John Kilcullen
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People taking part in politics will of course be guided partly by their philosophical beliefs (philosophy in the second sense of the word), including their religious beliefs, if they are religious. There is nothing objectionable about that, no violation of any (reasonable) idea of separation of Church and State. But they owe it to their fellow citizens, as we all do, to engage in philosophy in the first sense, i.e. to make a serious attempt, from time to time, to make sure their basic beliefs are true. This will involve listening to other people who do not share their religious beliefs and giving relevant and truthful answers to their questions and objections.
It is my impression that many Christians in politics use the "you'll go blind" type of argument--that is, instead of saying "I believe in this policy (e.g. refusing government money to overseas health programs that may advise contraception) because of my religious beliefs", they look for some other plausible reason, not their real reason, and often not a valid reason, that they hope will persuade non-religious people to support a policy they have really adopted for religious reasons. There is nothing wrong with saying, "I believe in this for religious reasons, but I recognise this won't convince you; but there are other reasons that might convince you, namely...", or "I believe in this partly for religious reasons, but I also have other reasons that you also might find convincing, namely...". But in my opinion it is wrong to pretend that their only reasons are the non-religious reasons. This is deception. If politicians give their religious reasons, other people may ask for explanations and support for those reasons, and the religious politician might have to justify his or her religious belief; but they should not evade that.
The above is an application of the general idea of honesty in discussion. Politicians of all kinds, and people in non-political life, often conceal their real reasons and pretend to have reasons they do not have, or pretend that certain reasons are their only reasons when in fact they have others. This is a departure from the virtues of frankness, openness, transparency. Apart from the moral objection to this sort of deception, it is usually ineffective: people are not as stupid as the would-be deceivers imagine.
Many religious people seem to think of conscience as a special faculty put into us by God to warn us against wrongdoing and to rebuke us when we do wrong. It is sometimes referred to as a "voice" in my soul that I must obey, equivalent in authority to the voice of God. It seems to me that this conception (which goes back only to the middle ages) has an unfortunate consequence. It shields the individual's moral judgment from the questions and objections of other people. My conscience is not an infallible source of guidance, it is not the voice of God in my soul, it is simply me in dialogue with myself about the rightness or wrongness of something I have done or propose to do. "My conscience tells me that this would be wrong" means simply, "After careful consideration, I don't think I should do this". My judgment, no matter how carefully made, is not infallible. There is no reason why other people should not disagree and give me reasons for thinking that my opinion is mistaken. They are not really trying to contradict the voice of God, they are simply trying to correct what they think is a mistake I am making.
To speak of "the rights of conscience", to say that "conscience must be respected", or that no one should try to make me act "against my conscience" may mean that those who disagree with my moral judgment should not use threats or inducements to get me to do something I think is wrong, and this is right. But there is no reason why others should not try to change my opinion, so that I no longer think it's wrong, and sometimes they should physically stop me from doing what I think I ought to do if it violates the rights of others. (See my essay, "Pierre Bayle on the Rights of Conscience".)
In politics, when people appeal to their faith or to their conscience, it often seems to me that they are trying to evade discussion--don't ask me for reasons, don't argue that I should change my mind, don't hold me responsible, just accept that I can't help thinking what I think and doing what I think I ought to do: "Here I stand, I can do no other". When their conscience is based on religious teaching, I suspect that they invoke their conscience as a way of avoiding explaining their religious reasons and avoiding any discussion in which they might have to explain why they believe in their religion. It seems to me that if politicians vote a certain way, they owe it to their fellow citizens to explain and discuss their real reasons for voting that way, and citizens dissatisfied with their vote are entitled to hold them accountable.
Kevin Rudd's emphasis on his religious beliefs (see "Faith in Politics") is an imitation of US Democrats. For a recent report see here. [2009: for more recent reports see The FundamentaList; on the increasing reference to religion in Australian politics see "Politics and Religious Language".]
