References are to the English translation in Anselm of Canterbury, vol. 2 (Edwin Mellen Press, Toronto and New York, 1976), edited and translated by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson (Fisher Research 230.208 3). For the Latin text see F.S. Schmitt, Sancti Anselmi Opera omnia.
There is another English translation in Anselm of Canterbury The Major Works, ed. B. Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 435ff (in Fisher Special Reserve 189.4 A618 2). If you are reading that translation switch to other version of this reading guide.
The De Concordia is divided into three sections, on God's Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (p. 181-), Predestination and Free Choice (p. 196-), and Grace and Free Choice (p. 198-). Each of these has been divided by the editor of the Latin text into numbered subsections.
Line references, e.g. 197.28, i.e. p. 197, line 28: Tear off the bottom of a sheet of paper and along the straight edge of this strip put numbers corresponding with every second line on p.182. Use this as a ruler. Measure from first line that is not a heading. Measure through spaces as if it were all ordinary text. Thus 197.28 begins "Let us now consider..."
READ subsection 1, p. 181-.
Comments:
The second paragraph amounts to this: If we suppose that the coexistence of human free choice and divine foreknowledge is impossible, then a second impossibility will follow. But a supposition that implies an impossibility is impossible. So our supposition is impossible, i.e. it is impossible that the coexistence be impossible, therefore it is possible for free choice and foreknowledge to coexist.
What is the other impossibility (182.1)? See several lines down (182.7): "Therefore, it is necessary that something be going to occur without necessity", which seems to be a contradiction. That this follows from our initial supposition is argued in lines 3-7, "Now, on the assumption... as is foreknown". For a possible source of this argument see Augustine, City of God, V.10: "It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing."
Anselm's argument in this paragraph is a reductio ad impossibile: the initial supposition that something is impossible leads to an impossibility, therefore the supposition is impossible and false, therefore the opposite of the initial supposition is true -- foreknowledge and freechoice are not incompatible:
1. Suppose: The coexistence of human freewill and divine
foreknowledge is impossible.
2. Then it follows that something will necessarily come about
without necessity -- which is impossible (182.3-7).
3. Therefore the supposition from which this follows is impossible
("For, indeed, an impossible thing is one ffrom which, when
posited, some other impossible thing follows", 182.2-3).
4. That is, it is impossible that the coexistence of human
freewill and divine foreknowledge is impossible.
5. Therefore foreknowledge and free will are not incompatible
(182.7-14).
Paragraphs 3 and 4 (and later passages in the work) are an imaginary dialogue between Anselm and the reader -- "you will say... I reply".
In 182.22-3, underline "without necessity", and in 182.39-40 underline "compelled by some hidden power to will". In City of God, V.9, Augustine answers the Stoics that the existence of an order of causes does not exclude free choice, since our choices are part of the order of causes. This leaves open the possibility that our choices are caused. This is the possibility Anselm now addresses.
READ subsection 2, down to 184.2.
Comments:
First paragraph. Necessity does not always imply compulsion by some outside force: God's existence and attributes are necessary, but not because of compulsion by any other cause.
"Knowledge is only of the truth" (183.28). You might believe something false or hold a false opinion, but I do not say that you know some proposition unless I think that that proposition is true. You can believe that 2+2=6, but you can't know it, because it is not true.
"Therefore, when I say... existence or non-existence" (183.28-37). Compare this with Boethius, Consolation V.vi, 166.25-168.2 (cf. my reading guide). The necessity here is what I have called the necessity of logical inference, as distinct from the necessity of causation. If "X will happen" is true, then, of necessity, X will happen. Or, in an equivalent formulation: If X will happen, then, of necessity, X will happen. (These two formulations are equivalent because "X will happen" is equivalent to "'X will happen' is true".) This kind of necessity does not imply compulsion. The rest of the paragraph (183.37-184.2 complete the point: this kind of necessity "follows, rather than precedes" -- it is because "X will happen" is true that it is necessary that X will happen, and not vice versa.
"What will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time": i.e. when the time comes and the thing happens, "It is happening" and "It is not happening" will be contradictories, and contradictories cannot both be true simultaneously.
READ to 184.24, "same time".
Comments:
The point of the first sentence (184.3-6) is that the statement "something (e.g. your choice of what to eat at breakfast this morning) was, but not of necessity" (you could have chosen otherwise) is consistent with the statement that "everything that was, necessarily was" (and similarly with "is" and "will be"): of everything that happened in the past it is true that if it happened then, necessarily, it happened; but at least some of those things happened by free choice.
