Boethius died in AD 524, Anselm was born in 1033, so we are skipping 500 years. Between Boethius and the twelfth century there wasn't much original philosophical writing. People read and copied and taught out of Boethius' philosophical writings and translations, but when they wrote books themselves the subject was generally theology.
One large exception to this generalisation is John Scottus Eriugena, who wrote original philosophical works, and also produced some translations of philosophical works. "Eriugena" is his rendering into Greek of "Scottus", which at that time meant Irish: John the Irishman. He was born in Ireland about AD 810, lived and wrote in France from about 840; he was one of the Irish and English clergy attracted to France by the Carolingian renaissance. He mastered Greek; knowledge of Greek was rare in western Europe before the Renaissance of the fourteenth century, but at most times during the middle ages there were some Latin-speaking Europeans who also knew Greek. He translated from Greek into Latin the works of Dionysios the Areopagite: the Mystical Theology, the Divine Names and the Celestial Hierarchy. Dionysios the Areopagite is mentioned in the bible, in Acts 17:34; he was one of the few converts Paul made when he visited Athens. In France it was believed that this Dionysios had travelled to Gaul to preach Christianity, and that he had founded the Abbey of St. Denys in Paris. His writings were held in great respect. Unfortunately they are not authentic. Modern scholars refer to their author as pseudo-Dionysios ("pseudo" meaning "false"), or as Dionysios the pseudo-Areopagite: perhaps his name was Dionysios, but he was not the "Areopagite" mentioned in the bible. His writings are a Christianised version of Proclus and are therefore yet another channel of neo-Platonic influence on medieval Latin thought. John's own philosophical writings, which are also in the neo-Platonic style, did not have much influence on later medieval thinkers. For an account of them see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.
Let us turn now to Saint Anselm, one of the great geniuses in the history of Philosophy. Anselm was born in Italy, travelled as a student to France, and became a monk in the abbey of Bec in Normandy, where the abbot was Lanfranc. When William duke of Normandy, "the Conqueror", invaded England and became King, Lanfranc became Archbishop of Canterbury. Anselm became abbot of Bec, and later also Archbishop of Canterbury. So he followed in Lanfranc's footsteps. But whereas Lanfranc was critical of attempts to reason about religious topics without constant reference to the bible, Anselm wrote a number of books on religious topics in which he relies on reason alone - arguing, that is, like a philosopher. Most of these philosophical books were written while he was at Bec, including the Monologion and the Proslogion, which we will look at.
The titles, Monologion and Proslogion are made-up Greek. By "monologion" he means a monologue or soliloquy. "Proslogion" may derive from the Greek word proslegein, which means "to speak to" or "address"; "proslogion" is an address to God. Turn to the Resources Book, and read the Preface to Monologion. The "certain brothers" with whom he had discussed these things were monks at Bec. "In the form of a meditation" explains the title Monologion - the book is a monologue representing a train of reasoning in one person's mind. Notice (on p. 4) the reference to Saint Augustine, whose writings influenced Anselm greatly.
Turn now to the first sentence of the preface to the Proslogion, which refers to the Monologion in the words: "meditation... through silent reasoning within himself". In making the extracts I was too free with the scissors and cut off the last paragraph of this preface, which tells us that the original title of the Monologion was "An example of meditating about the rational basis of faith", and the original title of Proslogion was "Faith seeking understanding", but later "I retitled the first writing Monologion, i.e. a soliloquy, and the present writing Proslogion, i.e. an address".
Now return to the preface to Monologion and read again the first paragraph. Notice the method of argument that he intends to follow: nothing will be argued on the authority of the bible, the aim is to show what is required by "rational necessity". For a similar contrast turn to the preface to Why God became Man: this book contains "the objections of unbelievers who reject the Christian faith because they regard it as contrary to reason, along with the answers of believers. It ends by proving by necessary reasons (Christ being put out of sight, as if nothing had ever been known of him)" etc.
These passages suggest that Anselm's purpose is to show by strictly philosophical reasons the truth of things he holds by faith. He already believes these things, but wants to show that they are true. The original title of Proslogion, "fides quaerens intellectum", "faith seeking understanding", expresses the same attitude. Compare Augustine, in Bourke The Essential Augustine, p. 21ff.