The Catholic Church and Politics
Protestant churches do not claim authority over the consciences of their members. This is consistent with the Protestant tradition that each individual is responsible for his or her belief -- see above. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, claims authority over conscience, not in the sense that it claims the right to instruct a person to act against conscience, but in the sense that, when the application of principles is clear, the Church claims to be able to tell the individual what conscience should say, and the Catholic is bound to take the Church's teaching as conclusive. "It seems to me that therapeutic cloning would be morally right, but the Church tells me that it is not, and I am bound to take the Church's teaching as decisive: so, taking that teaching into account, my conscience after all tells me that therapeutic cloning is morally wrong." This is sometimes called the "informed conscience", i.e. the conscience that has informed itself properly by listening to the teaching of the Church. Between the informed conscience and Church authority there can never be conflict, by definition, because an informed conscience conforms with Church teaching.
Similar points apply to the question whether individual Catholics are entitled to follow their consciences in matters of individual morality, e.g. in deciding whether to use "artificial" methods of contraception. The official position of the Catholic Church is that Catholics are obliged to accept Church teaching as decisive in informing their consciences in such matters. Catholics who do not realise that they have that obligation, or who do not know that the Church teaches that "artificial" contraception is wrong, may not commit sin, provided their ignorance is not culpable. (On culpable and inculpable ignorance see Thomas Aquinas here and here. Inculpable ignorance is sometimes called "invincible" ignorance.) Church officials have a duty to enlighten such ignorance by insisting on the teachings of the Church. Whether it is a matter of one's own conduct, or a question of legislation or politics, the Catholic Church claims authority to tell individuals what morality requires. If they ignore this advice they may not be excommunicated, but they may be warned that they are in mortal sin, that they ought not to receive communion, that if they die without repentance they will be damned (unless excused by invincible ignorance).
Everyone believes that conscience must be properly informed, i.e. that we must be in possession of the relevant facts, that we must have reflected carefully and given due weight to every moral consideration, etc. But in the view of the Catholic Church there is one item to which a Catholic must give overriding, decisive, conclusive, weight, namely the teaching of the Church. If all other information and reflection points in a certain direction, but the teaching of the Church points to the opposite, then the properly informed conscience follows the teaching of the Church. In fact, if we know what the Church teaches on the matter, no other information or reflection is necessary. The "informed conscience" means simply a conscience in conformity with Church teaching.
On the application of this doctrine to political activity, see Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal note on some questions regarding the participation of catholics in political life (summary: Toe the line, Catholic politicians told); Archbishop Pell's warning to Catholic politicians on stem cell research.
See also Bishop Michael Sheridan, "Catholic Politicians and informed conscience". Bishop Sheridan threatens exclusion from communion not only against politicians who support the legalisation of abortion but also against Catholics who vote for those politicians (see news item). (See also here and here.) Other US Catholic bishops also seem to have suggested that it was a mortal sin for a Catholic to vote for John Kerry in the 2004 US Presidential election (see news item). Other bishops have forbidden Kathleen Sebelius (governor of Kansas) to receive communion, because she vetoed a bill from the Kansas legislature that would have criminalised certain acts of abortion; see here.
This illustrates an uncertainty in the meaning of the claim to guide conscience. Conscience is concerned with what I must/may do here and how, i.e. with particular actions. The Church teaches moral principles. Often a lengthy and complex process of reasoning is needed to connect moral principle with particular actions. How far through this reasoning process does Church authority extend? There is obviously a difference between (1) personally carrying out an abortion, (2) legislating to remove criminal sanctions against abortion (a matter to which other considerations besides the morality of abortion may be relevant, e.g. the evils of "back yard abortion"), and (3) voting for a politician who supports decriminalising abortion (who may have many other good policies). According to Thomas Aquinas, it is sometimes appropriate for immoral acts not to be subject to legal sanctions. He quotes Augustine: "The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed". Is it not up to politicians and voters to judge when certain acts that some regard as wrong should be left unpunished? Is it not up to voters to weigh the relative importance of various items in a politician's or party's program? Excommunicating voters seems to go well beyond teaching moral principles.
This is a matter that Catholic theologians should clarify. Does the Church's claim to authority in interpreting moral principles ("abortion is wrong") imply that bishops have, in some cases, the authority to tell politicians how they ought to vote on a particular legislative proposal (to remove legal sanctions against abortion) or to tell voters how they should vote in an election ("you must not vote for John Kerry, since he voted to decriminalise abortion")?Return to Teaching
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