: Si quis [fol. 74r, line 22] spiritum Iesu non habet, {hoc add.} non est eius: cum ergo {?ens add.} transcendens sit primum omnium creaturarum {creatorum W (Poole); causarum/creaturam P} *{causarum}, videtur quod non posset dare homini quidquam inferius nisi prius naturaliter daret [fol. 74r, line 23] ipsum, et per {ita} consequens {om.} sicut communicat suo donatorio se ipsum, sic et totum amplum suum {trs.} dominium, iuxta {om.} illud {om.} Math.xxiv,47: Amen dico vobis, super omnia bona sua constituit eum.	This is confirmed, first, as follows. God cannot grant what is posterior unless he first grants whatever is essentially prior to it, since he is the first nature and makes grants in the most orderly way--not able to grant anything unless first, by priority of nature, he gives himself, according to the text of the apostle in Romans 8[:9]: "If anyone does not have the spirit of Jesus, he does not belong to him." Since therefore the transcendent is the first of all the causes, it seems that he cannot give a man anything inferior unless, by priority of nature, he gives himself; and consequently, just as he imparts {communicare} himself to his grantee, so also he imparts his whole ample lordship, according to the text of Matthew 24[:47], "Amen I say to you, he has established him over all his goods."
Similiter *{secundo} [fol. 74r, line 24] cum omne inferius requirit {requirat} causanciam sui superioris, videtur quod si Deus donat inferius, donat quodlibet essencialiter vel accidentaliter ipsum causans; huiusmodi [fol. 74r, line 25] est omne superius; ergo etc. Aliter indubie *{enim} donacio foret {fieret} inutilis, ac si quis donaret mihi accidens et non substanciam; unde iure illius donacionis que omni iusto [fol. 74r, line 26] ex Deo competit, dedit Achimelek David et pueris suis, dum tamen mundi fuerint {esset}, panem sanctum Deo specialiter consecratum, docens in hoc plane quod [fol. 74r, line 27] omni iusto {iuste} licet in tempore necessitatis uti ex naturali dominio bonis Dei. Aliter enim Deus deficeret servis sui in sibi necessariis. Nec est fingendum [fol. 74r, line 28] quod Deus primo in hora necessitatis daret dominium, quia omnia fundamenta dominii sunt equalite *{equalia} {trs.} post et ante.	Second, since every inferior needs the causality of its superior, it seems that if God grants something inferior, he grants whatever essentially or accidentally causes it; such is every superior; therefore, etc. For otherwise the granting would be useless, as if someone granted me the accident and not the substance. Whence by right of the grant which belongs to all the just from God, Achimelec gave to David and his young men, {cum tamen} provided they were pure [1 Kings 21:4], the holy bread especially consecrated to God, thereby plainly teaching that the just are all permitted in a time of necessity to use by natural lordship God's good things, for otherwise God would {deficeret} fail his servants in their necessities. (And it should not be imagined that God gave lordship [to David] for the first time in the hour of necessity, because all the foundations of lordship were equal afterwards and before.)
Similiter {?} Deus non restituit vel reparat aliquid nisi [fol. 74r, line 29] complete et perfecte resituat, quia Dei perfecta sunt opera; sed resituit genus humanum {trs. 231} ad dominium perditum, ergo plene et perfecte ipsum {om.} resituit {om.}. [fol. 74r, line 30] In cuius signum, Gen.ix1-3, alloquitur *{dicitur ad} iustos lapsos sic {om.}: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram: et terror vester ac tremor sit super cuncta animancia terre et superomnes volueres celi, cum universis que moventur in terra; omnes pisces maris manui vestrae tradite sunt: et omne quod movetur et vivit, erit vobis in cibum; quasi olera virencia {et replete... virencia: etc usque} tradidi vobis onmia. Et tam amplum et explicitum usum [fol. 74r, line 31] non legitur Deum innocentibus concessisse; et in idem sonant quotlibet {quelibet} dicta {verba} scripturarum {scripture} tam Novi quam Veteris Testamenti. Unde Gen. iv.3,4, scribitur {om.}: Factum est ut {om.} post multos dies offeret Caym de fructibus terre munera Domino; Abel quoque obtulit de primogenitis {dies... primogenitis: etc} gregis sui: in quo verbo sic *{si} notamus subtiliter digitum Spiritus scribentis tam varie, quod Abel iustus de suis obtulit et Caym [fol. 74r, line 33] impius *{iniustus} extranee *{extranea} de terre fructibus; patenter {?} innuitur quod omnis iustus simpliciter {om.} dominatur iuste {trs.} omnibus quibus preest, iniustus autem iniuste occupat aliena; sicut notat et declarat dominus Armakanus {ardmacanus} (libro secundo de Pauperie Salvatoris, tercio capitulo) utilis testis istius sentencie: et {utilis... et: om.} idem dicit Augustinus, Ieronimus, {trs.} [fol. 74r, line 35] Hugo de Sancto Vitore, Lincoliensis, et alii doctores, quibus concesse sunt primicie sensuum Scripturarum. Sed et doctor gencium, {ad add.} Hebreorum [fol. 74r, line 36] ii.8, probat quod Christus habet {habuit} dominium universitatis humanitus, per {dicitur} illud {om.} Psalmi {om.}, Omnia subiecisti sub {etc} pedibus {om.} eius {om.}: in hoc, inquit, quod omnia ei subiecit, nihil dimisit non subiectum ei {nihil... ei: etc} . Sed {et} cum nos simus [fol. 74r, line 37] fratres Christi, filii adoptivi, coheredes sui, sequitur per idem quod omnia sunt nobis subiecta {trs.}, eciam {et} ipsemet Christus. Iusti ergo sunt omnia, non tamen [fol. 74r, line 38] peccata, quia non prosequuntur {persequuntur} ex creaturis: ut mors et vita, {punctuation?