In these passages Augustine seems to envisage
a movement from partial understanding to belief, followed by
Suppose someone brings you a message; before you believe it you need to understand, at least in part, what it means; you may also need some reason to think that the messenger is genuine. This is the first phase - the movement from understanding the message and seeing that the messenger is credible to belief. Then, if you believe, eventually, acting on the message and thinking about it, you may come to understand its meaning and truth more deeply than you did when you first decided to accept it; this is the second phase, the movement from belief to deeper understanding.
Anselm's title "faith seeking understanding" suggests that he and his intended readers are in the second of the two phases, Christian believers who are seeking a deeper understanding of what they believe by considering what reasons could be given to people still in the first phase, who are considering whether to believe. In the extracts read Chapter 1 of the Monologion, read through the first paragraph. The argument to follow is addressed to someone who is not yet a believer. But Anselm is a believer, and so were the "certain brothers" for whom he wrote the book. This is faith, seeking deeper understanding by considering what might be said to those who do not have faith.
This is my understanding of his approach, but I should mention that others say that Anselm is not concerned with what might be said to an unbeliever, because nothing could be; this interpretation is influenced by Karl Barth, who held that Christian believers cannot give any reason for their faith that could make any sense to a non-believer. I don't myself believe that Anselm or any other medieval thinker held such a position. On the diversity of interpretations of Anselm's work see in The Many-faced Argument, edited by John Hick and A.C. McGill, the article by McGill, "Recent discussions", pp. 56-64, especially p. 59-60.
In Readings, pp.20-21, read on in Monologion chapter 1. The first two sentences indicate the content of the book. "The one Nature, highest of all existing things, alone sufficient unto itself in its eternal beatitude, through its own omnipotent goodness giving and causing all other things to be something and to be in some respect good" - this Nature is of course God. Anselm's language here should remind you of Boethius, and of Plato. The second paragraph is obviously Platonic: re-read it to the bottom of p.5.
The phrase "either in greater or lesser or equal degree" may puzzle you. In the lecture "Greek Historical Background" (Resources Book), in the outline of Plato's theory of forms, I mentioned two types of cases. There are (1) forms like Beauty or Justice, of which there are in the sensible world around us no perfect instances. The things we experience are more or less beautiful or just, but not perfectly beautiful or just. We might call such forms "ideals"; what we experience always falls short of the ideal. But there are also (2) forms like whiteness or humanity, instances of which are imperfect in the sense that they come into existence and cease to exist, whereas the forms are immutable; but while the instance is white or human it is adequate to its archetype, it doesn't fall short of the ideal. Human beings may be more or less just, but they are all equally human. Anselm's phrase "in greater or lesser, or equal, degree" covers both types of cases. So look again at the bottom of p.5: "Whatever things are called something", say "just" or "human", "in such a way that they are called it either in greater or less or equal degree" - in greater or lesser degree just, or in equal degree human - "they are called it with respect to something in them which is identical" - i.e. the form of justice, the form of humanity, etc. "In greater or lesser or equal degree" covers both types of case: whenever the one predicate can be predicated of several things they participate in the one form.
On page 6, line 13, at the dash, "although...", the argument takes a different turn. Anselm answers an unspoken objection: some goods seem to be called good with respect to different features - e.g. strength or swiftness, which do not seem to be the same thing. Anselm answers that strength and swiftness are both species of usefulness, and usefulness and excellence are species of good. This is a "porphyrian tree" with good at the top. You may recall that Aristotle rejects such a classification: like being, good is not a genus, good is an analogous term, not univocal, and there is no one form of good. But Anselm had not read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics I.6 in which Aristotle says this, since the Ethics had not yet been translated into Latin. So he does not answer this objection. For Anselm, as for Plato, the idea of the Good is one thing through which all goods are good.
Except for part of Timaeus, Plato's dialogues were not available in Latin - Anselm gets his Platonism second hand from Augustine, Boethius and many other sources. If he had been able to read Plato's Phaedo he would have found a relevant passage. Recall the objection that strength or swiftness make a horse good. Similarly it might be said that shape or colour make something beautiful. In Phaedo 100d Socrates says:
If someone tells me that the reason why a given object is beautiful is that it has a gorgeous colour or shape or any such attribute, I disregard all these other explanations... and I cling... to the explanation that the one thing that makes that object beautiful is the presence in it, or association with it, in whatever way the relation comes about, of absolute beauty... It is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful
"In whatever way the relation comes about" points to a difficult question which Aristotle would press. "The presence in it, or association with it", Socrates says, of the form: "the presence in it" is the expression Anselm adopts (top of p.6): "they are called it with respect to something in them which is identical". "It is by beauty that beautiful things are beautiful", Socrates says: Anselm says, it is "through" the supreme good that all things are good. The supreme good itself is good through itself.