In 184.7-24 Anselm makes that point that although "Whatever is past is past" is necessarily true, it is nevertheless possible for some things that happened in the past not to have happened of necessity, just as it is possible for a piece of wood to be painted either white or black even though a white piece of wood is, necessarily, white. A past event is, necessarily, past, even though it perhaps need not have come about. Similarly it is impossible for a bachelor to be a married man (since "bachelor" means unmarried man), but it is not impossible for bachelors to marry. The necessity of logical inference -- a bachelor is necessarily unmarried, white wood is necessarily white, past events necessarily happened, future events necessarily will happen -- does not constrain what happens.
READ to the end of subsection 2.
Comments:
Bear in mind that the Latin word futurum, translated in some places in this paragraph as "future", can also be translated as "what is going to happen".
Another way of putting 184.24-32: "In the same way, some thing -- e.g. some action -- is going to happen but not by necessity, because before it happens it is possible that it is not going to happen. But it is necessary that what is going to happen is going to happen, since what is going to happen cannot simultaneously be not going to happen. Of the past, similarly, it is true (1) that some thing did not happen of necessity, since before it happened it was possible for it not to happen, and (2) that it is always necessary that what happened happened, since it cannot simultaneously not have happened." Again the difference is between the causal necessity of events and the logical necessity of statements or inferences. That some statement is of necessity true does not mean that some event must happen by necessity and not by free choice.
184.33-37 is a parenthesis, acknowledging that, as time flows on, what is now happening becomes past and what is going to happen eventually happens and becomes past, whereas what is now past will always remain past -- its tense will never change.
The rest of the paragraph reiterates the by now familiar point.
"Subsequent necessity" (185.12-13) is what Boethius calls "conditional necessity" and I have been calling the necessity of inference or logical necessity: "If Socrates is sitting, then, necessarily, Socrates is sitting", "If Socrates will drink hemlock tomorrow, then, necessarily, Socrates will drink hemlock tomorrow" -- but Socrates is quite able to get up and walk away and quite able to refuse the cup of hemlock. The other sort of necessity I have called causal necessity and Anselm refers to as compulsion: if Socrates is sitting because he is paralysed, then he is not able to get up and walk away.
READ subsection 3, to the end of the second paragraph (186.17).
Comments:
In the first two subsections Anselm had made the point that the causal necessity of an event does not follow from the "subsequent" necessity of some statement or inference. This is a logical point (that something does not follow), which leaves open the question whether anything or everything does in fact happen by causal necessity. Here he says that some future events are causally necessary and others are not. Tomorrow's rebellion is not (since people have choice), tomorrow's sunrise is.
The passage from "Therefore if of an event..." (185.25) to the end of the paragraph I would translate somewhat differently: "If I say with necessity of something that is going to happen that it is going to happen -- in this way, 'The rebellion that is going to happen tomorrow is necessarily going to happen', or 'The sunrise that is going to happen tomorrow is necessarily going to happen' -- the rebellion, which will not happen from necessity [but from choice] is asserted to be going to happen only by subsequent necessity, because of what is going to happen it is asserted that it is going to happen (for if it is going to happen tomorrow, by necessity it is going to happen), but the sunrise is understood to be going to happen by two necessities, namely both by precedent [necessity] that makes the thing happen (for it will happen because it is [causally] necessary that it happen), and by subsequent, which does not compel anything to be, since it is going to happen by necessity precisely because it is going to happen." If it is true that the sun is going to rise tomorrow because of the rotation of the earth, then its rising is necessary both by necessity of logical inference (because if it is true that it will rise, then, necessarily, it will rise) and by causal necessity (because the earth's rotation will make it rise).
God foreknows everything that will happen, whether by free choice or by causal necessity. The caused acts will happen because they are necessitated by causes. The free acts will be free, but they necessarily will happen by "subsequent" necessity, since if God knows something will happen it is true that it will, and if it is true then, necessarily, it will; but not by compulsion
READ the next paragraph, 186.18-.
Comments:
"the things that God so subordinates... do not occur (186.22-4). If I will to move my hand it moves (generally), but if I will that a storm be calmed that will not happen. God subordinates some things to human will but not others.