} virtus {veritas W (Poole); ?veritas -- but seems to begin with d P} *{veritas} enim et peccatum, que sunt fines universitatis create, nulli possunt [fol. 74r, line 39] servire, licet *{equivoce iustis proficiant	Similarly God does not restore or repair anything unless he restores completely and perfectly, because God's works are perfect; but he restores the human race to lost lordship, therefore he restores it fully and perfectly. As a sign of this, in Genesis 9[:1\PN3], this is said to the just who had fallen: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth: and let the fear and dread of you be upon all the animals of the earth and upon all the birds of the sky, and all the things that move upon the earth; all the fish of the sea are delivered into your hand, and everything that moves and lives will be yours for food; as even the green herbs I have delivered them all to you." And we do not read that God granted such full and explicit use to the innocents [before the Fall]; and the same is suggested by any number of the statements of the Scriptures of both Old and New Testament. Thus in Genesis 4[:3,4] it is written: "It came to pass after many days that Cain offered of the fruits of the earth gifts to the Lord; Abel also offered of the first-born of his flocks." In this text, if we notice subtly the finger of the Spirit writing in such a nuanced way, that Abel, the just man, offered some of his own things, and the unjust man Cain things from outside, "of the fruits of the earth." It is clearly suggested that every just man is simply lord over all the things he rules, but the unjust man unjustly holds the things of others, as the Bishop of Armagh notes and declares (in On the Poverty of the Savior, \SCII\ES, Chapter 3), a useful witness to this doctrine. And the same thing is said by Augustine, Jerome, Hugh of St. Victor, the Bishop of Lincoln, and other men of learning, to whom were granted the first-fruits of the senses of the Scriptures. But also the Teacher of the Gentiles, in Hebrews 2[:8], proves that as human being Christ had lordship of the totality, by the text of the Psalm, "You have subjected all things under his feet." "In subjecting all things to him," he says, "he left nothing not subjected to him." But since we are Christ's brothers, adopted sons, co-heirs with him, it follows likewise that all things are subject to us, even Christ himself. All things therefore belong to the just; not, however, sins, because they do not [??] follow upon creatures, as death and life do [an allusion to 1 Corinthians 3:21\PN2]. For truth and sin, which are the limits of the created universe, cannot serve anyone, though in some sense they benefit the just.
ulterius est quaedam iustorum differentia notanda, ut quod quidam} sint iusti ad tempus qui statim excidunt [fol. 74r, line 40] a iusticia ut presciti, et quidam iusti predestinati qui finaliter perseverant; et hii solum sunt heredes regni habentes ius perpetuum pro [fol. 74r, line 41] se et suis. Primi autem, tamquam liberi tenentes, habent ad tempus pro quo serviunt sine forisfactura, omnia bona Domini secum {om.} tunc existencia: verumtamen [fol. 74r, line 42] non habent simpliciter titulum hereditarium pro suo perpetuo {pro suo perpetuo: all their life long} ad hec bona, quod non stat per defectum domini, cum limitat illis sub pena forisfacture [fol. 74r, line 43] quod omnia {bona add.} sua in caritate {sua add.} fiant (ut {om.} patet 1 Cor.xvi,14); quod servicium debitum *{om.} dum subtrahunt, a suo dominio excidunt; ideo non [fol. 74r, line 45] conceditur {?} de illis quod habent omnia, sed, quantum merentur de congruo de bonis gracie et nature, omnia tunc secum existencia: sed non {nec} habent {?omnem add.} suam beatitudinem, [fol. 74r, line 45] cum ipsam non merentur (ut {om.} patet {om.} supra, capitulo secundo), nec bona futura post sui dampnacionem; predestinatis autem promittit apostolus signanter i Cor.iii.22, [fol. 74r, line 46] quod omnia sunt illorum, sive presencia sive futura; de preteritis autem non meminit, quia, cum dominium requirit existenciam extremorum, videtur quod preterita [fol. 74r, line 47] corrupta ante illorum existenciam non sunt *{sua add.} sicut futura omnia {om.}, cum manent in gracia predestinacionis perpetua; verumtamen {attamen}, cum omnia preterita {prescita vel predestinata [fol. 74r, line 48] ? ?}, que iam non existunt, perficiunt dispositive ordinem seculi iam instantem, potest probabiliter dici quod omnis predestinatus habet [fol. 74r, line 49] omnia preterita vel futura, et correspondenter habet esse sempiternum in causis secundis, et iam non habet illa in propria existencia sed in effectu vel [fol. 74r, line 50] fruitu *{fructu}, modo {om.} quo {quomodo} opera bonorum sequuntur illos, ut {om.} dicitur {om.} Apokal. xiv.13, et alibi sepe {sepius} in Scriptura patet *{habetur} consimile; ideo *{om.} etc. *{om.