Read the last paragraph of chapter 1. Notice the sentence, "But no good which is good through another is equal to or greater than that which is good through itself." Like Plato and the neo-Platonists, Anselm ranks and orders things. To be good through itself makes it better, superior, greater, higher, than things that are good through it.
Look back over the second and third paragraphs of chapter 1 and notice the stages of the argument. Every argument has a premise or premises and a conclusion: the conclusion is what the argument is supposed to show, the premises are the reasons offered to show it. To understand a difficult argument first identify the conclusion, often introduced by "therefore", and then identify the premises, often introduced by "since" or the like. On p.6, nine lines down, "therefore" announces a conclusion; but the statment of the conclusion is deferred for another premise - "since all good things are either equally or unequally good when compared with one another". Then comes the conclusion: "it is necessary [this is the necessity of a conclusion with respect to its premises, the necessity of inference talked about in Boethius - see Reading Guide to the Consolation, p. 13] it is necessary that all good things are good with respect to something which is identical". That is the conclusion.
Let's identify the premises. Go back to the beginning of the argument. On p.5, two lines from the bottom, he states the first premise: "Whatever things are called something... are called it with respect to something in them which is identical". Underline the two "something"s and the two "it"s. The "it"s refer to whatever the first "something" refers to, the second "something" may refer to something else. These "something"s and "it"s are place-holders, variables, or blanks to be filled in appropriately.
The second premise is: "since all good things are either equally or unequally good when compared with one another"; this premise asserts that "good" is a suitable fill in for the first "something" and the "it"s in the first premise.
The conclusion follows: "therefore... it is necessary that all good things are good with respect to something which is understood to be identical in these various goods". But this "something which is... identical", corresponding to the second "something" in the first premise, is also a blank that needs to be filled in.
What is it? Notice at the end of this paragraph the restatement of the conclusion after the objection is disposed of: "through that very thing (whatever it be)"... Well, what is it? This needs further argument, part of which is provided in the next paragraph. The ultimate answer is going to be, the God whom Christians worship. But this can't be inferred for some time: first we will need to have some more attributes describing this entity, and when we have enough we will recognise it as a description of God.
So the last paragraph of the chapter tells us merely that this whatever it is through which all things are good is the highest good, the greatest and highest of all existing things. This is the conclusion of the argument of this chapter: that there is a highest good through which all goods are good.
What are the premises of the last stage of the argument, the third paragraph? First, the conclusion of the previous paragraph - that there is something through which all things are good; next, that that through which all things are good is itself good; next, that if all things are good through something that is good, then it is good through itself; next, that what is good through itself is a higher good than what is good through something else. From these premises the conclusion follows.
Write the argument out and think about it. The premise that that through which all things are good is itself good, or, in general, that that through which all x things are x is itself x, is characteristically Platonic: the form of beauty is beautiful, and so on. But is it true? Is the form of justice just? Is the form of humanity human? Plato himself expresses some doubts in the dialogue Parmenides, 132d-133a.
This chapter illustrates the point that many arguments go through several stages. I suggested that to understand an argument you should first identify the conclusion, then the premises. In this chapter the conclusion of the second paragraph was one of the premises of the third paragraph. A conclusion that is also a premise for the next stage is sometimes called an intermediate conclusion. The stages of a multi-stage argument are sometimes called "lemmata" (plural; the singular is "lemma").
Read chapter 2. This chapter seems to repeat the point already made, that the highest good is the greatest in the sense that there is nothing better.
So far Anselm has argued that there is one highest good which causes the goodness of everything else. Now in chapter 3 he argues that there is one highest being which causes the being of everything else: "Whatever is is seen to exist through some one thing." There seems to be no reason why he should not have used the same type of argument as he used in chapter 1 to prove that there is a supreme good. But in fact he goes about it another way. Into the text of chapter 3, p.21, in line 4 before "through something", write in "A", and before "through nothing" write in "B". In the next line before "it cannot" write in "C". Three lines down, before "there is one thing" write in "D". and before "there are many" write in "E". Now read down to "(3) they exist mutually through themselves". "Exist mutually through themselves" means that a exists through b and b exists through a, and c exists through d and d exists through c, and so on in pairs each member of which exists through the other.