"In this respect... does not will it by necessity" (186.29-31): For example, if I will to move my hand holding a knife in a certain way, the murder necessarily happens (because God has subordinated my hand movements to my will), but it was not necessary for me to will to do this, it was a freely chosen act.
"Nevertheless... anything" (186.40-187.2): Previously he defined sin as an act of will, so if I will what I ought not then, necessarily (by definition), I sin; but this necessity is the necessity of logical inference, not a compulsion to sin.
READ the rest of subsection 3.
Comments:
"Thus... same time" (187.3-9). A more literal translation: Thus, with respect to what it wills, free will both (1) can and (2) cannot not will and (3) it is necessary that it will it. For (1) it can not-will before it wills, because it is free. And when it now wills, (2) it cannot not will and (3) it is necessary that it will it, because it is impossible for it to will and not will the same thing at the same time." Points (2) and (3) are equivalent. The necessity implied by (2) and (3) is logical necessity, not compulsion: if the will wills something, then, necessarily, it wills it.
"Deeds" (187.11-13) (opus) refers not to the inner act of willing but to the external action (e.g. moving the hand) that is willed. The movement of my hand is free in the sense that it results from free will, but it is compelled by the will.
READ subsection 4, first paragraph
Comments:
The argument of this paragraph is a reductio ad absurdum (otherwise called reductio ad impossibile); the absurdity that follows from the initial supposition is at 188.5. (For "suppose" substitute "hold as an opinion", opinari.) God's foreknowledge (or knowledge) covers not only what we will do, but what he will do himself. If we suppose that (fore)knowledge imposes necessity, then it will follow that God's choices are necessary (since he (fore)knows them), which is absurd; therefore the supposition is false. In 188.9 underline "our" -- if God's knowledge does not impose necessity on his own choices, neither does it on ours (because there is no more reason in the one case than in the other).
READ the next paragraph, 188.13-
Comments:
In relation to the fixed stars (the firmament) the sun moves in a circular path, moving away from and simultaneously towards any given point in the path. Its movement in relation to the firmament is the opposite of its movement in relation to the earth.
READ subsection 5.
Comments:
This subsection is an exploration of the idea (familiar from Boethius) that God's knowledge is in an eternal present. Will I catch the 8.37 bus tomorrow? Suppose I intend to do so. Then if I will indeed act on this intention, it is eternally true that I catch that bus. However, if in the meantime I change my mind and do not catch it, then it is eternally true that I do not catch that bus, and it never was true that I do. It is not as if in God's knowledge the statement changes from true to false when I change my mind; God foresees that I will change it and from eternity foresees that I do not catch that bus. So God's knowledge is always correct, but I can change my mind at any time.
READ subsection 6, first two paragraphs (pp. 191-2).
Comments:
In the first paragraph he is saying that will or choice and freedom are not identical. We speak of them in many contexts, but in the present work the question is about salvation and damnation.
On Truth, On Free Will (192.6-7): See On Truth chapter 12 (this volume, p. 93-), On Freedom of Choice, chapters 3 and 13 (this volume, pp. 108-, 124-).
"Justice" here means not what we normally mean by the word, but something more like moral goodness in general (of which justice in our usual sense is a part). Freedom is inseparable from human nature, but justice is not; but God cannot take justice away from a person against that person's will (proved by another reductio ad impossibile, 192.21-5).
READ the rest of subsection 6.
Comments:
The point of these paragraphs is that threat of death does not impose necessity -- if we choose to lie to avoid death our choice is free. Compare Anselm, On Freedom of Choice, chapter 5 (this volume, p. 112-).
READ subsection 7
Comments:
Evil lacks existence (194.1-2): Compare On the Fall of the Devil, chapter 9- (this volume, p. 145-). See also The Essential Augustine, pp. 49 (The Nature of the Good, chs. 2-24), 65 (Enchiridion, iii.10-iv.12), 100 (City of God, XII.4). According to Augustine, there is evil when a created will does not will as it ought; there is no evil substance. God causes things and actions, but he does not cause the falling away of a will from what it ought to will -- that is entirely the responsibility of the willer. When a human being wills wrongly, God's power enables the will to act and enables the willed action to be done, but does not cause the misdirection of the will.
READ subsection 1 (pp. 196-7)
Comments:
In this sub-section Anselm sets out the problem he wishes to solve. The arguments are not necessarily ones he subscribes to, but establish the problem.
READ subsection 2, p. 197.