}	Further, we must note a certain difference among the just, namely that some of them are just {ad tempus} for a time who soon {excidunt} fall from justice (these are the foreknown), and some are the predestined just who persevere finally. Only the latter are the heirs of the kingdom with a perpetual right "for themselves and theirs." The former, however, have as freeholders all the Lord's goods then in their actual possession while they serve without forfeiture, but they do not simply have an hereditary, {pro suo perpetuo} life-long title to these goods. Their title does not {stat} stand because of {defectum} loss of their lord, since he {limitat} prescribes to them under pain of forfeiture that all their acts be done in charity (as is clear in 1 Corinthians 16[:14]), and when they withdraw this service, they are {excidunt a} deprived of his lordship. Therefore it is not conceded of them that they have "all things," but, as far as they merit de congruo by means of the gifts of grace and nature, [they have] all things then in their actual possession; but they do not have their blessedness, since they do not merit it (as is clear above, in Chapter 2), and they do not have future goods postdating their condemnation. It is {signanter} significant that when the Apostle promises the predestined, in 1 Corinthians 3[:22], that all things are theirs, whether "things present, or things to come," he does not mention things past, because, since lordship requires the existence of the extremes [of the lord-servant relationship], it seems that things that passed away before they existed are not theirs--as all future things are, since they remain in the perpetual grace of predestination. However, since all past things, which do not now exist, dispositively perfect the present order of the world, it can probably be said that every predestinate person has all things past or future (and correspondingly that he has everlasting being in second causes), but he does not have them now in their own existence, but rather in effect or in their fruits, in the way in which the deeds of the good "follow them" (as is said in Apocalypse 14[:13] and we likewise read often elsewhere in Scripture).
Cap. X [fol. 74r, line 51] Ex istis possunt {sequitur} elici {om.} quatuor veritates: prima, quod {om.} humanum dominium racione lapsus hominis est extensius {trs.} et graciosius quam fuisset toto humano genere {trs.} [fol. 74r, line 52] statum innocencie conservante. Patet primo ex hoc quod regnum {?} universitatis occasione peccati est per dampnatos, cum appendiciis suis, extensius [fol. 74r, line 53] quam foret subducto omni peccato; et super omnibus illis dominatur quilibet beatus, ergo extensius quam dominaretur subducto {omni add.} peccato {peccati W (Poole); peccato P}. Pro asserto {assumpto} [fol. 74r, line 54] suppono pronunc quod tanta {om.} multitudo precise sit {trs. 231} celestium {tanta add.} civium {om.}, quanta fuisset subducto peccato. Ex quo patet quod, quot sunt homines vel angeli [fol. 74r, line 55] damnati {dominati, damnati in margin W (Poole); dampnati P}, tot erunt {plures add.} homines, et *{om.} plures {om.} quam fuissent *{in add.} statu innocentie ex integro conservato; et cum mors et vita omnium {illorum} istorum {om.} cedunt [fol. 74r, line 56] sanctis {om.} ad gloriam et ministerium, secundum Paulum {apostolum} patet quod occasione peccati est dominium beatorum {bonorum} extensius et gloriosius.	[Four implications illustrating God's generosity] Chapter 10 From these points four truths can be drawn. First, that because of the Fall human lordship is more extensive and more gracious than it would have been if the whole human race had preserved the state of innocence. This is clear, first, from the fact that by the occasion offered by sin the kingdom of the universe is more extensive--because of the damned and the things connected with them--than it would have been if there had been no sin; and over all these all the blessed are lords; therefore their lordship is more extensive than it would have been if there had been no sin. In favour of {asserto} the major premise I suppose for now that the multitude of heavenly citizens is by itself as great as it would have been if sin had after all not happened; from this it is clear that there will exist as many human beings more than would have existed if the state of innocence had been completely preserved as there are human beings or angels who have been damned. And since the death and life of all these {cedere sanctis} redound to the glory and service of the saints, according to Paul [1 Corinthians 3:20], it is clear that, by the occasion offered by sin, the lordship of the blessed is more extensive and more glorious.
Secundo *{om.} confirmatur idem *{hoc} per hoc [fol. 74r, line 58] quod humanum genus recipit multa {misteria vel add.} ministeria a Christo, qui est magni consilii Angelus et a ceteris angelis, que non recepisset [fol. 74r, line 59] stante statu innocencie ex integro; ergo conclusio. Argumentum {assumptum} {a^m W} patet ex hoc quod Christus fuit minister Hebreorum (secundum {om.} apostolum {om.} {ad add.} Rom. xv.8) et omnes alii sunt [fol. 74r, line 60] administratorii Spiritus (ut {om.} dicit {om.} apostolus {om.}, Hebr. primo capitulo); et {om.} quod nec {autem} Christus {non add.} fuisset incarnatus nec angeli taliter administrantes si nullum peccatum precesserit. [fol. 74r, line 60] Ex hoc videtur quod utrumque foret superfluum; ymmo, posito quod sic, Christus non fuisset sic {om.} passus {punitus} et {nec} mortuus, nec angeli ex pugna cum dyabolo [fol. 74r, line 61] mererentur; que omnia cum {trs.} serviunt beatis ad gloriam, sequitur quod tale {om.} dominium illorum {om.} est modo amplius quam fuisset.	This is confirmed by the fact that the human race receives many services from Christ, who is "the angel of great counsel," and from the other angels that it would not have received if the state of innocence had {stante} lasted completely; therefore the conclusion. The argument is clear from the fact that Christ was a servant to the Hebrews (according to the Apostle, Romans 15[:8]), and all the others are "ministering spirits" (as the Apostle says in Hebrews, 1[:14]); and if sin had not happened Christ would not have been made flesh and the angels would not have ministered in such a way. From this it seems that both would have been superfluous; rather, assuming that it was so, Christ would not thus have suffered and died, and the angels would not have merited by fighting the devil; since all these things serve the blessed for glory, it follows that such lordship of the blessed is now wider than it would have been.