Now let us consider the rest of the argument. The translator has inserted (1) (2) (3), and then these numbers again with a curved sign in front. The curved sign is called "tilde"; think of it as a modified N, and read "not-"; it negates the statement that follows it. So: if E, then either (1), (2) or (3); but not (1), not (2), not (3); therefore not E. This is the translator's suggestion on how to analyse this argument. But there is a better analysis:
Either A or B
But not B, because C
Therefore A
Therefore either D or E.
If E, then either 1, 2 or 3.
But if 1, then not E but D;
and if 2, then D, not E;
and not 3;
therefore not E but D.
I think that corresponds more closely to Anselm's argument.
Return to Anselm's text. Three lines from the bottom of p.7, before "everything exists through a plurality", write in "E", - on the next line, before "everything exists through that one", write in "D". On p.8, line 6, before "through this one thing", write in "D", and on the next line, before "through the many" write in "E". Read now from where you were before (line 12 of chapter 3) to the end of the paragraph, and also the next short paragraph.
Write out the argument sketched above in full, filling out A, B, C, D, E as follows: Either (A) whatever exists exists through something, or (B) whatever exists exists through nothing. But not (B), because (C) it is inconceivable that anything exists except through something. Therefore (A) whatever exists exists through something. Therefore either (D) all things exist through one thing, or (E) all things exist through many; and if (E) through many, then either (1), (2) or (3). And so on.
The last paragraph of chapter 3 parallels the last paragraph of chapter 1; read these and make the comparison. Notice the reference to "good", five lines from the end of chapter 3, and to "supremely good" and "best"; the highest being is also the highest good, as in Boethius and other Christian Platonists (in contrast with the pagan neo-Platonists, who placed being lower than the one or the good).
Let's look again more closely at the argument of the first long paragraph of chapter 3. Anselm is using arguments that modern logician call "propositional"; in fact Anselm is quite a virtuoso in propositional logic. "Proposition" means "statement". Aristotle wrote about what is now called "predicate" logic. Aristotle was concerned with statements of the form "S is P", where S represents the subject, P the predicate. Propositional logic is not concerned with the internal structures of statements, only with the relationships between statements, relations expressed by such connecting words as "if", "either", "not" (taking the "not" as negating the whole statement that follows it). For example, "if A then B, but A; therefore B" is a valid argument, whatever the internal structure of the propositions that A and B represent.
Aristotle's immediate successor as head of the Lyceum, Theophrastus, began the study of propositional logic, which was then taken up by the Stoics. Boethius wrote an exposition of this branch of logic entitled On Hypothetical Syllogisms. Karl Durr in chapter 1 his book, The Propositional Logic of Boethius argues that Boethius' source was not the Stoics but Theophrastus and other early peripatetics.
But let's look at the five argument types the Stoics regarded as basic - see H. Chadwick, Boethius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 167. The basic schemata are as follows:
1. If the first, then the second; but the first, therefore the second.
2. If the first, then the second; but not the second, therefore not the first.
3. Not both the first and the second; but the first, therfore not the second.
4. Either the first or the second; but the first, therefore not the second.
5. Either the first of the second; but not the second, therefore the first.
The Stoics used "the first" and "the second" to represent propositions (Boethius used "A", "B", etc.). In each of these five schemata ("schema" is a common term for a skeleton outline of an argument; plural "schemata") - in each schema the first part, before the semicolon, is the first premise; the second premise starts with "but" (Greek and Latin writers often introduce the second premise of an argument with "but"); "therefore" introduces the conclusion. You might copy out these five schemata, writing each part on a separate line, writing "A" for "the first" and "B" for "the second". So (1) "If A, then B"; second line, "But A"; third line, "Therefore B"; and so on for the other four.
These five basic types could be combined and reduplicated in various ways to give more complex schemata. Read cursorily Chadwick's summary (Boethius, pp. 170-2) of Boethius' account of some of the more complex forms. (Don't try to read this closely, since it contains errors that will puzzle you; but a brief examination will give some idea of the way Boethius, or his sources, elaborated the logic of the hypothetical syllogism).
Now look again at the analysis given above of the argument of Anselm's Monologion chapter 3.
The first three lines fit schema 5. So line 3 comes from the
first two lines by virtue of schema 5.
