Appendix: Arnauld on Freewill and Necessity

John Kilcullen

From: Sincerity and Truth: Essays on Arnauld, Bayle and Toleration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988)

The distinction between 1 and 2 Arnauld got from Augustine, between 2a and 2b from Jansen.[Note 5] According to Augustine, an act of the will is always free, since we will if and only if we will.[Note 6] But an act of will may be necessary in the sense that the willer cannot help willing as he does; for example, God necessarily wills his own goodness, human beings necessarily will their own happiness.[Note 7] According to St Thomas, such acts are determined by natural necessity, "natural" meaning not by the general order of the universe but specifically by the nature of the will. When an object is presented which corresponds perfectly to the nature of the will we simply have no power not to will it, but if the good presented is in some way imperfect we have power to will it or not.[Note 8] Thus the beatific vision (i.e. the vision of God "face to face" in heaven) is voluntary but necessitated, since the presentation of the most perfect good leaves no power of rejection.[Note 9] In this life we do not meet with anything that corresponds perfectly to the nature of the will. We necessarily will happiness, but since we cannot be completely happy with any particular action we always have power to will that action or not.

Arnauld followed St Thomas on these points. In his later writings he decided to restrict the term "free" to the indifferent, so that voluntary acts determined by natural necessity are not free.[Note 10] Since in this life we do not meet with any perfectly satisfying object we always have power of opposite choice, that is, freedom "of indifference", both of contrariety (to do good or evil) and of contradiction (to do or not do this act).[Note 11] But---Arnauld emphasises---free choice does not presuppose that the opposite choices are equally possible, nor that they are both effectively possible; an act is free as long as it is not determined by external constraint or by natural necessity, that is, as long as some (even merely metaphysical) power of opposite choice remains.[Note 12] Choice of any of the imperfect goods we encounter in this life is therefore always free, even when the power to reject it is inevitably and infallibly overborne by desire for it.[Note 13] Thus grace is efficacious without destroying liberty: even when the will is infallibly moved by grace or by concupiscence to choose good or evil we always have, metaphysically, both the power to choose good and the power to choose evil.[Note 14] Similarly the blessed inevitably but freely will whatever God wills, and Jesus on earth infallibly but freely willed whatever the Father willed.[Note 15] What is done willingly is voluntary, and, if there is at least a metaphysical power of doing the opposite, free.

After Adam's sin human beings, unless helped by grace, are under an inevitable necessity of sinning. No particular sin is inevitable, but our will-power is so weak in comparison with the strength of concupiscence that, in any situation of choice, if we do not commit one sin we will inevitably commit another, at least the sin of not choosing out of love of God (see above, Essay I, sect. 5). Nevertheless we are free (i.e. have the metaphysical power) to do or not do any particular act,[Note 16] and to do good if we will---but without grace we cannot will it, and the good act is not effectively possible. Similarly we always have power to do evil if we will, but under the influence of grace we cannot will it and sin is not effectively possible; grace is not constraint, however, since its first effect is willingness.[Note 17] Thus we always have the power to sin or to do good, but in every case one or other choice is not effectively possible. The act is always free, since we do it because we will it, and since the opposite act is always (metaphysically) within our power, always in that sense possible, even when actually to do it needs grace, and even when that grace is not given.[Note 18]

An act which is necessary in either of the first two senses cannot be a sin. Necessity in the third sense does not excuse. To be morally good or evil the act must be free, but acts necessary in the third sense are also free. Since an unavoidable sin is a free act, which we could avoid "if we chose" (only we cannot so choose), according to Arnauld it is imputable. But if a naturally necessitated act deserves neither praise nor blame because there is no power to choose otherwise, then it seems that powerlessness excuses, and there seems to be no difference morally between a merely metaphysical power which is infallibly ineffective and no power at all. So why does necessity of the third kind not excuse? Perhaps because this necessity is a penalty for sin (see above, Essay I, sect. 4): what makes the difference morally is the reason for the necessity. Before the fall Adam had "liberty of indifference", and it is for that reason that Adam's sin deserved punishment (see above, Essay I, n. 137). Among the punishments thus deserved by Adam (and his posterity) is that of being subject to necessity of the third kind---and to punishment for the sins that then become effectively necessary.