Tercio *{om.} confirmatur ex hoc quod predestinati pugnando cum [fol. 74v, line 1] hostibus, in virtute ducis exercitus Jesu Christi superaddunt unum genus meriti {demeriti}, quod pro statu innocencie non {om.} fuisset {defuisset}, et aliunde est equivalens [fol. 74v, line 2] vel superhabundans quantum ad graciam; ergo simpliciter est dominium hominis graciosius et premium gloriosius quam fuisset: patet consequencia, cum quia nullum triumphum [fol. 74v, line 3] laudabilem pretermittit Deus irremuneratum {?}, eciam ultra condignum, tum eciam *{om.} quia, racione lapsus, est talis gracia sincerior quam fuisset si filius adoptivus [fol. 74v, line 4] staret innocens, immunis simpliciter a peccato; gaudium ergo de triumpho superadditur beatis occasione peccati, cum constat quod, subducto [fol. 74v, line 5] omni peccato, non fuiset rebellio: unde non legi angelos astitisse hominibus ministraliter ante lapsum, cum instructi fuissent sufficienter [fol. 74v, line 6] per dominium; nec oportuisset opposuisse {aposuisse} angelum bonum contra malum, ubi nulla adversancia astitisset: unde in signum huius dominii legitur Apok [fol. 74v, line 7] ultimo, postquam Iohannes cecidit ad pedes angeli ut adoraret cum dulia, qui ostendit {?} sibi ministeria: Vide, inquit, ne feceris; conservus enim tuus sum et fratrum tuorum; ubi [fol. 74v, line 8] non est putandum angelum propter urbanitatem falsum fingere.	It is confirmed from the fact that by fighting with enemies in the strength of the leader of their army, Jesus Christ, the predestined add one kind of merit that would not have existed in the state of innocence and it [i.e., their merit under other heads] is otherwise equivalent or superabundant in respect of grace; therefore the lordship of humanity is simply more gracious and the reward more glorious than it would have been. {consequencia} The inference is clear, both because God allows no praiseworthy triumph to go without reward, even beyond what is condign, and because by reason of the Fall such grace is purer than it would have been if the adoptive son had {staret} remained innocent, simply free from sin; therefore joy in the triumph is added to the blessed by the occasion offered by sin, since it is certain that, if all sin were removed, there would have been no rebellion. Thus I have not read that the angels assisted human beings by their ministry before the fall, when they [i.e. human beings] would have been provided for sufficiently by their own lordship; and it would not have been necessary for the good angels to have opposed the bad, since there would have been no antagonism. Thus, as a sign of this lordship, we read in Apocalypse 22[:9], that, when John fell at the feet of the angel who had done him service to adore him in worship, the angel said: "Do not do that; for I am your fellow servant, and the servant of your brothers." We must not think that the angel lied here out of politeness.
Et {ex add.} hinc credo {?credendum} beatum Gregorium in cantico ecclesie confirmasse *{dixisse} quod necessarium {?} fuit {?} Ade [fol. 74v, line 9] peccatum et {etc} nostrum {om.}, et felix culpa que talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem {que... redemptorem: etc}: felix, dico {inquam}, a signo remissibilitatis {?}, sicut urina est sana {trs.}. Et huic sentencie videtur apostolus alludere (Rom. v.20) [fol. 74v, line 10] quando dicit, Ubi habundavit delictum, superhabundavit et gracia {superhabundavit... gracia: etc}. Sed absit ex isto concludere quod peccandum est {sit} ut bona eveniant (ut {sicut} supra dictum est, capitulo sexto); quia quod bonum [fol. 74v, line 11] evenit, non est {om.} ex occasione data delicti, sed ex gracia Salvatoris. Ex quo patet quod propter istam sentenciam Christianus speraret in nomine Christi {trs.}, potens victorialiter [fol. 74v, line 12] insurgere ad pugnandum viriliter pro corona, et yperduliam devocius sibi {Christo} refunderet {?} in cuius virtute fiunt hec omnia. Et sic patet [fol. 74v, line 13] illud *{salvatoris add.}, Luc.xv.7, salvari ad litteram quod Gaudium erit in celo super uno peccatore penitenciam agente, quam super nonaginta novem iustis qui {peccatore... qui: etc usque} non indigent penitencia. Pro cuius declaracione suppono quod Salvator [fol. 74v, line 14] intelligat in sua parabola per centenarium universitatem creature *{rationalis add.} {why singular?} salvandam, per ovem perditam humanum genus per Christum redemptum, et per [fol. 74v, line 15] nonaginta novem universitatem novem ordinum angelorum stancium: cum ergo Christus sit unum suppositum illius generis, qui, licet non peccavit, egit tamen penitenciam [fol. 74v, line 16] principalem pro omnibus; patet {om.} quod plus gaudendum est de illo genere quod, secundum plurem {plurima} partem, est peccator, quam super {sit per, margin super W (Poole); super P} universitate {universitatem W (Poole); universitatem P} *{universitatem} ordinum angelorum; [fol. 74v, line 17] ymmo super quolibet illorum peccatorum racione redempcionis et Christi conversacionis est materia plus gaudendi.	