The overall structure of the argument from line 4 to the end is what the ancient logicians called a dilemma. A typical dilemma goes like this (write this down):
Either A or B; but if A then C, and if B then C; therefore C.
In the present case the dilemma is more complex (write this down):
Either D or E; [if D then D]; if E then either 1 or 2; if 1 then D; if 2 then D; therefore D.
The premise in square brackets, "if D then D", Anselm does not express - it is a "tacit" or unspoken premise, something so obvious it needn't be said.
Now for any argument to be successful, i.e. actually to prove its conclusion, two conditions must be met:
every one of the premises must be accepted as true;
and
Logic is not concerned with the truth of the premises but with whether the conclusion follows: if the conclusion does follow from the premises, then logicians say that the argument is "valid", using that word more narrowly than it is often used: to say that an argument is valid means that its conclusion must necessarily be true if all its premises are true; it will be valid whether its premises are actually true or not (though of course it won't actually prove the conclusion unless the premises are true).
The argument we have been looking at is valid in that sense - i.e. if we accept all the premises as true then we must accept the conclusion, since that conclusion does indeed follow from those premises. Let me go through the argument again:
Whatever exists exists either (A) through something or (B)
through nothing;
not B;
therefore (A) whatever exists exists through something;
therefore (given the meaning of "something", "one" and "many"),
either (D) through one or (E) through many;
if E then either 1, 2 or 3;
not 3;
and if 1 then not E but D;
if 2 then not E but D;
therefore D.
This argument is valid. To decide whether the premises are true, we need to fill in A, B, C, etc. and consider whether we accept each premise as true.
Now look again at Anselm's text, chapter 3. Go through and highlight or underline the words that give the reader clues about how the parts of the argument fit together - "since", "therefore" and the like. The first sentence states the conclusion to be proved. The next sentence begins "For", which tells you that a reason is going to be given for the statement just made. The next sentence begins "But", the word often used in ancient and medieval texts to introduce the second premise of an argument. The next sentence begins "For" - it gives a reason to back up the second premise of the argument. The next sentence begins "Thus", which like "therefore" introduces a conclusion. This is not the final conclusion, but an intermediate conclusion - the conclusion of the first stage or "lemma", which will be a premise in the next stage. "Accordingly" is equivalent to "therefore"; it introduces a conclusion drawn from the previous sentence together with a tacit premise, namely that "something" means "one or more than one". "But" introduces the second premise of the next stage of argument, and so on. Notice in the third last line on p.7 another sense of "but"; "but would rather be the case", which of course is not another premise but an alternative statement of the conclusion. Go through the rest of the chapter and underline or highlight such clues to the structure of the argument.
Let's look now at Anselm's Monologion, chapter 4. Read the first paragraph. Chapter 1 was about the goodness of things, chapter 3 about their being, chapter 4 is about their natures or essences. (According to Aristotle's Categories the essence is the answer to the question, What is it?) Chapters 1 and 3 argued that there is a highest good and a highest being. This chapter argues that there is a highest nature or essence. Notice toward the end of paragraph 1 the rejection as absurd of the idea that there may be a numerical infinity: In his Physics Aristotle argued that there cannot be an actually existing infinity: something can exist that could be divided or subdivided, or added to, over and over again without end, but there can't be anything that has actually been divided or added to an infinite number of times. Aristotle's Physics had not yet been translated into Latin; Anselm has perhaps heard of this argument indirectly.
So the first paragraph concludes that the series of higher and higher natures does not go upwards infinitely. But is there one highest nature or more than one? To say that there is a highest in the sense that nothing is higher does not mean that there can't be one or more equally high. So the conclusion of the first paragraph is that there is at least one nature than which none is higher. The next paragraph argues that there is only one.
On p.9, line 11, in front of "there is a nature" write in (1), and in place of "a nature" write "at least one nature". In the first line of the next paragraph in front of "singular", write (2), and in the next line in front of "more than one" write (3). Two lines down, in front of "equal through different things", write (4), and in front of "through the same thing" write (5). One line down, in front of "is itself what they are" write (6), and in the next line in front of "is something other than what they are" write (7). Seven lines down below that, in front of "they would be less than that through which they are great" write (8). Go through the paragraph and notice the words indicating logical structure. "Now" at the beginning of a sentence often indicates a new stage of a multi-stage argument. Here is a sketch of the argument:
(1) At least one...