Comments:
Notice Anselm's gloss on the doctrine of St Paul, according to whom God hardens the hearts of some sinners ("For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, 'I have raised you up for the very purpose of showing my power in you...'. So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills", Romans 9.17-18). According to Anselm hardening simply means not softening.
READ subsection 3, pp. 197-8..
Comments:
"The necessity which precedes a thing and causes it.... the necessity which succeeds a thing" (198.2-3): compare "subsequent necessity", 185.12-13. Anselm's answer to the question whether predestination is incompatible with freewill parallels his answer to the question whether foreknowledge is incompatible with freewill: if something is predestined or foreknown, then, necessarily, it will happen, but not by causal necessity but only by the necessity of inference.
READ subsection 1, pp. 198-200.
Comments:
Again, the first subsection is aporetic, setting out the problem to be solved.
READ subsection 2, pp. 200-201.
Comments:
"To others... these infants" (200.23-4): This is a reference to the parents, god-parents or sponsors who present an infant for baptism. Since the child is too young to ask for baptism, they ask for it on the child's behalf.
"kept for its own sake" (201.13-14). It is not enough to act rightly for the sake of good reputation, or because "honesty is the best policy" (i.e. pays best), or because wrong action will be punished. True goodness is to do the right thing precisely because it is right. This was emphasised by Plato (Apology, 28b; Republic, book 2), Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, book 2, ch. 4, 1105a30-35), and Augustine (City of God, V.20), among many others.
"an example" (201.19): See 192.32-. Someone whose will is upright may be faced with a choice (e.g. to lie and avoid death, or to tell the truth and die). Their choice is free; uprightness of will does not make it impossible to choose. If uprightness is possible only by grace, then, if uprightness is compatible with free choice, grace is compatible with free choice.
READ sub-section 3, pp. 201-2.
Comments:
"The will is not upright because it wills rightly but wills rightly because it is upright" (201.31-3). This seems to be the vital premise of the argument of this section. Contrast Aristotle's view that virtue is a habit acquired by repeated right acts. The person who does not yet have the virtue of temperance can nevertheless, by special effort, manage to reject some temptation to over-indulgence; this makes the next act of rejection easier, and by repeated acts temperate behaviour finally becomes easy and the person has the virtue of temperance (see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 2, chapters 1 and 4). Anselm is more pessimistic, as Augustine was; we have been so much weakened by Adam's sin that we cannot manage the special effort required for the first, second, etc. acts of self-control -- we can't reject any temptation until grace has made our will upright.
READ subsection 4, pp. 203-4.
Comments:
Freedom of Choice: chapters 5-7 (this volume, p. 112-).
READ subsection 5, pp. 204-5.
Comments:
"When Sacred Scripture says" (204.21) is a back reference to the passages quoted in subsection 1 (p. 199), some of which are discussed below.
"The fact that he wills" (204.39). That I will rightly is not due to me, but to God who gives the grace to will rightly.
READ subsection 6, pp. 205-9.
Comments:
There are two questions posed at the beginning -- why does Scripture invite, and why are those blamed who do not accept the invitation. The first question is the subject of subsection 6, the second of subsection 7. The first question is like Augustine's question (in On Rebuke and Grace), why should we rebuke sinners, since whether they turn to the right path is a matter of grace.
"...to will to believe what ought to be believed..." (206.24), "when uprightness-of-willing is added..." (206.39). According to many modern philosophers belief is not a matter of choice. (See Kilcullen, Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle and Toleration, p. 140.) However, according to Augustine, no one believes unless he is willing to believe (Augustine, Tractates on John, tractate xxvi.2, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series I, Vol. VII, or Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 35, col. 1607). Thomas Aquinas follows Augustine on this point: Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 2, arts. 9, 10.
"If the statement is arrived at..." (207.32-): Note what Anselm says here about the relationship between reason and Scripture.
READ subsection 7, pp. 461-3.
Comments:
"We must note... has the inability" (209.16-18). This is the main premise of Anselm's argument; cf. Cur deus homo, I.xxiv. The main other, tacit, premise is that every human being inherits Adam's fault.
"Human nature" (209.19, 22, etc.): an implied reference to Adam's sin, which damaged human nature in all his descendants.
"the death of God" (210.4): See Cur deus homo, II.vi.
The second paragraph ("Indeed, Sacred Authority...") makes explicit the premise that Adam's sin is imputed to all. See Augustine, City of God, XIII.3. For later discussion see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 81, a. 1.