And it was for this reason, I believe, that in the canticle of the Church blessed Gregory said that Adam's sin--and our own--was "necessary" and the fault a "happy" one that merited such and so great a redeemer: happy, I say, by the sign that it can be remitted, as urine is healthy [i.e. a sign of health]. The Apostle seems to allude to this doctrine when he says, "Where sin abounded, grace super-abounded" (Romans 5[:20]). But (as was said above, in Chapter 6) it must not be inferred from this that we should sin so that good may come, because it is not from the occasion given by the crime that good comes, but from the Savior's grace. From this it is clear that, because of that doctrine, the Christian would hope in Christ's name, being able to rise up victoriously to fight bravely for a crown, and would more devotedly return special worship to him in whose strength all these things are done. Thus it is clear that the text of the Savior in Luke 15[:7] is satisfied literally, that "there will be more joy in heaven upon one sinner doing penance than over ninety nine just persons who need not do penance." To explain this I suppose that in his parable the Savior meant by the hundred the totality of the rational {creature --why singular?} creation to be saved, by the {perditam} lost sheep the human race redeemed by Christ, and by the ninety nine the totality of nine orders of angels {stancium} who did not fall: since, therefore, Christ is one individual of this race, who, though he did not sin, yet does the chief penance for all, it is clear that there should be more rejoicing concerning this race which, in its more numerous part, is a race of sinners, than over all the orders of angels--indeed, over any of those sinners there is matter for greater rejoicing because of the redemption and the life {conversatio} of Christ.
Secunda veritas est {om.} ista, {om.} quod {om.} totum genus humanum complecius per [fol. 74v, line 18] mediatorem Dei et hominum est redemptum quam fuit perditum {per ?peccatum}: pro cuius {quo} declaracione {om.} suppono quod tota multitudo predestinatorum sit una generacio [fol. 74v, line 19] sive genus, cuius principium {?} sit secundus Adam celestis; et totum genus prescitorum sit generacio pessima, cuius pater seu {aut} principium sit dyabolus. Patet ista supposicio ex modo [fol. 74v, line 20] loquendi Salvatoris: creberrime {?} de {?} prima {?} dicitur, i Ioh.v18, Generacio Dei conservat predestinatum; de secundo, Math.xvi, Generacio mala et adultera signum querit: et de illa loquitur Math.xxiii 34-36, Ecce ego mitto ad vos sapientes, etc., ut veniat super vos omnis sangwis iustus. Amen dico vobis, venient hec omnia {signum... omnia: Math. 23 (between lines) usque} super generacionem istam; ubi nec {non} dubium [fol. 74v, line 21] intelligit totam multitudinem prescitorum, cum Math. xxiv.34 dicit, Amen dico vobis quia non preteribit generacio hec donec omnia fiant. Unde Crisostomus super illo Math.xxiii, scribit {om.}: Omnium, inquit, [fol. 74v, line 22] iniquorum persecutorum homicidarum generacio una est, et si non sint omnes in tempore uno omnes sunt filii persecutorum, ipsius Caym; et declarat [fol. 74v, line 23] diffuse continuacionem illus generacionis a gente in gentem. Istis suppositis patet conclusio de generacione predestinatorum que ex integro est redempta. Et cum redimitur {hoc est add.} [fol. 74v, line 24] ad maius et melius dominium ad gloriosius premium, et secundum tantam multitudinem {predestinatorum add.} electorum quanta fuisset servata in *{om.} innocencia, patet quod complecius [fol. 74v, line 25] est redemptum quam fuit perditum per peccatum: utrum autem precise idem {?} homines qui fuissent in {om.} statu {om.} innocencie iam salvantur, vel mixtim utriusque [fol. 74v, line 26] generacionis homines tunc fuissent, non audeo {debet} temere diffinire; sed probabiliter assero *{potest dici} quod manet idem genus salvatum quod fuit perditum per peccatum, intelligendo [fol. 74v, line 27] modo priori {?} per genus generative *{?generationem}, excluso principio qui est Christus. Nam non est qui ex integro faciat bonum, usque ad illud unum exclusive {nam... exclusive: om.}; cum ipse {om.} nunquam illegaliter declinavit {delinquerit}.	The second truth is this, that "the mediator between God and men" redeems the whole human race more completely than it was {perditum} lost. To explain this I suppose that the whole multitude of the predestined is one generation or race, the origin of which is the second, heavenly, Adam, and the whole race of the foreknown is the wicked generation, the father or origin of which is the devil. The supposition is clear from the Savior's manner of speaking. The former generation is referred to very {creberrime} often: in 1 John 5[:18], "The generation of God preserves" the predestined. The latter is referred to in Matthew 16[:4]: "An evil and adulterous generation seeks a sign." It is spoken of in Matthew 23[:34\PN6]: "Behold, I send you wise men... so that all the just blood may come upon you. Amen, I say to you that all these things will come upon this generation"--there is no doubt he means here the whole multitude of the foreknown, since in Matthew 24[:34] he says, "Amen, I say to you that this generation will not pass until all these things happen." Thus Chrysostom writes on this text of Matthew 23: "The generation of all wicked murdering persecutors is one, and if they do not all exist in the one time, they are [nevertheless] all children of persecutors, of Cain himself," and he explains at length the {continuacionem} continuity of