Then iether (2) only one, or (3) many
If (3), then either (4) or (5)
Not (4)
If (5), either (6) or (7)
If (6), then not (3)
If (7), then (8)
and not (3)
Therefore neither (6) nor (7)
Therefore not (3)
Therefore (2)
Write this out in full, adding the statements from the text that correspond to the numbers, and spend a while - it may take a while - to understand and evaluate the argument.
The last paragraph of chapter 4 draws together the points established so far, which add up to the description of a being already recognisable as God. In fact Anselm does not refer to this being as God until near the end of the Monologion, after he has established many other attributes of the highest being. In chapters 5-14 (omitted from the Resources Book) he gives arguments for some of the most important attributes: that the supreme nature exists from and through itself, that it was not caused, that it brings all other things into being from nothing and sustains them in being, that it creates them in accordance with thoughts in the creator's mind (like the demiurge in Plato's Timaeus); and so on.
This brings us to chapter 15, in which Anselm gives a general argument for concluding all other attributes of the highest being. Remember that the argument of the Monologion began by establishing that there is a highest good, through which all things are good. The general formula worked out in chapter 15 for deriving the attributes of the being that is the highest good is that it has any attribute that makes a being better (i.e. more good); if it is in every case better to be X than not to be X, then to be X is an attribute of the being that is the highest good.
However, some characteristics are better only for some limited class of beings; to be made of gold, for example, may be better for some ornamental objects, and for some other objects, but it is not universally better for a thing to be made of gold - for example, a gold violin would not sound well. So for X to be an attribute of the being that is the highest good, then, universally, for anything capable of being X, it must be better for it to be X than not to be X: "better universally", in other words better in every case, or better simply, or better altogether, or better absolutely, or - as Americans might say - better "period", better without qualification - without the qualification "better, if it is a being of such and such a kind", or "better, if the circumstances are so and so". Thus to be wise is better altogether and simply: a violin can't be wise, but if it could be if would not be a worse violin for being wise; whatever is capable of being wise is better wise than not wise. Wisdom is therefore an attribute of the being that is the highest good. Now read chapter 15.
Notice an implication of the first paragraph: the terms we have been using to refer to this nature - the highest good, the creator - are relative terms, and do not express what this nature is in itself. It would be in itself whatever it is now even if there were no other things at all. In medieval philosophy it is common doctrine that we do not know and cannot speak of God as he is in himself; all our language about him is in terms of his relations to creatures, or his likeness and unlikeness to creatures.
In chapters 16 and 17 Anselm makes another point that is also common medieval doctrine: that whatever the supreme nature is, it is that identically. God's justice is himself, whereas our justice is a quality we may acquire or lose without ceasing to be ourselves. So read chapters 16 and 17.
You might go back through chapters 15-17 and analyse the arguments, noticing the words that give clues to structure - "for", "since" etc. What are the conclusions and intermediate conclusions, what are the premises? Do the conclusions follow validly from the premises, and are the premises true? Notice in chapter 15 that part of the chapter is there to set aside some predicates to which the formula suggested in the chapter is not meant to apply - that is, the relational predicates. Also, you might notice in these chapters the implicit references to Aristotle's doctrine of categories, and the analogies with arguments in Boethius' Consolation - see, for example, Consolation, p. 94-108.
This is the end of the extracts from Monologion, but let me give you a sketch of what is in the rest of the book, which has 80 chapters altogether. Chapters 18-28 develop various other attributes of the supreme nature - that it exists eternally, that it is present to every other being in every time and place, without itself being dispersed among times and places, and so on. From chapter 29 Anselm argues for many propositions the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, still using strictly philosophical arguments, not using the authority of the bible. This is quite a tour de force. In chapters 9 and 10 he had argued that the supreme nature makes other things in accordance with thought, thought which is that nature's expression. In chapters 29 ff he argues that this expression is a person equal to the supreme nature itself, and that the love of the supreme nature for itself is another equal person, and so on; in this part of the book Anselm draws on Saint Augustine's On the Trinity. Toward the end he argues that the supreme nature gives himself as reward to human souls who love him, that those who do not are wretched, that the human soul is immortal, that we ought to have faith in this supreme being. All of this Anselm tries to establish by strictly philosophical argument. Later medieval thinkers, Thomas Aquinas, for example, thought that there were many many Christian doctrines that could only be established by the authority of revelation.
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