READ subsection 8, pp. 210-11.
Comments:
Penalty not wiped away by baptism (211.1-2): see Augustine, City of God, XIII.4.
"He can in no way rise up again unless he is raised up by grace" (211.17-18). This is another important premise of Anselm's argument. Cf. "which it is unable by itself to reacquire" (209.24-5). For the reasoning behind this see Cur deus homo, I.xi, xii, xx-xxiv. Only the God-man can make satisfaction for sin, and until satisfaction is made no human being can be just or happy.
READ subsection 9, pp. 211-14.
Comments:
Again, see Augustine, City of God, XIII.4.
READ subsection 10, p. 214..
Comments:
"As I said" (214.32): Compare subsection 4, p. 203.
READ subsection 11, to the bottom of p. 215.
Comments:
The distinction in 215.1-6 is between the power of sight or ability to see and the particular act of seeing, e.g. when you see these words. The power or the ability is the instrument through which you do the particular act.
aptitudines et usus (215.9). An aptitudo is an adaptation towards, a readiness, a disposition. By usus Anselm probably means the particular act, e.g. of seeing these words. I have the power to see (even when I am asleep and not seeing), I may have acuity of sight (a disposition or state of the eyes that enables me to see small things), and I have particular acts of seeing (in which I actually use my sight).
"Equivocally" (215.16): a word is said to be equivocal if it has several distinct senses (e.g. "pen" may mean a writing instrument or an enclosure for animals). The opposite is "univocal", having just one sense. The three senses of "will" (and words formed from this root, such as "willingly", "to will") are: (1) the power of the soul by which one wills (just as the "reason" is the power by which one reasons); (2) the disposition to will a certain kind of thing (e.g. the will to power, the will to survive, the will to do good); (3) the particular act of willing (volo in Latin could mean "I consent" or "I resolve" -- in English "I will" is usually a future auxilliary). The second sense is perhaps likely to be overlooked, so Anselm illustrates it, 215.23-37.
READ the next paragraph, p.216.1-34.
Comments:
The paragraph gives further illustrations of the same distinction: the instrument (216.3-), the disposition (216.14-, "But the inclination..."), the act (216.25-, "But the use...").
READ the next two paragraphs (216.35-).
Comments:
The will has many dispositions, not just two, but Anselm picks out these two, ad volendum commoditatem and ad volendum rectitudinem, as the most important, and as the most general dispositions under which all others can be listed. (In an earlier version -- see apparatus of Schmidt's edition -- Anselm wrote: "duae... sunt principales affectiones, quae omnes alias continent, meaning: "There are two principal affections that contain all the rest".) For example, the will to power, the will to survive, the will to happiness, and many other dispositions, come under the heading of the will for what is advantageous or useful. Compare this paragraph with Monologium chapter 1 (on utility and the honourable).
"Uprightness": The same Latin word (rectitudo) could be translated as "what is right" or "righteousness", equivalent to "justice".
"To know rightly, that is, to live justly" (217.17): amend to "to know how to live rightly, that is, justly".
"To see" (217.24-6): Anselm is describing the Latin usage of his time. In English we would perhaps say "sighted" for the person who is not blind but not actually seeing.
READ to the end of subsection 11 (pp. 217-18).
Comments:
This is clear enough.
READ subsection 12, pp. 218-19.
Comments:
"Separable, inseparable" i.e. from human nature.
"As I have said above": cf. p. 192.9-.
"this thing which it wills" (218.38): i.e. to will what is advantageous is not to will it for its own sake (I will happiness for my sake), whereas rectitude is willed for its own sake (cf. 192.1-2).
"No one is able to will uprightness except by means of uprightness" (218.40-219.1): cf. 201.31-.
READ the first two paragraphs of subsection 13 (pp. 219-20)
Comments:
The question is, how did human beings become disposed to seek their own advantage irrespective of justice? This was not the original state.
"Although the happiness of angels is greater... intense cold" (220.6-14): This is a digression from the main point of the paragraph; a modern author might put it into a parenthesis or a footnote. The point of the paragraph is stated in the last sentence.
READ next paragraph (p. 220)
Comments:
"Will-as-instrument would use the will-which-is-justice" (220.26). The will as power acts through its dispositions.
"he would not thereafter be able to regain it by himself" (220.35): see above, 211.17-18.
So God gave the first human beings everything good, but they voluntarily abandoned justice (by willing something that they ought not to have willed), and then the other good gifts became a source of unhappiness.