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Notes

Note 1. Jansen, pp. 238-49, Denunciation 2, p. 123 (based on Apology, p. 582). Arnauld quotes or refers to the following passages of St Augustine: De civitate dei, V.10, Enchiridion, xxviii.105, De natura et gratia, xlvi.54. He refers also to Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, III.138, De potentia dei, q.10 a.2 ad 5, De veritate, q.22 a.5 ad 1, ad 3, ad 4, q.23 a.4 c, ad ult., q.24 a.1 ad 20, Summa, 1, q.82 a,1 ad 1. He quotes many texts from other medieval authors (Jansen, pp. 244-9). For the distinction between necessities in Luther and Calvin see Wendel, pp. 190-1. Arnauld at first, like most of his sources, did not generally distinguish the second kind of necessity from the third. For the threefold distinction see Disquisition, p. 635(1-17).

Note 2. According to Augustine a thing is in our power if we do it if we will. On this point Arnauld refers (Apology, p. 584 and elsewhere) to De spiritu et littera, xxxi.53, De civitate dei, V.10, De libero arbitrio, III.iii.7-8, and Retractations, I.22 and II.1 (PL, vol. 32, cols. 620, 630). For Aristotle on "in our power" see EN, III.5, 1113 b2-1115 a3; the concept was much discussed in antiquity. For a definition of liberty like Augustine's see Hobbes, p. 262.

Note 3. Jansen, pp. 181-4. In Arnauld's French the distinction is made with the term effectivement, or with the contrast between il peut and il peut arriver; in Jansen's Latin, which Arnauld quotes, the contrast is between posse facere and posse fieri. For similar distinctions see above, Essay I, n. 142.

Note 4. An act is not good or evil unless it is free; see Liberty, p. 620(12-22), Love, pp. 678(35-6), 679(16-20). See also Arnauld's collection of texts from St Thomas, Disquisition, pp. 632-4.

Note 5. The point of Jansen's distinction is to effect a (perhaps merely apparent) reconciliation between Augustine's doctrines and the doctrine of "liberty of indifference" (to which the Catholic Church was by then deeply committed); see above, Conclusion, sect. 1. Since after the fall liberty of indifference is merely metaphysical, not effective, Augustine's analysis of freedom is what effectively applies. The third of the Five Propositions attributed to Jansen is that "to merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature, man need not have the freedom which excludes necessity; it is enough to have freedom from constraint" (Denzinger, p. 445, no. 2003). The distinction between the two kinds of necessity obviates this condemnation. The Jansenists can say, with at least apparent orthodoxy, that to merit we need the freedom which excludes not only constraint but also the second kind of necessity.

Note 6. Augustine, De civitate dei, V.10. He means, I assume, not that there must always be two separate acts of will---so that one cannot will without first willing to do so, which would generate an infinite regress---but that an act of will necessarily satisfies the definition of something in one's power, namely as something that happens if and only if one wills and not whether one wills or not. See Jansen, Augustinus, vol. 3, 622AB. The argument is an equivocation: the definition is of something that happens if and only if one wills it, and the "it" cannot simply be disregarded.

Note 7. "We dare not say that because he cannot will to sin God's justice is due not to will but to necessity", i.e. in the first sense (Augustine, Enchiridion, xxviii.105, quoted Jansen, pp. 238-9; cf. De natura et gratia, xlvi.54). Indifference cannot be of the essence of freedom, or God and the blessed would not be free; Jansen, pp. 242-3. For a similar argument from Stoic sources see the quotation from Alexander of Aphrodisias in Long, p. 183. Duns Scotus also regarded indifference as inessential to freedom; see Bonansea, pp. 93-7, and Hyman and Walsh, pp. 595-6. Compare Descartes, vol. 1, p. 175.

Note 8. Liberty, pp. 615(37)-616(2), 619(40)-620(4).