this generation from one people to another. Supposing these things, the conclusion is clear concerning the generation of the predestined, which is redeemed as a whole. Since it is redeemed to a greater and better lordship, to a more glorious prize, and according to as great a multitude of the elect as there would have been if innocence had been preserved, it is clear that this generation has been redeemed more completely than it was {perditum} lost by sin. But whether precisely the same people who would have existed in the state of innocence are now being saved, or whether there would then have been mixedly people of both generations, I do not dare rashly to define; but it can probably be said that the race saved remains the same as that which was {perditum} lost through sin (by "the race" understanding as before the generation, excluding the origin who is Christ; for none of them wholly did good up to him alone, since he never unlawfully turned aside).
Et *{ex quo} patet quod de toto genere humano, aliqui {quidam} sunt [fol. 74v, line 28] non redempti, ut presciti qui nunquam gustaverunt {om.} carismata caritatis; aliqui {quidam} sunt redempti set non ad hereditatem vel gloriam, ut presciti qui a gracia [fol. 74v, line 29] exciderunt; et {om.} aliqui {quidam} sunt {om.} redempti de captivitate ad gloriam, ut generacio iustorum qui in gracia finaliter perseverant: utrum autem plures sunt {sint} dampnati [fol. 74v, line 30] quam salvati, sicut *{innuere add.} videtur *{textus multi sunt vocati pauci electi Math. 22 add.} multis *{om.} Scripturam *{om.} sapere *{om.}, {et illud add.} non est nostrum discutere. Non enim sequitur: Multi [fol. 74v, line 31] sunt vocati pauci vero electi {vocati... electi: etc}, ergo plures sunt dampnandi quam {quod W (Poole)} salvandi;' cum tota generacio {multitudo} salvandorum {vel generacio add.} et maior pars {generationis add.} adultere sit vocata, et minor numerus [fol. 74v, line 32] est paucus respectu minoris *{maioris}: unde, licet perdicio {trs.} sit universalior quam redempcio, ipsa tamen est prestancior {?} ex perdicione finali prescitorum cum ultra genus salvandorum [fol. 74v, line 33] in statu innocencie exinde perficitur, et precium sufficiens pro quotlibet mundis salvandis, si fuerint {fierent vel essent}, est solutum. Et patet quod materiam *{?manet} {m^az W; maz P} [fol. 74v, line 34] superhabundans dat *{om.} operacio ubique {utrobique} {trs.} redemptoris quia maius genus hominum redemit ad gloriam vel graciam {trs. 321}, quam in statu innocencie salvaretur, et preter hoc [fol. 74v, line 35] creavit unum aliud genus, quod licet ex proprio peccato sit perditum, tamen {om.} cedit salvandis ad gaudium, et precium redempcionis illorum sufficiens, si non rennuerint, [fol. 74v, line 36] est inpensum: unde quod Adam habet plures filios modo licet indebite procreatos quam habuisset subducto peccato, est bonum sibi et ordinatum eternaliter ad [fol. 74v, line 37] perfeccionem perpetuam universi.	From this it is clear that of the whole human race some are not redeemed, such as the foreknown who have never tasted the charismata of charity; some are redeemed, but not to the inheritance or glory, such as the foreknown who {exciderunt} have fallen from grace; and some are redeemed from captivity to glory, such as the generation of the just who persevere finally in grace. But whether more are damned than saved, as the text "Many are called but few are chosen (Matthew 22[:14]) seems to suggest, is not for us to resolve. For it does not follow, "Many are called, but few are chosen, therefore more are to be damned than saved," since the whole generation of those to be saved and the greater part of the adulterous generation are called, and the lesser number [i.e. those who will be saved] is "few" in respect of the greater: thus {licet} even if perdition is more general than redemption, it [redemption] is {prestancior} greater because of the final perdition of the foreknown, since it has been carried thence {exinde} beyond the race of those to be saved in the state of innocence, and a price has been paid sufficient to save any number of worlds, if they had existed. And it is clear that the operation of the redeemer remains everywhere superabundant, because he redeems to glory or grace a greater race of human beings than would have been saved in the state of innocence, and beyond this he has created another race which, though by its own sin is {perditum} lost, yet {cedere salvandis} redounds to the glory of those who are to be saved, and a price has been paid sufficient for their redemption if they do not refuse. Hence it is good for him, and something eternally ordained to the everlasting perfection of the universe, that Adam now has more sons, though begotten in an unlawful way, than he would have had but for sin.