READ the rest of subsection 13.
Comments:
"powerless" (221.21): again see 211.17-18.
"I predicate... means of them" (221.37-222.7): An interruption to the main flow of the argument; it might have been better placed close to 215.13. The idea that the will acts through (or as modified by) the disposition is implied at 220.26.
READ subsection 14, pp. 222-3.
Comments:
"being given and followed up by grace" (223.5). "Given by grace" refers to the Adam and Eve's original state of uprightness, which was a grace. See Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 31.
On the "two wills" (mentioned at 217.2 etc.), see The Fall of the Devil, last page of chapter 12 and chapters 13-14 (this volume, pp. 154-8). If God had given Satan only the one "will", the will to happiness, he could not have willed anything except what was advantageous to him, and he could not have failed to will anything such, and nothing that he willed that way would have been unjust, since it was willed by necessity (causal necessity, by the nature of his will). Therefore none of his actions would have been morally good or evil. On the other hand, if God had given him only the will to justice (and not the will to happiness), again, by the same reasoning, none of his actions would have been good or evil. To make merit and happiness (which must be deserved) possible, God gave both wills -- which also made evil possible.
On God's causation of even evil acts of willing (De concordia, 222.26), see The Fall of the Devil, chapter 20 (p. 164-).
Skim rapidly through the work and highlight (only the key words) passages in which Anselm puts the questions he wants to answer or the statements he wants to refute. (Examples: in section I, at the beginning and end of subsection 1 (p. 181-2), first para. of subsection 6 (p. 191), beginning of subsection 7 (p. 193), end of subsection 7 (p. 195.26-); in section II, end of subsection 1 (p. 197); in section III, beginning of subsection 1 (p. 199), beginning of subsection 6 (p. 205), beginning of subsection 7 (p. 209), beginning of subsection 9 (p. 211), beginning of subsection 13 (p. 219).)
Write in some headings for the subsections. For example, at the beginning of section I, subsection 1 (p. 181) write "God foresees that we will choose freely". At the beginning of subsection 2 (p. 183) write "How can God foresee unless choice is necessitated?". At the beginning of subsection 3 (p. 185) write "Even if it will happen, beforehand it is possible that it will not happen". And so on.
Mark the most difficult sections of the work and then re-read them.
Can you recall in your own words the answers Anselm gives to his questions? Are there other questions he should have asked? Are you convinced?
Read the translations of On Free Will and The Fall of the Devil included in this volume. Read also the introduction to Anselm of Canterbury, Truth, Freedom, and Evil, translated by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, New York, 1967.
On Anselm's view of original sin (see subsection 13, p. 219), it seems that the consequence of Adam's sin was precisely the absence of "original justice", which allowed the will for the advantageous to take over. But as constitutent or consequence of original sin medieval theologians also listed "concupiscence", meaning the desires of the animal part of human nature (sensuality, sensitive appetite, as distinct from will, which is the appetite of the rational part of the soul); see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 81. It seems that sinful man is not a rational seeker after the advantageous irrespective of justice, but very often the victim of animal impulses that lead to conduct not only unjust but also disadvantageous. Compare Paul, Letter to the Romans, 7.14-23: "I am carnal, sold under sin. I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do the thing I want [will] but I do the very thing I hate...I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind". Does Anselm give enough attention to this aspect of sin? On the comparison between Anselm's views and those of other medieval views see Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 121-126, Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, pp. 96-100. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 82, a. 3.
On free will and the two "wills": In the 14th century Duns Scotus put forward a novel view of freedom of choice. Our choice is free not merely in the sense that it is our own choice, but in the sense that even at the moment of choice we have full power not to choose or to make the opposite choice. What makes this possible, according to Scotus, is that our will has the two dispositions Anselm spoke of, the affection for the advantageous (commodi) and the affection for justice. See "Native Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus", in A. Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, p. 148-; see also Wolter's translations of Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington 1986). See also R. Cross, Duns Scotus, pp. 84-9; John Boler, "Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will", American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (1993), pp. 109-126; Thomas Williams, "How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness", American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 69 (1995), pp. 425-45. According to Boler and Williams, Scotus assigns the whole of what Aristotle regards as morality (the striving for happiness) to the affectio commodi, with the affectio iusti being concerned with moral obligation. Contrast Thomas Aquinas, who follows Aristotle; see D. Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 29 (1991), pp. 559-84.
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