Note 9. Ibid., pp. 617(28)-618(16). Disquisition is a collection of texts from St Thomas's Summa supporting this thesis. See e.g. 1, q.82 a.1, q.5 a.4, 1-2, q.10 a.2, 1-2, q.13 a.6. For Arnauld's summary in geometrical form of St Thomas's arguments see Disquisition, pp. 638-9. Duns Scotus had rejected St Thomas's position on this matter: "The will wills nothing necessarily, and therefore does not have to will necessarily that by reason of which it wills all other things (if there were anything such)" (Opera, vol. 2, p. 99). But Arnauld does not seem to be aware of any controversy.

Note 10. Liberty, pp. 619(22)-620. He says that this is the usage of Thomas Aquinas; see Disquisition, p. 635(24-33). But Thomas Aquinas sometimes follows Augustine's usage (perhaps in earlier writings, or when he is commenting on Augustine's words), e.g. in the texts quoted Jansen, p. 240 (e.g. De potentia, q.10 a.2 ad 5), and in Summa, 1, q.82 a.1 ad 1 (see Love, p. 684(29-31)). To define free choice Arnauld gives what seems to be a new turn to Augustine's phrase that the will wills because it wills (see above), as if it meant that there is free choice if there is or can be two acts of will, one causing or inhibiting the other (cf. Scotus, in Bonansea, p. 88). The act is free because one wills to will it, or at least does not will not to will it.

Note 11. Jansen, pp. 181-2, 241-3. Notice that we have freedom of indifference even under the influence of grace (Jansen, p. 182(1-2)). As will be explained shortly, this does not mean that we are equally able to choose either way. On the distinction between indifference of contrariety and indifference of contradiction see Jansen, pp. 181(20-4), 260(3-8), 242(24-5). Jansen refuses to define freedom as implying indifference (see above, n. 7), but this does not imply that human beings in this life do not have freedom of indifference.

Note 12. Liberty, pp. 615(37)-617(5) ("the power of the will is not entirely exhausted, so to speak"), 617(38)-618(9). Contrast the position ascribed to the Jesuits, that freedom requires equal power for either choice; Denunciation 1, p. 7(33-5).

Note 13. Arnauld sometimes uses the word "determine" for necessity of the third kind. See e.g. Jansen, pp. 182(18), 184(20), and Liberty, p. 615(19).

Note 14. Jansen, pp. 182-4. The second of the Five Propositions attributed to Jansen is that grace is irresistible. The Jansenists held that it is effectively irresistible, but a "metaphysical" power of resistance remains. For an analysis of Arnauld's attempt to reconcile efficacious grace with freedom and a discussion of its consistency with the rest of Arnauld's philosophy, see Lennon, "Jansenism" and "La logique". See the latter article on the distinction between in sensu composito and in sensu diviso. Compare Jansen, Augustinus, vol. 3, 825A-27B, 870D-71B, 872CD, Aristotle, Soph. el., 4, 166 a23-37, William of Sherwood, pp. 140-4, and Duns Scotus, in Hyman and Walsh, pp. 594-5. The distinction between the two senses seems to come to this: to say that both choices are possible does not mean that they can both be made at once; but although the opposite acts cannot coexist, the opposite powers can coexist, and each power can coexist with the opposite act. If Socrates has both the power to sit and the power to stand but cannot do both at once, then if he sits he cannot at the same moment stand: but not because he has lost the power. This does not help Arnauld's argument much. His thesis is not merely that Socrates cannot do both things at once, but that morally speaking he is too weak to stand by himself at all, and that when God offers him help he cannot refuse.

Note 15. Liberty, p. 618(17-27).

Note 16. Jansen, pp. 259-60.

Note 17. Ibid., p. 233(17).

Note 18. Apology, pp. 585(23)-586, in which Arnauld quotes Bellarmine, and Denunciation 2, p. 124, in which he quotes Thomas Aquinas: "If \OD\in human power\CD\ means apart from the help of grace, then human beings are obliged to many things not possible without healing grace: for example, to love God and one's neighbour and to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace these are possible. This help, if it is given from heaven, is given in mercy; if it is not given, that is in justice, as a penalty for previous sin, at least original sin, as Augustine says" (Summa, 2-2, q.2 a.5 ad 1; quoted also in Excuse, p. 672, Difficulties, p. 374). Compare Summa, 1-2, q.109 a.4 ad 2.

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