Tercia veritas sequens ex dictis {hiis} est {om.} ista {om.}: Sicut peccans post maiorem graciam peccat gravius, sic resurgens post lapsum a gracia [fol. 74v, line 38] redit ad tantam graciam vel maiorem. Prima pars ex {om.} hoc {om.} videtur {om.} evidens quod {patet quia}, peccatum dictum formaliter *{est defectus ubi igitur ?persona debet esse in gratia maiori et ex culpa propria [fol. 74v, line 39] deficit add.} est defectus amplior et per consequens maius peccatum: igitur {om.} confirmatur ex hoc quod ingratitudo prius grati, peccantis post maiora carismata, [fol. 74v, line 40] est eo maior; et omnis ingratitudo est peccatum vel {hoc add.} sese inseparabiliter consequitur; ergo et peccatum est adeo magis grave. Et *{om.} tercio *{om.} confirmatur ex hoc [fol. 74v, line 41] quod omnis Deo gracior est de tanto sibi obligacior, et per consequens solvendo obligacionem est inobediencior, et obliganti {obligato} plus debitor, et hec ac {et} peccata [fol. 74v, line 42] sibi invicem in gravedine commendent *{correspondent}. Sicut ergo cadens a gradu alciori ad situm eque bassum patitur ruinam cum paribus [fol. 74v, line 43] graviorem, sic cadens spiritualiter *{om.} a maiori gradu *{gratia spiritualiter} ad non gradum *{gratiam} simpliciter magis peccat. Et {om.} hinc dicunt doctores quod primus parens post statum innocencie [fol. 74v, line 44] non potuit primo {om.} venialiter peccavisse {peccare} {trs.}, quia tanto dotato virtutibus non affuisset excusacio peccandi, quantumcunque {?} levi peccato de genere; et [fol. 74v, line 45] cum venialitas et excusabilitas a dampnacione, sicut et eorum opposita, correspondent, videtur patere sentencia: ideo (ut patet tractatu primo, de ordinacione [fol. 74v, line 46] temptacionis, capitulo quinto) primum peccatum fuit defectus submissionis *{obmissionis W (Poole)} {?omissionis}, quod sequebatur superbia peccatum proximum actuale.	The third truth following from what has been said is this. Just as [a] one who sins after a greater grace sins more seriously, so [b] one who rises again after a fall from grace returns to as great a grace, or greater. The first part seems evident from the fact that sin in the formal sense is {defectus} a defection; therefore where a person ought to be in a greater grace and by his own fault defects, the defection is larger and consequently the sin is greater. This is confirmed by the fact that the ingratitude of one previously in grace, who sins after greater gifts, is to that extent greater; and ingratitude is always a sin or follows inseparably upon sin; therefore the sin also is to that extent more serious. It is confirmed by the fact that anyone who is more pleasing to God is to that extent more obliged to him, and consequently by throwing off the obligation is more disobedient and more in debt to the one who obliges him, and these things and sins correspond to one another in seriousness. Therefore, just as one who falls from a higher degree to a situation equally low suffers a loss more serious than that of his equals [i.e. those who are his equals after his fall], so one who falls from a higher grace spiritually to no grace sins simply more. Thus the {doctores} learned say that our first parent after the state of innocence could not have sinned first venially, because for one so gifted with virtues there would have been no excuse for sinning, by a sin however light in its kind; and since forgivability and excusability from damnation, like their opposites, correspond, the doctrine seems to be clear. Therefore the first sin was a {defectus} fault of omission, upon which followed pride, the next actual sin; this is clear in Tract \SCI\ES, on the ordering of temptation, chapter 5 (De mandatis divinis, p. 37).
Sed pro solucione obiectuum dicitur [fol. 74v, line 47] communiter quod gravedo peccati potest attendi tripliciter: primo intensive, et sic defectus gracie Petri, a qua cecidit negando Dominum, fuit maius peccatum quam peccatum [fol. 74v, line 48] traditoris, posito quod nunquam fuerat ita grave *{fuerat... grave: Iudas fuerit ita gracius}; secundo {modo add.} dicitur peccatum reliquo {alio} gravius extensive, et sic quodlibet peccatum finalis inpenitencie [fol. 74v, line 49] est infinitum gravius quam peccatum aliquod quod doletur *{infinitum... gravius: peccato quod ?deletur gravius}; et {om.} tercio {modo add.} dicitur {om.} peccatum {om.} gravius {om.} effective, in hoc quod magis nocet rei publice quoad sensum, et sic occidens plures homines vel [fol. 74v, line 50] meliores iniuste plus peccat quam gracior ad hoc consulens vel consenciens.' Et istam gravedinem attendunt iudices *{solum add.} [fol. 74v, line 51] secundum faciem solum *{om.} iudicantes; et in opinione gravedinis talis peccati sensibilis, sicut et sue pene, errant plurimi putantes quod [fol. 74v, line 52] pena sensus propter eius sensibilitatem equiparari poterit pene dampni.	But for the solution of objections it is commonly said that the seriousness of a sin can be looked at in three ways: first intensively, and thus Peter's {defectus} failing in grace, from which he {cecidit} fell by denying the Lord, was a greater sin than the sin of the betrayer, assuming that Judas was never so full of grace; second, a sin is said to be more serious than another extensively, and thus any sin of final impenitence is more serious than a sin that is blotted out; and third, a sin is said to be more serious effectively, in that it does more sensible harm to the commonwealth, and thus one who unjustly kills more or better victims sins more than one in more grace who advises or consents to it. And judges take notice only of this [third] seriousness, judging by appearance; and many err in their opinion of the seriousness of such sensible sin and concerning its penalties, thinking that the pain of sense, because it can be perceived by the senses, will be equal to the pain of damnation.
Secunda vero *{om.} pars conclusionis patet ex largitate et perfeccione divini operis, [fol. 74v, line 53] quod non potest quidquam reparare vel facere nisi augendo ipsum perficiat; cum sit Ioseph acrescens et non decrescens in aliquo vel {nec} peyorans. [fol. 74v, line 54] Probatur {hoc add.} per deducens {deductiones} ad impossibile, capiendo a falsigrapho quod Petrus {Sortes} cadens a gracia, ut 2 *{8a}, peccando mortaliter resituatur tantum [fol. 74v, line 55] ad gradum gracie, ut 6; in qua decidat, proporcionabiliter ad istam {illam} graciam premiatus: et patet, cum gracie vie et glorie patrie correspondent {corresponeant}, quod Petrus {om.} est {om.} parcius [fol. 74v, line 56] premiatus *{premiatur} quam foret *{fuisset} si in prima gracia decessisset. Ex quo patet quod manebit perpetuo privatus gloria correspondente gracie, ut secunda *{8a}, ad quam [fol. 74v, line 57] ante lapsum habuit iusticiam; quod, stante ista dampnacione *{damnificatione} perpetua, peccatum non est plene dimissum; sed, cum manet perpetua {?perpetuus} pena peccati *{om.} [fol. 74v, line 58] dampni, gravior quam aliqua pena sensus, reliquitur quod manet peccatum *{perpetuum add.} in beato: consequens *{est add.} impossibile, cum {eo quod} Deus {om.} non potest remittere {remitti culpa vel} partem {pars} [fol. 74v, line 59] peccati et dimittere reliquam irremissam, eo quod non potest remittere culpam nisi infundat graciam que non stat in aliquo cum mortali. Et ista est sentencia Linconiensis, Armakani {trs.} et aliorum doctorum concorditer.	[b] The second part of the conclusion is clear from the breadth and perfection of the divine work, which cannot repair anything or make it unless it perfects it by increasing it, since he is Joseph, increasing and not decreasing in any respect or making worse. This is proved by a reductio ad absurdum, starting from the {falsigrapho} false assumption that Peter, falling from grace, for example [from degree of grace] 8, by sinning mortally, is restored only (for example) to degree of grace 6, in which he dies, rewarded in proportion to that grace. Since the grace of the way and the glory of the fatherland correspond, it is clear that Peter is rewarded more sparingly than he would have been if he had died in the first grace. From this it is clear that he will remain forever deprived of the glory corresponding to the grace, e.g. the eighth degree, to which he had a right before his fall; that, if this loss {stante} stands forever, the sin is not fully forgiven; but, because the penalty of the damned, more serious than any pain of sense, remains everlasting, it follows that sin remains forever in one who is blessed. {consequens} The conclusion is impossible, since God cannot {remittere} remit part of a sin and {dimittere} forgive the rest unremitted, since he cannot remit a fault unless he pours in grace, which {non stat} cannot coexist in anyone with mortal sin. And that is the doctrine of the Bishop of Lincoln, the Bishop of Armagh, and other {doctorum} learned men in concord.
Ex qua quarto {om.} patet quod, si sine superaddicione meriti peccans originaliter baptisetur, [fol. 74v, line 61] restituitur ex equo ad minimum gradum gracie, que per minimum peccatum, scilicet originale, sibi defuerat; quod si attricione vel contricione meruerit {?} [fol. 74v, line 62] sibi secundam graciam, tunc de lege *{communi add.} divine misericordie restituitur ad graciam ampliorem. Ex quo patet quod sicut Deus restituit naturam lapsam [fol. 74v, line 63] penitentem ad graciam uberiorem quam fuit illa a qua ceciderat {?}, sic restituit ad utilius dominium, tollendo omni mala culpe. {sed rel-? add.} [fol. 75r, line 1] {? ad ?militans commodum ecclesie mala culpe add.} Et {om.} ex ista {qua} radice eliciunt doctores quod Christus {dominus} non sanavit aliquem corporaliter nisi quem prius mentaliter {trs.} sanaverat; quia si corporaliter sanavit, tunc donavit sanitatem huiusmodi corporalem, et per consequens {per consequens: ita} graciam et alia queque {que} sequuntur: quis ergo non delectaretur cum Apostolo (Rom. vii. 22) in huiusmodi lege Dei, etc?	From this it is clear, fourth, that if, without an addition of merit, one with original sin is baptized, he is restored equally to the lowest degree of grace, which he {sibi defuerat} had lost by the least sin, namely original sin; but if by attrition or contrition he merits a second grace, then by the common law of divine mercy he is restored to a fuller grace. From this it is clear that, just as God has restored repentant fallen nature to a richer grace than that from which it had fallen, so he has restored it to a more useful lordship, taking away all the evil of fault. And from this root {doctores} the learned infer that Christ did not heal anyone physically without first healing them mentally; because if he healed physically, then he granted such physical health, and consequently grace and whatever else follows. Who, therefore, would not declare with the Apostle (Rom.7[:22]), "For I am delighted with the law of God" etc.?
Return to Books, Articles, Essays

JOHN WYCLIF, DE CIVILI DOMINIO CHS. 1-10

Introduction

MANUSCRIPTS

Conventions

John Wyclif, On Civil Lordship, chapters 1-10

[No one in mortal sin has a simple right to God's gifts]

[First Argument]

[Second Argument]

[Third Argument]

[Fourth argument]

[Objections to the fourth argument]

[Answers]

[A difficulty]

[Reply]

[More Objections]

[Replies to objections]

[Preliminaries]

[Replies]

[Fifth Argument]

[Sixth argument]

[Seventh argument]

[Eighth argument]

[Ninth argument]

[Anyone in gratifying grace (finally) has in reality all God's good things]

[Five Arguments to prove that everything belongs to the just]

[Implications regarding true and false fame]

[God will not allow the just to be deprived of anything without recompense]

[Another argument to prove that everything belongs to the just]

[Four implications illustrating God's generosity]